Melissa Mandel

The accused was convicted by jury of two counts of possession of a loaded, restricted firearm contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code, two counts of careless storage of ammunition contrary to s. 86(1), and one count of possession of a prohibited device contrary to s. 92.

The accused jumped from a balcony during a police search warrant execution and was found with two loaded prohibited firearms in the laneway below.

The court imposed a global sentence of 3½ years in custody, with credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in six months remaining to be served.

The court balanced the serious nature of firearm offences and the need for denunciation and deterrence against mitigating factors including the accused's youth, first-time offender status, supportive family, rehabilitative potential, and harsh conditions of pre-sentence detention.

The accused, Mark Andre Davis, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a 13-year-old complainant, his tennis student, relating to an incident in his car after a tennis practice.

The complainant and the accused gave conflicting accounts of the incident.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the complainant’s evidence and was left in reasonable doubt by the accused’s version.

Mr. Davis was acquitted of all charges.

Praveen Balahumar pleaded guilty to unlawfully being in a dwelling house, sexual assault, and forcible confinement of an 84-year-old victim with advanced dementia.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability, the home invasion aspect, the location of the assault in the victim's home, and the significant emotional impact on the victim and her family.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, lack of prior record, rehabilitative potential, family support, and restrictive pre-sentence release conditions.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence for sexual violence.

A total sentence of six-and-a-half years incarceration was imposed, reduced by credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in 1855 days (approximately five years and one month) to serve.

Ancillary orders for DNA, SOIRA, and a firearms prohibition were also made.

The accused, M.U., was charged with seven counts of sexual assault and seven counts of sexual interference against his step-daughter, P.N., who was under 16 years of age at the time of the alleged offences (April 2013 - February 2017).

The trial was judge-alone.

The Crown's case relied on the complainant's testimony, which the court found intelligent, credible, and reliable despite minor inconsistencies.

The accused denied all allegations, but his testimony was deemed wholly incredible and rejected.

The court applied the principles from R. v. W.(D.) and found the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all 14 counts.

The accused, charged with sexual offences against his daughter, brought an application seeking a declaration that a surreptitiously recorded phone call between himself and the complainant was not a 'record' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued the recording did not contain personal information as it related to family law proceedings.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the communication, which touched on her emotional well-being and dignity.

The court ordered that a hearing under s. 278.93 must be held to determine the admissibility of the recording.

Omar Mansour pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and breach of a bail condition.

The court considered aggravating factors, including carrying the weapon in public while on bail for drug trafficking and under house arrest, and mitigating factors such as his youth, guilty plea, remorse, family support, and productive use of time in custody.

The Crown sought a 39-month global sentence, while the defence sought 18-24 months (time served).

The judge imposed a global sentence of 36 months, with 32 months credit for time served (including harsh conditions), leaving 4 months to serve, plus three years probation.

A conditional sentence was rejected due to the seriousness of the conduct.

The accused, K.F.C., was charged with two counts of sexual assault against his elderly mother's caregiver, Q.Z. The alleged assaults occurred on June 29, 2019.

The case hinged on the credibility and reliability of the complainant's and the accused's conflicting accounts.

The court found significant inconsistencies and shifts in the complainant's testimony, particularly regarding injuries, phone calls, and prior statements to police, which undermined her credibility.

While the court also had misgivings about the accused's explanations for certain phone calls and timeframes, it ultimately found that the Crown had not proven the essential elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The accused, R.A.-M., was found guilty of sexual interference and sexual assault of a 15-year-old victim.

The sexual assault charge was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court considered sentencing principles for child sexual abuse, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Friesen.

Despite the persistence of the acts, the court viewed them as being at the lower end of intrusiveness.

Considering the accused's good character, employment, and family support, an intermittent sentence was deemed appropriate.

The accused was sentenced to 90 days intermittent, 2 years probation, SOIRA registration for 15 years, a s. 161.1(b) order, and a DNA sample order.

Walsh Construction Company Canada (WCC) brought a motion to compel the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) to produce approximately 1,600 documents over which TTC claimed litigation privilege.

The court applied the "dominant purpose" test for litigation privilege, conducting a contextual analysis of when litigation was reasonably contemplated and whether the documents were created primarily for litigation or for other purposes such as contractual claims review, project completion, or budget management.

The court found that while litigation was anticipated, many documents served multiple purposes, and TTC failed to establish dominant litigation purpose for a significant portion of the disputed documents.

The court ordered the production of most documents, with specific exceptions for those genuinely created for the dominant purpose of litigation or solicitor-client privilege, and provided directions for redactions.

Andre Hidi appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial judge had found him guilty based on an off-duty police officer's observations of "horrible" driving, an odour of alcohol, and the appellant's testimony of alcohol consumption, despite the exclusion of breathalyzer data.

The appellant raised five grounds of appeal, primarily challenging the trial judge's factual findings, credibility assessments, and the application of legal principles regarding evidence inconsistent with impairment.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's deference on factual findings and credibility, and clarifying the interpretation of "horrible driving" in conjunction with other evidence to infer impairment, particularly distinguishing and adopting the analysis in *R. v. Kumric* over *R. v. Singh*.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mgs.

The trial judge had found that the Crown failed to establish that breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" due to an unexplained 14-minute delay at the police station.

The appeal court dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming that the trial judge applied the correct legal standard and did not commit a palpable and overriding error in her factual conclusion that the Crown had not met its heavy burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicants sought an order of mandamus for a new pre-enquete hearing after a Justice of the Peace refused to issue process on a private information alleging perjury against a police officer.

The applicants argued the Justice of the Peace was biased, lost jurisdiction by refusing to hear evidence, and denied natural justice.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error, bias, or breach of procedural fairness.

The court also noted that the application was vexatious and an abuse of process, as the applicants were attempting to re-litigate a matter previously decided by another judge.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving and over 80 charges.

The trial judge erred by refusing to allow the Crown to call the Qualified Breath Technician (QBT) without a certificate and by dismissing the charges without hearing submissions.

The Superior Court found these to be fundamental errors in law, as the Crown is entitled to prove its case through viva voce evidence even without a certificate, and parties must be given an opportunity to make submissions.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted for a new trial.

The Crown appealed the accused's summary conviction acquittal for failing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused despite disbelieving his testimony about medical distress, finding that the Crown failed to disprove the accused's 'reasonable excuse' beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge committed a reversible error of law by reversing the burden of proof; the onus is on the accused to prove a reasonable excuse on a balance of probabilities.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and refusing to re-open the application after the release of R. v. Jordan.

He also argued the trial judge erred by admitting in-car video evidence of his impairment after finding a s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly characterized a 4.5-month delay caused by a judge's recusal as a discrete event/neutral delay.

The court also held the trial judge properly exercised his discretion not to re-open the delay application and correctly admitted the video evidence, which merely confirmed the officers' lawful observations of impairment.

Nathan Buress appealed a 10-year driving prohibition imposed after he pleaded guilty to driving while disqualified and dangerous driving.

The appellant had a lengthy criminal record including multiple driving offences and was on probation and a conditional sentence at the time of the offences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the prohibition was necessary for specific and general deterrence and public protection, given the appellant's history and the dangerous nature of his conduct.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault against his wife, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to provide meaningful reasons, misapprehended evidence, inappropriately took judicial notice of injuries, and misapplied the burden of proof.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge materially misapprehended evidence by conflating two separate incidents (the alleged morning assault and a later computer struggle) and by accepting an explanation for inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony that was not in evidence.

This misapprehension undermined the credibility assessment, which was central to the case.

The appeal was allowed, the finding of guilt quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for dangerous driving and over .80 operation of a motor vehicle, following a trial where the sole issue was the identity of the driver.

The trial judge disbelieved the appellant's evidence and accepted the arresting officer's identification, which was based on a brief "one second glance" followed by apprehension 40 seconds later.

The appellant contended that the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the officer's identification and the appellant's credibility.

The appellate court affirmed the trial judge's findings, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to credibility assessments and finding no error in the application of identification evidence principles.

The court held that the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's implausible version of events and accepting the officer's identification were well-supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Nishan Minhas, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and "over 80" stemming from a RIDE checkpoint stop.

He alleged multiple Charter violations by the police officer, including errors in credibility assessment, acceptance of impairment evidence, handling of mouth alcohol, and the timing of the approved screening device demand relative to the right to counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments, the reliability of the impairment indicia, or the handling of the mouth alcohol issue.

Crucially, the court held that the brief delay in providing the right to counsel during the roadside investigation, including the approved screening device test, was a reasonable and demonstrably justified limit under section 1 of the Charter.

The appellant, Mark Broxterman, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood.

The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, misapprehended the evidence regarding the approved screening device (ASD) result, and rendered an unsafe verdict due to comments about writing two judgments.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, affirming the trial judge's findings on reasonable grounds, the reliability of the ASD result based on expert evidence, and the appropriateness of the trial judge's decision-making process.