Derek Robert Freeman

The applicant, charged with robbery, applied under s. 8 of the Charter to exclude CCTV video surveillance taken from an elevator in his condominium building, which police obtained without a warrant.

The Crown conceded that if the video was excluded, the search warrant for the applicant's residence would be invalid.

The court found that the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common area elevator video, as it was apparent that security cameras were present and the observations were unobtrusive and mundane.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that s. 8 was not engaged and, alternatively, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The applicant, Jessica Martin, sought a review of her bail denial after being charged with several offences, including first degree murder (later dropped), kidnapping, obstructing justice, accessory after the fact to murder, aggravated assault, and assault causing bodily harm.

The Court considered whether there was a material change in circumstances, legal error, or whether the detention was "clearly unwarranted." The Court found no material change, no legal or palpable and overriding error, and that the decision to detain was reasonable.

The application was dismissed.

Prajaphan Sivashothy was found guilty by a jury of possession for the purpose of trafficking 55.78 grams of fentanyl.

This decision concerns his sentencing.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the deadly nature and quantity of fentanyl and the high moral culpability involved in trafficking such a substance.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and positive rehabilitation prospects, tempered by a lack of insight into his actions.

The Crown sought a 6.5-year custodial sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence.

The court determined that a conditional sentence was inadequate given the gravity of the offence and the strong need for denunciation and deterrence, imposing a sentence of 5 years in prison, a mandatory DNA order, and a 10-year s. 109 prohibition.

The request to waive the victim surcharge was denied.

Jessica Martin applied for interim release from custody pending trial on charges including first-degree murder, forcible confinement, possession of stolen property, and obstruction of justice.

The murder charge carried a reverse onus for bail.

The court assessed the Crown's case, noting its weakness on the murder charge but strength on the obstruction charges due to intercepted communications and self-incriminating statements.

Despite the proposed supervision plan by her parents, the court found a substantial likelihood that the accused would interfere with the administration of justice if released, given her past actions and apparent willingness to deceive her sureties.

The application for bail was denied on the secondary ground, with the tertiary ground also supporting detention for the non-murder charges.

Gary Junichi Nishikawara pleaded guilty to second-degree murder of his 95-year-old mother.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the victim's vulnerability, breach of trust, multiple injuries inflicted, and the concealment of the body.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, lack of prior criminal record, the offender's age and failing health, and the harsh conditions of his pre-sentence detention.

The Crown sought a 16-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence argued for the minimum 10 years.

The court ultimately imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 13 years, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, applied for bail pending a retrial ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The court found that the applicant failed to meet his burden to show that his detention was not justified on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The proposed release plan was deemed insufficient to mitigate the risk of reoffending or interfering with the administration of justice, and the strong circumstantial case against the applicant necessitated his continued detention to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to second degree murder for stabbing his intimate partner to death.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 16 to 17 years, while the accused sought the minimum 10 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the killing, the breach of trust, and the aggravating factor of intimate partner violence, balanced against the mitigating factors of a guilty plea, lack of prior record, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 15 years.

In a first-degree murder trial involving a domestic homicide, the Crown sought to introduce various out-of-court statements and text messages.

The court ruled on the admissibility of this evidence, applying the Barton framework for prior sexual conduct and the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court admitted text messages arranging a sexual encounter as evidence of the accused's motive, but excluded them as evidence of the deceased's state of mind.

The court also admitted several of the accused's prior statements as admissions, while excluding certain hearsay statements made by the deceased to her estranged husband for lack of threshold reliability.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, applied for a stay of proceedings or an increase in juror remuneration, arguing that the current payment framework under the Administration of Justice Act breaches his ss. 11(d) and 11(f) Charter rights by excluding lower-income individuals and creating an unrepresentative jury.

The court dismissed the application, finding that jury representativeness depends on the random selection of the jury roll, not diversity, and that the applicant failed to provide evidence that financial hardship disproportionately affects lower-paid workers or that increased remuneration would resolve the issue.

The defendant brought a pre-trial Charter challenge to the requirement in the Criminal Code, the Juries Act, and a regulation under the Administration of Justice Act that all jurors be Canadian citizens.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was bound by the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, which directly addressed the issue.

The Crown and defence sought pre-trial rulings regarding the editing of police statements made by the accused, Mr. Lu and Mr. Dookhram, and an application for severance by Mr. Lu.

The court ruled on various excisions to Mr. Lu's statements, removing highly prejudicial opinions from his grandmother and questions about another witness's credibility, while retaining references to his homosexuality and the officer's interview techniques.

The court declined to edit out Mr. Dookhram's references to triads and fear, prioritizing fairness to him over minimal prejudice to Mr. Lu.

Finally, the court dismissed Mr. Lu's application for severance, finding the preference for joint trials was not rebutted.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit expert evidence and the defence brought applications regarding jury selection, editing a co-accused's statement, and admitting third-party suspect evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The court ruled that the accused, an Indo-Caribbean man, could ask the standard Parks question during jury selection.

The court admitted the Crown's expert evidence on bloodstain pattern analysis and handwriting, finding it necessary and reliable.

The court declined to heavily redact the co-accused's police statement, opting instead for limiting instructions.

Finally, the court admitted hearsay evidence implicating a third-party suspect under the state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay.

The Crown appealed a decision granting the accused a preliminary inquiry.

The accused was charged with offences carrying a maximum 10-year sentence, but the Crown indicated intent to seek a dangerous offender designation, which could lead to indefinite detention.

The lower courts held that this potential indefinite detention entitled the accused to a preliminary inquiry under s. 535 of the Criminal Code, interpreting "punishable by 14 years or more of imprisonment" to include the overall penal jeopardy.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 535 unambiguously refers to the maximum sentence of the *offence charged*, not the potential outcome of a subsequent dangerous offender proceeding.

The court emphasized that dangerous offender proceedings are separate and relate to the offender, not the offence, and that the lower courts' interpretation contradicted Parliament's intent to restrict preliminary inquiries and would lead to absurd results contingent on prosecutorial discretion.

The offenders, two brothers, were convicted of second degree murder for the planned and deliberate killing of an innocent 17-year-old victim, whom they mistakenly believed was associated with a group that had previously robbed one of the offenders.

The Crown sought a 22-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 13-17 years, citing systemic anti-Black racism and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court found the murder to be exceptionally egregious, bordering on first degree murder, and sentenced both offenders to life imprisonment with a 20-year period of parole ineligibility, alongside mandatory weapons prohibitions and DNA orders.

The Crown applied for judicial review to quash a pre-trial judge's decision that the accused was entitled to a preliminary inquiry.

The accused was charged with assault offences carrying maximum sentences of 10 years, but the Crown gave notice of its intent to seek a dangerous offender assessment upon conviction.

The pre-trial judge found that the potential for an indeterminate sentence meant the offences were 'punishable by 14 years or more of imprisonment' under s. 535 of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that the pre-trial judge had jurisdiction to make the finding and correctly interpreted the provision by considering the accused's actual penal jeopardy.

The defendant sought a preliminary inquiry under section 535 of the Criminal Code despite being charged with offences carrying a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment, which falls below the fourteen-year threshold established by 2019 amendments.

The Crown provided notice of its intention to seek a Dangerous Offender designation, which could result in an indeterminate sentence.

The court held that the defendant was entitled to a preliminary inquiry, finding that the Crown's notice of intent to pursue a Dangerous Offender application fundamentally altered the defendant's potential penal jeopardy, bringing it within the scope of section 535 when interpreted purposively.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on the Crown's failure to make proper and timely disclosure of relevant video surveillance evidence, and the loss of some of that evidence.

The court found that the police were unacceptably negligent in failing to preserve all relevant video footage, resulting in a breach of the accused's rights under section 7 of the Charter.

However, the court concluded that the prejudice to the accused was minimal and could be adequately addressed by alternative remedies, including adjournments and a specific jury instruction regarding the lost evidence.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of two counts of second degree murder and two counts of wounding following an unprovoked public shooting.

The Crown sought consecutive periods of parole ineligibility totaling 30 years, while the defence sought concurrent periods of 12 years.

The court considered the offender's Indigenous background, difficult upbringing, and extensive criminal record.

The court imposed a life sentence with a total parole ineligibility period of 22 years for the murders, and concurrent 7-year sentences for the wounding counts.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a surviving victim of a shooting to testify behind a screen pursuant to s. 486.2 of the Criminal Code.

The witness suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and experienced significant anxiety about facing the accused.

The court granted the application, finding that the witness's mental disorder would make testifying difficult and that a screen would facilitate a full and candid account without interfering with the proper administration of justice.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the deceased victim to a police officer shortly after he was shot.

The victim provided a description of the shooter while pleading for his life.

The court ruled that the statements were not admissible as dying declarations because the victim did not have a settled expectation of death.

However, the court admitted the statements under the common law exception for spontaneous declarations, finding that the victim's mind was dominated by the shock of the shooting.

Alternatively, the court held the statements were admissible under the principled approach to hearsay due to sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.