Elise Quinn

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol after crashing his vehicle into a pillar in an underground parking garage.

Although no one saw him driving, the court found that circumstantial evidence established he was the driver.

The court rejected the defence's Charter arguments regarding the timing of the breath demand and alleged racial profiling.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The sentencing reasons in this first-degree murder case reflect on the complexity of modern criminal trials, the evolution of the justice system, and the application of what the judge terms "spiritual laws" of truth and justice.

The judge, reflecting on a long career, discusses the facts and evidence that led to the conviction, the character and conduct of the accused, and the broader lessons for society.

The sentence imposed is life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years, with ancillary orders including weapons prohibition and DNA order.

This decision addresses the admissibility of ante-mortem statements made by the deceased, Mark Bakir, in the prosecution of Alessandro Giammichele for murder.

The court reviews the law on hearsay, including both the traditional state of mind exception and the principled approach, and applies these to various statements made by the deceased to friends and family regarding a loan and the accused's failure to repay.

The court finds most of the statements admissible, with some exceptions for opinion and cumulative evidence.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed Dennis Rhodes' application to renew his section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay in the trial process.

The court emphasized the importance of timely and proper notice for 11(b) applications as mandated by the Ontario Court of Justice practice direction and Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, particularly Jordan.

The decision highlights the court's concern with procedural compliance, the history of delay and adjournments in the case, and the exceptional nature required for post-verdict 11(b) applications.

The ruling underscores the judiciary's efforts to manage court resources efficiently and maintain the integrity of the criminal justice process.

This decision addresses the jurisdiction of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to order increased compensation for jurors in lengthy criminal jury trials, above the statutory minimums set by regulation.

Justice Skarica reviews the constitutional and historical importance of jury trials, the inadequacy of current compensation, and the inherent jurisdiction of the court to ensure a fair and representative jury.

The court orders increased daily compensation for jurors, as well as improved provision of snacks and meals, to ensure the effective functioning of the jury system and the fair administration of justice.

The applicant, Joshua Belovari, sought to sever counts of dangerous driving and criminal harassment, which arose from two separate incidents about a month apart, into separate trials.

The Crown opposed the severance, indicating an intention to bring a similar fact application.

The court denied the severance application, finding that the interests of justice did not require it.

Despite a thin factual nexus, the unique manner of the alleged dangerous driving created a legal nexus supporting a similar fact application.

The court prioritized the societal interest in efficient proceedings and avoiding multiplicity, noting that a single judge-alone trial would mitigate prejudice and prevent inconsistent rulings on similar fact evidence.

The accused, Bruce Cavey, brought an application to stay his sexual assault charge for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The aggregate delay was 911 days.

The court deducted 31 days for defence delay related to counsel retention and 138 days for a portion of the delay caused by exceptional circumstances (volume of third-party disclosure, Toronto Star involvement) which were partially offset by Crown delay (late complainant's counsel, late Seaboyer application).

The court rejected the Crown's arguments for further deductions based on a "complex case" exception or a "COVID ripple effect" emphasizing the need for concrete evidence and a holistic "bird's-eye view" as per *Jordan*.

The court found the total attributable delay to be 742 days, exceeding the 18-month ceiling for provincial court cases, and consequently stayed the charge.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging an unreasonable delay in his trial for impaired driving offences.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the projected end of trial was 673 days (22 months and 3 days).

The Crown argued that several periods were attributable to the applicant, which would bring the net delay below the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan for provincial court cases.

The court found that delays caused by the applicant's absence, requests for adjournments, and prolonged settlement discussions were attributable to him.

However, a period of delay related to the applicant's request for a French trial was not attributable to him, as the court had failed to inform him of his linguistic rights as required by the Criminal Code.

Ultimately, the court calculated the net delay at 519 days, which is below the 18-month (548-day) ceiling.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant, Dennis Rhodes, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Charter to stay his charges for delay.

The Crown argued the application was materially deficient due to incomplete transcripts.

The defense requested an adjournment, citing late receipt of the Crown's response.

The court dismissed the adjournment request, noting the Crown had provided timely notice of the transcript deficiency.

The court then dismissed the 11(b) application, finding the defendant failed to meet the high onus of providing all necessary transcripts or demonstrating their immateriality, which is required to establish the evidentiary record for a delay application.

The defendant, Dennis Rhodes, sought to bring a Charter application alleging unreasonable delay under section 11(b).

The Crown opposed the scheduling of the application, arguing it was untimely under a new practice direction requiring such motions to be heard four months before trial, and asserting that the trial commenced with an upcoming remote testimony motion.

The Ontario Court of Justice held that the remote testimony motion did not mark the start of the trial, which was scheduled for a later date.

The court further determined that because the practice direction's four-month notice requirement conflicted with the court rules requiring sixty days' notice, the rules prevailed.

Consequently, the court allowed the defendant's application to schedule the Charter motion under the sixty-day timeline.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including obtaining sexual services for consideration, assault, sexual assault, and uttering threats, against a sex trade worker.

The incidents allegedly occurred during several meetings at hotels in Hamilton, Oakville, Niagara Falls, and Kitchener.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to her admitted heavy alcohol consumption during the material times, limited details, and inconsistencies.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court was left with a reasonable doubt on all charges and acquitted the accused.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, arguing a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and a new release plan.

The court accepted COVID-19 as a material change warranting a de novo hearing.

However, the court found the proposed release plan, which was identical to the one rejected at the initial bail hearing and involved a surety with a history of ineffective supervision, insufficient to address public safety concerns, especially given the applicant's violent criminal record and history of breaching court orders.

The application for detention review was dismissed, and continued detention was ordered.

Two young persons were convicted of robbery simpliciter following a trial.

They were among a group that forcefully entered a hotel room in Oakville and robbed an escort of her personal belongings.

The young persons' culpability was grounded in party liability.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of three to six months followed by probation, while defence counsel sought probation with conditions.

The court found the offence constituted a violent offence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act due to psychological bodily harm to the victim and the home invasion nature of the crime.

However, considering the young persons' lack of prior records, their conduct while on bail, educational achievements, supportive family circumstances, and the mitigating factor of adult influence, the court imposed a non-custodial sentence of two years' probation with conditions including community service.

Three young persons were charged with robbery with a firearm, use of an imitation firearm during robbery, and related offences arising from a September 28, 2017 armed robbery of an escort at the Holiday Inn in Oakville.

The Crown's case relied heavily on eyewitness testimony from the victim, corroborating evidence from an adult co-accused, hotel security video surveillance, cellular phone records and extraction reports, and a hearsay statement from a hotel guest.

The defence challenged the identification of the accused and the reliability of the Crown's witnesses.

The court found that the Crown established identity beyond a reasonable doubt through a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence, including credible eyewitness testimony, forensic cellular analysis, and video surveillance.

However, the court found reasonable doubt as to whether an actual firearm or an imitation firearm was used.

The accused pleaded guilty to procuring a minor to be a prostitute, receiving a financial benefit from prostitution, and advertising sexual services.

The offences occurred over a nine-day period in February 2018.

The accused groomed and exploited a 17-year-old victim with developmental delays, controlling her work as an escort and retaining most of the financial proceeds.

The court imposed a sentence of two years imprisonment concurrent on all charges, followed by 18 months probation with conditions including no contact with the victim and mandatory counselling.

The accused was charged with failing to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device and several provincial driving offences.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess the accused's credibility, ultimately rejecting his testimony that he had attempted to provide a proper sample.

The court accepted the evidence of the police officers that the accused was intentionally thwarting the test by not sealing his lips, sticking his tongue in the mouthpiece, and blowing short bursts.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault involving a vulnerable adult victim with mental health issues.

The first assault occurred on November 7, 2016, when the accused sexually penetrated the victim while she was unconscious and video-recorded the acts.

The second assault occurred on September 19, 2017, when the accused again sexually penetrated the victim while she was incapacitated by medication and alcohol.

The court imposed consecutive sentences totaling 40 months, with ancillary orders including lifetime SOIRA registration, DNA order, weapons prohibition, and communication prohibition with the victim.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle after having consumed alcohol in excess of the legal limit following observations of erratic driving on the Queen Elizabeth Way.

The Crown sought to rely on breathalyzer readings of 190 and 180 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on the grounds of alleged breaches of the right to counsel under sections 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, and also argued that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable as required by the Criminal Code.

The trial judge found that the accused was properly informed of her right to counsel, including the right to free legal aid duty counsel, both at the roadside and at the police station.

The judge rejected the accused's version of events and found that the officer complied with the spirit of the Prosper warning by indicating that breath testing would be delayed to allow for a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

The judge concluded that the accused provided an informed, clear, and unequivocal waiver of her right to counsel and that there was no breach of the Charter.

The breath samples were found to have been taken within a reasonable timeframe.

The Crown applied to introduce evidence of the accused's discreditable conduct, specifically images from a tablet and Instagram posts, at his jury trial for charges including procuring, recruiting, and exploiting D.M. for sexual services, sexual assault, and possession.

The court considered the admissibility of this evidence, applying the legal principles regarding extrinsic misconduct and balancing probative value against prejudicial effect.

The court found that most of the evidence, including images of money and posts associating prostitution with financial gain and violence, was relevant to the accused's state of mind, motivation, and intent regarding the pimping charges, and corroborated the complainant's account.

The court dismissed the argument that humorous intent negated probative value and ruled that the probative value outweighed the prejudice, which could be mitigated by jury instructions.

The Crown sought leave to adduce evidence of discreditable conduct, both from one count to another and extrinsic to the indictment, in a sexual assault case.

The central issue was whether the complainant's consent was vitiated by the accused's breach of his position of authority.

The court applied the similar fact evidence test, requiring a sufficient nexus and probative value outweighing prejudice.

The application was dismissed, as the court found insufficient commonality and nexus between the proposed evidence (from another employee and financial irregularities) and the sexual assault charge, particularly regarding the complainant's stated reason for consent and lack of direct threats.