Fergus O’Donnell

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements made by an alleged co-conspirator to an undercover police officer.

The Court of Appeal held that the co-conspirator's statements fell within the 'rare case' exception where a traditional hearsay exception must yield to the principled approach.

Because the co-conspirator was available to testify and the statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, the necessity and reliability requirements were not met.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant applied for a review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order, arguing that the Minister should have sought a formal assurance that the death penalty would not be imposed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no basis upon which the death penalty could be imposed, as the appellant was not charged with a capital offence, New Jersey had a moratorium on the death penalty, and the prosecutor confirmed the appellant was ineligible for the death penalty.

The Minister's refusal to insist on a formal assurance did not violate the appellant's Charter rights.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of a pilot charged with importing, trafficking, and possession of cocaine and hashish for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused, finding he was not a member of the conspiracy to import drugs, lacked actual knowledge of the drugs, and was not wilfully blind.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Court held that the trial judge erred by excluding the accused's own intercepted statements, which were admissible as admissions regardless of his membership in the conspiracy.

The trial judge also erred in excluding hearsay statements of alleged co-conspirators and relying on irrelevant factors to determine conspiracy membership.

Furthermore, the trial judge's finding that the accused was not wilfully blind because further inquiry would have placed him in jeopardy was logically incompatible with his earlier finding that the accused was not acting under duress.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dealing in passports and breach of trust after stealing 246 blank passports from her employer, the Scarborough Passport Office.

She was sentenced to 5.5 years imprisonment.

On appeal, the Crown conceded the trial judge erred in principle by treating an unproven profit motive as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the offence was not the worst envisaged by the statute and emphasizing the appellant's youth and lack of prior record.

The global sentence was reduced to 4.5 years, resulting in a net sentence of 4 years after credit for pre-trial custody and bail conditions.

The appellant was convicted of money laundering after an undercover RCMP investigation involving transactions in the Turks and Caicos Islands and the Netherlands.

He appealed his convictions and 30-month sentence, raising issues of extraterritorial Charter application, hearsay exceptions for foreign bank records, jurisdiction, and unreasonable delay.

The Crown cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to order forfeiture of $3 million allegedly linked to prior uncharged drug offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings on the Charter, evidence, or jurisdiction, and agreeing that the forfeiture provisions require a nexus between the property sought and the offences prosecuted at trial.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to give weight to the joint position of counsel that some time in custody was required.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to 90 days intermittent, to be served on weekends, with probation while not in custody.

The appellant was convicted of multiple drug trafficking offences and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

Much of the evidence was derived from wiretaps.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Garofoli application to exclude the wiretap evidence under s. 8 of the Charter, alleging the supporting affidavit was misleading.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the police acted in good faith and that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking, possession for the purpose of trafficking, possession, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Court of Appeal found four trial errors, including improper cross-examination by the Crown regarding the failure to call a co-accused, a flawed jury charge on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule (the Carter test), a violation of section 650(1) of the Criminal Code by allowing the accused to leave the courtroom during cross-examination, and a failure to instruct the jury on good character evidence.

The cumulative effect of these errors deprived the appellant of a fair trial, leading the court to set aside the convictions and order a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable because the trial judge's reasons indicated the appellant only acted to aid the co-accused after the co-accused had already abandoned the attempt to take possession of the drugs.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for conspiracy to import drugs, importing, and attempted possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals against the conspiracy and importation convictions, finding sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions and rejecting arguments regarding the misuse of disclosure and directed verdicts.

However, the Court applied the Kienapple rule to stay the convictions for attempted possession for the purpose of trafficking, as a single act underlay the multiple charges.

The appellant challenged convictions for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime arising from a vehicle search.

He argued the trial judge improperly relied on evidence related to a dismissed charge and that the remaining evidence was insufficient to establish knowledge of the contraband.

The court held that the circumstantial evidence, including possession of car keys, proximity to the vehicle, and items associated with trafficking, supported a compelling inference of knowledge and control.

Even assuming error in considering the impugned evidence, no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice occurred.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and hashish and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, improperly turned the trial into a credibility contest, and failed to properly answer a jury question regarding reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge or the recharge on reasonable doubt.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the seven-year sentence for importing 2.13 kilograms of cocaine and 1 kilogram of hashish was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed convictions for conspiring to traffic in a narcotic and possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking arising from a heroin shipment from Thailand to Canada.

He argued the verdicts were unreasonable and that intercepted private communications in Chinese were admitted contrary to s. 189(5)(a) of the Criminal Code because he was not served with a written transcript in the original language.

The court held the trial judge was entitled to reject the appellant's exculpatory explanation and that the findings of guilt were fully supported by the evidence.

It further held that s. 189(5)(a) is an evidentiary provision to be interpreted liberally, and that where the Crown proved the communications viva voce through a translator, service of the transcribed English translations constituted a statement setting out full particulars of the private communications.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for importing marijuana arising from a controlled delivery and a subsequent search of her apartment.

The court held that police breached s. 10(b) by questioning the appellant while detained without advising her of the right to counsel, and that later admissions obtained after formal compliance remained temporally, contextually and causally connected to the original breach.

Once those admissions were excised, the information to obtain did not justify the search warrant, rendering the apartment search contrary to s. 8.

The admissions and the seized material were characterized as conscriptive evidence and excluded under s. 24(2).

Without that evidence, the conviction could not stand and an acquittal was entered.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to traffic in cannabis resin following a reverse sting operation in which the RCMP offered to sell them a large quantity of hashish.

The appellants sought a stay of proceedings, arguing the police conduct was illegal and constituted an abuse of process.

They also sought disclosure of legal advice the RCMP received from the Department of Justice, which the Crown claimed supported the police's good faith belief in the operation's legality.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police are not immune from criminal liability and that their conduct in offering to sell narcotics was illegal.

Furthermore, by asserting good faith reliance on the legal advice, the RCMP waived solicitor-client privilege.

The Court ordered disclosure of the relevant legal advice and directed a new trial limited to the issue of whether a stay of proceedings should be granted.