Court File and Parties
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
RYAN DAVIES, TANYA DAVIES, AND TANYA DAVIES ON BEHALF OF V.D
J. Kitchen, for the Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs
- and -
SPENCER BUTTS
Self-represented
Defendant
HEARD: March 18 and April 2, 2026
REASONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Introduction:
1This is a defamation action. The plaintiffs, Ryan Davies, Tanya Davies and Tanya Davies on behalf of her son, V.D., seek damages for derogatory and demeaning statements or remarks published or referenced on podcasts and social media by the defendant, Spencer Butts. The plaintiffs submit that the facts are easily established by affidavits, evidence from the internet along with other relevant materials. The plaintiffs submit that there are no genuine issues requiring a trial and they move for summary judgment.
2The defendant resists the summary judgment motion. The defendant argues that defamation actions are rarely suited to summary judgment because of the unique role the fact finding process plays in these kinds of actions. In any event, the defendant argues that the impugned comments were made in good faith, fair comment, as political rhetoric and were neither inferred or expressly derogatory in nature. The defendant argues that the plaintiffs rely heavily on third-party comments. The impugned statements are within the sphere of healthy political debate or opinion. The defendant submits that this matter ought to proceed to trial in order for a full review of the alleged impact of the words, their context, the availability of defences, and assessment of damages.
3For the reasons that follow, I have concluded there is no general rule against summary judgment for a defamation action in the proper case. Summary judgment is granted in favour of the plaintiffs, but the damages are on a reduced scale when measured against their overall claim.
Background:
4The adult plaintiffs, Ryan and Tanya Davies, (hereinafter the “plaintiffs”) are well-recognized, reputable political commentators on social media. Their channel, Northern Perspective, is their primary source of income. The minor plaintiff, VD, is the adult plaintiffs nine-year-old autistic son.
5The defendant, Spencer Butts, is also a political commentator on social media. His channel is about a third of the size of Northern Perspective.
6In February 2025, the defendant undertook an investigation into Ontario’s voter identification process. He made a video documenting what he found and sent it to the plaintiffs, seeking feedback and/or further investigation. The plaintiffs were skeptical about the investigation and were disinterested in participating. This upset the defendant, and he began to question their credibility and authenticity.
7On April 17, 2025, the defendant did a livestream on YouTube commenting on the Federal Election Leaders Debate (the “defendant’s livestream”). The defendant’s audience asked for his thoughts on other political commentators. He gave “shout outs” to other conservative content creators. Three hours and ten minutes into the defendant’s livestream, in a 22 second clip, he made disparaging comments about the plaintiffs:
And I will even give a shout out to the Northern Cuckspective even though they are clearly bought and paid for and refuse to look at evidence and they very well might be brother and sister, which would make another thing make sense, which would be way too mean of me to say, but you can all infer. Um, Northern Cuckspective, but also they do do some good stuff. Um, I really can't stand those frauds.
8“Northern Cuckspective” refers to the adult plaintiffs.
9The defendant produced a YouTube analytics report from his April 17 livestream. Although over 4000 people attended the defendant’s livestream in total, only about 118 were watching when he made the impugned statements. Most viewers would have attended to watch the political debate, which had long ended.
10The plaintiffs submit, and the defendant does not deny, that before the defendant’s livestream, on April 6, 2025, the defendant wrote on X (formerly Twitter) that the adult plaintiffs were “the biggest frauds”, “grifters”, “shills”, “inbred”, and that they were “brother and sister”. Multiple times he said the adult plaintiffs were “bought and paid for by the government”, “two ugly fucks” and that they “beg for money for a kid that doesn’t need it”.
11On May 18, 2025, in their own livestream, the adult plaintiffs told their viewers that the defendant said they were brother and sister, and their son was autistic because their incest (the “plaintiffs’ livestream”).
12It appears from the evidence that no third parties drew the inference about VD’s autism, until the adult plaintiffs spelled it out on their livestream. If third parties did draw such a conclusion, they did not share it on social media. The plaintiffs produce many third-party comments to show the defamatory effect on their reputation. Almost all condemn the defendant and his statements, and express disbelief thereof.
13From May 18 onward, a flurry of third parties began to draw the inference and were disgusted at the defendant for making such an insinuation. The defendant received so many hateful comments that he thought the adult plaintiffs paid for cyber robots to attack him on social media.
14On June 18, 2025, plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter requesting the defendant remove the defamatory content and issue a public apology. That same day, the plaintiffs posted said letter on “X”. In this post, they once again spelt out the defamatory words as well as the defamatory inference. They wrote that the defendant had falsely claimed: “ That we are “frauds” and are “bought and paid for” by Elections Canada or Elections Ontario; That we are “grifters” and exploit our autistic son for attention and financial gain; And worst of all – he has repeatedly claimed that my wife and I are biological siblings, and that our son’s autism is the result of incest [Emphasis in original.]
15The plaintiffs concede that this republication received over 34,300 views.
16On July 10, 2025, the defendant removed all the defamatory content and issued an 18-minute-long apology video, (the “apology video”). He outlined the defamatory statements for which he is apologizing, per the plaintiffs’ request. However, the plaintiffs also asked him to also outline the inference that V.D. was autistic because of their incest, but the defendant refused to repeat in his apology video.
17The plaintiffs say the apology video was a republication. It had received over 23,000 views. Hundreds of people apparently unsubscribed from the plaintiffs’ channel afterward. Although, there is no cogent evidence of the regular flux in subscribership. The plaintiffs then issued a public statement saying they would not litigate in the court of public opinion.
Summary Judgment:
18Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg 194, provides that summary judgment shall be granted if there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. The rule also provides various tools to shorten and focus the action even if complete summary judgment is not appropriate. Summary judgment is a tool to enhance access to justice by ensuring that cases are adjudicated in the most appropriate and cost-effective manner. It is not a tool for deciding cases unjustly or depriving parties of their rights in litigation. A court has a responsibility to ensure that judicial and court resources are appropriately and proportionally used to achieve the ends of justice.
19Defamation cases have traditionally been tried before a jury. They are also burdened with some degree of complexity. It has been recognized that the common law evolved largely to balance the interests of public figures and traditional media and that aspects of defamation law such as the distinction between libel and slander may be ill equipped to deal with libel or slander by means of the ubiquitous use of electronic and social media: Skafco Limited v. Abdalla, 2020 ONSC 136 at para. 23, citing Haaretz.com v. Goldhar, 2018 SCC 28, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 3.
20The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the protection of individual reputation as a quasi-constitutional value that must be balanced against the Charter protected value of freedom of speech: Editions Ecosociete Inc. v. Banro Corp., 2012 SCC 18, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 636; Grant v. Torstar Corp., 2009 SCC 61, 2 S.C.R. 640. The need for a balancing exercise and the need to measure the impact of defamatory speech against the harm experienced by the plaintiff in their community raises the question as to whether or not defamation cases ever lend themselves to summary judgment: Abdalla, at para. 23.
21The plaintiffs submit that summary judgment is an important tool to make defamation law more amenable to disposition, and given the presumptions attributable to defamatory statements, summary judgment is becoming the norm rather than the exception. The defendant disputes that assertion.
22The question remains therefore, is the nature of defamation actions amenable to summary judgment?
23I draw support from the very instructive decision of C. MacLeod R.S.J., in the case of Abdalla at paras. 26 to 44. I cannot express the position any better than my learned colleague, and I take liberty to reference and reproduce certain paragraphs of his ruling hereunder:
29There are in any event important principles about defamation actions discussed in Baglow v. Smith which also find support in decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Firstly, it is relatively easy to establish that words were published and by whom. That is a straight factual question. The issue of whether or not words are defamatory, however, involves an objective test. It is a question reserved to the triers of fact who must assess the significance of the words in the particular community where the words were published. While defamatory meaning may be obvious from the words themselves, the court may also “take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, including any reasonable implications the words may bear, the context in which the words are used, the audience to whom they were published and the manner in which they were presented. [Footnote omitted].
30The assessment of damages is also a very different exercise in defamation actions than it is in other types of litigation. The trier of fact may consider the conduct of the plaintiff as well as that of the defendant, the position and standing of the plaintiff in the community, the nature of the defamation, the absence or refusal of an apology, and the conduct of the defendant throughout the proceedings including conduct during the trial. Similarly, it has been held that malice is a finding that may require consideration of circumstances outside the four corners of the publication and may require a trial.[Footnotes omitted].
36If summary judgment decisions are to be applied consistently then consideration of what is the province of the trier of fact should form part of the analysis with or without a jury notice. The question is whether it is possible to determine the facts justly without a trial and part of that analysis may be the unique questions and discretion reserved to the trier of fact in defamation actions. In this case, for example, it is the contention of the defendants that the nuanced findings of fact and credibility required to fairly adjudicate this matter cannot be done on a paper record. While I agree that the jurisprudence suggests that the role of the trier of fact must be jealously guarded, it does not follow that a trial is necessary in every case.
37The notion that findings of fact and assessment of credibility cannot be fairly adjudicated on the basis of affidavit evidence was rejected by the Rules Committee when it enacted the amendments to Rule 20. The specific authority provided by Rule 20.04 (2.1) and (2.2) was added to overcome impediments to summary judgment previously found in the jurisprudence. More importantly, the conservative approach to summary judgment was roundly rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hryniak v. Mauldin. As discussed above, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the “full appreciation” test enunciated by the Ontario Court of Appeal and directed that summary judgment rules had evolved “from highly restricted tools used to weed out clearly unmeritorious claims or defences to their current status as a legitimate alternative means for adjudicating and resolving legal disputes”. [Footnote omitted.]
38The court added that “summary judgment motions must be granted whenever there is no genuine issue requiring a trial” and then gave the following direction:
49There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result.
39Significantly, the Supreme Court appears to reject the idea that there are cases inappropriate for summary judgment. It will be just to give judgment without a trial if the material before the court and the nature of the issues permits the judge to make findings of fact and apply the relevant legal principles with confidence. [Footnote omitted.]
40The critical first question is always whether it is reasonable and just to dispose of the issues based on affidavit evidence. If there are genuine issues of credibility, it may still be possible to resolve those questions in this forum by means of a mini-trial under Rule 20.04 (2.2). If a mini-trial does not appear to be useful or there are genuine issues requiring a trial for reasons other than credibility, it is important to remember that the Rule contains various other tools to prune, focus or streamline the litigation. In Hryniak, the Supreme Court has mandated that “summary judgment rules must be interpreted broadly, favouring proportionality and fair access to the affordable, timely and just adjudication of claims”. As noted above, however, the Court of Appeal has rejected the idea that summary judgment is now the preferred approach and trials are a last resort. [Footnotes omitted.]
42Firstly, it is important to recognize that there are different types of summary judgment motions. Rule 20.04 (2), for example, imposes different tests if the parties agree to the use of Rule 20 than if they are disputing that summary judgment is appropriate. In addition, a summary judgment motion brought by a defendant to dismiss an action for lack of proof may be significantly different than a motion by a plaintiff seeking judgment in its favour. The latter will look quite different if the action is undefended. [citation omitted]. In some cases, the inference permitted by Rule 20.02 (the best foot forward rule) will apply and in others it will not. A summary judgment motion based on a limitation period or to strike a claim or defence for technical reasons may be different again. In short, it is dangerous to generalize about summary judgment. To some degree, the applicability of summary judgment requires a case by case analysis. [Footnotes omitted].
[43]Secondly, while there are a number of cases in which summary judgment has been granted in defamation actions and in which the motions judge addressed the test for summary judgment, it does not appear that the question I am now concerned with was fully argued. Nor does it appear that the Baglow v. Smith summary judgment appeal was brought to the attention of the motions judges in any of the cases cited. [Footnote omitted.]
44The caselaw does not demonstrate that summary judgment is now to be considered routine in defamation cases nor that it is the preferred procedure for such actions. On the other hand, it does demonstrate that summary judgment has been granted in a number of cases both before and after Hryniak was decided when the motions judge has been able to conclude that there is no genuine issue and the affidavit evidence is sufficient.
24I adopt the sage analysis provided by MacLeod R.S.J. in Abdalla. I similarly conclude that summary judgment is available in certain defamation actions. The analysis of whether a trial is necessary will be depend on the evidence available to the motions judge, the matters in issue, and of course the positions taken by the parties, having regard to the particularities of defamation law and procedure. In that regard, credibility assessment may not be the only concern as the court will also have to consider whether questions such as the defamatory nature of the published words, the impact of those words in the community and the assessment of damages can be properly undertaken on a paper record.
25The bottom line is whether a trial is necessary to adjudicate the matter and to reach a just result.
26In my opinion, it is not necessary to have a trial to fairly address the evidence or arguments advanced by the parties. On the facts of this case, it may be readily ascertainable that at least some of the words published by the defendant were defamatory, referred to the plaintiffs and were communicated to others. Affidavits and references to the various oral podcasts and internet postings have been provided. Reference to the impugned statements have been fully canvassed. The reaction from the readership or viewing public has been identified and quantified. It is true that no one was proffered as a witness on behalf of the plaintiffs who felt that the reputation of the individual plaintiffs had been diminished in their minds. However, this does not mean the plaintiffs are disentitled to damages, because in defamation actions damages are presumed, but it may be demonstrated that there is little basis for a significant damages award.
27I find, on this record, that summary judgment is available to determine the facts at issue, the relevant legal principles, the assessment of potential damages, and whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial.
Legal Principles- Law of Defamation:
28The onus of proof is on the plaintiff to plead and prove a publication. To succeed, the plaintiffs must prove three things on a balance of probabilities:
That the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiffs’ reputations in the eyes of a reasonable person;
That the words referred to the plaintiffs; and,
That the words were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiffs: Grant, at paras. 28-29.
29Once these elements are proven “falsity and damage[s] are presumed”: Grant, at para. 28.
30A defamatory statement is one which has a tendency to injure the reputation of the person to whom it refers. That is to say, to lower the person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally and, in particular to cause him [or her] to be regarded with feelings of hatred, contempt, ridicule, fear, dislike, or disesteem. The statement is judged by the standard of an ordinary, right-thinking member of society: Color Your World v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (1998), 1998 1983 (ON CA), 38 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.), at para. 14.
31To determine what is truly defamatory, the court must ask whether the words, in their context, would lower the plaintiffs’ standing in the eyes of a “right-thinking person”: Weaver v. Corcoran, 2017 BCCA 160 at para. 69. That is, a person who is reasonably thoughtful and informed, rather than someone with an overly fragile sensibility: Color Your World, at para. 15.
32Mere insults are not defamatory: Awan v. Levant, 2014 ONSC 6890, at para. 175, aff’d 2016 ONCA 970. Insults are not believed as facts and therefore do not genuinely affect reputation. Professor Hilary Young, in her article titled “But Names Won’t Necessarily Hurt Me: Considering the Effect of Disparaging Statements on Reputation” (2011) 37 Queen’s LJ 1, distinguished between disparagement and defamation. She highlighted the important point that if a right-thinking person would not find a hyperbolic insult to be credible, then it is not the kind of thing that would cause a right-thinking person to think less of the plaintiff. Therefore it is not defamatory.
33A defamatory statement published or repeated by a defendant is to be treated the same as if he or she originated it. A defendant who has reported another person’s defamatory allegation about the plaintiff cannot succeed in a plea of justification merely by proving that the allegation was made; he or she must prove the truth of the underlying allegation. No one is justified in stating false facts about another merely because someone else has done so. Those who give currency to a defamatory report are responsible for its truth: Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada, 2nd Edition., at pgs. 10-19 to 10-27, E.(L.) v. P.(W.), 1998 CarswellBC 1074 (B.C.S.C.), at para. 68.
34It is a question of law, which is determined on an objective standard, as to whether or not the challenged words are capable of bearing the defamatory meaning set out in the pleadings. The ordinary and natural meaning is the “plain, obvious and literal” meaning of the words. This appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable, fair-minded person with no special knowledge of the facts could infer the meanings alleged by the plaintiff. Context is important: Laufer v. Bucklaschuk (1999), 1999 5073 (MB CA), 145 Man R (2d) 1 (C.A.).
35A defendant is liable for defamation whether or not they intended to make a statement which carried a defamatory imputation, or whether or not the defendant intended or reasonably believed it would not convey a false meaning, or refer to the plaintiff, or cause any harm. The innocence, good faith, motive, belief, reasonableness or intention of the defendant is generally irrelevant to the question of liability: Raymond Brown, The Law of Defamation in Canada, 2nd Edition, (Toronto: Carswell, 1999), at pp. 3-3 to 3-6.
36Several courts have avoided determining whether social media posts are considered “broadcasts” under the Libel and Slander Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.12 (the “Act”). It has been recognized that an action in libel regarding a newspaper article republished on the internet is subject to the Act: John v. Ballingall et al, 2016 ONSC 2245, and see Shtaif v. Toronto Life Publishing Co. Ltd., 2013 ONCA 405. The law is still in its infancy in relation to the ubiquitous and nature of social media and podcasts.
37Nonetheless, there is a need for judicial interpretation to deal with the evolving technologies and this exercise should only be done on a clear and ample record: Nanda v. McEwan, 2019 ONSC 125, at para. 84.
38Defamatory words are presumed to be false. However, truth or justification is a complete defence to an action for defamation at common law. To successfully establish truth as a full defence, a defendant must displace the presumption of falsity and need only demonstrate that the statements are substantially correct. The justification established must meet the gist or sting of the defamatory statement.
39A statement characterizing conduct as disgraceful without reference to supporting facts will not be regarded as a comment but an allegation of fact: WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, 2009 SCC 40, [2008] 2 SCR 420.
40To meet the threshold for proving the truth of the statements, the defendant’s evidence must always be sufficiently clear, convincing and cogent to satisfy the court that the abuse occurred on the balance of probabilities: F..H. v. MacDougall, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41, 2008 SCC 53, at paras. 45 and 46.
Findings on Defamation:
41In oral submissions, the defendant all but conceded the publication of the defamatory words, previously referenced at paras. 7 and 10 of this ruling. In the context in which they were published, further manifested and where intended to be understood to bear the defamatory meanings in relation to the plaintiffs.
42Reasonable people can draw inferences. It is not fatal if the literal words are not defamatory, so long as the plaintiffs plead the inferential meaning they intend to prove: Zhong v. Wu, 2019 ONSC 7088, at para. 17. Seemingly innocent words may be defamatory to those who know of an extrinsic fact. The plaintiffs need not prove that the defendant knew of the extrinsic fact when he made the statements. However, they must prove the following: That at least one audience member knew of the extrinsic fact; and that a reasonable person with this knowledge would have understood the defamatory meaning: Allen M. Linden et al., Canadian Tort Law, 13th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2025) at c. 13.02.
43It is not controversial that the subject posts were written by the defendant, and that they refer to the adult plaintiffs. The defendant’s statements that the adult plaintiffs, a married couple, are brother and sister, and that they are incestuous, are defamatory. Incest is a crime in Canada, and carries a high level of stigma: Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 155. Though this defamatory inference requires an extrinsic fact, it is common knowledge that the plaintiffs are married.
44Regarding the other comments that the adult plaintiffs are frauds, grifters, and shills, a line must be drawn between mere insults and statements that could genuinely harm the plaintiffs’ reputations. The defendant argues that finding his insults to be defamatory would open the floodgates to claims of internet defamation and would stifle healthy political discourse.
45The claims that the plaintiffs are “grifters” might have been an insult if the defendant had not expanded on this insult to say that the plaintiffs beg for money for their child who does not need it. With this context, someone could genuinely believe the plaintiffs are grifters and this could lower their reputation. The added context grows the insult into defamation.
46The bald assertion that the plaintiffs are “frauds” and “shills” is defamatory because the defendant coloured the insult with his relentless suggestions that the adult plaintiffs are “bought and paid for” by the government, and that they are covering for Elections Canada in one way or another. The defendant repeatedly openly calls into question the plaintiffs’ integrity and reputation beyond the scope of insults. With this context, the insults are defamatory.
47To be clear, the defendant raised that freedom of speech ought to be given substantial weight here. Again, this is not a s. 137.1 anti-SLAPP motion. However, the defendant does have the freedom to make these statements without liability, if they are true. To do so, the defendant would have to raise and prove the defence of truth. He has not done so. There is no evidence that the plaintiffs are colluding with the government to cover up election fraud. Further, there is no evidence before the court that the plaintiffs’ “grift” or obtain a profit through dishonest means, scams or trickery. The fact that they may have asked for money to help support their autistic child is not dishonest trickery, even if the defendant does not think they “need” the money.
48Finally, the defendant’s statement in the 22 second clip of April 17, 2025, requires a second layer of analysis into what a reasonable person would infer from the defendant’s words. For ease of reference, I reproduce his words below:
And I will even give a shout out to the Northern Cuckspective even though they are clearly bought and paid for and refuse to look at evidence and they very well might be brother and sister, which would make another thing make sense, which would be way too mean of me to say, but you can all infer. Um, Northern Cuckspective, but also they do do some good stuff. Um, I really can't stand those frauds.
49The statement that the plaintiffs “are clearly bought and paid for and refuse to look at evidence” is defamatory on its face, as well as the statement that the plaintiffs “very well might be brother and sister”, given it is known that they are married. The statement that the adult plaintiffs’ incest “would make another thing make sense” is capable of defamatory meaning by a reasonable person if the reasonable person knew that V.D. was autistic.
50It is not contested that some audience or third party viewers knew that VD is autistic. The plaintiffs were open about this on social media. The plaintiffs have proven that some who received the defendant’s statements would have been in possession of the knowledge that V.D., the plaintiffs’ child, is autistic.
51This statement borders the line between insult and defamation but ultimately, the statement is defamatory because someone hearing it could infer the allegation that the plaintiffs caused VD’s autism with their incest, and this poses a genuine threat to their reputation. For this analysis, it matters not whether the defendant knew that VD was autistic when he made the statement. Audience members knew, and a reasonable person with this knowledge could draw the inference.
52On the totality of the evidence, the plaintiffs have met their burden. I am more than satisfied, based on a natural and ordinary meaning of the words used by the defendant in reference to the plaintiffs, that they are capable as a matter of law of supporting the defamatory meanings pleaded. With regards to liability, there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. I find that the statements were in fact understood by at least one or more reasonable persons in clearly defamatory ways.
Defences:
53As mentioned, a plaintiff in a defamation proceeding is required to prove three things. First, those are that the impugned words were defamatory, in the sense that they would tend to lower the plaintiff’s reputation in the eyes of a reasonable person. Words implying dishonesty or immorality easily meet this test. Secondly, the plaintiff must show that the words referred to the plaintiff. This is not difficult if the plaintiff is referred to by name. Thirdly, the plaintiff must prove that the words were communicated to at least one person other than the plaintiff.
54If these elements are established on a balance of probabilities, then at least in libel cases, falsity and damage are presumed. Liability is strict insofar as it is not necessary to prove intention. Liability is established unless the defendant can rely on one of the recognized defences.
55There are seven recognized defences to a defamation action. In each case, the onus of proving the applicability of the defence lies upon the defendant. These defences are “truth” or “justification”, “immunity” or “absolute privilege”, “qualified privilege”, “responsible communication in mass media” or “responsible journalism”, “reportage” or “reporting on matters of public interest”, “fair comment”, “consent” and, “statutory limitations”. There may be a reduction or limitation on damages if there has been an apology or retraction.
56The onus is on the defendant to prove all facts and circumstances as are necessary to bring the impugned words within the scope of the defence or privilege.
57These defences have their own unique conditions, which may be overlapping. For example, the defence of fair comment requires that the words published are on a matter of public interest, based on fact, recognizable as statements of opinion, fairly made insofar as they represent an opinion that could be honestly held on the proven facts, and made without malice.
58Each of these requirements is also subject to a nuanced meaning found in the jurisprudence. For example, defining “public interest” is a challenging question and will not insulate a defendant from comments regarding business or private affairs. The public must have a genuine stake in knowing about the matter published. Similarly, recklessness or carelessness about the truth of the underlying facts may nullify the defence of fair comment and may be evidence of malice. In some circumstances, malice is implied.
Application of the Relevant Legal Principles to this Case:
59At its most generous application, the defendant has pleaded only the defences of “fair comment, absence of defamatory meaning, and consent. In oral submissions the defendant raised the spectre of “qualified privilege”.
60In this case, I am of the view that the pleaded or expressed defences can be assessed on the record before me.
Qualified Privilege:
61While not specifically pleaded, there is no basis for qualified privilege in this case.
62In RTC Engineering Consultants v. Ontario et al (2002), 2002 14179 (ON CA), 58 O.R. (3d) 726 (C.A.), at para. 16, Laskin J.A. held: “At the heart of the defence of qualified privilege is the notion of reciprocity or mutuality. …[a] defendant must have some interest in making the statement and those to whom the statement is made must have some interest in receiving it”. The defence of qualified privilege is aimed at serving the public interest in the sharing of information, rather than the private interests of either the defamer or recipient: Macintosh v. Dun, [1908-10] All E.R. Rep. 664 (P.C.), at 667.
63According to the Supreme Court of Canada in Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, 1995 59 (SCC), [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at pp. 1188-1189, citing the House of Lords decision of Adam v. Ward, [1917] A.C. 309 with approval, a privileged occasion is one in which “the person making the communication has either an interest or a legal, social, or moral duty to make it and the person to whom the communication is made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it”. This element of “reciprocity”, between the duty on the defamer to make the impugned statement and the duty on the recipient to receive it, is “essential” in finding that the occasion is privileged: Hill, at p. 1189. Such reciprocity accords with the underlying purpose of the qualified privilege exception to liability articulated in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1999] 3 W.L.R. 1010, at 1017 (H.L.):
The essence of this defence lies in the law's recognition of the need, in the public interest, for a particular recipient to receive frank and uninhibited communication of particular information from a particular source.
64The defendant vehemently argues freedom of speech in a broad sense, but did not bring a s. 137.1 motion under the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43. The defendant is self-represented and entitled to some procedural assistance, but the court cannot initiate a s. 137.1 motion on its own initiative. Hence, this ground would fail. Nevertheless, as will become clear, the defendant’s statements are not matters of interest to the public. The court must adventure its own analysis into what a right-thinking person would take from the statements, not defer to what this subsect of society thought at the time.
65In any event, there is no basis or supporting facts to invoke or substantiate this privilege.
Defence of Fair comment:
66If the factual foundation is unstated or unknown, or turns out to be false, the fair comment defence is not available: WIC Radio, at para. 31.
67The fair comment defence has five elements. First, the comment must be on a matter of public interest. Second, the comment must be based on fact. Third, thought it can include inferences of fact, it must be recognizable as comment. Fourth, it must satisfy an objective test: could any person honestly express that opinion on proven facts? Finally, if the comment was primarily motivated by malice then it cannot be “fair”: Hansman v. Neufeld, 2023 SCC 14, [2023] S.C.R. 519 at para. 96, Grant, at para. 31.
68The defendant is self-represented. I have granted his pleadings, affidavits, and oral submissions a broad and generous interpretation, reflecting the fact that he is not a lawyer and may not be able to present his arguments with legal acumen. I must, however, draw the line at making arguments on the defendant’s behalf. The court must be independent and impartial while maintaining accessibility for self-represented parties to present their case.
69In WIC Radio, at para. 28, the Supreme Court of Canada outlined the test as follows: (a) the comment must be on a matter of public interest; (b) the comment must be based on fact; (c) the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any person honestly express that opinion on the proved facts? (d) the comment, though it can include inferences of fact, must be recognizable as comment; and (e) even though the comment satisfies the objective test of honest belief, the defence can be defeated if the plaintiffs prove that the defendant was subjectively actuated by express malice.
70The defendant must prove the four elements of the defence before the onus switches back to the plaintiffs to establish malice: WIC Radio, at para. 52.
71I am not persuaded by the defendant’s submissions. It is not a matter of public interest, political dialogue or freedom of expression whether the plaintiffs, who are not public figures, are frauds, shills, grifters, brother and sister, or whether their child is the result of their incest. Even if I am wrong with regards to my assessment as to the “public figures” descriptors, and taken the most liberal interpretation of the plaintiffs’ prominence within the social media context, the defendant has not proven these comments are based on any reliable basis or fact. Even if he had, in his statements, he did not lay the factual foundations upon which his alleged comments were made.
72The defendant has failed to prove fair comment.
Defence of Consent:
73The defendant argues that the plaintiffs cannot complain of defamatory words which they themselves republished. He also argues that because the plaintiffs invited the apology video and specifically asked that the defamatory statements be repeated, they cannot complain of that either. The defendant enjoys mixed success on this defence.
74It is unfair for a person to enforce a right which they themselves have voluntarily waived or abandoned. Consent is a full but narrow defence: Grimmer v. Carleton Road Industries Association, 2009 NSSC 169, at para. 63. The publication must be substantially the same as that to which the plaintiff consented. It is inherently forward-looking.
75To establish consent, “the defendant must clearly establish that the plaintiff either expressly agreed to having such a statement published or that he or she necessarily gave such consent by participating in some common activity with the defendant that would inevitably result in the publication of such statements.”: Andrew Botterell, Fridman’s The Law of Torts in Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2020), at p. 804.
76The Divisional Court has found that implied consent defeated a defamation claim where the defamatory words were uttered spontaneously in response to the plaintiff’s public demand for an explanation: 1658410 Ontario Inc. v. Great Gulf (Dundas) Ltd., 2020 ONSC 428, at para. 9.
77In Syms v. Warren (1976), 1976 1204 (MB QB), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 558 (Man. Q.B.), the plaintiff went on a radio show to dismantle some defamatory rumours made about him. The publication of the interview which contained the defamatory remarks was not actionable. Afte the interview, the radio host received a call from a listener saying the rumours were true and that she had additional information. This call as aired on the radio show was defamatory and actionable because it was outside the scope of the plaintiff’s original consent. The consent did not extend to the conversation with the caller, which happened after the interview. Nevertheless, the damages were minimal because the plaintiff bore most of the responsibility for any damage suffered due to his participation in the program before the incoming call, which drew attention to the defamatory remarks. Inherently, it seems unfair for a plaintiff to collect substantial damages for statements which they themselves repeat.
78In this case, the plaintiffs requested an apology video with the defamatory statements included. They did not like the apology video they received, not because it contained the defamatory statements, per their request, but because it included arguments and additional information about the legal battle. The plaintiffs cannot withdraw their consent after the fact. In this case, the defendant’s apology video is not actionable because of consent.
79However, the defendant goes further. He argues that the first time anyone drew the inference that V.D. was autistic because of incest was when the plaintiffs said it in their May 18 livestream. Therefore, they cannot seek damages for this inference which they procured. Significantly, the evidence appears to show that no third party drew the inference about V.D. until the plaintiffs’ livestream on May 18. Or, at least, they did not reduce such inference to writing and share it on social media.
80I do not accept the entirety of the defendant’s argument. Consent cannot work retroactively. The plaintiffs did not consent to the defendant’s remarks when they were made in his livestream on April 17 or on April 6, 2025. What flows from those comments has been explained in these reasons. In any event, the plaintiffs need not prove that anyone actually believed in the defamation, although this may be relevant to quantum of damages.
Damages:
81Although damages are presumed once defamation has been proven, the plaintiff may be entitled to different categories of damages depending on the circumstances. General damages are always available for non-pecuniary loss but damages in defamation cases have been found to be significantly different from general damages in personal injury cases.
82Damages for defamation are assessed as the amount necessary under all of the circumstances to compensate the plaintiff for loss of reputation in the community and injury to feelings and also to provide public vindication.
83As mentioned, while general damages are presumed, there is a wide range. A court should take into consideration all the circumstances, including the conduct of the plaintiff, his position and standing, the nature of the libel, the mode and extent of publication, the absence or refusal of any retraction or apology, and “the whole conduct of the defendant from the time when the libel was published down to the very moment of their verdict. They court may take into consideration the conduct of the defendant before action, after action, and in court at the trial of the action”: Hill, at para. 182.
84The Supreme Court also stipulated that the following factors are relevant to the assessment: a) the nature and circumstances of the publication of the libel, b) the nature and position of the victim of the libel, c) the possible effects of the libel statement upon the life of the plaintiff, and d) the actions and motivations of the defendants: Hill, at para. 187. See also Barrick Gold Corp. v. Lopehandia (2004), 2004 12938 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 416 (C.A.).
85Where plaintiffs seek substantial general damages, as in the case at bar, they must provide evidence of the context, the audience, the effect of the defamatory messages and its impact, which must be calculated to arrive at a just result. For example, damages may be increased where the target audience has been selected to maximize damage to reputation. All this is done in order for the court to conclude what effect the defamatory comments had and thus, compensate the plaintiff accordingly: see Abdalla, at para. 20. Where the plaintiffs fail to proffer any evidence about their diminished reputation, there is very little basis for awarding a significant damages award: Abdalla, at para. 51.
86Despite the finding that the defendant acted with malice, the court in Abdalla only awarded $15,000 total, spread amongst three plaintiffs, because the plaintiff had not proven any measurable loss to their reputation.
87It is important to note that in evaluating the harm to the plaintiffs’ reputations, a court can examine the risk that the defamatory remarks were actually believed: Vaquero Energy v. Weir, 2004 ABQB 68, at para. 17. A court may also consider the size and nature of the audience and “whether it is the type of audience which would give any credence to the remarks.”: Focus Graphite Inc. v. Douglas, 2015 ONSC 1104, at para. 55.
88It may also be aggravating that the statements were published on the internet due to its universality and potential for widespread dissemination: see Awan, at para. 193; Cyr v. LeBlanc, 2022 ONSC 2555, at para. 35.
Analysis:
89In their factum and oral submissions, the plaintiffs seek $150,000 in damages for the three named individuals. However, in their Statement of Claim, the plaintiffs only petition for $75,000.
90$75,000 is therefore the limit or maximum amount that can be awarded.
91The plaintiffs do not claim aggravating or punitive damages, so there is no need to determine the issue of malice: Hill, at paras. 188-191. In any event, I do not find that malice has been established on this record.
92Recall that the genesis for this litigation arose because the defendant was concerned about election integrity. The defendant disagreed with the plaintiffs’ decision not to get involved. Still, this does not give him license to defame them.
93The plaintiffs’ channel had approximately 154,000 subscribers in March 2025, before this all began. In submissions, plaintiffs’ counsel confirmed that his clients’ channel now has over 230,000 subscribers. The plaintiffs submit that this increase reflects their skill and effort rather than the publicity from the conflict with the defendant. They say “we don’t know” how much their subscribership would have increased had it not been for the defamation. The plaintiffs do not demonstrate whether a 50% increase in less than a year is within their normal range of growth. At the very least, this substantial growth during the pertinent time is not evidence of harm to their overall reputation.
94The plaintiffs produced many third-party social media comments in an effort to show that the defamatory comments were not without an audience. Most of the comments are supportive of the plaintiffs and disagree with the defendant. Most demand proof by the defendants and say he is “petty”, a “loser”, and is showing his “true colours”. Many say they are unsubscribing from the defendant’s channel because he made such comments. It appears his comments damaged his own reputation quite a bit.
95On this record, no one appeared to draw the negative inference until the adult plaintiffs spelled it out for their audience on May 18, 2025. There is no evidence that anyone believed the defamatory comments until the apology video. After the apology video, a couple of commenters appear to turn against the adult plaintiffs because they resorted to suing the defendant. One said, “Northern Relatives!...sue me too if you have to ask for an apology I promise you don’t deserve one…obviously this one struck close to home.” Almost all the other comments in evidence, even after the apology video, disparage the defendant and condemn his statements.
96The plaintiffs did not ask the defendant to stop at any point before they publicly reposted the defamation on X on June 18, along with their counsel’s letter. The defendant removed the defamatory statements at the plaintiffs’ request.
97That being said, I agree with the plaintiffs that the reach of the defamatory statements is incredibly important to the damages analysis. However, this is where the plaintiffs’ republication becomes an issue.
98Of the 4000 viewers of the defendant’s livestream, only 118 people viewed the defamatory statements in real time on April 17, 2025. The defendant’s written defamatory statements appear to have reached around 30 to 363 individuals each.
99The plaintiffs did not provide their own livestream from May 18, so it is unknown how many people their republication reached. The plaintiffs’ June 18 tweet spelling out the defamation reached over 34,300 individuals.
100The defendant’s apology video reached over 23,000 individuals but, again, that republication is not actionable because of the temporal defence of consent.
101That being said, the defendant’s apology was not sincere. The defendant took the opportunity to present his argument that his words did not imply that V.D. was the result of incest. He outlined why he refused to repeat the inference – because he did not think the inference would be made by a reasonable person. He discussed the unfairness of the litigation and referred to it as “lawfare”.
102The defendant said the adult plaintiffs were “obviously not brother and sister” and that he had no evidence to support that whatsoever. He said he did not mean it seriously, and that “no one who is reasonable should believe that statement is serious especially coming from me. Nothing I do is serious.” He further said that the incest claim was “demonstrably of course not true. They are obvious not brother and sister. I unequivocally detract that statement that I made.”
103In the comments which immediately followed, the defendant continued to defame the plaintiffs by calling them “grifts” and “frauds”. He did not detract or apologize for those statements which call into question the plaintiffs’ integrity. Even in submissions to this court the defendant was tongue-in-cheek about this apology video. It was not sincere, and it did not have the effect of vindicating the plaintiffs’ reputation. His statements in court before me were also insincere and equivocal. I find that this vitiates any mitigation that the apology video or his in-court expression of remorse may have had.
104The plaintiffs argue that the fact that they operate in a conservative space and represent traditional values makes the statements more damaging. Insinuations of incest, fraud and grifting off a child’s disability would have a repulsive effect on any audience, right or left. The plaintiffs make their living doing political commentary. Statements calling into question their integrity, reliability and authenticity could damage their standing with their audience. The essence of these submissions have merit.
105However, in this case, I am persuaded that the plaintiffs have either advertently or unintentionally drawn more eyes to the defamation than the defendant, by virtue of their tweets and podcasts.
106It bears repeating that one of the considerations in the exercise of discretion under the summary judgment rule is proportionality. The defendant put forward important evidence and argued persuasively against a significant damages award.
107As referenced, this is not a case for punitive or aggravated damages. The defendant’s actions were wrongful but they are not so shocking, reprehensible or flagrant that they require additional condemnation.
108With respect, there is no evidence that the plaintiffs’ livelihood or reputation has been tarnished to the extent being claimed. The plaintiffs say they are concerned that some people may not want to work with them, or that their son may be bullied in the future. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary. It seems that the plaintiffs’ podcast audience has grown, irrespective of the libelous and slanderous comments.
109I am prepared to award damages to the adult plaintiffs, albeit on a reduced scale. As part of that award, the plaintiffs are entitled to a damages to assuage their reputation and hurt feelings. The plaintiffs provided evidence of some harm that would have been foreseeable from the nature of the insults. However, there is no evidence of significant mental distress or permanent damage to their reputation beyond what would flow naturally from inappropriate claims of dishonesty and lack of honour.
Conclusion:
110For all of the aforementioned reasons, there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. The plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment for defamation.
111What is appropriate in this case is an award of damages having regard to the nature of the defamatory remarks, the context in which they were made and the plaintiffs’ subsequent conduct in advancing or republishing the libelous comments to a greater audience with exposure through their own podcasts. The damages award must also reflect the size and nature of the audience, and the overall harm done to the plaintiffs’ reputations.
112General damages are awarded to each of Ryan Davies and Tanya Davies in the amount of $12,500, for a total amount of $25,000. No damages are awarded in favour of the minor plaintiff.
113If the parties cannot agree on the issue of costs, I will consider brief written submissions. These cost memoranda shall not exceed three pages in length, (not including any Bill of Costs or Offers to Settle). The plaintiffs shall file their costs submissions within 15 days of the date of this ruling. The defendant may file his costs submissions within 15 days of the receipt of the plaintiffs’ materials. The plaintiffs may file a brief reply within five days thereafter. If submissions are not received by July 10, 2026, the file will be closed and the issue of costs considered settled.
A. J. Goodman J.
Date: May 28, 2026