Victoria Rivers

The accused, charged with multiple drug trafficking and proceeds of crime offences, brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings.

He alleged that police used excessive force during his arrest, resulting in a sprained ankle, and that officers stole $5,000 in cash during the search of his apartment.

The court dismissed the excessive force claim, finding the takedown was justified and the injury incidental.

However, relying on the accused's weekly drug transaction log and video evidence of the search, the court found on a balance of probabilities that police stole $5,000 from a laundry hamper.

To denounce this serious police misconduct and preserve the integrity of the justice system, the court granted a stay of all proceedings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and weapons offences, as well as his sentence.

He argued that the search of his residence was unreasonable, the trial judge failed to apply the rule in W.(D.), and the verdict was unreasonable based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Charter issue was not properly before the court and the trial judge correctly applied the relevant legal standards.

The sentence appeal was allowed in part to credit the appellant for 48 days of pre-sentence custody, reducing his sentence on one count.

The appellant appealed his sentence for multiple drug trafficking and firearms offences.

He argued the 14-year sentence was crushing and that the sentencing judge erred by treating his flight from police as an aggravating factor, given the presentence report detailed his negative experiences with police, including anti-Black racism.

The Court of Appeal rejected the first ground but agreed the trial judge's findings on flight were incongruent with her acceptance of his negative police experiences.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the net sentence was reduced from 11.5 years to 11 years.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple drug and firearms offences and was sentenced to a net term of just over 8 years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that new evidence of harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including lockdowns and triple-bunking, justified a reduction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge had implicitly accounted for the likelihood of harsh conditions when imposing a sentence at the bottom of the proper range.

The court also rejected arguments that the sentencing judge misapprehended the appellant's drug addiction or his role as a street-level dealer.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found the drugs in a concealed compartment of a vehicle he had abandoned following a shooting at a mall.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The court found that multiple other individuals had access to and used the vehicle, and there was no forensic evidence connecting the accused to the drugs.

The court concluded that it was reasonably possible someone else hid the drugs in the vehicle without the accused's knowledge, and therefore the Crown failed to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of fentanyl and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal raised four grounds: (1) whether the first case management judge erred in denying leave to cross-examine the affiant; (2) whether the second case management judge erred in dismissing the motion to relitigate the cross-examination application; (3) whether the application judge erred in rejecting the Charter section 8 challenge to the search warrant; and (4) whether the application judge erred in admitting evidence despite a violation of the appellant's section 10(b) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the convictions.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging his prosecution for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that the prosecution should be stayed as it offended the rule against double jeopardy following his conviction on institutional disciplinary charges; that the search of his cell violated s. 8 of the Charter; that questioning by correctional officers violated s. 10(b) of the Charter; and that evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court dismissed all arguments, finding that s. 11(h) does not apply to inmate disciplinary proceedings; that the search was properly authorized; that no s. 10(b) violation occurred; and that evidence exclusion was not warranted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings granted due to a breach of the respondents’ rights under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The court agreed with the trial judge that last-minute offering of earlier trial dates did not require defence counsel to be available, nor did it make any resulting delay attributable to the defence.

The court also found the case was not sufficiently complex to justify an exception to the Jordan framework, and the presence of a Garofoli application did not elevate the case’s complexity.

The applicant, T. D., brought Charter applications to exclude evidence obtained by police, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the applications related to sections 8 and 9, finding the search warrants and arrest lawful.

However, the court found breaches of section 10(b) due to an unreasonable delay in facilitating access to duty counsel and a failure by police to "hold off" from asking investigative questions before the applicant consulted counsel.

Applying the Grant analysis under section 24(2), the court determined that admitting the evidence found in the applicant's car would negatively impact public confidence in the justice system, and therefore excluded it.

The Crown appealed a stay of charges granted under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The trial judge found that defence counsel acted reasonably in not accommodating earlier trial dates offered by the Crown, which would have brought the case within the *Jordan* ceiling.

Consequently, the delay was not attributed to the defence, and the charges were stayed as the original schedule exceeded the 18-month ceiling.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of fact regarding defence counsel's reasonableness, noting it was entitled to deference, and found no error in the application of law, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of firearm possession and drug trafficking and appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that the information to obtain a search warrant (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds, specifically alleging the affiant misled the Justice of the Peace (JP) regarding the appellant's address and failed to establish reasonable grounds for drugs at his residence.

The Court of Appeal found that while the reviewing judge misapprehended one argument, it was immaterial as police observations provided sufficient grounds for the search warrant.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded credit for time served, and the Court granted enhanced credit (1.5:1) for 145 days, resulting in 217 days credit.

The sentence appeal was allowed.

The applicant, Andrew Rocha, sought a stay of proceedings for charges of possession of cocaine for trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, alleging police stole money and drugs during a search warrant execution, violating his s. 7 Charter rights.

The court found approximately $6000 of seized cash was missing and inferred it was taken by police officers involved in the investigation.

This misconduct was deemed an abuse of state power and a breach of s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Given the egregious nature of the police misconduct and the lack of an adequate alternative remedy, the court granted a stay of proceedings to dissociate the justice system from the impugned conduct, despite the strong societal interest in a trial on the merits.

Donovan Shah appealed his convictions for possession of heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal raised two grounds: whether the trial judge erred in denying leave to cross-examine the search warrant affiant regarding the inclusion of information about dismissed charges, and whether the trial judge improperly used Shah's pretrial silence to assess his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to deny cross-examination and concluding that the trial judge did not rely on pretrial silence in assessing credibility.

The appellant, Ryan Gomboc, appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and trafficking cocaine.

He challenged the trial judge's findings regarding the validity of a search warrant for one of his residences (6 Gibbon Drive), specifically arguing that the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) misled the issuing justice and that there were insufficient reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The trial judge had found the search warrant for another residence (32 Royal Oak Drive) invalid but admitted the seized cellphone under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the affiant did not mislead the justice and that there were sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to search 6 Gibbon Drive based on the appellant's conduct and police observations.

Consequently, a new s. 24(2) analysis was deemed unnecessary.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and heroin for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 8 Charter application to exclude drugs seized from his car and home.

The appellant challenged the sub-facial validity of the search warrants, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) was misleading and contained irrelevant information.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that, even after minor excisions, there was sufficient credibly-based probability to issue the warrants.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's use of amplification evidence on the voir dire, concluding the affiant acted in good faith.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine and heroin, and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and heroin.

During a police raid, the offender was found hiding in a bathtub, refused to comply with police directions, and was tasered, resulting in facial injuries.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the significant quantity of drugs and a lengthy criminal record, against mitigating factors such as mental health issues and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant, charged with possession of controlled substances and assaulting a police officer, brought Charter motions alleging breaches of his s. 7 and s. 8 rights during the execution of a search warrant.

The court found that the police use of force, including a Conducted Energy Weapon, was reasonable given the applicant's resistance and the belief he might be armed, dismissing the s. 7 claim.

While the court found a s. 8 breach occurred when an officer searched the applicant's jacket for identification after a safety pat-down, the evidence of drugs was admitted under s. 24(2) as the officer acted in good faith to assist the applicant.

The accused was charged with possession of a fentanyl/carfentanil mixture for the purpose of trafficking after police found the drugs in a locked safe in his bedroom closet.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge and control.

A defence witness testified that he shared the bedroom, had exclusive access to the safe, and that the drugs were his alone.

The court found the defence witness's evidence, while problematic, raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant, Peter Cowan, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and sought leave to appeal his nine-month sentence.

The conviction appeal centered on the trial judge's application of the burden of proof, specifically the "could reasonably be true" phrase in relation to the W.(D.) questions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that despite the inappropriate language, the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof.

Regarding the sentence, the parties agreed the trial judge misapprehended the likelihood of deportation.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence and varied it to a 12-month conditional sentence, considering the appellant's first-offender status, low-level trafficking, and mental disabilities.

The appellant, Bradley Kennedy, appealed his conviction for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred by admitting and relying on anecdotal expert testimony regarding typical personal use quantities of methamphetamine, citing R. v. Sekhon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion was grounded in objective facts, not inadmissible anecdotes, and that the trial judge did not rely on the impugned testimony.

The court also found the verdict was reasonable, as the trial judge was entitled to draw an inference of guilt after rejecting the appellant's testimony, given the significant quantity of drugs and lack of indicia of personal use.