Paul L. Bellefontaine

This is a sentencing decision for Jesse King-Norris, who was charged with assault causing bodily harm during a Junior C hockey game, resulting in the victim sustaining a broken jaw.

The Crown sought a conditional jail sentence, while the defence argued for an absolute or conditional discharge, citing mitigating factors and the commonality of fighting in hockey.

The court acknowledged the unique context of hockey violence and the defendant's good character and remorse but denied a discharge due to the severity and foreseeability of the injury and the public interest in deterring serious on-ice assaults.

A suspended sentence with probation and community service was imposed.

The accused, on trial for firearms and obstruction offences, brought a mistrial application after admitting to possessing a handgun during cross-examination on a Charter application regarding excessive force by a police canine.

The defence argued the admission tainted the trial judge and compromised trial fairness.

The court dismissed the application, finding the cross-examination was proper to assess credibility and the necessity of police force, and affirming that a trial judge can disabuse themselves of inadmissible inculpatory evidence.

The defendant brought an application challenging the constitutionality of section 16 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, which provides for forfeiture of offence-related property.

The defendant argued that the forfeiture provision was ultra vires Parliament, violated the Charter prohibition on double punishment, was overbroad, and constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The defendant had pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana for purposes of trafficking and simple possession of cocaine, and the Crown sought forfeiture of his pickup truck.

The court rejected all constitutional challenges and upheld the forfeiture provision as valid federal legislation within the criminal law power, as a distinct but related component of the sentencing process.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of luring a child by computer contrary to s.172.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused communicated with an undercover police officer he believed to be a 14-year-old girl over a two-week period, made sexual solicitations, exposed himself, and arranged to meet her.

He also possessed five images of child pornography.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months imprisonment followed by two years probation, reflecting both the serious nature of the offence and significant mitigating factors including the accused's stable background, early guilty plea, intensive counseling participation, and very low risk of reoffending as assessed by a forensic psychiatrist.

The court also imposed a 20-year s.161 order and 20-year SOIRA obligation.

The accused was charged with driving while suspended, making unreasonable noise, failing to identify, and assaulting and obstructing a peace officer following a traffic stop.

The court found that the officers failed to strictly comply with the preconditions for a warrantless arrest under s. 33(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, rendering the arrest unlawful and acquitting the accused of the criminal charges and failure to identify.

However, based on uncontradicted evidence, the accused was found guilty of driving while suspended and making unreasonable noise.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent Michael Tsapoitis on a charge of driving an unsafe vehicle under section 84(1) of the Highway Traffic Act and the acquittal of Ontario Line Clearing and Tree Services Ltd. on a "wheel-off" offence under section 84.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice found that a wood chipper being towed behind a commercial motor vehicle was not a "vehicle" within the meaning of the Act.

The appellate court reversed, holding that a purposive interpretation of the statutory definition of "vehicle" should apply, and that the wood chipper constituted a vehicle.

The court ordered new trials rather than entering convictions.

The accused was convicted of trafficking in cocaine (three counts) and trafficking in a firearm by offer.

The defence challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory three-year minimum sentence under Section 99(2) of the Criminal Code as cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that while the three-year minimum was not grossly disproportionate to the accused's particular circumstances, it would be grossly disproportionate in reasonable hypothetical cases involving young first offenders with minimal culpability.

The court declared Section 99(2)(a) invalid and imposed a total sentence of two years less one day plus three years probation.

The accused was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on a breathalyzer test result of 150 milligrams.

The defence challenged the validity of the approved roadside screening device (ASD) demand on grounds of breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the officer detected an odour of alcohol at the initial contact but unreasonably delayed making the ASD demand to conduct routine license inquiries.

The court further found that the total delay of 21 minutes from the formation of reasonable suspicion to the point the officer was ready to require a breath sample provided a realistic opportunity for the accused to consult with counsel, which was not afforded.

The court concluded that section 8 rights were breached and excluded the evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding, challenging whether the Crown must strictly prove that the police officer who operated the laser speed measuring device was formally qualified to do so.

The trial Justice of the Peace found the officer sufficiently trained and qualified based on evidence that he had received training on the device, tested it before and after his shift in accordance with manufacturer's specifications, and performed five manufacturer-recommended tests.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, holding that formal certification is not a prerequisite to admissibility of speed measurement evidence.

The court found that qualifications go to the weight of evidence rather than admissibility, and that the officer possessed sufficient training and experience to operate the device properly.

The respondent city sought costs against the appellants following an appeal of convictions under the Building Code Act.

The appellants had appealed their convictions and sentences of fines totaling $47,500.00.

The court upheld the convictions but reduced the fines to $21,000.00, which matched an offer to settle made by the city.

The city sought to recover solicitor and client costs of $18,258.00 incurred after making the settlement offer.

The court declined to award costs, finding that the case was not exceptional and that cost awards are rare in Provincial Offences litigation, which are intended to be informal proceedings accessible to lay persons.

The accused was charged with offering to transfer a firearm (a handgun) while not being authorized to do so, contrary to s. 99(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that during ongoing drug trafficking transactions with an undercover officer, the accused made a clear and sincere offer to obtain a handgun for $2,500.

The defence argued the offer was not serious and lacked sufficient particularity.

The court found the accused guilty, rejecting the defence evidence as unreliable and accepting the officer's testimony.

The court also dismissed the defence application for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment, finding that the accused, not the officer, initiated the firearm discussions and that the officer did not go beyond providing an opportunity to commit the offence.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of luring a child via computer contrary to Section 172.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

Over a period of three-and-a-half months, the accused engaged in thirteen computer communications with an undercover police officer posing as a 12-year-old girl, including sexually explicit content and masturbation on camera.

No meeting was arranged or attempted.

The accused, a 59-year-old with no criminal record and stable employment history, was sentenced to eight months imprisonment concurrent on all counts, followed by three years probation with strict conditions including a 10-year Section 161 order, 10-year Sex Offender Registration Act order, DNA sampling, and computer forfeiture.

The accused, a psychological associate, was charged with three counts of fraud for allegedly misleading clients by using the title 'Doctor' and failing to explicitly identify himself as a psychological associate rather than a psychologist.

The clients had retained him for counseling and child custody assessments.

The court found that while the accused's use of the title 'Doctor' constituted a fraudulent act, the Crown failed to prove that this misrepresentation caused any financial deprivation or risk of loss to the complainants, as they likely would have retained him regardless of his specific licensing status.

Furthermore, the court found a reasonable doubt regarding whether the accused had the requisite mens rea for fraud.

The charges were dismissed.

The accused, a psychological associate licensed by the College of Psychologists of Ontario, was charged with three counts of fraud relating to fees paid for counseling services and child custody assessments.

The Crown alleged that the accused fraudulently represented himself as a psychologist rather than a psychological associate by using the title "Dr." in conjunction with his practice, thereby deceiving clients about his qualifications.

The court found that while the accused's use of the title "Dr." combined with his careful compliance with College guidelines in a manner that obscured his status as a psychological associate constituted "other fraudulent means" the Crown failed to prove the essential element of causation—that the misrepresentation caused financial loss or risk of loss to the complainants.

The court concluded that the complainants' lack of knowledge about the existence and qualifications of psychological associates, rather than the accused's conduct, was the cause of their inability to make an informed choice.

All charges were dismissed.