Rutu Gadhia

The decision addresses an application by Rutal Alott Hankey for a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his case to trial.

The court applies the framework from R. v. Jordan, analyzing periods of delay attributable to the defence, the Crown, and systemic factors, as well as the impact of exceptional circumstances.

The court finds that the net delay exceeds the 30-month ceiling even after accounting for exceptional circumstances, and grants a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, T. D., brought Charter applications to exclude evidence obtained by police, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the applications related to sections 8 and 9, finding the search warrants and arrest lawful.

However, the court found breaches of section 10(b) due to an unreasonable delay in facilitating access to duty counsel and a failure by police to "hold off" from asking investigative questions before the applicant consulted counsel.

Applying the Grant analysis under section 24(2), the court determined that admitting the evidence found in the applicant's car would negatively impact public confidence in the justice system, and therefore excluded it.

The accused was charged with firearm offences after police found a loaded handgun and a bullet during an interaction that began as a Cannabis Control Act investigation.

The court found that the initial detention of the accused was unlawful and violated his s. 9 Charter rights, as the officer had no reasonable grounds to suspect the accused was in the vehicle or engaged in criminal activity.

While the court excluded the bullet found in the accused's bag under s. 24(2) of the Charter, it admitted the firearm due to the seriousness of gun violence.

However, the court ultimately found the accused not guilty, as the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the person who threw the firearm during the struggle with police.

The three offenders were convicted of manslaughter following a jury trial for the stabbing death of a 22-year-old victim.

The sentencing judge found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offenders were the aggressors who tracked down the victim for revenge after an earlier altercation where the victim had cut the principal offender with a knife.

The court rejected the Crown's argument for an 'aggravated manslaughter' sentence range, finding the earlier provocation mitigated the offenders' moral blameworthiness.

After applying significant credit for pre-trial custody, harsh jail conditions including triple bunking, and strict bail conditions, the principal offender was sentenced to a further 14 months, the second offender to 6.5 months, and the third offender to time served.

During a first-degree murder trial, an alternate juror reported that another juror had expressed a belief in the accused's guilt before any evidence was called.

The offending juror was discharged.

The accused moved for a mistrial, arguing the remaining jurors may have been tainted.

The court dismissed the application, finding that several other jurors had immediately criticized the offending remark and defended the presumption of innocence, demonstrating that the jury was not tainted.

During a trial for first degree murder where the accused raised self-defence, the accused applied to admit evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence under the Scopelliti framework.

Specifically, the accused sought to introduce evidence of the deceased's habitual possession of a knife and prior use of a racial slur.

The court ruled that the evidence of habitual knife possession was admissible as it indicated a violent tendency.

The court also held that a prior ruling from a mistrial excluding the racial slur evidence was not binding under section 653.1 of the Criminal Code in the interests of justice, and admitted the evidence to demonstrate the deceased's anger and aggressive conduct.

During a criminal trial for a stabbing, the Crown applied under section 9.2 of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness on a prior inconsistent statement.

The witness testified at trial that one of the accused attempted to break up the fight, which contradicted his earlier police statement and preliminary inquiry testimony.

The court granted the application, finding the Crown could not have been expected to lead this evidence in-chief.

However, the court restricted the Crown from questioning the witness about post-offence phone calls with the accused, ruling that such questions would improperly suggest consciousness of guilt and be highly prejudicial.

The accused were charged with firearm offences after police found a loaded handgun in a satchel inside a vehicle.

The police had arrested one of the accused on an outstanding warrant and subsequently searched the vehicle.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of their rights under ss. 7, 8, and 10(b), including claims of racial profiling, excessive force, unlawful search, delay in access to counsel, and lost CCTV evidence.

The court found that the police violated s. 7 by negligently losing CCTV footage, s. 8 by unlawfully searching the satchel without reasonable grounds, and s. 10(b) by delaying access to counsel and attempting to elicit evidence before the accused spoke to a lawyer.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the handgun and a knife found on the co-accused under s. 24(2).

Both accused were found not guilty on all counts.

The defendant brought an application seeking the recusal of the trial judge assigned to his second trial, alleging that she demonstrated bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias during his first trial, which had ended in a mistrial.

The defendant argued that the trial judge's rulings, tone, and interventions during cross-examinations favoured the Crown and undermined defence counsel.

The court reviewed the transcripts and audio recordings and found that the trial judge's conduct was appropriate and necessary to manage a highly contentious trial.

The court concluded there was no cogent evidence of bias and dismissed the application.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that late disclosure by the Crown prevented him from re-electing a judge-alone trial, thereby causing delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the primary reason for the trial not proceeding was the suspension of jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The court also found that the applicant failed to prove that the late disclosure was the sole reason for not re-electing, noting other factors like the complainant's COVID-19 symptoms.

During a first-degree murder trial, proceedings were halted for several months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Upon assessing the jury's availability to resume the trial in the fall, the court conducted individual inquiries with several jurors.

The court discharged two jurors due to undue hardship related to childcare, schooling, and employment concerns exacerbated by the pandemic.

As only nine jurors remained, and the parties did not consent to continue without a jury, a mistrial was declared.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial motions to edit the videotaped police statements of two co-accused before they were played for the jury.

The moving parties sought to excise references to fears of reprisal, the interviewing officer's opinions on the credibility of another witness, and portions of other witnesses' statements played during the interviews.

The court dismissed most of the requested edits, finding that the passages were necessary to provide context for the accused's responses and that any potential prejudice could be cured by proper limiting instructions to the jury.

A few specific passages lacking probative value and carrying potential prejudice were ordered excised.

The applicant brought a motion to exclude evidence of a submachine gun, ammunition, and utterances obtained during a warrantless search of his home.

The police attended the applicant's home to investigate a gun allegation made by his intoxicated girlfriend.

The officers searched the home without a warrant and without advising the applicant of his right to refuse the search or his right to counsel upon detention.

The court found that the applicant was psychologically detained and did not give informed consent to the search, resulting in breaches of his s. 8 and s. 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the officers' conduct was serious and the impact on the applicant's rights was significant, warranting the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The four co-accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to be seated at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box during their trial.

The Crown opposed the application, citing courtroom security and the default practice of using the prisoner's box.

The court balanced the security concerns, which required six escort officers if the accused sat at counsel table, against trial fairness considerations, including the need for effective communication between the accused and their counsel during a lengthy trial.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused met their onus and that sitting at counsel table would facilitate communication and ensure the accused were viewed as individuals by the jury.

The offender was convicted by a jury of pointing a firearm and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose following an altercation outside a bar where he pointed a BB gun at the victim.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the pointing a firearm charge.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for firearms offences, the court sentenced the offender to 9 months' imprisonment, reduced to 5 months after applying Downes credit for restrictive bail conditions and pre-sentence custody credit.

The Applicant, charged with gun and drug offences, sought a bail review after being detained by a Justice of the Peace.

The court conducted a de novo review, finding that the initial bail hearing had materially misapprehended the proposed release plan.

The court assessed the revised bail plan under the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

It found the Applicant's parents suitable as sureties, despite minor inconsistencies in their testimony, and deemed the proposed house arrest with a security system sufficiently robust to address public safety concerns.

The court also considered the strength of the prosecution's case, including potential Charter defenses, and concluded that continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail review application was granted, and the Applicant was ordered released on conditions.

At a preliminary hearing, the Crown sought committal on charges of importing a Schedule I substance (cocaine) under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The defendant, an international traveler transiting through Toronto International Airport from St. Lucia to the United Kingdom, was stopped by border officials who discovered approximately 3.9 kilograms of cocaine hidden in the linings of his checked luggage.

The defendant admitted the luggage was his, that he had packed it, and was aware of its contents.

The defendant resisted committal arguing insufficient evidence of possession (no proof of knowledge of the hidden drugs), insufficient evidence of mens rea for importing (arguing he was merely in transit and never intended to import into Canada), and insufficient evidence of possession for trafficking purposes (arguing lack of expert evidence regarding quantity thresholds).

The court found reasonable inferences could be drawn from the circumstantial evidence supporting committal on both charges.

The applicant, Athrin Deko, sought a bail review after being detained on gun and drug charges.

The court addressed the threshold question of whether sufficient grounds existed for a de novo review of his detention under R. v. St-Cloud.

The applicant argued the Justice of the Peace misapprehended the evidence regarding his proposed bail plan, specifically the supervision arrangements by his parents who worked opposite shifts.

The court found that the Justice of the Peace, likely influenced by Crown counsel, misunderstood the details of the bail plan, leading to an erroneous conclusion about the adequacy of supervision.

This material misapprehension of evidence was deemed to satisfy the St-Cloud threshold for review, impacting both secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The matter was adjourned for a full bail review hearing.

The Crown brought a pretrial motion seeking an order for the jury and the court to take a view of the food processing facility where the deceased was fatally injured by a high-pressure air hose during an incident of horseplay.

The Crown sought the view primarily to allow the jury to hear the sound of the air hose.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the facility had undergone significant changes since the incident, the exact conditions could not be recreated, and the jury would have access to high-quality video and audio evidence.

The court concluded that the potential prejudice to the accused outweighed the limited probative value of the view.

In a manslaughter trial involving three Punjabi Sikh accused, the defence brought a pretrial motion to determine the wording of a challenge for cause question to be put to the jury panel.

The court ruled that a general preamble was sufficient, rejecting a more detailed version proposed by the defence.

The court also held that the question should specifically identify the accused as Punjabi Sikhs, recognizing that prejudice may be triggered by outward manifestations of religious beliefs such as wearing a turban.

Finally, the court exercised its discretion to not provide the question to prospective jurors in advance, preferring spontaneous answers.