Jeffrey Mazin

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a complainant who was under 16 at the material time.

The central issue was whether the Crown had proven the alleged acts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found significant conflicts between the complainant’s video statement, preliminary inquiry evidence, and trial testimony, and treated with caution the fact that the complainant had fabricated a rape allegation only months before reporting the charged conduct.

Although the allegations were not impossible, the court held they were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt and entered acquittals on all counts.

The accused, charged with multiple offences including assault, sexual assault, and break and enter against his wife, applied to sever the pre-2014 assault and sexual assault counts from the 2014 break and enter counts.

The court applied the criteria from R. v. Last and found a factual nexus between the charges, as the earlier offences provided context for the later ones.

The court concluded that the interests of justice favoured a joint trial and dismissed the application for severance.

The applicant sought judicial review of an OIPRD decision affirming the Toronto Chief of Police's conclusion that his assault complaint against an officer was unsubstantiated.

The applicant argued the OIPRD breached procedural fairness by refusing to disclose the subject officer's statement before the applicant provided his own.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no statutory obligation to disclose the officer's statement to the complainant at the investigative stage, and held that the OIPRD's decision was reasonable.

The accused brought an application seeking production of police occurrence reports and related records concerning the complainant during the period covered by the indictment for multiple assault-related offences.

The defence argued the records could demonstrate that the complainant’s alleged injuries were caused by someone else and were relevant to credibility.

The court considered whether the records were governed by first-party disclosure under Stinchcombe or the third-party records regime under O’Connor and ss. 278.1–278.9 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that police occurrence reports created during police investigations do not attract the reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the O’Connor regime.

The Crown was therefore required to disclose the records subject to standard screening, redactions, privilege claims, and relevance.

The accused was convicted of trafficking in cocaine (three counts) and trafficking in a firearm by offer.

The defence challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory three-year minimum sentence under Section 99(2) of the Criminal Code as cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that while the three-year minimum was not grossly disproportionate to the accused's particular circumstances, it would be grossly disproportionate in reasonable hypothetical cases involving young first offenders with minimal culpability.

The court declared Section 99(2)(a) invalid and imposed a total sentence of two years less one day plus three years probation.