L. A. Thomas

The offender, a 30-year-old first offender, pleaded guilty to sexual interference contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code for sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old complainant.

The Crown sought 18 months imprisonment while the defence sought the minimum 90 days.

The court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 90 days to be served intermittently on weekends, followed by two years probation with stringent conditions including no contact with the victim or persons under 18, community service, and counselling.

The court balanced the seriousness of the offence against the offender's youth, first-offender status, genuine remorse, guilty plea, and employment circumstances.

The offender was convicted of aggravated assault, mischief under $5,000, and two counts of breach of probation following a trial.

The assault occurred when the offender, armed with a knife, lay in wait for the victim to enter his home after the offender had thrown the victim's belongings onto the front lawn.

The victim suffered a stab wound to the left elbow requiring stitches and resulting in lasting nerve damage that affected his ability to work as a welder.

The offender had an extensive criminal record spanning 21 years with multiple prior convictions for assault, robbery, and various breaches.

The Crown sought two years less a day; the defence sought five months.

The court imposed 21 months in custody less pre-trial credit, followed by three years' probation, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation over rehabilitation given the aggravating circumstances and the offender's poor track record.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was found unconscious in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle.

The Crown conceded that the accused was seated in the driver's position and that his ability to drive was impaired with blood alcohol over the legal limit.

The sole issue was whether the accused had care or control of the vehicle.

The court found that the accused rebutted the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) by establishing on a balance of probabilities that he did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The court further found that the Crown failed to prove de facto care or control, as the requisite realistic risk of danger was not present.

The accused was acquitted of both counts.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on charges of importing heroin, conspiracy to import heroin, possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiracy to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking relating to approximately 10 kg of heroin hidden in carpets imported from Pakistan.

The court applied the Shephard test and the Arcuri framework for circumstantial evidence.

Olufeko and Onaola consented to committal on all counts.

Ajiri was discharged on importing and conspiracy to import counts but committed on possession counts.

Fanikayode contested committal on all three counts.

The court committed Fanikayode to trial, finding sufficient evidence that he conducted counter-surveillance at the cargo terminal and storage facility, from which a jury could infer his membership in the conspiracy and knowledge of the controlled drug shipment.

The accused were charged with possession of cannabis marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime following execution of a search warrant.

Both accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of their section 11(b) Charter rights (right to trial within a reasonable time).

The total delay from commencement of proceedings to trial was 19 months and 22 days.

The court found that approximately 16 months of delay was attributable to state conduct, including Crown delays in vetting the Information to Obtain and significant institutional delays in scheduling.

The court found that the delay exceeded the 8-10 month guideline for provincial court trials and that the accused suffered some prejudice from the extended delay.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a roadside screening device (ASD) sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the accused made multiple unsuccessful attempts to provide a breath sample after being lawfully demanded to do so.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the demand on two grounds: (1) the delay between formation of reasonable suspicion and the demand, and (2) the officer's opinion that the ASD was in proper working order.

The court found the demand unlawful because the officer lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe the device would produce a proper analysis, as it lacked the required calibration sticker and the officer had not verified the device's testing status.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant brought a Charter application under s. 24(1) alleging that his right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with possession of multiple controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of delay attribution under the Morin framework, examining the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, prejudice, and societal interests.

The court found that the operative delay fell within acceptable guidelines and that no actual prejudice had been demonstrated.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, a psychological associate licensed by the College of Psychologists of Ontario, was charged with three counts of fraud relating to fees paid for counseling services and child custody assessments.

The Crown alleged that the accused fraudulently represented himself as a psychologist rather than a psychological associate by using the title "Dr." in conjunction with his practice, thereby deceiving clients about his qualifications.

The court found that while the accused's use of the title "Dr." combined with his careful compliance with College guidelines in a manner that obscured his status as a psychological associate constituted "other fraudulent means," the Crown failed to prove the essential element of causation—that the misrepresentation caused financial loss or risk of loss to the complainants.

The court concluded that the complainants' lack of knowledge about the existence and qualifications of psychological associates, rather than the accused's conduct, was the cause of their inability to make an informed choice.

All charges were dismissed.