Carlos Da Cruz

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Standing Court Martial that dismissed his applications for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter in respect of a sexual assault charge.

The Court Martial Appeal Court found no palpable and overriding error in the military judge's calculation and characterization of the delays under the Jordan framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a military judge's order staying proceedings against the respondent.

The military judge had ruled that the subjugation of military judges to the Code of Service Discipline violated the respondent's right to an independent and impartial tribunal under section 11(d) of the Charter.

Relying on its recent decisions in related appeals, the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada found no Charter violation, allowed the appeal, lifted the stay, and ordered the trial to proceed.

The respondent, Corporal Christmas, brought a motion to re-impose a stay of proceedings pending the Supreme Court of Canada's disposition of a leave to appeal application in related matters (Edwards et al.).

The original stay was granted on the basis that the military judge lacked independence, but was lifted after the Court Martial Appeal Court allowed the Crown's appeals in the related matters.

The Court dismissed the motion, holding that an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada is not intended to freeze the wheels of justice and that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to proceed expeditiously.

The Crown appealed four court martial stay orders entered after military judges held that the possibility of prosecuting military judges under the Code of Service Discipline undermined the accuseds' right to an independent and impartial tribunal under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court Martial Appeal Court held that the decisions below were inconsistent with binding Supreme Court of Canada authority recognizing the dual military and judicial role within the military justice system.

Applying the contextual reasonable-apprehension-of-bias analysis, the court found that military judges remain subject to the National Defence Act and that the impugned order did not compromise institutional independence.

The cross-appeal challenging ss. 12, 18 and 60 of the National Defence Act was dismissed, and motions to admit fresh evidence concerning the appellate court's own independence were also dismissed.

The accused was charged with care or control while impaired by alcohol, over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, driving while licence suspended, and driving as a novice driver with more than zero blood alcohol content.

The trial addressed Charter violations regarding arrest grounds and right to counsel, the interpretation of truncated breath readings under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, and the sufficiency of evidence for each charge.

The court found no Charter violations, acquitted on the over 80 and impaired charges, acquitted on the driving while suspended charge due to lack of proof of notice, and convicted on the novice driver zero BAC charge.

The appellant appealed his 'Over 80' conviction, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached when police failed to contact his wife (a non-criminal lawyer) and he spoke to duty counsel instead.

The Crown cross-appealed the trial judge's failure to render a verdict on the impaired driving charge and the failure to impose the mandatory minimum driving prohibition due to a s. 9 Charter breach.

The Superior Court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no s. 10(b) breach as the appellant willingly spoke to duty counsel.

The Court allowed the Crown's cross-appeals, remitting the impaired driving charge for a verdict and imposing the mandatory 12-month driving prohibition, holding that s. 24(1) of the Charter cannot be used to reduce a sentence below a statutory minimum absent a constitutional challenge to the provision itself.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application challenging delay in the criminal proceedings.

The charges were laid on October 30, 2016, with trial dates set for January 29-31, 2018.

The trial did not complete on the third day, and the continuation date was set for May 7, 2018, which was eight days beyond the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the delay attributable to defence counsel's unavailability constituted defence delay under the Jordan framework, and that the additional time required for trial testimony constituted an exceptional circumstance due to good faith underestimation of trial time by experienced counsel and the trial judge.

The accused was charged with five counts of assault arising from incidents occurring between June and October 2016 during a romantic relationship.

The accused claimed the physical contact was consensual and part of a mutually agreed therapeutic program involving "slap-bets," pinning, and verbal challenges.

The Crown argued the complainant's apparent consent was vitiated by the accused's coercion, manipulation, and duress.

The court found the accused guilty on all five counts, determining that the complainant's will was completely overcome through the accused's controlling behaviour, verbal abuse, and escalating physical violence.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as unreliable due to his mental health condition and medication non-compliance, and found corroboration in text messages and audio recordings where the accused admitted to assaultive behaviour.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol in excess of the legal limit following observations of erratic driving on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The Crown sought to rely on breathalyzer readings of 190 and 180 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on the grounds of alleged breaches of the right to counsel under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, and also argued that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable as required by the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the accused was properly informed of her right to counsel, including the right to free legal aid duty counsel, both at the roadside and at the police station.

The judge rejected the accused's version of events and found that the officer complied with the spirit of the Prosper warning by indicating that breath testing would be delayed to allow for a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

The judge concluded that the accused provided an informed, clear, and unequivocal waiver of her right to counsel and that there was no breach of the Charter.

The breath samples were found to have been taken within a reasonable timeframe.

The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision on Highway 403.

The defendant, who was impaired with a blood alcohol concentration of 110 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, drove westbound in the eastbound lanes on two 400-series highways for several kilometres before colliding head-on with the victim's vehicle.

One person was killed and another seriously injured.

The court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment for the death charge and two years concurrent for the bodily harm charge, along with an eight-year driving prohibition and a ten-year firearms prohibition.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter motion to exclude the breath test evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the officer's account of the traffic violation justifying the initial stop was unclear, inconsistent, and not supported by objective facts.

The officer's testimony regarding which stop signs were disobeyed was contradicted by a map and was not recorded in contemporaneous notes.

The court concluded that the defendant's detention was arbitrary and that his Charter rights were infringed.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court excluded the breath test evidence as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a roadside stop.

A police officer received a report that the accused appeared intoxicated at a drive-through window, stopped the vehicle, and requested a roadside screening device (ASD) test.

The ASD arrived approximately 15 minutes later, and the test was administered 18 minutes after the initial stop.

The accused was not advised of his right to counsel until after failing the ASD test.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test evidence showing a blood-alcohol concentration of 160 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the evidence on multiple grounds, including that the ASD demand and test were not made "forthwith" as required by statute, and that the breath tests were not taken "as soon as practicable" as required to trigger the evidentiary presumption of identity.