Gabriel Gross-Stein

The appellant challenged a sexual assault conviction arising from an indictment that included multiple violent offences against an intimate partner.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on uncorroborated complainant evidence and by reversing the burden of proof through an odd-to-fabricate remark.

The court held corroboration was not legally required and found the trial judge properly conducted a charge-by-charge credibility and reliability assessment, accepting only portions of witness evidence.

The court further held the burden of proof was correctly articulated and applied, and that the impugned remark was a permissible common-sense credibility observation.

Appellate intervention was not warranted.

The court sentenced Ciro Garofano to life imprisonment with 18 years of parole ineligibility for second-degree murder, and concurrent 10-year sentences for two counts of aggravated assault.

The decision details the circumstances of the offences, the impact on the victims and their families, and the aggravating and mitigating factors considered.

The court reviewed the statutory framework for parole ineligibility, relevant case law, and the fit sentence in light of the facts and sentencing principles.

The court sentenced Evan Mitchell for multiple firearms and drug offences, including possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and breach of a weapons prohibition order.

The decision reviews the circumstances of the offences, the offender’s background, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the application of sentencing principles such as totality, parity, and the impact of systemic anti-Black racism.

The court imposed a global sentence of 55 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh custodial conditions, with ancillary orders including a DNA order, lifetime weapons prohibition, and forfeiture.

This criminal trial involved a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from the defendant's vehicle following an arrest and detention related to a robbery.

The defendant argued that the initial arrest of a passenger and his own detention were unlawful, rendering the subsequent vehicle search and warrant invalid.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the passenger's arrest and the defendant's investigative detention, and that the warrantless search of the vehicle was a lawful search incident to arrest.

Consequently, the Charter application was dismissed.

The defendant was found guilty of multiple firearm and drug trafficking charges, but not guilty of trafficking fentanyl, instead being convicted of simple possession of fentanyl.

Richard John Raymond pleaded guilty to reckless discharge of a prohibited firearm, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The offences stemmed from a gunfight outside a Toronto nightclub where Raymond discharged his weapon multiple times and was himself shot.

The Crown sought a global sentence of seven years, while the defence sought five years, emphasizing mitigating factors such as Raymond's difficult background, anti-Black racism, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years and six months, granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody due to the difficult conditions and Raymond's injuries.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The appellant, Maurice Johnson, appealed his convictions for kidnapping and sexual assault.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, and did not properly consider the issue of consent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that any alleged misapprehensions were immaterial, the purported inconsistencies did not negate the elements of the offences, and the trial judge's conclusion that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity was legally and factually sound, given the coercive circumstances of the three-day ordeal.

This endorsement addresses the repeated failure of the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC) to produce the accused, Thornell Shah, for his scheduled sentencing hearings.

Shah had pleaded guilty and was awaiting sentencing.

Despite court orders for his appearance, first by videoconference and then in person, the OCDC failed to comply without explanation.

Citing precedent, the court emphasized the judiciary's authority over prisoner production and the executive branch's obligation to comply.

The judge ordered the Superintendent or a Deputy Superintendent of the OCDC to appear before the court to provide an explanation for the non-compliance.

The appellant, Thomas Lush, pleaded guilty to several property-related offences and appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred by imposing a sentence of 2 years and 3 months, which was higher than the 2 years less a day agreed upon by the Crown and defence, without advising the parties or inviting submissions on the proposed increase.

Citing R. v. Nahanee, the court determined this procedural error affected the sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and the sentence appeal was allowed, reducing the global sentence to 2 years less one day.

The offender, Ryan Foster, pleaded guilty to three convenience store robberies involving weapons and gratuitous violence.

The Crown sought a 9-year global sentence and a 10-year Long-Term Supervision Order (LTSO).

The defence sought a 7-year global sentence (18 months further custody) and a 5-6 year LTSO.

The court imposed an 8-year global sentence, resulting in 18 months further custody, and a 7-year LTSO.

The judge emphasized general and specific deterrence, while also considering the offender's mental health issues (PTSD, ASPD) and potential for rehabilitation, recommending he serve his remaining sentence at a correctional and treatment centre.

This judge-alone trial addressed whether the defendant possessed fentanyl for trafficking purposes.

The defendant admitted to trafficking cocaine and possessing proceeds of crime but denied knowing the 100 pills contained fentanyl, asserting he believed them to be Percocet for personal use due to an addiction.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's knowledge of the pills' fentanyl content and his intent to traffic them, based on expert testimony and the defendant's narrative of personal use.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of fentanyl trafficking but convicted of simple possession of fentanyl, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

This decision concerns the sentencing of Brandon Drakes-Simon and Jason Williams for attempt murder, following their conviction for first-degree murder of the same victim.

The attempt murder involved a planned shooting on a highway.

The court identified several aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, possession of multiple illegal guns, Drakes-Simon's prior gun convictions, extreme recklessness endangering others, and a judicial finding that the crime was a contract killing.

Mitigating factors for Williams included his lack of a prior criminal record and strong family support.

The court imposed concurrent sentences of 16 years for Drakes-Simon and 11 years for Williams, both running concurrently with their life sentences for first-degree murder.

The Crown applied to admit three categories of discreditable conduct evidence against the accused, Brandon Drakes-Simon and Justin Malcolm, in a first-degree murder trial: Drakes-Simon's acquisition of a firearm, his expressed intention to deal with legal bills, and evidence that he was seeking additional "contract killing" work.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, ruling all three categories of evidence inadmissible.

The judge found the evidence to have negligible probative value due to its general nature and to be overwhelmingly prejudicial, particularly as it amounted to forbidden bad character reasoning.

During a first-degree murder trial, the self-represented accused sought to introduce a hearsay statement made by the deceased victim to a friend.

The Crown conceded necessity but argued the statement lacked threshold reliability.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and found that the statement met substantive reliability based on its inherent trustworthiness, corroborated by other evidence.

The court ruled the statement admissible, noting that admitting it also served the interests of trial fairness.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed on the ground that the trial judge failed to explicitly instruct the jury that the alleged unlawful confinement, which formed the basis for constructive first-degree murder, must be a distinct criminal act from the killing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions, when read as a whole and in the context of the trial, sufficiently conveyed this distinct act requirement, providing the jury with a functional understanding of their task.

The appellant, Andrew Cowan, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The appeal was based on two primary grounds: inadequate disclosure by Crown counsel regarding the extent of his friendship with the trial judge, and the trial judge's post-conviction social interactions with the prosecution team.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's failure to fully disclose the nature of his relationship with the trial judge, including a prior agreement not to appear on the same cases, constituted a miscarriage of justice.

Additionally, the trial judge's decision to meet for drinks and dinner with the prosecution team immediately after the jury's verdict, and before sentencing, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The accused, Tanade Mohamed, shot and killed two men in a nightclub parking lot following a minor altercation.

He claimed self-defence and provocation for the first victim, and accident for the second.

The co-accused, Abdirisaq Ali, drove the getaway vehicle and was charged as a party to the offences.

The court rejected Mohamed's claims of self-defence and provocation, finding him guilty of second-degree murder for the first victim.

However, the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his intent to kill the second victim, resulting in a manslaughter conviction.

The co-accused was acquitted of all charges, as the court found a reasonable doubt regarding his prior knowledge of the shooter's intentions.

The applicants, charged with two counts of second-degree murder following a nightclub shooting, brought Charter applications to exclude evidence.

The police had obtained the applicants' names and contact information from their banks without a warrant, claiming exigent circumstances due to the fleeing armed suspects.

The court found a breach of section 8 of the Charter, noting the applicants had a diminished expectation of privacy in the 'tombstone' banking information.

However, applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the police acted in good faith with an honest belief in exigent circumstances and that exclusion would significantly harm the administration of justice.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of assault, sexual assault, mischief, and breach of recognizance against his former intimate partner.

The trial turned on credibility, with the complainant alleging non-consensual sexual acts and physical abuse, while the accused denied the sexual assaults and claimed the physical altercations were justified or exaggerated.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence and accepted the complainant's testimony regarding the physical assaults and the first sexual assault.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding the second sexual assault due to inconsistencies in the complainant's explanation for delayed reporting.

The accused was found guilty on seven counts and acquitted on one count of sexual assault.

This is an application for bail pending appeal by Adekunle Johnson Omitiran, who was convicted of sophisticated credit card fraud and sentenced to 48 months' imprisonment and a significant restitution order.

The applicant, with a history of similar frauds and breaches of court orders, argued for release based on arguable grounds of appeal, a non-violent record, a substantial release plan, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Crown opposed, emphasizing the weak grounds of appeal, the seriousness of the offences, the applicant's recidivism, and the unlikelihood of serving the full sentence before appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that while the grounds of appeal were "not frivolous," they were weak.

The decision primarily turned on the public interest factor under s. 679(3)(c) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the applicant's history of repeat offending, disregard for court orders, and the serious nature of the financial crimes, especially in the current economic climate, outweighed the reviewability interest.

The proposed release plan and surety were deemed insufficient to mitigate the risk of reoffending.

During a retrial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce evidence of two unidentified cell phone calls made to the victim moments before he stepped outside and was shot.

The Crown argued the calls supported the theory that the victim was lured to an ambush.

The Superior Court of Justice ruled the evidence inadmissible, finding no direct or indirect evidence connecting the calls to the accused.

The court held that inferring the calls lured the victim outside, contrary to family testimony that he went to buy juice, would be based on impermissible speculation and conjecture.