Andrés Hannah-Suarez

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal entered after the trial judge denied the Crown's request for an adjournment.

The adjournment was sought on the first and second days of trial due to the sudden and serious illness of the assigned trial Crown.

The trial judge forced the matter on, leading the Crown to call no evidence.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge failed to properly weigh the relevant factors, including the public interest in a trial on the merits and the lack of fault by the Crown.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial.

The court considered whether a justice of the peace erred by refusing to order an in-person trial for a defendant facing Highway Traffic Act charges, instead leaving the decision to the prosecution.

The court found that while the justice of the peace erred in law by not applying the correct statutory test, this was not a jurisdictional error and certiorari was not available.

The application was dismissed.

This is a summary conviction appeal from Jason Robertson’s conviction for refusal to provide a breath sample under s. 320.15 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the demand for a breath sample was not made “immediately” as required, and that unusual circumstances did not excuse any delay.

The court found that the demand was made promptly after ensuring the appellant’s health and safety following a serious accident, and that any delay was justified by the circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Marco Franco, appealed his conviction for driving with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood causing bodily harm, and his six-month custodial sentence.

The appeal challenged the lawfulness of the roadside breath demand, whether he was arbitrarily detained, whether his right to be informed of the reason for arrest was violated, and whether his right to counsel was delayed.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the breath demand lawful, no arbitrary detention, no s. 10(a) Charter violation due to a "fresh start" by the breath technician, and no s. 10(b) Charter violation despite some delay in accessing counsel.

The court also found the six-month sentence was fit and within the appropriate range, upholding the trial judge's balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors.

Bronson Lake pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of his girlfriend, Kim Gagne.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 16 years, while the defence argued for a lower end of the range, emphasizing the guilty plea.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the brutality of the domestic violence and lack of clear mental illness, and mitigating factors, such as the guilty plea and lack of prior criminal record.

The judge imposed a life sentence with 14 years of parole ineligibility, finding the brutality of the murder warranted a strong denunciatory sentence.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness and admissibility of the accused's videotaped statement to Detective Parsons.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to improper leading questions and the accused's intoxication, which allegedly overbore his will and compromised his operating mind.

The court found that the police questioning was proper, the accused was the first to identify the victim as a pedestrian, and there was no evidence of oppressive circumstances or that the accused lacked an operating mind despite alcohol consumption.

The statement was deemed voluntary and admissible.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown conceded a Charter breach occurred when the constable delayed approximately twenty minutes in reading the approved instrument demand to the accused.

The court applied the s. 24(2) Charter analysis from R. v. Grant and admitted the breath sample evidence, finding that the seriousness of the breach was minimal (simple human error), the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was slight to moderate, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits strongly favoured admission.

The accused was found guilty.