Carlos Da Cruz

The accused was charged with care or control while impaired by alcohol, over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, driving while licence suspended, and driving as a novice driver with more than zero blood alcohol content.

The trial addressed Charter violations regarding arrest grounds and right to counsel, the interpretation of truncated breath readings under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, and the sufficiency of evidence for each charge.

The court found no Charter violations, acquitted on the over 80 and impaired charges, acquitted on the driving while suspended charge due to lack of proof of notice, and convicted on the novice driver zero BAC charge.

The accused was charged with five counts of assault arising from incidents occurring between June and October 2016 during a romantic relationship.

The accused claimed the physical contact was consensual and part of a mutually agreed therapeutic program involving "slap-bets," pinning, and verbal challenges.

The Crown argued the complainant's apparent consent was vitiated by the accused's coercion, manipulation, and duress.

The court found the accused guilty on all five counts, determining that the complainant's will was completely overcome through the accused's controlling behaviour, verbal abuse, and escalating physical violence.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as unreliable due to his mental health condition and medication non-compliance, and found corroboration in text messages and audio recordings where the accused admitted to assaultive behaviour.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application challenging delay in the criminal proceedings.

The charges were laid on October 30, 2016, with trial dates set for January 29-31, 2018.

The trial did not complete on the third day, and the continuation date was set for May 7, 2018, which was eight days beyond the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the delay attributable to defence counsel's unavailability constituted defence delay under the Jordan framework, and that the additional time required for trial testimony constituted an exceptional circumstance due to good faith underestimation of trial time by experienced counsel and the trial judge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol in excess of the legal limit following observations of erratic driving on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The Crown sought to rely on breathalyzer readings of 190 and 180 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on the grounds of alleged breaches of the right to counsel under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, and also argued that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable as required by the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the accused was properly informed of her right to counsel, including the right to free legal aid duty counsel, both at the roadside and at the police station.

The judge rejected the accused's version of events and found that the officer complied with the spirit of the Prosper warning by indicating that breath testing would be delayed to allow for a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

The judge concluded that the accused provided an informed, clear, and unequivocal waiver of her right to counsel and that there was no breach of the Charter.

The breath samples were found to have been taken within a reasonable timeframe.

The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm arising from a fatal motor vehicle collision on Highway 403.

The defendant, who was impaired with a blood alcohol concentration of 110 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, drove westbound in the eastbound lanes on two 400-series highways for several kilometres before colliding head-on with the victim's vehicle.

One person was killed and another seriously injured.

The court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment for the death charge and two years concurrent for the bodily harm charge, along with an eight-year driving prohibition and a ten-year firearms prohibition.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter motion to exclude the breath test evidence, alleging violations of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the officer's account of the traffic violation justifying the initial stop was unclear, inconsistent, and not supported by objective facts.

The officer's testimony regarding which stop signs were disobeyed was contradicted by a map and was not recorded in contemporaneous notes.

The court concluded that the defendant's detention was arbitrary and that his Charter rights were infringed.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court excluded the breath test evidence as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a roadside stop.

A police officer received a report that the accused appeared intoxicated at a drive-through window, stopped the vehicle, and requested a roadside screening device (ASD) test.

The ASD arrived approximately 15 minutes later, and the test was administered 18 minutes after the initial stop.

The accused was not advised of his right to counsel until after failing the ASD test.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test evidence showing a blood-alcohol concentration of 160 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the evidence on multiple grounds, including that the ASD demand and test were not made "forthwith" as required by statute, and that the breath tests were not taken "as soon as practicable" as required to trigger the evidentiary presumption of identity.