Jennifer Armstrong

The accused, charged with firearms offences and driving while suspended, had been detained for over 90 days, triggering an automatic detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused had a lengthy criminal record, including a history of fleeing the jurisdiction and breaching court orders.

The court found that the proposed release plan, which included house arrest and an ankle bracelet, was insufficient to mitigate the risks.

The court concluded that continued detention was necessary on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds under s. 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant, Landyn Delaney, sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

The original Justice of the Peace had found detention justified on tertiary grounds.

The Superior Court found no error of law in the Justice of the Peace's application of the tertiary ground test but identified a material change in circumstances based on new evidence, including a more stringent release plan with two sureties (father and brother) and electronic monitoring.

The court concluded that, with the new plan, a reasonable member of the public would not lose confidence in the administration of justice if the applicant were released, considering his lack of prior record, youth, and the principle of restraint.

The application was allowed, and the applicant was released on strict conditions.

The accused, Steven Karapetrov, was on trial for attempted murder, discharge firearm, and related offences following a shootout captured on video.

The Crown conceded the attempted murder charge.

The court had to determine if Karapetrov fired shots, if they were accidental, and if self-defence applied.

The court found Karapetrov did fire shots, rejected the accidental discharge claim, but found that self-defence applied to some charges due to the imminent lethal threat he faced.

He was acquitted of pointing a firearm and reckless discharge, but convicted of possession of a restricted firearm, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and being an occupant in a vehicle with a prohibited firearm.

This ruling addresses an application by the defendant to determine whether the complainant's counsel has the right to cross-examine the defendant during a s. 276 hearing regarding the admissibility of evidence of other sexual activity.

The court held that while s. 278.94 of the Criminal Code allows the complainant to appear and make submissions, it does not grant a right to cross-examine witnesses.

The complainant remains a witness, not a party to the proceedings, and evidentiary matters fall within the purview of the Crown and Defence.

The defendant sought a preliminary inquiry under section 535 of the Criminal Code despite being charged with offences carrying a maximum sentence of ten years imprisonment, which falls below the fourteen-year threshold established by 2019 amendments.

The Crown provided notice of its intention to seek a Dangerous Offender designation, which could result in an indeterminate sentence.

The court held that the defendant was entitled to a preliminary inquiry, finding that the Crown's notice of intent to pursue a Dangerous Offender application fundamentally altered the defendant's potential penal jeopardy, bringing it within the scope of section 535 when interpreted purposively.

At the close of the Crown's case in a first degree murder trial, the accused brought applications for a directed verdict.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance, cell phone records, and motive, to establish that the accused planned and carried out the shooting.

Applying the test from Arcuri, the court found that the Crown's evidence, if believed, could reasonably support an inference of guilt.

The applications for a directed verdict were dismissed.

The applicant, O.M., sought to sever counts on a single indictment relating to two different complainants, Ms. D.K. and Ms. J.M., alleging various violent and sexual offences.

The court granted the severance motion, finding no factual or legal nexus between the sets of allegations, which were separated by five years.

The judge noted the risk of cross-pollination of credibility assessments and propensity reasoning if the charges were tried together, concluding that severance was required in the interests of justice despite limiting jury instructions.

The plaintiffs sought leave to amend their Statement of Claim to include claims for punitive and aggravated damages, and costs under the Victims' Bill of Rights, 1995, arising from a motor vehicle accident involving an impaired driver.

The defendants opposed, arguing the amendments constituted a new cause of action and would cause prejudice.

The court granted leave to claim punitive and aggravated damages and to plead impaired driving, finding these were not new causes of action and any prejudice could be remedied by costs or adjournment.

However, leave to claim costs under the Victims' Bill of Rights was denied, as impaired driving is not a prescribed offence under the relevant section of the Act.

A preliminary inquiry into the first-degree murder of Rala Fredrick, who was shot execution-style on George Street in Toronto on July 6, 2014.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on eyewitness testimony from individuals at a men's shelter who were under the influence of drugs and alcohol, combined with CCTV surveillance footage.

No direct evidence linked either defendant to the shooting, no gun was recovered, and no witness identified the shooter.

The judge found sufficient circumstantial evidence to commit both defendants to trial, though expressed serious reservations about the weakness of the case, particularly regarding eyewitness reliability and inconsistencies in their descriptions.

The Crown brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter seeking admission of a firearm and ammunition previously excluded after a finding that a search warrant was invalid and the search unconstitutional under s. 8.

Applying the three-part test from R. v. Grant, the court assessed the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, the impact of the breach on the accused’s privacy interests in his home, and society’s interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

Although the intrusion into a private dwelling was significant, the police acted in good faith pursuant to a judicially authorized warrant and did not deliberately or recklessly disregard Charter rights.

Given the reliability and central importance of the firearm evidence and the seriousness of the firearms offences, the balance favoured admission of the evidence.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped statement given by the accused to police following his arrest.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the statement, addressing issues of voluntariness and alleged violations of the accused's Charter rights under sections 10(a) and (b).

The central issue was whether police violated the accused's rights by failing to provide or offer a Tamil-speaking interpreter, thereby preventing the accused from exercising his right to counsel in a meaningful manner.

The Crown sought a ruling on the threshold admissibility of an out-of-court videotaped statement made by the deceased complainant to police regarding an alleged sexual assault.

The defence challenged admissibility on grounds of insufficient indicia of reliability, despite conceding the necessity requirement was met.

The court applied the functional approach from R. v. Khelawon and found the statement met the threshold reliability test based on inherent trustworthiness and adequate safeguards, despite the complainant's death and inability to be cross-examined.

The statement was admitted as part of the Crown's case.

The offender was convicted of carrying a loaded handgun in downtown Toronto.

The Crown sought a sentence of five to six years, while the defence sought the mandatory minimum of three years.

The court considered the offender's youth, remorse, and rehabilitative efforts as mitigating factors, and the carrying of a loaded weapon in public and breaches of bail as aggravating factors.

The court sentenced the offender to four years' imprisonment and declined to make a DNA order.

The offender was found guilty of second-degree murder for stabbing his mother to death.

The Crown sought a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years.

The court considered the profound breach of trust in a domestic relationship, the brutal nature of the attack involving multiple weapons, and the offender's criminal record.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 15 years.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused to police during a lengthy interrogation.

The court applied the Oickle framework to assess voluntariness.

While the initial portions of the interview were voluntary, the court found that the police crossed the line by suggesting the accused needed to 'spin' his story for the courts and that his lawyer would not investigate his side.

This constituted an improper inducement that overbore the accused's will.

The statements made after this point were ruled involuntary and inadmissible.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and one count of possession of a weapon dangerous.

On June 7, 2011, he robbed a bank teller and an innocent cyclist outside a bank while armed with a knife.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of approximately three years, while the defence sought time served.

The court imposed a sentence of time served with enhanced credit for pre-trial detention (19.5 months), suspended the passing of sentence, and placed the accused on probation for three years with conditions including psychiatric counselling, medication compliance, and no contact with victims.