Kate Robertson

This endorsement addresses two applications for leave to intervene in a criminal appeal from conviction, brought by the Canadian Police Association, Toronto Police Association, and Police Association of Ontario.

The underlying appeal concerns a police officer convicted of criminal negligence causing death and failing to provide necessaries of life to an intoxicated individual.

The court granted intervener status, finding that the associations had a substantial interest and could offer useful perspectives on legal issues such as the standard of care for police officers, the relevance of mistake of fact in objective liability offences, and the need for expert evidence on professional standards, provided they confined their submissions to legal arguments and avoided the merits of the appeal.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent, Jake Grant, on an assault charge.

The trial judge had stayed proceedings due to alleged abuse of process, citing the complainant's monetary motivation, police misconduct in not referring the investigation out, and Crown's disclosure issues (not disclosing *R. v. Tout* and not calling the complainant).

The appellate court found that the trial judge made reversible errors in law and fact, particularly in misapprehending the evidence (especially surveillance videos), misapplying the *Babos* test for abuse of process, and incorrectly stating the Crown's duty to call witnesses or the accused's right to confront an accuser.

The appellate court found the police investigation was comprehensive and the disclosure process was adequately managed through pre-trial conferences.

The court concluded that the case was not one of the "rarest of cases" warranting a stay and that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute if the charges did not go to trial, given the egregious conduct depicted in the surveillance videos.

The appeal was allowed, the stay quashed, and the matter remitted for trial before a different judge.

The respondent father brought an urgent motion for contempt against the applicant mother for refusing access to their child, Tyler Dawn, during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the child's best interests and the safety concerns raised by the applicant regarding the respondent's adherence to COVID-19 protocols, including travel for access and the respondent's continued work outside his home.

Applying principles from Ribeiro v. Wright and Ruffolo v. David, the court found the applicant had justified reasons for suspending access.

The respondent's motion for contempt was dismissed, and his alternating weekend access was suspended for four weeks, with a provision for review.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for assault bodily harm.

The appeal grounds included misapprehension of evidence regarding the officer's actions and the complainant's resistance, erroneous application of case law on police use of force, and misapplication of the R. v. W.D. test.

The court reviewed the trial judge's findings, particularly in light of CCTV footage, and found no material misapprehension of evidence or errors in legal application.

The trial judge's verdict was deemed reasonable, and the appeal was dismissed.

Meron Asfaw Zere was charged with possessing 1.3 kg of heroin for trafficking following a controlled delivery.

The central issue at trial was Zere's knowledge of the package's contents.

The Crown argued Zere had actual knowledge or was wilfully blind, citing circumstantial evidence including his association with the co-accused, his role as driver, the nature of the package contents (non-North American phone chargers), and cell phone records.

The court admitted cell phone records under common-law exceptions to the hearsay rule, finding them reliable and necessary.

However, the court found reasonable doubt that Zere was the person sending or receiving the incriminating phone calls and text messages, or that his police interview statements unequivocally demonstrated knowledge or willful blindness.

Consequently, the court dismissed the charges against Zere and entered an acquittal.

A police sergeant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after a trial.

The Crown sought a 60-day conditional sentence, while the defence sought an absolute or conditional discharge with probation and community service.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with 18 months probation, 200 hours of community service, a $1,000 victim surcharge, and DNA databank inclusion.

The court balanced the seriousness of police misconduct and the need for denunciation and deterrence against the officer's exemplary 19-year career, unblemished record, and the out-of-character nature of the incident.

A police sergeant was charged with assault causing bodily harm after using force to arrest a highly intoxicated individual with a lengthy criminal history and known propensity for violence.

The sergeant employed a "grounding" technique that resulted in the arrestee's face striking the ground, causing a laceration to the cheek.

The court found that while the sergeant had reasonable grounds to arrest and was entitled to use necessary force, the force employed was unnecessary, disproportionate, and unlawful.

The arrestee had become compliant before the sergeant applied force, and the sergeant's stated justifications for the use of force were contradicted by video evidence.

The court convicted the sergeant of assault causing bodily harm, finding that the injury met the statutory threshold for bodily harm.

The defendants brought a Charter application under section 11(b) alleging that their right to a trial within a reasonable time had been breached.

The delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was approximately 20.5 months.

The Crown acknowledged the delay was presumptively unreasonable and sought to justify it based on case complexity and transitional exceptional circumstances.

The court found neither complexity nor transitional circumstances applied.

The case involved straightforward factual issues regarding consent and age verification, with only three principal Crown witnesses and a five-day trial schedule.

The court granted the application and stayed all charges against the defendants.

The applicant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol.

He applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging his right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

The total delay was seventeen months, below the presumptive ceiling of eighteen months.

The critical issue was whether a five-month period of delay, during which the applicant pursued resolution discussions rather than setting a trial date, constituted unreasonable delay.

The court found that the applicant's decision to adjourn the matter repeatedly while awaiting a Crown resolution position, rather than setting a trial date, constituted defence delay or an implicit waiver of Charter rights.

The court also found the applicant failed to demonstrate the defence initiative required under the Jordan framework for transitional cases below the presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 ml) following a traffic stop on Highway 401.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer breath test results showing readings of 104 and 99 mg/100 ml.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that while the accused's right to silence under section 7 was breached when the breath technician misinformed him about the scope of that right, the breach did not warrant exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2).

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to make the breath demand based on the accused's erratic driving and physical signs of impairment.

The court rejected arguments regarding the reliability of the Intoxilyzer machine and the alcohol standard solution used for calibration.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a complainant in his home after they met at a bar and shared a taxi.

The complainant testified that she was pinned down and forcibly penetrated while repeatedly telling the accused to stop.

The accused testified that all sexual contact was consensual.

The trial judge found the accused's testimony to be deliberately misleading on material points regarding his interest in the complainant and the circumstances of leaving the bar.

However, the judge also found the complainant's testimony to be unreliable due to significant memory loss inconsistent with her alcohol consumption and numerous prior statements to others describing consensual sexual activity that turned rough.

The judge concluded that while the accused's guilt was possible or even probable, a reasonable doubt existed regarding whether the complainant withdrew consent, and therefore acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a high-speed collision with a business sign and hydro pole.

The Crown's case relied on blood alcohol analysis, but the court found serious and material inconsistencies in the chain of custody evidence regarding the blood sample, rendering it impossible to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the tested blood was the accused's blood.

Consequently, the over 80 charge was dismissed.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired driving based on the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence, including observations of alcohol odour on the accused's breath, slurred speech, false identification, and the violent nature of the collision in safe driving conditions.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and "drive over 80" following his arrest on January 20, 2014.

The accused brought an application for relief pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The trial proceeded on March 18-19, 2015, and continued on June 19, 2015.

The total delay from arrest to the continuation date was 17 months.

The court found that the Crown's failure to provide readily available disclosure, particularly the cell video, caused substantial delay.

The court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.