Rutu Gadhia

The decision addresses an application by Rutal Alott Hankey for a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his case to trial.

The court applies the framework from R. v. Jordan, analyzing periods of delay attributable to the defence, the Crown, and systemic factors, as well as the impact of exceptional circumstances.

The court finds that the net delay exceeds the 30-month ceiling even after accounting for exceptional circumstances, and grants a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, T. D., brought Charter applications to exclude evidence obtained by police, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the applications related to sections 8 and 9, finding the search warrants and arrest lawful.

However, the court found breaches of section 10(b) due to an unreasonable delay in facilitating access to duty counsel and a failure by police to "hold off" from asking investigative questions before the applicant consulted counsel.

Applying the Grant analysis under section 24(2), the court determined that admitting the evidence found in the applicant's car would negatively impact public confidence in the justice system, and therefore excluded it.

The Applicant, charged with gun and drug offences, sought a bail review after being detained by a Justice of the Peace.

The court conducted a de novo review, finding that the initial bail hearing had materially misapprehended the proposed release plan.

The court assessed the revised bail plan under the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

It found the Applicant's parents suitable as sureties, despite minor inconsistencies in their testimony, and deemed the proposed house arrest with a security system sufficiently robust to address public safety concerns.

The court also considered the strength of the prosecution's case, including potential Charter defenses, and concluded that continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail review application was granted, and the Applicant was ordered released on conditions.

The applicant, Athrin Deko, sought a bail review after being detained on gun and drug charges.

The court addressed the threshold question of whether sufficient grounds existed for a de novo review of his detention under R. v. St-Cloud.

The applicant argued the Justice of the Peace misapprehended the evidence regarding his proposed bail plan, specifically the supervision arrangements by his parents who worked opposite shifts.

The court found that the Justice of the Peace, likely influenced by Crown counsel, misunderstood the details of the bail plan, leading to an erroneous conclusion about the adequacy of supervision.

This material misapprehension of evidence was deemed to satisfy the St-Cloud threshold for review, impacting both secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The matter was adjourned for a full bail review hearing.

Following a jury trial, the accused was convicted of failing to provide the necessaries of life to his infant child but the jury was unable to reach verdicts on related aggravated assault and assault counts.

At sentencing, the issue arose whether the court could determine under s. 724 of the Criminal Code whether the trauma inflicted on the child was intentional, which would constitute an aggravating circumstance.

The court held that a sentencing judge may determine relevant factual issues not resolved by the jury, provided the facts essential to the verdict are accepted and any aggravating circumstance is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Based on medical evidence and the accused’s after‑the‑fact conduct, the court concluded the trauma was intentionally inflicted.

The finding was included as part of the factual basis for sentencing.

The offender was convicted by a jury of failing to provide the necessaries of life to his infant child after failing to obtain urgent medical treatment following severe head trauma.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender intentionally inflicted the trauma and knowingly failed to seek medical assistance for approximately 40 hours while the child displayed symptoms of serious brain injury.

The child suffered catastrophic and permanent disabilities, including blindness, cognitive impairment, seizures, and physical disability.

The court held that denunciation and deterrence were the paramount sentencing objectives given the offender’s knowledge of the injury and his decision to prioritize self‑interest over the child’s safety.

A penitentiary sentence was imposed after credit for pre‑sentence custody.

In a pre-trial voir dire in a murder prosecution, the Crown sought to prove the voluntariness of an utterance allegedly made by the accused to police during a brief encounter in an apartment building.

The defence argued the statement should be excluded on the basis that it was not proven to have been made by the accused and that it was obtained during an arbitrary detention contrary to s. 9 of the Charter, seeking exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court held that the statement was voluntary and that circumstantial evidence, including self-identification, physical description, and a distinctive tattoo, established on a balance of probabilities that the speaker was the accused.

Applying the framework from Grant, the court further concluded that the encounter did not constitute a detention, as it was brief, non-coercive, and part of general police patrol activity.

The accused’s application to exclude the statement was dismissed and the Crown’s application was granted.

The accused applied for an order requiring YouTube to remove approximately 75 videos associated with a street gang until the completion of a murder trial, arguing that jurors might view the material online despite judicial instructions and thereby jeopardize the fairness of the trial.

The court refused leave to bring the application due to failure to comply with the Criminal Proceedings Rules for the Superior Court of Justice, including the absence of proper notice and evidentiary foundation.

The court further held that the application had no reasonable prospect of success because it relied on an incorrect statutory provision, lacked evidence of a real and substantial risk to trial fairness, failed to consider alternative measures, and sought an order affecting third‑party Charter expression rights without notice.

The judge also raised concerns about territorial jurisdiction given that YouTube operated outside Canada.

Leave was denied and the application summarily dismissed.

In a murder prosecution, the Crown brought a pre-trial application seeking to qualify a forensic document examiner as an expert in handwriting analysis to assist in establishing authorship of seized writings.

One accused opposed the application, arguing the proposed expert lacked sufficient qualifications and that her work had not been peer reviewed and used a different classification methodology than other forensic standards.

The court applied the test for admissibility of expert evidence from R. v. Mohan and held that the witness possessed the requisite specialized knowledge through education, training, and experience at the Centre of Forensic Sciences.

Concerns raised by the defence related to methodology and review processes went to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility.

The witness was therefore qualified to provide opinion evidence in handwriting analysis.

The applicant sought costs against the Crown following delays in disclosure and non-compliance with undertakings made at a Judicial Pre-Trial.

The applicant alleged that the Crown's failure to respond to six disclosure request letters, delayed notification to Legal Aid regarding appointment of independent counsel, and inconsistent information about occurrence reports and criminal records constituted conduct warranting a costs award.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the Crown's conduct was unsatisfactory, it did not rise to the level of recklessness, conscious indifference to duty, or a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable prosecution standards required to justify costs in criminal proceedings.