Bradley J. Greenshields

The defendant brought a s. 276 application to cross-examine the complainant on five lines of inquiry regarding her past sexual activity and non-disclosure, aiming to challenge the link between the alleged assault and pregnancy.

The court allowed inquiry into the complainant's understanding of pregnancy-causing sexual activity, her initial denial of sexual activity, and whether other sexual activities could have caused pregnancy, with limitations.

However, the court disallowed questioning on the non-disclosure of alleged assaults by the defendant's brothers and the nature and circumstances of those alleged assaults, finding them irrelevant or unduly prejudicial and offending the collateral fact rule.

The decision emphasizes balancing the accused's right to full answer and defence with the protection of the complainant under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, R.M., appealed convictions for attempted abduction of his son and assault of another boy.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the actus reus of attempted abduction by failing to apply s. 24(2) of the Criminal Code, which designates this as a question of law for the judge.

The court quashed the attempted abduction conviction and substituted it with a conviction for unlawful confinement, lifting the conditional stay on that charge.

The appeal against the assault conviction was dismissed, as were arguments regarding unlawful confinement jury instructions.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, sought an "order in aid" to compel the complainant's parents to disclose the names and contact information of her therapists.

This information was required to facilitate an application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code for the production of therapy records.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the statutory regime for third-party record production requires the applicant to identify the specific record and the person in possession or control of it.

The court found that the Criminal Code does not contemplate a discovery process or an "order in aid" to obtain the identity of record holders, and that the complainant's parents were not "record holders" as defined by the Code.

The applicant, G.G., facing sexual assault charges, brought a motion seeking direction on whether sections 276 and 278.93 of the Criminal Code applied to the proposed impeachment of the complainant, E.B., based on her inconsistent police statement.

The Crown argued that a s. 276 application was required.

The court ruled that s. 276 did not apply, allowing the defence to cross-examine the complainant on her January 23, 2020 statement without a s. 276 application, emphasizing that the evidence related to the very sexual activity alleged, not prior sexual history.

The applicant, Clara Eva Boros, sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order to surrender her to Romania for extradition.

The Minister's decision regarding the significant delay in the extradition process, spanning over 18 years, was found to be unreasonable due to a lack of transparent investigation into when Romanian authorities became aware of the applicant's presence in Canada and an insufficient explanation for the delay on the Canadian side.

The Court of Appeal allowed the application, remitting the matter back to the Minister for reconsideration with specific directions for further inquiry and explanation regarding the delays.

An applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order to surrender him to the United States to face drug trafficking and conspiracy charges.

The applicant argued that surrender would be unjust or oppressive due to serious health conditions including schizophrenia, epilepsy, and prostate cancer, and that extradition would cause significant harm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Minister's decision, finding that the Minister applied the correct legal test under section 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act, properly considered the overall effects of surrender including available medical care in the U.S., and was entitled to rely on information from U.S. authorities regarding treatment availability.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of impaired operation of a vessel causing bodily harm arising from a boating accident.

The appellant had consumed alcohol throughout the day and evening before taking control of a boat in unfamiliar waters at dusk, resulting in a collision with an island that ejected two passengers.

The trial judge convicted based on the totality of circumstances, including the appellant's conduct, alcohol consumption, and expert evidence regarding blood alcohol concentration.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding it was reasonable and supported by evidence.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence and raised a Charter argument regarding the breathalyzer demand that had not been raised at trial, which the court declined to hear.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the victim surcharge order was quashed, but the sentence itself was upheld as within the normal range for the offence.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States to stand trial for Internet luring and child exploitation offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal order and dismissed the application for judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The majority found that the search warrants were valid, that the extradition judge did not err in applying the disclosure test, and that the Minister reasonably exercised her discretion in ordering surrender.

The dissent argued that the extradition judge applied the wrong disclosure test and exercised discretion unreasonably, rendering the hearing unfair.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder arising from the deaths of two sex trade workers found in different locations in the Niagara Region approximately 29 months apart.

Both victims died of blunt-force trauma to the head, and blood of both victims was found in the appellant's residences.

The trial judge admitted evidence of one count as similar act evidence on the other count and refused to sever the counts.

The trial judge also refused to discharge a juror who had a prior acquaintance with the victim's stepmother, and declined to leave manslaughter as an included offence.

The Court of Appeal found multiple errors: the similar act evidence did not meet the required threshold of striking similarity, the juror should have been discharged to preserve the appearance of fairness, and manslaughter should have been left to the jury.

The court also addressed a Charter breach regarding live monitoring conditions in wiretap authorizations but found the evidence admissible under section 24(2).

The accused, Jeetinder Gill, was charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The Crown did not pursue attempted murder.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of multiple witnesses, including the complainant and his associates, finding their testimonies to be inconsistent, self-serving, and unreliable, particularly regarding alcohol and drug consumption and the events leading to the stabbing.

Objective evidence from a hotel guest and manager contradicted the complainant's narrative of a peaceful interaction.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the stabbing.

An acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failing to provide the necessaries of life to his blind and cognitively impaired mother and sister, resulting in their deaths from starvation and septic shock respectively.

The appellant also appealed his sentence of 18 years (8 years consecutive for criminal negligence in his sister's death and 10 years for manslaughter in his mother's death).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal.

The court found that while the verdicts were inconsistent (acquittal on manslaughter but conviction on criminal negligence for the sister's death), the criminal negligence conviction was reasonable and supported by evidence, whereas the manslaughter acquittal arose from a manifest legal error.

The court admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's cognitive limitations on the sentencing issue and reduced the global sentence to 14 years, minus presentence custody credit of 1,405 days, resulting in a net sentence of 10 years and 2 months.

The Crown appealed an acquittal resulting from the exclusion of evidence of child pornography under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The respondent was charged with possessing and accessing child pornography.

Police seized a family computer from the home co-owned by the respondent and his common-law spouse without a warrant, based on the spouse's consent.

The computer was retained for four months without judicial authorization before a warrant was obtained to search it.

The application judge found multiple Charter violations and excluded the evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the basis that the application judge erred in finding the spouse could not consent to the seizure, and conducted a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, ultimately admitting the evidence and ordering a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to import and importing heroin following a jury trial.

He received concurrent sentences of 16 years in penitentiary, less 4 months pre-disposition credit.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his convictions on six grounds, including issues relating to the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the co-conspirators' exception, post-arrest statements, travel history evidence, and jury instructions regarding a Vetrovec witness.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal from conviction and, while granting leave to appeal sentence, dismissed the sentence appeal as well.

The applicant, Marco Viscomi, brought a Charter application to exclude Canadian-gathered evidence from a second extradition application, alleging unlawful residential searches, improper execution of searches, unauthorized forensic searches, unlawful detention of seized items, and a breach of the affiant's duty of candour in obtaining a search warrant.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the search warrants were lawfully issued, the forensic searches were authorized, the detention of items was not contrary to the Charter, and there was no material breach of the duty of candour.

While acknowledging potential minor Charter breaches related to arbitrary detention, the court concluded that these were not serious and had no meaningful impact on the lawfulness of the evidence seizure, thus not warranting exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with possessing and accessing child pornography.

He brought a Charter application alleging violations of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and sought exclusion of computer-related evidence.

The court found that the police conducted a warrantless search of the accused's home computer relying solely on the consent of his common-law spouse, which was insufficient as a third party cannot waive another's Charter rights.

The police also failed to comply with sections 489.1 and 490 of the Criminal Code regarding the detention and reporting of seized property.

Additionally, the information to obtain the search warrant was misleading and incomplete.

The court excluded all computer-generated evidence and any derivative evidence.

In a murder prosecution, the court considered a voir dire on the voluntariness of several statements given by the accused to police in 2002.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to lack of a proper caution, deceptive investigative tactics, and the police use of evidence previously obtained in breach of the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights.

The court held that the absence of a caution and police deception did not undermine voluntariness, as the accused understood her right to silence and demonstrated sophistication during the interviews.

However, fairness concerns arose where police referenced material seized unconstitutionally from a gun locker.

The court ruled the statements voluntary but ordered that portions referring to that material be excised.

During a murder trial, the defence challenged the admissibility of a journal and cassette recording seized from a locked gun locker in the marital home, arguing the search violated the accused’s s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found the accused had not provided legally valid consent for police to open the locker and seize the items, resulting in a Charter breach.

Applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant, the court assessed the seriousness of the police conduct, the impact on the accused’s privacy interests, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits.

The police were found to have acted in good faith during the early stages of a homicide investigation and reasonably believed consent had been given.

Balancing the factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and ruled the items admissible.

The accused was charged with first degree murder in relation to the death of her spouse.

The Crown sought a ruling that multiple statements made by the accused to police during the investigation were voluntary and therefore admissible.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary because the accused had become the primary suspect during the investigation but was not cautioned, and police misled her about her status.

Applying the confessions rule and the operating mind doctrine, the court assessed the context of the interviews, the accused’s sophistication, and the absence of coercive police conduct.

The court concluded the accused understood she was speaking with police and that her statements could be used as evidence, and that the police conduct, including limited deception, did not undermine voluntariness.