Glenn Peter Christie

The applicant, a Black municipal councillor, alleged he was subjected to racial profiling by a police officer.

After a Police Services Act (PSA) disciplinary hearing cleared the officer of misconduct, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) dismissed the applicant's human rights complaint under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, finding the matter had been appropriately dealt with.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court found the HRTO's decision unreasonable because it failed to apply or justify its departure from established Supreme Court of Canada and HRTO jurisprudence, which holds that it is generally unfair to use a PSA proceeding to bar a human rights complaint due to differences in purpose, standard of proof, and available remedies.

The HRTO decisions were set aside and remitted for a new hearing.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed his application alleging racial discrimination and reprisal against a newspaper, a hospital, and a press council.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the application for having no reasonable prospect of success was reasonable.

The Court also dismissed the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness, reasonable apprehension of bias, and systemic oppression against self-represented litigants.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The Attorney General for Ontario sought judicial review of an arbitration award between CUPE Local 27 and the Greater Essex County District School Board, arguing the arbitrator erred in interpreting s. 177 of the Education Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for the reasons given in a related Stated Case (2016 ONSC 2361), finding the result was the same regardless of whether the standard of review was correctness or reasonableness.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to CUPE Local 27.

The Minister of Education brought a Stated Case asking the Divisional Court to determine whether the Education Act permits school boards to pay for life insurance and health benefits for retired employees over 65 years of age.

The Minister argued that the Act only permits payments to current employees and that specific statutory authority is required for such expenditures.

The Court held that while ss. 177(3) and 177(4) do not authorize these payments, other sections of the Act, including ss. 58.5(1), 170(1)18, 171(1)3, and 177(1), when read together and in context, provide the necessary authority.

The Court found that school boards have the power to negotiate and pay for post-retirement benefits as part of employee compensation packages.

The proposed interveners, two unions, brought motions for leave to intervene in an application for judicial review concerning the payment of post-retirement benefits by a school board.

The judicial review was scheduled to be heard immediately after a related Stated Case in which both proposed interveners were already participating.

The court dismissed one union's motion to intervene, finding it could efficiently make its arguments in the Stated Case proceeding without prolonging the judicial review.

However, the court added the other union as a responding party because it was a joint signatory to the collective agreement at issue in the underlying arbitration.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitral award that dismissed a professor for just cause.

The underlying dismissal occurred in 2001, and the arbitral award was issued in 2002.

Due to various procedural steps, adjournments, and a late intervention by the dismissed professor raising jurisdictional arguments, the application did not proceed to a hearing until 2014.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for extreme delay, finding that relitigating a workplace dispute over a decade later would cause prejudice and bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial, the only remaining issue concerned the quantum of partial indemnity costs payable by the employer to the employee.

The employee sought over $455,000 in costs, including a large disbursement for services provided by a corporate entity associated with a lay witness who assisted counsel and testified at trial.

The court found several categories of claimed legal fees excessive, particularly for pleadings and trial preparation, and held that the defendant should not bear the cost of premium legal services retained by the plaintiff.

The court also significantly reduced the claimed disbursement for the lay witness’s advisory services, noting that much of the evidence was rejected and the invoices lacked sufficient detail.

Fees and disbursements were therefore substantially reduced.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision dismissing his grievances against the Police Services Board.

The arbitrator had ruled that the applicant lacked standing to proceed to arbitration because his police association refused to take carriage of the grievances.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding that under the Police Services Act and the collective agreement, an individual officer does not have the right to arbitrate a grievance against the employer without the association's support.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The respondent, a deputy chief of police, sought a declaration that the fixed-term provision in his employment contract was void after the police services board declined to renew it.

The application judge found the provision was a colourable device to bypass statutory termination procedures and declared it void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the judgment, finding no evidence of an ulterior motive.

The Court held that the expiry of a fixed-term contract does not constitute a dismissal under the Police Services Act, and that a three-year term does not undermine the independence required of a deputy chief.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitration award and a decision of the Ontario Police Arbitration Commission.

The arbitrator had dismissed a grievance regarding the inclusion of cadet service in the calculation of 'continuous active service' for a seniority premium, finding he lacked jurisdiction to define the term as the parties had not yet done so.

The Commission subsequently refused to appoint a conciliation officer, finding no notice to bargain had been given for the current collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determining the standard of review for the arbitration award was patent unreasonableness and for the Commission's decision was reasonableness.

The Court found neither decision met the threshold for intervention and dismissed both applications for judicial review.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his complaints of unlawful reprisal under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The applicant had been suspended twice by his employer following work refusals.

The Board found the discipline was imposed for threats and engaging in an illegal work stoppage, not for raising safety concerns.

The Divisional Court applied the patently unreasonable standard of review and dismissed the application, finding no reviewable error in the Board's factual determinations.

In an addendum regarding costs, the court considered the written submissions of the parties and the factors set out in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Applying the principle that costs must be reasonable and fair, the court fixed costs at $7,500 on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendant sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from orders dismissing its motion to decertify a wrongful dismissal class action and varying the process for adjudicating individual claims.

The defendant argued the motion judge erred in finding common issues and a workable plan, and in altering the application of Rule 49.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's orders and noting that the Class Proceedings Act provides broad discretion to manage individual issues.

The defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision dismissing its motion to decertify a wrongful dismissal class action and varying the process for adjudicating individual claims.

The class action involved former employees terminated after mass store closures.

The defendant argued the motion judge erred in finding common issues and a workable plan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's orders and noting that the Class Proceedings Act provides adequate mechanisms to handle individual issues.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that limited her long-term disability benefits and assessed her wrongful dismissal notice period at 12 months.

The respondent cross-appealed the calculation of short-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant failed to mitigate her disability by not seeking medical assistance.

The court increased the notice period to 18 months based on the Bardal factors.

The cross-appeal was dismissed, affirming that short-term benefits should be calculated on base pay and commissions.

The plaintiff appealed a Divisional Court decision setting aside a motion judge's order that appointed judges and judicial officers as referees to determine individual class members' claims under the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a court cannot appoint a judge or judicial officer to conduct a reference under s. 25(1)(b) of the Class Proceedings Act without first obtaining the authorization of the Chief Justice or her designate under s. 14(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The consent of individual judicial officers is not an adequate substitute for the Chief Justice's overarching responsibility for judicial assignments.

The employer, Great Blue Heron Gaming Company, and the Mississaugas of Scugog Island First Nation brought motions to stay a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) pending judicial review.

The OLRB had determined that the Ontario Labour Relations Act applied to the employer's casino operations on the reserve, rejecting the First Nation's argument that its own Labour Code applied pursuant to aboriginal rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Divisional Court dismissed the stay motions, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicants failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured allowing collective bargaining to proceed for the 800 employees who had voted for union representation over a year prior.

The appellant employer appealed a motion judge's order regarding the plaintiff employee's claim for long-term disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in finding the collective agreement's benefits terms fell within Brown & Beatty's third category.

The language of the collective agreement and Letter of Understanding clearly incorporated the benefits plan into the collective agreement, meaning disputes over entitlement must be submitted to arbitration.

The appeal was allowed and the civil action against the employer was dismissed.