Andrew J. Goodman

The offenders were convicted of possession of benzimidazole for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

The court noted that benzimidazole is a highly addictive and lethal opioid, more potent than fentanyl and resistant to Narcan.

The principal offender, who operated a high-end mid-level trafficking enterprise from her residence, was sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment.

The co-offender, a frequent visitor to the residence who was found to have diminished moral culpability as a 'found-in' party, was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment.

Following the offender's conviction by a jury for serious firearms offences, the Crown applied to revoke his bail pending sentencing pursuant to s. 523 of the Criminal Code.

The court reviewed conflicting jurisprudence regarding whether the Crown must show cause to revoke bail post-conviction.

Adopting the reasoning of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Aheer, the court held that s. 523(1)(b)(ii) governs post-conviction bail revocation and grants the trial judge unique discretion to revoke bail without the Crown having to show cause, as the presumption of innocence is lost upon conviction.

Given the offender's serious convictions, prior record, and history of breaches, the court exercised its discretion to revoke bail and remand the offender into custody pending sentence.

The offender pleaded guilty to six offences, including conspiracy to commit robbery and discharging a firearm with intent, following a drive-by shooting and vehicle pursuit in Stoney Creek.

The Crown and defence proposed a joint submission of eight years.

The court expressed serious concern that the joint submission was at the extreme low end of the range for such egregious gun violence, but ultimately accepted it.

Due to the leniency of the joint submission and the offender's repeated institutional misconduct, the court declined to grant enhanced Duncan credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions and reduced the standard Summers credit to a 1.25:1 ratio, resulting in a net sentence of 69 months.

Sentencing for a youthful offender who pleaded guilty to possessing approximately 609 grams of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, possessing a loaded prohibited firearm, and breaching three weapons prohibition orders.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as paramount, finding the offender to be at the high end of a mid-level fentanyl trafficking hierarchy and emphasizing the dangerous combination of large quantities of lethal drugs and a loaded handgun.

After imposing consecutive sentences totalling 14.5 years, the court reduced the sentence to 12 years under the totality principle, then further mitigated the sentence by six months for harsh pre-sentence detention conditions.

After Summers credit for 428 days of pre-sentence custody, the net sentence was 117 months in a federal penitentiary, together with lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA, and forfeiture orders.

The plaintiffs, who are political commentators on social media, brought a defamation action against the defendant, a fellow commentator, for derogatory statements made on a livestream and social media.

The defendant falsely claimed the adult plaintiffs were brother and sister, and insinuated their child's autism was the result of incest.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.

The court found that summary judgment was appropriate for this defamation action and that the statements were defamatory.

The defendant's defences of fair comment and qualified privilege failed, though the defence of consent applied to an apology video the plaintiffs requested.

The court awarded $25,000 in general damages to the adult plaintiffs, reducing the quantum because the plaintiffs had republished the defamatory comments to a larger audience.

Following a motion where the respondents were substantially successful and the applicant condominium corporation was denied relief, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found that the applicant had acted unreasonably and in bad faith by failing to address a breach of the Condominium Act for decades and refusing to enter into a section 98 agreement.

Consequently, the respondents were awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

However, the respondents were ordered to bear the costs of preparing and registering the section 98 agreement, as it was for their exclusive benefit.

The applicant, a 50% shareholder in two family-owned corporations, brought a motion for interim costs to fund an oppression application against her former spouse and the corporations.

The court applied the two-part test from Alles v. Maurice under s. 249(4) of the OBCA.

While the court found the applicant had established a case of sufficient merit based on the respondents' failure to provide financial statements, the motion was dismissed because the applicant failed to provide sufficient evidence of her financial circumstances to prove that pursuing the claim would unreasonably reduce her standard of living.

A condominium corporation sought removal of a concrete pad installed in the exclusive use common element rear yard of a unit approximately 40 years ago by a predecessor in title without a s. 98 agreement under the Condominium Act.

The court dismissed the application, finding the doctrine of laches applied given the corporation's decades of acquiescence -- the board conducted annual walk-throughs during which the pad was clearly visible, yet took no action until 2024.

The court found the corporation's principal affiant not credible regarding lack of knowledge, held that the board did not act in good faith, and ordered the parties to enter into a s. 98 agreement rather than require removal.

The offender, a 62-year-old man with a dated but related criminal record, was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against a 13-year-old victim who lived in his home.

The court applied the Friesen principles, emphasizing the abuse of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the significant psychological impact.

A global sentence of six years was imposed, which was reduced to two years less a day after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh jail conditions, followed by two years of probation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, over 80, flight from police, and stunt driving, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 10(b) Charter application by failing to find a breach when police did not allow him direct access to his phone to call a third party to obtain a lawyer's contact information.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the conviction appeal, holding that police are not constitutionally required to give a detainee direct access to a phone to call a third party.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge provided adequate notice before imposing a harsher sentence than the Crown requested and that the 150-day total sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash a ruling by a Justice of the Peace that committed the applicant to trial in the Superior Court without a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm, an indictable offence eligible for a preliminary inquiry.

Due to miscommunication between Crown counsel and defence counsel, both parties mistakenly believed the charge was ineligible for a preliminary inquiry.

The Justice of the Peace, relying on this misinformation, transferred the matter to Superior Court without affording the applicant the statutory right to a preliminary inquiry.

The Superior Court found this constituted a breach of natural justice and jurisdictional error, granted the certiorari application, and ordered the matter returned to the Ontario Court of Justice for a preliminary inquiry.

This decision concerns an application by Brandi Stewart-Sperry for a directed verdict following the close of the Crown’s case in a first-degree murder trial.

Stewart-Sperry argued that there was insufficient evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict her, particularly regarding her knowledge of the co-accused’s possession of a firearm and intent to shoot a police officer.

The court reviewed the legal principles for directed verdicts, the use of circumstantial and after-the-fact conduct evidence, and found that there was sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury could convict.

The application was dismissed.

This decision addresses an application by several media organizations for virtual access to a high-profile murder trial, invoking the open court principle.

The court reviews the constitutional and statutory foundations of open courts, the discretion of judges to permit or deny virtual access, and the practical realities facing media coverage.

Ultimately, the court finds that while the open court principle does not require virtual access, it may be granted at the court’s discretion in light of modern realities and the decline of local news coverage.

The accused, Mario Bixhi, was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of cannabis for the purpose of distributing and selling, possession of proceeds of crime, willfully resisting a police officer, and taking a weapon from a peace officer.

The case arose from a search warrant executed at Bixhi’s apartment.

The court found Bixhi guilty of the cannabis-related offences and resisting/taking a weapon from police, but acquitted him of the cocaine trafficking charge, finding a reasonable doubt as to his knowledge and control over the cocaine, given the evidence of a third party who claimed sole responsibility for the cocaine.

The applicant, facing human trafficking charges, brought an abuse of process application after the Crown preferred a direct indictment.

The direct indictment was sought shortly after a preliminary inquiry judge granted the defence's request to cross-examine the complainant at the upcoming preliminary inquiry.

The applicant argued this was an improper circumvention of a judicial order.

The Superior Court found that while the Crown's stated rationale regarding delay was unmeritorious and its true intention was to avoid having the complainant testify twice, the Crown acted within its statutory authority under s. 577 of the Criminal Code.

The court concluded the conduct did not rise to the level of flagrant impropriety required for an abuse of process, and dismissed the application.

The Crown appealed acquittals for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the respondent's state (asleep/awake) and provided insufficient reasons.

The appellate court found the trial judge's reasons deficient, failing to articulate findings of fact or explain how the evidence of the respondent's actions could be reconciled with the complainant's testimony about him being asleep.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered before a different judge.

The applicant, Jack Densmore, facing sexual assault and voyeurism charges, sought disclosure of journalistic records from The Hamilton Spectator related to the complainant and other witnesses.

The Spectator, supported by the Crown, objected, claiming journalistic privilege under the Journalistic Sources Protection Act (JSPA) and the Canada Evidence Act (CEA), and arguing the Mills regime applied.

The court analyzed the applicability of the JSPA (CEA branch), Mills, and O'Connor regimes, and the Vice Media framework.

The court found that the journalistic records were privileged under the JSPA (CEA branch) as the sources were promised anonymity, and the applicant failed to demonstrate reasonable necessity or that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the public interest in preserving confidentiality.

Alternatively, the court found the Mills regime applied, and the applicant failed to establish the records were likely relevant or necessary in the interests of justice.

Consequently, the application for disclosure was dismissed.

The accused, Laureano Bistoyong, was charged with second-degree murder in the stabbing death of his cousin, Mark Bistoyong.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter, but the Crown did not accept the plea, arguing for murder intent.

The court found that the Crown proved the requisite mens rea for murder, specifically that the accused intended to cause serious bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless whether the victim died or not.

The court rejected the defence of provocation, finding no air of reality to it due to a significant time lapse between the alleged provocation and the stabbing.

Laureano Bistoyong was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The offender pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, firearms offences, and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The murder involved a targeted public shooting with two firearms, resulting in one death and injuries to two others.

The court considered the offender's youth, guilty plea, and social context evidence of anti-Black racism, but found the aggravating factors, including elements of planning and deliberation, required a significant period of parole ineligibility.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years, and a concurrent 13-year sentence for the firearms and drug offences.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the appropriate timing for directed verdict applications in joint criminal trials, particularly when rulings may differ between co-accused.

The accused, Marsha Gonzales and Marshall Gonzales, brought directed verdict applications at the close of the Crown's case.

The court ruled that such applications should be determined and rendered at the close of the Crown's case, before the accused elects whether to call evidence.

The court dismissed Marsha Gonzales's application but granted Marshall Gonzales's application, dismissing the case against him.

The decision emphasizes that the risk of inconsistent verdicts is outweighed by the accused's right to a fair trial and full answer and defence.