Juliana Greenspan

The offenders, a police officer and an employee of the Public Guardian and Trustee, were convicted by a jury of defrauding an estate of over $830,000 using a forged will.

The employee was also convicted of breach of trust by a public official.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the complexity and duration of the fraud, the significant impact on the victim, and the offenders' abuse of their positions of public trust.

Both offenders were sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

The court also issued restitution and forfeiture orders for the full amount of the fraud.

The defence sought to exclude specific evidence related to the accused's infidelity and attempts to conceal it, arguing its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value in a circumstantial evidence case involving alleged will forgery.

The Crown contended this evidence was crucial to demonstrate the accused's motive and actions to prevent discovery of the alleged fraud.

The court dismissed the defence's application, finding the evidence highly relevant to the Crown's theory and that any prejudicial effect could be adequately mitigated by proper jury instructions.

The applicant sought a ruling to exclude evidence obtained from a motor vehicle's "Infotainment system" arguing that police searches violated sections 7 and 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that a warrantless search and a failure to make a return to a justice constituted Charter breaches.

However, the court determined that the search warrant itself was validly issued.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court concluded that the seriousness of the breaches was moderate, the impact on the applicant's privacy interests was limited, and society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits was strong due to the reliability and importance of the evidence.

Consequently, the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and the application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of photographic and video evidence against the accused, Raja Dosanjh, in a first-degree murder trial.

The defence objected to four photographs and one video.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect test, excluding one photograph (Exhibit 'A') due to its high prejudicial value outweighing its low probative value.

Three other photographs (Exhibit 'B') and one video (Exhibit 'C') were deemed admissible as circumstantial evidence related to identification, height, and mannerisms, with appropriate jury cautions to mitigate prejudice.

In a first-degree murder trial, the defence objected to the admissibility of various Crown documents (hotel records, telephone records, BC police surveillance) and sought a ruling to prevent the Crown from presenting its proposed theory of liability to the jury.

The court applied the probative value versus prejudicial effect balancing test and found most of the disputed evidence admissible, as it collectively supported the Crown's theory connecting the accused to the vehicle used in the killing and to co-conspirators.

However, Air Canada records related to the victim's travel were deemed inadmissible due to speculative relevance.

The defence's broader objection to the Crown's theory of liability was adjourned as premature, and the court affirmed that the jury could compare handwriting samples without expert testimony, provided proper instructions are given.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of various PowerPoint slides the Crown sought to use during a criminal trial.

The defence objected to specific elements, including a label on a DNA evidence slide implying a warrant was necessary, the relevance of an arrest photo taken a year after the alleged offence, and the potential for opinion evidence from an officer using video stills.

The court ruled that the DNA slide must be edited to remove the warrant reference, the arrest photo was admissible given the significance of identification, and the video stills were admissible provided prejudicial labels were removed and witness testimony avoided improper opinion.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of expert evidence in a first-degree murder trial, building upon a previous decision.

The court assessed the qualifications and proposed opinion evidence of several Crown experts: Jeremy Dupuis (forensic computer and digital analysis), Dr. Elena Bulakhtina (postmortem examination, adopting conclusions of the deceased Dr. John Fernandes), D/Cst.

Greg Kaut (phone analysis), and Mr. Beatty (functionality of BlackBerry phones).

The court found all experts qualified and their opinion evidence admissible, with counsel agreeing to redact inadmissible portions of the postmortem report for the jury.

The Crown sought to use the phrase "professional killing" in its opening and closing addresses to the jury in a first-degree murder trial, arguing it was an "umbrella term" supported by circumstantial evidence of planning and coordination.

The defence objected, arguing the phrase was prejudicial, irrelevant, and would lead to improper propensity reasoning, especially as the accused had no prior record and was not charged with criminal organization involvement.

The court found the phrase irrelevant and potentially irreparably prejudicial without an evidentiary basis at the opening stage, prohibiting its use in the Crown's opening address but allowing for reconsideration before closing arguments.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought a pre-trial ruling to admit ante-mortem hearsay statements and evidence of the deceased's past drug dealing to establish motive for a professional killing.

The defence argued the evidence was irrelevant, lacking a nexus between the deceased's background and the accused, and that motive was not a required element to prove.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the proposed evidence irrelevant to the issue of identity and highly prejudicial, as it would invite the jury to speculate without a direct connection to the accused.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought leave to cross-examine three police officers (D/Cst Brian Welsh, Julie Meier, and Constable Michael Ryder) in relation to a pre-trial motion to exclude electronic evidence obtained from a vehicle's infotainment system.

The defence argued the warrant for this evidence was invalid due to alleged s. 8 Charter breaches, material non-disclosure, or misleading information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) the warrant, particularly concerning a prior warrantless search.

The Crown agreed to Welsh's cross-examination but opposed Meier and Ryder.

The court granted leave to cross-examine all three officers, finding that the defence had met the "reasonable likelihood" standard that the cross-examination would assist in determining whether the issuing justice was materially misled by the ITO, thereby undermining the warrant process.

The defence brought a pre-trial motion for disclosure of communications between the investigating officer and the Crown attorney regarding an infotainment system warrant, following the Crown's filing of an affidavit by the officer.

The defence argued the materials were relevant to the officer's credibility and the validity of the warrant.

The Crown opposed, arguing the request was overly broad and a "fishing expedition." The court, following an in camera review of the requested documents, ordered the disclosure of specific emails and a volume of documents deemed relevant to the officer's credibility.

The defence moved for disclosure of legal advice provided to the Guelph Police Service, arguing that the police implicitly waived solicitor-client privilege by referencing legal advice in an Information to Obtain (ITO) a search warrant, thereby putting their good faith in issue.

The Crown and Guelph Police Service denied waiver.

The court distinguished the facts from R. v. Campbell, finding no illegal police activity and that the references to legal advice were part of a narrative for full disclosure, not an attempt to justify illegal activity.

The court held that the police did not implicitly waive privilege, and the defence's request for disclosure was dismissed.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness of statements made by the accused, Raja Dosanjh, during a police interview in a first-degree murder case.

The defence put the Crown to its burden of proving voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, without raising specific issues regarding promises, threats, or oppressive circumstances.

The court conducted a contextual analysis, considering factors such as the accused's demeanor, understanding of rights, and the absence of inducements, oppression, lack of operating mind, or trickery.

The court found that the accused voluntarily chose to speak to the officer and that the statements were admissible.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The court, acting as gatekeeper, reviewed the qualifications and reports of seven proposed expert witnesses.

While the defence conceded the admissibility of most experts, the court ruled on the scope of their evidence.

The court accepted experts in DNA analysis, photogrammetry, gunshot residue, and firearms examination.

However, the court expressed concerns regarding the clarity of reports and the current qualifications of two experts in phone analysis and phone functionality, requiring further clarification or a voir dire before their evidence could be admitted.

The accused pleaded guilty to abduction in contravention of a custody order.

She had abducted her daughter in 1993 when the child was approximately two years old, believing the child's safety was at risk.

The accused and child lived under assumed identities for 18 years until the accused's arrest in 2011.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day followed by two years of probation, finding that while general deterrence and denunciation are paramount in child abduction cases, the unique mitigating circumstances—including the accused's traumatic childhood, early guilty plea, remorse, and the victims' wishes for restorative justice—justified a community-based sentence rather than incarceration.