Tom Meehan

The accused, Anthony Bruzzese, was charged with attempted murder after allegedly stabbing Mr. M. twice in the abdomen.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of Mr. Karcz, an eyewitness, and Mr. M., the victim, despite their intoxication and memory gaps.

The defence argued for reasonable doubt due to the possibility of self-inflicted wounds and the absence of forensic evidence linking the accused to the stabbing.

The court found Mr. Karcz's and Mr. M.'s testimonies credible and reliable, despite minor inconsistencies and the victim's recovered memories.

The court dismissed the self-inflicted wound theory and the significance of absent forensic evidence given the overwhelming direct and circumstantial evidence.

The court concluded that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally stabbed the victim with intent to kill.

Jessica Martin applied for interim release from custody pending trial on charges including first-degree murder, forcible confinement, possession of stolen property, and obstruction of justice.

The murder charge carried a reverse onus for bail.

The court assessed the Crown's case, noting its weakness on the murder charge but strength on the obstruction charges due to intercepted communications and self-incriminating statements.

Despite the proposed supervision plan by her parents, the court found a substantial likelihood that the accused would interfere with the administration of justice if released, given her past actions and apparent willingness to deceive her sureties.

The application for bail was denied on the secondary ground, with the tertiary ground also supporting detention for the non-murder charges.

The defendant, Michael Naser Philib Zakhari, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Crown conceded reasonable doubt on the sexual assault charge.

The core issue for sexual interference was the defence of mistaken belief in age, specifically whether the defendant honestly believed the complainant was 16 or older and took all reasonable steps to ascertain her age.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable regarding impairment and inconsistencies.

Based on the evidence, including that the complainant and her friends actively misrepresented her age as 18, the court found that the defendant honestly believed the complainant was 18 and took all reasonable steps to ascertain her age.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.

He argued the trial judge erred by using his roadside statement to assess credibility and by finding no breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights when the arresting officer allegedly steered him to duty counsel instead of facilitating contact with his counsel of choice.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found the roadside statement was admissible, but concluded the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in the s. 10(b) analysis, specifically in finding that a second reading of the rights at the detachment cured any defects in the initial roadside explanation.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

This is a sentencing decision for a second impaired driving conviction.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence under section 12 of the Charter and sought the judge's recusal due to alleged bias.

The court dismissed both the recusal motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias from prior proceedings or alleged trial errors, and the Charter challenge, determining that the appropriate sentence was equal to or greater than the minimum.

The court imposed a 30-day sentence, a 3-year driving prohibition, and 2 years of probation.

The appellant was convicted of possessing and accessing child pornography.

The sole issue at trial was the defence of legitimate educational purpose under s. 163.1(6) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge rejected this defence, finding the appellant's evidence not credible and lacking an objective connection to an educational purpose, and also found an undue risk of harm to minors.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's decision to allow Crown reply evidence, the assessment of the educational purpose's merit, and the finding of undue risk of harm.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on the admissibility of reply evidence and the lack of a legitimate educational purpose.

The defendant sought a review of his detention order, arguing errors by the Justice of the Peace and a material change in circumstances due to a revised release plan and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found a material change in circumstances, allowing for review, but ultimately dismissed the application.

The proposed release plan was deemed insufficient to mitigate the substantial risk of reoffending on the secondary ground and to maintain confidence in the administration of justice on the tertiary ground, despite the pandemic.

The defendant was charged with two counts of breaching an Officer in Charge Undertaking by communicating with Maria Barakza in July 2018 and November 2018.

The defendant was self-represented with section 486 appointed counsel preventing direct cross-examination of the complainant.

The court found the defendant guilty of the July 2018 breach based on corroborating testimony from the defendant's brother, but acquitted on the November 2018 breach due to concerns regarding the ineffectual cross-examination of the complainant by appointed counsel and the resulting inability to properly assess the complainant's credibility and reliability.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's evidence was uncontested.

The sole issue was whether the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter was breached.

The accused argued that his waiver of the right to counsel was equivocal and that police should have taken further steps to explain his rights.

The court found that the accused's initial response of "I guess so" constituted a positive assertion of the right to counsel, placing the burden on the Crown to prove an informed and unequivocal waiver.

The court determined that the Crown satisfied this burden, as the accused was adequately informed of his rights on multiple occasions, including information about free duty counsel, and his waiver was clear and unequivocal despite his expressed uncertainty and emotional state.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking in persons contrary to section 279.01 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought the mandatory minimum sentence of four years imprisonment.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum under section 12 of the Charter, arguing it was grossly disproportionate to his circumstances.

The court found the mandatory minimum infringed section 12 and could not be justified under section 1.

The court determined an appropriate sentence of 21 months was warranted based on the circumstances of the offence and offender, and declared the mandatory minimum invalid in these proceedings.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code, with 76 pictures found on his computer.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted for six months custody.

The court addressed two issues: (1) the parameters for enhanced pre-sentence custody credit for harsh jail conditions, and (2) the scope of a section 161 order.

The court declined to award credit exceeding the statutory 1.5:1 ratio but considered harsh conditions through collateral consequence analysis.

The court imposed a comprehensive section 161 order restricting the offender's access to children, public spaces, employment, and digital communications for ten years, based on the absence of a risk assessment and the serious nature of child pornography possession.

The accused was charged with "over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood).

The Crown alleged the accused was in care and control of a vehicle at a pizza parlour after consuming alcohol.

The defence raised Charter issues regarding the reliability of the Approved Screening Device (ASD) test due to recent consumption of alcohol and alleged breaches of the right to counsel through improper funneling to duty counsel.

The court found the accused was in care and control of the vehicle, rejected Charter arguments, and convicted the accused of the charge.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, having relied only on suspicion.

The court excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed both charges.

The court also found insufficient evidence of impairment independent of the breath tests.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres in his blood.

The Crown withdrew the impaired charge during trial.

The court addressed two issues: whether the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make a demand, and whether the breath certificate was properly served pursuant to section 258(7) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on speeding, lane deviation, glassy and watery eyes, odour of alcohol, difficulty locating identification, and inconsistent statements about alcohol consumption.

However, the court found the Crown failed to prove proper service of the certificate of analysis, as the officer showed but did not give the certificate to the accused, and there was no evidence it was provided in disclosure.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging warrantless seizure of financial and customer information from various entities (UPS, GTA Financial, Buduchnist Credit Union, Cash House, Money Market) during a fraud investigation.

The court found that while there was an expectation of privacy in financial affairs, the applicant had left a "public trail of breadcrumbs." Minor Charter breaches were identified regarding the warrantless acquisition of specific banking account information.

However, the court dismissed the application, concluding that the breaches were minor, the officer acted in good faith, and the evidence should be admitted under a s. 24(2) analysis to serve the truth-finding function of the trial, especially given the serious nature of the alleged fraud.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown established through witness testimony that the accused operated his vehicle erratically, crossing lane markings multiple times and nearly causing collisions.

Police observed similar erratic driving and detected the odour of alcohol upon approach.

Breathalyzer tests confirmed blood alcohol levels of 188 and 186 milligrams per 100 millilitres.

The accused raised multiple Charter violations including claims of degrading treatment, arbitrary detention, racial discrimination, improper search, failure to inform of arrest reasons, trial delay, procedural abuse, denial of counsel of choice, and denial of French language services.

The court rejected all Charter claims and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while impaired.

He argued the trial judge erred by rejecting the evidence of his stepson solely because of their familial relationship.

The summary conviction appeal judge found that the trial judge properly assessed the stepson's credibility, noting the witness was not forthcoming during cross-examination and had only observed the appellant for a few seconds.

The trial judge's preference for the arresting officer's detailed evidence of the appellant's erratic driving and signs of impairment was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with two counts of mischief to property and one count of assault.

The defence brought an application to find the complainant (the accused's spouse) incompetent to testify on the mischief charges.

The court held that while a spouse is generally incompetent to testify against the other spouse, exceptions exist where the charge involves the person, liberty, or health of the witness spouse.

The court found that the mischief charges, arising from separate incidents and not involving threats or violence to the spouse's person, liberty, or health, fell outside the exception.

The spouse was therefore found incompetent to testify on the mischief charges.