Kelley Jane Bryan

The applicant, Martin Ngigi, brought an amended O'Connor application seeking extensive medical and school records of the complainant, J.G., a nine-year-old boy with muscular dystrophy, who alleged assault.

The application also involved a Mohan voir dire to admit expert evidence from Dr. Ken Berger regarding neuromuscular conditions and cognitive function to support the records request.

The court dismissed the Mohan voir dire, finding Dr. Berger's expert evidence was not relevant, necessary, or impartial.

Consequently, the court also dismissed the O'Connor application for further records, concluding that the requested information was not likely relevant to the issues at trial or necessary for the applicant's full answer and defence, and that the complainant's significant privacy interests outweighed any potential probative value.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision affirming a Consent and Capacity Board (CCB) finding that the appellant, S.H., was incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic treatment.

S.H. had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) and detained under the Ontario Review Board.

The core issue was S.H.'s capacity to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of taking or refusing treatment, particularly given his delusional disorder and religiously-toned beliefs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings, concluding that S.H.'s inability to recognize his mental condition and its manifestations prevented him from appreciating the consequences of treatment decisions.

The Court also addressed the interplay of Charter values, specifically freedom of religion, in capacity determinations, affirming that while such values are important, they do not alter a finding of incapacity when beliefs are a manifestation of a mental condition that precludes appreciation of treatment consequences.

The appeal and a fresh evidence motion were dismissed.

The defendant, Martin Ngigi, facing charges of Assault and Assault Bodily Harm, brought an application to qualify Dr. Ken Berger as an expert witness in neuromuscular conditions and cognitive function.

The Crown and counsel for the complainant conceded Dr. Berger's expertise in emergency medicine and trauma but disputed his qualifications in the other two areas.

Applying the Mohan test and the Pham factors for expert qualification, the court found Dr. Berger qualified to opine on neuromuscular conditions, noting his specialized knowledge beyond the trier of fact, despite some concerns about the breadth of his experience.

However, the court determined that Dr. Berger lacked sufficient specialized knowledge and experience to be qualified as an expert in cognitive function, citing vague and anecdotal evidence in that area.

The defendant, Martin Ngigi, charged with assault, brought an O'Connor application for the disclosure of the complainant J.G.'s extensive medical records related to muscular dystrophy and potential cognitive conditions.

The application sought to establish "likely relevance" to the mechanism of injury, credibility, reliability, and competence to testify.

The court dismissed the broad request for all records, finding insufficient evidentiary basis, particularly the lack of an affidavit, to establish "likely relevance" for most records.

However, the court found two specific outpatient records from J.G.'s muscular dystrophy specialist, proximate to the alleged incident, to be "likely relevant" for information on prescriptions, dosage, timing of medications, and the status of J.G.'s muscular dystrophy.

These two records were ordered to proceed to a Stage 2 review for potential disclosure to the defence, while the broader application was denied.

This case involves two consolidated applications concerning the estate of Veronica Bishop.

Carolyn Mae Reeves sought interpretation of the will regarding executor appointments and asset vesting, and an accounting from Anne Marie Veronica Inglis, a de facto executor.

Margaret Bishop, the deceased's daughter, sought dependant's relief, an accounting, and the removal of Anne Marie as executor.

The court determined that Anne Marie and Carolyn are the current executors.

It clarified that non-residence assets vested at the deceased's death, while residence proceeds vested upon sale.

The court ordered Anne Marie to provide a formal accounting.

Margaret was found to be a dependant and awarded $725,000 from her trust, inclusive of her share of the residue and dependant's support, subject to Anne Marie's proven expenses.

The decision on Anne Marie's removal as executor was adjourned pending the accounting.

This ruling addresses an application by the defendant to determine whether the complainant's counsel has the right to cross-examine the defendant during a s. 276 hearing regarding the admissibility of evidence of other sexual activity.

The court held that while s. 278.94 of the Criminal Code allows the complainant to appear and make submissions, it does not grant a right to cross-examine witnesses.

The complainant remains a witness, not a party to the proceedings, and evidentiary matters fall within the purview of the Crown and Defence.

The accused, D.B., was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, robbery, and other offenses involving two complainants, L.G. and E.H., on a single indictment.

D.B. applied to sever the charges relating to L.G. from those relating to E.H. and also sought to admit evidence under s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding L.G.'s past willing sexual services for drug debts.

The court granted the severance application, finding insufficient factual nexus between the incidents and a significant risk of propensity reasoning by the jury.

It also determined that the Crown's similar fact evidence application was unlikely to succeed.

The s. 276 application was dismissed, as the proposed evidence was deemed inadmissible under s. 276(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code, serving no purpose other than to support an inference of past consent, which is prohibited.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition finding that an NCR accused with schizophrenia and substance use disorders constituted a significant threat to public safety and ordering continued detention.

The appellant challenged the Board's application of the legal test for "significant threat" under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found the Board failed to properly apply the Winko standard by relying on speculative harm ("could" result) rather than assessing the real likelihood and seriousness of harm together.

The court allowed the appeal and returned the matter to the Board for a new hearing with proper legal analysis.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated February 6, 2018.

The appellant sought a conditional discharge from a detention order, arguing that the proposed conditional discharge terms would provide equivalent public protection.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but allowed it in part, finding that while the Board's refusal to order a conditional discharge was reasonable and supported by evidence, the Board had erred by failing to remove the 24-hour supervision requirement from the disposition.

The court amended the disposition to remove this phrase, allowing the appellant to continue his transition to less supervised community living.

The appellant appealed two dispositions of the Ontario Review Board following his finding of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for offences committed in January 2016.

The Board found the appellant suffered from delusional disorder and posed a significant threat to public safety, ordering his detention on a secure forensic unit.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge or conditional discharge to return to the community.

Amicus curiae argued the hearings were procedurally unfair and the disposition was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from the Initial Disposition as moot and upheld the Current Disposition, finding the Board conducted a fair inquisitorial hearing and the detention decision was reasonable and supported by evidence.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her involuntary psychiatric admission.

She sought a declaration that a forced injection of anti-psychotic medication violated her Charter rights and requested rescission of her detention certificate as a remedy.

The central issue was whether the Board has jurisdiction to grant remedies under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board does not have s. 24(1) Charter jurisdiction, despite having authority to decide questions of law.

The court found that the legislature clearly intended to exclude Charter remedies from the Board's jurisdiction based on the removal of s. 52(1) jurisdiction, strict statutory timelines, limited remedial powers, composition of the Board, and the availability of Superior Court appeals.