Nick Papageorge

The moving parties brought an ex parte motion for an interim injunction to suspend the coming into force of provisions in Bill 97 that would exempt the Premier's cell phone call logs from disclosure under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The moving parties argued that the legislation violated section 2(b) of the Charter and that the records might be destroyed.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no arguable case, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the government.

The court awarded costs of $1,500 to the Attorney General.

The applicant, a Black municipal councillor, alleged he was subjected to racial profiling by a police officer.

After a Police Services Act (PSA) disciplinary hearing cleared the officer of misconduct, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) dismissed the applicant's human rights complaint under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, finding the matter had been appropriately dealt with.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court found the HRTO's decision unreasonable because it failed to apply or justify its departure from established Supreme Court of Canada and HRTO jurisprudence, which holds that it is generally unfair to use a PSA proceeding to bar a human rights complaint due to differences in purpose, standard of proof, and available remedies.

The HRTO decisions were set aside and remitted for a new hearing.

This endorsement addresses procedural directions for a motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario from a Divisional Court decision dismissing Adam Knauff’s application for judicial review of decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The moving party seeks clarification of the test for leave to appeal, referencing recent Court of Appeal decisions, and requested a five-judge panel.

The Court directs that the motion for leave to appeal will be heard orally, and sets timelines and procedures for intervention motions.

The appellant, a non-profit organization, sought public interest standing to bring nine applications for judicial review challenging decisions made by the Ontario Integrity Commissioner under the Lobbyists Registration Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the applications, finding the appellant lacked standing.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the applications did not raise a serious justiciable issue as they merely challenged individual exercises of discretion rather than statutory interpretation.

The Court also agreed that the applications were not a reasonable and effective means to bring the issues before the courts, as they would conflict with the statutory scheme and its strict confidentiality provisions.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding that his 'ethical veganism' was not a creed under the Human Rights Code.

Prior to the decision, the parties had settled the underlying complaints, withdrawing them and agreeing not to refile, though preserving the right to seek judicial review on the preliminary issue.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review on the basis of mootness, finding no live controversy remained between the parties and declining to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision striking his defamation claim against his former employer.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis that a termination letter sent to an employment agency was not 'published' to the public, and alternatively, that the appellant failed to provide notice under s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that publication to a single third party satisfies the test for defamation, and that the s. 5(1) notice requirement does not apply to private emails or letters.

The defamation claim was restored.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision dismissing his application alleging age discrimination in credit card travel insurance.

The HRTO had dismissed the application at a preliminary hearing, finding that s. 22 of the Human Rights Code applied.

The Divisional Court granted the judicial review, finding that the adjudicator made a fundamental error by placing the onus on the applicant to prove that s. 22 did not apply, rather than on the respondents seeking to benefit from the exception.

The HRTO decisions were quashed and the matter was remitted for a new preliminary hearing before a different adjudicator.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Canadian Human Rights Commission's decision to dismiss his complaint of employment discrimination against his former employer.

The applicant argued the investigation was insufficient and the decision unreasonable.

The Federal Court found the Commission's decision unreasonable because the investigation report failed to analyze the core allegation that workplace harassment caused the applicant to fall sick, a flaw the Commission itself had previously acknowledged but never remedied.

The application was granted and the matter remitted back to the Commission.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside an order quashing nine judicial review applications on the basis that it lacked public interest standing.

The Divisional Court panel found no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's application of the test for public interest standing.

The motion judge correctly concluded that the applications did not raise a serious justiciable issue transcending specific individual interests and that judicial review was not a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

The motion was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, which denied his request to amend his application and dismissed his application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of age, race, and colour by the Toronto Transit Commission.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Tribunal reasonably concluded the application had no reasonable prospect of success, as there was no evidence linking the failure to hire with the applicant's age, race, or colour.

The court also found the Tribunal reasonably denied the request to amend the application.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

This appeal concerned the procedural fairness requirements when a court, on its own motion, strikes the pleadings of a self-represented Indigenous party for alleged contempt and abuse of process.

The motion judge had found the appellant, an alleged protest leader, in defiance of court orders, struck his pleadings, and granted a permanent injunction with significant costs.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by conflating contempt and abuse of process, failing to provide the appellant with adequate procedural safeguards, and denying him a fair opportunity to be heard, especially given his self-represented and Indigenous status.

The appeal was allowed, the orders striking pleadings and granting the permanent injunction were set aside, and the costs award was also set aside.

The applicant, Chair of the City of Hamilton's LGBTQ Advisory Committee, sought judicial review of an Integrity Commissioner's report finding he breached the code of conduct by disclosing confidential information, and the City Council's subsequent decision to reprimand him.

The applicant argued the Integrity Commissioner lacked jurisdiction because the advisory committee was not a 'local board' under the Municipal Act, 2001, and that the process was procedurally unfair.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it was reasonable to interpret 'local board' as including the advisory committee, and that the applicant was afforded procedural fairness throughout the investigation and council proceedings.

The applicant sought judicial review of two Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decisions that dismissed his appeal regarding a freedom of information request for police records.

The IPC found that the applicant's request was barred by the doctrines of issue estoppel and collateral attack, as the records at issue had already been adjudicated in a prior 2003 proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's application of issue estoppel and collateral attack was reasonable, and that there was no denial of procedural fairness.

The Ontario Integrity Commissioner brought a motion to quash nine applications for judicial review commenced by Democracy Watch.

Democracy Watch sought to challenge decisions made by the Commissioner under the Lobbyists Registration Act, 1998 regarding investigations into alleged lobbyist wrongdoing.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that Democracy Watch lacked public interest standing because the applications did not raise a serious justiciable issue and were not a reasonable and effective way to bring the issues before the courts, as they conflicted with the private interests and statutory privacy protections of the investigated lobbyists.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the successful defendant sought costs of $78,104.24 on a full indemnity basis.

The defendant, a lawyer, claimed costs for his own time spent as a self-represented litigant before retaining counsel.

The court found that full indemnity costs were not appropriate and that the time claimed by the defendant for his own work was excessive and not fully attributable to lost remunerative activity.

The court fixed the defendant's costs at $45,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario's decision declining to reactivate her application after a workplace grievance was withdrawn.

The Tribunal found she failed to provide a reasonable explanation for her delay in requesting reactivation, as her medical evidence did not establish she was prevented from pursuing her legal rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable, its assessment of the medical evidence entitled to deference, and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The plaintiff brought a defamation action against the defendant regarding Twitter posts that highlighted the plaintiff's past involvement with white supremacist organizations and criticized the City of Hamilton for employing him in its IT department.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court granted the motion, finding that while the defamation claim had substantial merit, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant had no valid defences of fair comment and justification.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish that the harm he suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expressions regarding municipal accountability and public safety.

The plaintiff, a retired insurance producer, brought a summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that both 'assigned' and 'developed' clients should be included in the calculation of his deferred compensation pool under his employment contract.

The defendant employer argued that only 'developed' clients were included.

The court found no ambiguity in the employment contract, concluding that the clear language of the agreement allocated only 'new customers' (developed clients) to the deferred compensation pool.

The plaintiff's motion and claim were dismissed.

RBC Dominion Securities Inc. (RBCDS) sought leave to amend its statement of defence to a counterclaim by Jeffrey Kowal, introducing new grounds for his employment termination.

Kowal did not oppose the amendment but sought compensation for prejudice in costs.

The court granted leave to amend, finding that while RBCDS was successful in obtaining the amendment, Kowal was more successful on the issue of terms, particularly costs.

The court ordered RBCDS to pay Kowal $10,000 in costs as a condition of filing the amended defence, acknowledging the delay by RBCDS and the additional work required by Kowal.