Shane Staniek

The accused was charged with multiple firearm offences after a .22 calibre rifle was discharged four times in a hospital parking lot, striking the tires of three parked vehicles.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance tracking the accused's vehicle and expert forensic evidence matching the spent casings to a rifle found in the accused's possession upon arrest.

The court found the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the shooter.

The accused was found guilty of careless use of a firearm and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, while the charge of discharging a firearm with recklessness was adjourned to address an error in the indictment.

Antonio Manzo was charged with four firearms-related counts stemming from an incident on May 6, 2020, where a Toyota Tundra was shot multiple times.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including civilian observations of the accused's vehicle near the scene, the subsequent discovery of a firearm (Ruger rifle) in his possession, and forensic evidence linking a spent shell casing from the scene to the Ruger.

The court found all Crown witnesses credible and concluded that the only reasonable inference from the evidence was that the accused fired the Ruger at the Tundra, causing the damage.

Manzo was found guilty on all counts.

The Crown sought to admit expert evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The court, acting as gatekeeper, reviewed the qualifications and reports of seven proposed expert witnesses.

While the defence conceded the admissibility of most experts, the court ruled on the scope of their evidence.

The court accepted experts in DNA analysis, photogrammetry, gunshot residue, and firearms examination.

However, the court expressed concerns regarding the clarity of reports and the current qualifications of two experts in phone analysis and phone functionality, requiring further clarification or a voir dire before their evidence could be admitted.

The accused were charged with discharging a firearm and mischief under $500 for firing a rifle into a residential home, narrowly missing an occupant.

The Crown alleged that Mohammed was the shooter and Rodney was the driver.

The Crown's case relied on direct and circumstantial identification evidence, which standing alone was insufficient to meet the requisite standard of proof.

The Crown also called a jailhouse informant to buttress the identification evidence.

The court found that while the informant was an unsavoury character with a lengthy criminal record, certain elements of his testimony were corroborated by evidence not available to the public, thereby enhancing his reliability.

The court concluded that the combination of identification evidence and the informant's testimony satisfied the Crown's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with robbery, assault causing bodily harm, and several firearms offences after attacking a drug dealer and stealing a bag of marijuana.

The accused pleaded guilty to the robbery and assault but contested the firearms charges, claiming he found the gun inside the stolen bag and did not bring it to the robbery.

Undercover police officers witnessed the robbery and testified that the accused used a handgun to pistol-whip the victim.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, applying the W.(D.) framework, and accepted the officers' evidence.

The court also found that although the seized handgun had a defective firing pin, it met the definition of a firearm because it could be readily adapted for use within a reasonable time.

The accused was found guilty of the firearms offences.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and two counts of aggravated assault following a shooting at a student pub.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury regarding a firearms expert's testimony on muzzle flash, delivered an unbalanced jury charge, and erred in the instruction on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's characterization of the expert evidence or the balance of the charge, and concluding that the error in the post-offence conduct instruction did not warrant setting aside the conviction.