Geleta McLoughlin

The accused pleaded guilty to charges involving domestic violence, extortion, and transmission of intimate images of two separate women.

The court imposed an 18-month sentence with enhanced pre-trial custody credit accounting for harsh conditions at Toronto South Detention Centre, including lockdown periods and COVID-19 pandemic conditions.

The accused received credit at 1.5 for Summers credit, 1.5 for lockdown conditions, and 0.5 for COVID-19 conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 69 days to serve.

Ancillary orders included a three-year probation term with conditions including no contact with victims, attendance for domestic violence counselling, and a DNA order.

The defendant, Ahmed Mohamed Marzouk, was charged with robbery contrary to s. 343 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that a robbery occurred as described by the complainant, Mr. Hinds.

The central issue was the identification of the perpetrator.

The defendant presented an alibi, claiming he was in class at York University, but failed to provide sufficient corroborating evidence and was found to have lied on the witness stand.

The court applied the W.(D.) analysis and, after discrediting the defendant's testimony, found strong corroborating evidence identifying the defendant as the robber, including phone contact, meeting location near his residence, physical description, and subsequent location of the stolen vehicle.

The defendant was found guilty.

Eduardo Bohorquez and Qasim Siddiqi were found guilty by a jury of sexual assault with another person contrary to s. 272(1)(d) of the Criminal Code.

The court was tasked with imposing sentence.

The offenders, sexual predators, lured a 19-year-old complainant, S., to Bohorquez's home for non-consensual sexual activity, which they video recorded.

The court rejected the offenders' claims of consent or honest but mistaken belief in consent, emphasizing the power imbalance and the complainant's fear.

The impact on the victim was severe, leading to PTSD and a suicide attempt.

Bohorquez was identified as the leader and more aggressive participant, while Siddiqi was an enthusiastic follower.

The court considered sentencing objectives of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, noting the aggravated nature of the offence.

Bohorquez was sentenced to 6 years and 4 months imprisonment, and Siddiqi to 3 years and 7 months imprisonment, along with ancillary orders.

The accused, A.J., was sentenced for three sexual assaults, two counts of surreptitiously making visual recordings of sexual activity, forcible confinement, assault, and theft of a cell phone, all involving his common-law partner.

The case had a protracted procedural history, including a jury trial for some charges and guilty pleas for others, and a withdrawn Dangerous Offender/Long Term Offender application.

The court considered aggravating factors such as victim vulnerability, force used, internet publication of images, and the accused's criminal record, alongside mitigating factors including guilty pleas, family support, rehabilitation efforts, and significant pre-trial custody in harsh conditions.

A joint submission for a total sentence of 71 months (five years and eleven months) was accepted, with a remanet of six months to be served, followed by three years of probation with strict conditions.

The accused was convicted of sexual interference with a 14-year-old victim.

The Crown sought a mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days in jail.

The defence challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it would be grossly disproportionate.

The court found that while 90 days was not grossly disproportionate for the particular offender, the mandatory minimum violated section 12 as applied to reasonably foreseeable hypothetical offenders.

The violation could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of 45 days to be served in the community, followed by 3 years of probation, along with DNA and SOIRA orders.

The accused was charged with failing to attend court contrary to section 145(2)(b) of the Criminal Code after he failed to appear on the thirteenth day of his trial for unrelated criminal charges.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused's subjective intent not to appear.

The court found that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was that the accused intended not to appear, as he had been present on the preceding trial day and never returned to court thereafter.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a rear-end collision on Highway 409.

The Crown alleged the defendant's vehicle struck the victim's vehicle at approximately 4:15 am on January 31, 2016.

While the court found the defendant was clearly the driver of the vehicle involved in the collision, it acquitted him of impaired driving.

The Crown's evidence consisted primarily of an odor of alcohol detected by the investigating officer and the nature of the collision itself.

The court found this evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, distinguishing the case from precedents where additional indicia of impairment were present.

During a criminal trial for sexual offences against his stepdaughter, the accused was cross-examined by the Crown on a written statement he had provided to a Children's Aid Society worker.

The defence objected, arguing the worker was a person in authority and a voluntariness voir dire was required.

The court found that the CAS worker was a person in authority because the accused reasonably believed she had the power to compel the statement and influence proceedings.

However, the court declined to hold a voluntariness voir dire at that late stage of the trial due to prejudice to the accused, and instead excluded the evidence related to the statement.

Applications for a mistrial and stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The Crown brought a cross-count similar fact application at the close of its case, seeking to admit evidence related to three incidents of alleged sexual abuse by the accused, H.F., against his stepdaughter, LFR, to apply to each other count.

The charges included sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The court applied the R. v. Handy framework, balancing the probative value of the similar fact evidence against its prejudicial effect.

Despite some dissimilarities in the specific acts, the court found compelling similarities in the surrounding circumstances, such as the complainant's young age and vulnerability, the accused's position of trust, the mother's absence during the incidents, and the location of the acts within the family home.

The court concluded that these common characteristics demonstrated a pattern of conduct, and that the probative value outweighed the potential for prejudice, especially in a judge-alone trial.

The application for the admission of similar fact evidence was granted.

The accused, H.F., facing sexual assault charges, brought an application for the production of Children's Aid Society (CAS) records related to the complainant, LFR, his stepdaughter.

The Defence argued H.F. was already in lawful possession of the records from prior child protection proceedings and thus the s. 278 Criminal Code regime for third-party records did not apply.

The Crown and Complainant argued the records were not in lawful possession for criminal proceedings and were subject to s. 278.

The court found that H.F. was not in lawful possession of the CAS records for the purpose of criminal proceedings, and the records were subject to the s. 278 disclosure scheme.

The court further determined that the Defence failed to establish the records were "likely relevant" to an issue at trial and that their production was not necessary in the interests of justice, considering the complainant's privacy rights and the limited probative value of the records.

The application was denied, and the records were deemed inadmissible.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found unconscious in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle.

The Crown conceded that the accused was seated in the driver's position and that his ability to drive was impaired with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The sole issue was whether the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

The court found that the accused rebutted the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) by establishing on a balance of probabilities that he did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The court further found that the Crown failed to prove de facto care or control, as the requisite realistic risk of danger was not present.

The accused was acquitted of both counts.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving following a serious motor vehicle collision on Islington Avenue in Toronto on October 7, 2014.

The defendant's vehicle left the roadway, struck a fire hydrant and hydro pole, and came to rest in an apartment building driveway.

The Crown relied on forensic toxicological evidence establishing the defendant's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The defendant testified that he had consumed only one glass of wine and two bottles of beer over the course of the evening and attributed the collision to another vehicle veering into his lane.

The court found the defendant's evidence unreliable and accepted the expert toxicological evidence demonstrating significant impairment.