Lara Kinkartz

Following an appeal that was allowed in part, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The appellant sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $59,600, while the respondent argued each party should bear their own costs.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Divisional Court awarded costs to the appellant fixed at $40,000 all inclusive.

The applicant, a municipal councillor, sought judicial review of an Integrity Commissioner's decision finding he breached the municipal Code of Conduct by disclosing confidential and solicitor-client privileged information to external legal counsel.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Integrity Commissioner's decision was reasonable because the applicant lacked authority to waive the municipality's privilege or disclose confidential procurement documents.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness during the investigation.

The appellant pharmacist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding he committed professional misconduct by breaching a condition prohibiting him from dispensing to or interacting with minors unsupervised.

The Divisional Court found the Committee interpreted the condition over-broadly and made palpable and overriding errors of fact regarding three of the four alleged breaches.

The appeal was allowed in part, three findings of misconduct were set aside, and the penalty and costs orders were remitted to the Committee for redetermination.

The College's cross-appeal seeking revocation of the appellant's certificate was dismissed.

The applicant dentist sought judicial review of a Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) decision confirming an Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) order requiring him to complete a specified continuing education or remediation program (SCERP) on informed consent.

The order arose from a patient complaint regarding the administration of conscious sedation during a wisdom tooth extraction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the ICRC's concerns about the lack of one-on-one communication and the applicant's reliance on staff for informed consent were supported by the record, making the HPARB's confirmation of the decision reasonable.

The applicant, Chair of the City of Hamilton's LGBTQ Advisory Committee, sought judicial review of an Integrity Commissioner's report finding he breached the code of conduct by disclosing confidential information, and the City Council's subsequent decision to reprimand him.

The applicant argued the Integrity Commissioner lacked jurisdiction because the advisory committee was not a 'local board' under the Municipal Act, 2001, and that the process was procedurally unfair.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it was reasonable to interpret 'local board' as including the advisory committee, and that the applicant was afforded procedural fairness throughout the investigation and council proceedings.

The Medical Officer of Health for Haldimand-Norfolk appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board (HSARB) that struck down a requirement limiting the number of migrant farm workers to three per bunkhouse during their mandatory 14-day COVID-19 self-isolation period.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the HSARB erred in law by applying too high a standard of proof, failing to consider that the directive was a class order, and incorrectly concluding that the three-person limit was arbitrary.

The court restored the original order, emphasizing the precautionary principle and the vulnerability of migrant farm workers.

Three groups brought motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in an appeal from a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board.

The underlying appeal concerned a medical officer of health's order limiting migrant farm workers to a maximum of three persons per bunkhouse to prevent the spread of COVID-19.

The court granted leave to intervene to the human rights organization and a coalition of legal clinics, finding they would make useful and distinct contributions regarding international human rights and the specific vulnerabilities of migrant workers.

The court dismissed the motion by the religious organization, finding it had not demonstrated a unique legal perspective or expertise.

The appellant, a small distillery, challenged the LCBO's 139.7% mark-up on spirits sold at its on-site retail store, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax under sections 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The application judge dismissed the challenge, finding the mark-up was a proprietary charge and not a tax, and that the appellant had voluntarily agreed to it by contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the LCBO, as the owner of the spirits under the contract, was exercising its private law rights to determine prices in a commercial context.