Stefan Dimitrijevic

The young person pleaded guilty to first-degree murder.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the young person's central role in the planned murder, the profound impact on the victim's family, the crime occurring in the victim's home, and the use of firearms.

Mitigating factors included the young person not being the principal shooter, his guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior youth record, significant rehabilitative efforts in custody (completing high school, programs), strong family support, cognitive weaknesses (head injuries, ADHD, learning disability), and the impact of systemic anti-Black racism on his background.

The court imposed an eight-year sentence, consisting of five years in custody and three years under community supervision, with credit for pre-sentence custody (30 months one-for-one, and 12 months enhanced credit for harsh adult detention conditions), resulting in six further months of custody followed by three years of community supervision.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

This mid-trial ruling addresses the appropriate timing for directed verdict applications in joint criminal trials, particularly when rulings may differ between co-accused.

The accused, Marsha Gonzales and Marshall Gonzales, brought directed verdict applications at the close of the Crown's case.

The court ruled that such applications should be determined and rendered at the close of the Crown's case, before the accused elects whether to call evidence.

The court dismissed Marsha Gonzales's application but granted Marshall Gonzales's application, dismissing the case against him.

The decision emphasizes that the risk of inconsistent verdicts is outweighed by the accused's right to a fair trial and full answer and defence.

The offender pleaded guilty to possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a four-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court noted the offender's lengthy criminal record and the significant amount of fentanyl involved, but also recognized his exceptional rehabilitative efforts and success in overcoming a long-standing drug addiction.

Applying recent appellate jurisprudence, the court found that returning the offender to jail would undermine his rehabilitation and serve little useful purpose.

A conditional sentence of two years less a day was imposed, along with a 10-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

Jahmal Graham was convicted after a jury trial for possession of a prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was also convicted at a judge-alone trial for breach of probation and two firearms prohibition orders.

The court considered aggravating factors, including Graham's recidivism for firearms and drug offences, the public nature of the firearms possession, and the quantity of cocaine.

Mitigating factors included strong family support, some education, spiritual interests, and challenges in his upbringing.

The court rejected claims of historical sexual abuse and anti-black racism as mitigating factors due to lack of proof and found Graham lacked present rehabilitative potential.

The court determined Graham was the principal in possession of the unlawful items.

A total sentence of 10 years imprisonment was imposed, after applying the totality principle and credit for pre-trial custody and lockdown conditions.

Ancillary orders for a lifetime firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture of seized property were also granted.

The applicant, a passenger in a vehicle stopped for traffic violations, brought a pre-trial Charter motion seeking to exclude a handgun, ammunition, cocaine, and cash found in a satchel in the vehicle's trunk.

The applicant alleged ten Charter violations relating to his detention, arrest, and the search of the vehicle.

The court found only one violation—a breach of s. 10(b) when officers briefly questioned the occupants about discarded marijuana before advising them of their right to counsel.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the breach was isolated, had minimal impact on the applicant's rights, and society's interest favoured adjudication on the merits.

The Crown applied under s.715(1) of the Criminal Code to admit the preliminary hearing transcript of a key witness, Boris Golan, at trial, arguing he was absent from Canada and refused to testify.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the witness was truly unavailable, citing insufficient diligence in verifying his absence and exploring electronic testimony options.

Furthermore, the court found that the accused did not have a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing because the Crown failed to disclose the witness's intention to leave Canada, which would have altered defence counsel's cross-examination strategy.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging warrantless seizure of financial and customer information from various entities (UPS, GTA Financial, Buduchnist Credit Union, Cash House, Money Market) during a fraud investigation.

The court found that while there was an expectation of privacy in financial affairs, the applicant had left a "public trail of breadcrumbs." Minor Charter breaches were identified regarding the warrantless acquisition of specific banking account information.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that the breaches were minor, the officer acted in good faith, and the evidence should be admitted under a s. 24(2) analysis to serve the truth-finding function of the trial, especially given the serious nature of the alleged fraud.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm while prohibited.

He carried the loaded gun in his waistband while selling drugs and pulled it out during an altercation on a public street.

The Crown sought 7-8 years, while the defence sought 3.5 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender's extensive criminal record and repeated breaches of court orders.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 years, but granted 40 months of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and an additional 9 months for harsh conditions (triple bunking, frequent lockdowns, lack of fresh air), leaving 23 months to serve.

The defence applied to preclude the Crown from bringing a hearsay application to admit the prior videotaped statement and preliminary inquiry testimony of a missing victim in an attempted murder trial.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to comply with notice requirements under the Superior Court Criminal Proceedings Rules and that police efforts to locate the witness were insufficient.

The court found that while police efforts were inadequate and Crown disclosure of the witness's unavailability was late, there was no improper motive by the Crown.

The court dismissed the defence's application, concluding that it was in the interests of justice to permit non-compliance with the notice rules, as the defence was not prejudiced by the timing of the application itself, and the issues raised were relevant to the merits of the hearsay application.

The defence brought an application to preclude the Crown from bringing a hearsay application to admit the prior statements of a missing witness.

The defence argued the Crown failed to provide the required 30 days' notice under Rule 30.04 of the Superior Court Criminal Proceedings Rules and failed to promptly disclose that the witness could not be found.

The court found that while the police efforts to locate the witness were lacking and the Crown failed to comply with the notice rules, there was no improper motive.

The court concluded it was in the interests of justice to dispense with compliance with the rules, as the defence suffered no prejudice.

The accused brought a recusal application during the second day of trial on an assault charge, alleging that the trial judge had previously heard a guilty plea from the accused on a related offence approximately four and a half years earlier.

The defence argued that a judge who has heard a plea cannot preside over a subsequent trial involving the same accused and requested that the judge recuse himself and declare a mistrial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused failed to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the prior judicial dealings.