Anna Frances Porter Leggett

The court sentenced Hugo Munoz to 14 years in prison for the manslaughter of his intimate partner, Cindy Coffey, after he pleaded guilty partway through his trial.

The decision details the facts of the offence, the impact on the victim’s family, Mr. Munoz’s mental health history, and the joint sentencing submission.

The court accepted the joint position, emphasizing the aggravating factors of intimate partner violence and the mitigating factors of Mr. Munoz’s guilty plea, lack of criminal record, and mental illness.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and a no-contact order with specified individuals.

The accused, Urgen Tsering, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing his sexual assault, criminal harassment, and voyeurism charges to trial.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was 815 days (26 months and 23 days), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice set by R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, attributing 158 days to the defence and the remaining 657 days (21.5 months) to the Crown, primarily due to significant police disclosure delays regarding CCTV footage and a witness statement.

The court found the delay presumptively unreasonable and granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused, K.N., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving his stepdaughter, T.S., between the ages of 14 and 18.

T.S. was the sole Crown witness.

The court found significant inconsistencies and improbabilities in T.S.'s testimony regarding key incidents, particularly the shower incident and the last alleged assault, which were not disclosed until much later or were inconsistent with other facts.

Coupled with a strong motive to fabricate, arising from T.S.'s mother's arrest and the stepfather seeking custody, the court was left with reasonable doubt regarding the veracity of the allegations.

K.N. was found not guilty of all counts.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for sexual assault charges, arguing a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from information sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 36 months, exceeding the *Jordan* ceiling of 30 months.

The court found that a significant portion of this delay (352 days) was solely attributable to the applicant's repeated requests for adjournments to secure legal representation or funding, including pursuing a *Rowbotham* application.

Subtracting this defence-caused delay resulted in a net delay of approximately 24 months, which falls below the *Jordan* ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

Tyvon Whyte was found guilty of sexual assault after a contested trial.

This decision concerns his sentencing.

The complainant, an aspiring model, was intoxicated by alcohol and cannabis supplied by Mr. Whyte during a photoshoot.

Mr. Whyte made non-consensual sexual advances, persisting despite the complainant's clear verbal and physical disengagement.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's vulnerability, breach of trust, coercion into suggestive photos, and the fact that Mr. Whyte was on an undertaking for a separate sexual assault at the time.

Mitigating factors included his lack of prior criminal history (absolute discharge expunged), youthfulness (25), strong community support, work history, and compliance with bail conditions.

The paramount sentencing objectives were denunciation and deterrence.

The court determined an appropriate sentence of six months jail, but converted it to a one-year conditional sentence order (CSO) with strict punitive conditions, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders (SOIRA, DNA, weapons prohibition).

Richard John Raymond pleaded guilty to reckless discharge of a prohibited firearm, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The offences stemmed from a gunfight outside a Toronto nightclub where Raymond discharged his weapon multiple times and was himself shot.

The Crown sought a global sentence of seven years, while the defence sought five years, emphasizing mitigating factors such as Raymond's difficult background, anti-Black racism, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years and six months, granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody due to the difficult conditions and Raymond's injuries.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

David Obregon Castro and Sarai Lopez-Iglesias, accused of first-degree murder, applied to deliver an opening address to the jury immediately after the Crown.

The court dismissed the application, affirming that such a request is a matter of judicial discretion, not a constitutional right, and should only be granted in special or unusual circumstances.

The court found no such circumstances present, citing concerns about the defence's ability to commit to evidence not yet determined and the risk of the opening address straying into argument.

The accused, Marvin Small, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging his continued detention by a Justice of the Peace.

He argued for a material change in circumstances based on the proposed addition of electronic monitoring, a new surety (KN), an increased monetary pledge from his girlfriend (TT), and trial delays due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that neither TT nor KN were suitable sureties, rendering electronic monitoring ineffective.

The increased monetary pledge did not address the core concern of surety supervision.

Furthermore, the COVID-19 related delays were largely duplicative of arguments made at the initial bail hearing.

Consequently, the court found no material change in circumstances, dismissed the application, and maintained the accused's detention.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault following an incident at an Airbnb apartment in Toronto.

The complainant alleged she was asleep when the defendant initiated sexual contact without her consent.

The defendant did not testify and called no evidence.

The trial turned on the credibility of the complainant and two corroborating witnesses.

The court found significant inconsistencies and contradictions in the complainant's evidence, including discrepancies between her trial testimony and her initial police statement, exaggerations regarding her level of intoxication, and unsubstantiated claims about the defendant's drug use.

Critically, a witness testified that the complainant and defendant appeared to engage in consensual sexual activity in the bed before walking together into the washroom, directly contradicting the complainant's account of being assaulted while asleep.

The court found it dangerous to rely on the complainant's evidence and acquitted the defendant.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm-related offences arising from the discharge of a handgun into a crowded lane in downtown Toronto in the early morning of October 14, 2017.

The Crown's case was based on circumstantial evidence of identity, as eyewitness identification was insufficient.

The trial judge found the accused guilty based on the totality of evidence, including surveillance video footage, forensic ballistics evidence, DNA analysis, and the consistency of the accused's appearance and clothing with that of the shooter.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and agreed that facts related to a third robbery count could be considered in sentencing.

Over four days in April 2018, the offender committed three bank robberies using note-passing methods without weapons or disguises, obtaining modest amounts of cash.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years imprisonment with concurrent sentences on the two guilty counts, applying principles of denunciation, general deterrence, and public protection while considering mitigating factors including the offender's guilty plea, addiction and mental health issues, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The defence brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The accused, who suffered from bipolar disorder, PTSD, severe depression and anxiety, was living in her car with her therapy dog when stopped by police.

The court found that while the arrest was lawful and the breath demand was made as soon as practicable, there was a breach of the accused's section 10(b) rights to counsel.

Police failed to exercise adequate diligence in contacting the accused's counsel of choice and did not offer her the option of speaking to alternative counsel when her preferred lawyer was unavailable.

The evidence was excluded as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was charged with committing an indecent act in a public place and failing to comply with a probation order.

The Crown alleged the defendant exposed his penis and masturbated inside and outside a coffee shop, and that he breached his probation by failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour.

The court found the defendant not guilty of the indecent act charge due to insufficient evidence of harm or substantial risk of harm as required under the harm-based test established in R. v. Labaye.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of failing to comply with the probation order, as his disruptive behaviour in the coffee shop constituted a clear breach of the peace.

The accused was charged with obstructing police and assaulting a police officer in resisting the arrest of her son.

The Crown alleged the accused physically interfered with an officer's lawful arrest of her son for armed robbery.

The defence argued the arrest was unlawful because the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that while the officer held a subjective belief in reasonable and probable grounds, the objective review revealed non-inculpatory factors (presence of an accompanying adult, appropriate behaviour of the suspect, unknown duration of association) that were not considered.

The court concluded the arrest was unlawful and therefore the officer was not engaged in lawful execution of duty.

The accused was acquitted of both charges, and the court found her actions constituted lawful defence of her son under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown's case was based on observations by paramedics of erratic driving, police observations at the scene, and breath sample readings.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest, the demand for breath samples, and his detention.

The court found Charter violations: a breach of s. 8 regarding the "as soon as practicable" requirement for obtaining breath samples, and a breach of s. 9 regarding arbitrary detention (overhold).

The breath sample evidence was excluded as a remedy.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired operation based on the paramedics' and officers' observations of the defendant's driving and physical condition.

The defendant was acquitted of the Over 80 charge due to exclusion of the breath readings.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with a recognizance that prohibited him from possessing drug paraphernalia, specifically scales.

Police stopped him for riding a bicycle on the sidewalk without lights.

During the stop, which lasted over six minutes, police conducted a criminal investigation into bail compliance without advising the defendant of his Charter rights to counsel.

The defendant was detained and questioned about scales, which he admitted to possessing.

The Crown conceded that sections 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The court applied the section 24(2) test and excluded the evidence of the scales, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood alcohol concentration (BAC) after registering a "Fail" on a roadside screening device at a RIDE stop and subsequently providing "over 80" Breathalyzer readings.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the Breathalyzer evidence on Charter grounds, arguing that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the defendant's body when making the initial roadside screening device demand, thereby violating section 8 rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the odour of alcohol emanating from the vehicle combined with observations of nervousness and slurred speech, satisfying the statutory standard under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The court also found that even if a Charter breach had occurred, exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2) was not warranted.

The defendant was convicted.