R. v. Cupid, 2026 ONSC 3275

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

CITATION: R. v. Cupid, 2026 ONSC 3275

COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-3-549

DATE: 20260616

B E T W E E N:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

• and -

TAMAR ENOCH CUPID

Constantinos Stratos,

for the Crown

Gabriel Gross-Stein,

for the accused

HEARD: April 23, 2026

K.L. Campbell J.:

Reasons for Sentence

A. Introduction and Overview

1On October 24, 2025, following his jury trial on charges of robbery, aggravated assault and manslaughter, the accused, Tamar Enoch Cupid, was found guilty of robbery and aggravated assault, but not guilty of the alleged offence of manslaughter. These offences were all alleged to have been committed in Toronto on or about Sunday, June 25, 2023. The alleged victim, now deceased, was Mr. Ifeanyichukwu Gabby Oseke.

2While the jury trial spanned more than two weeks, the vast majority of the relevant events were captured and recorded on video surveillance cameras on the scene of the Knob Hill Plaza, located near the intersection of Brimley Road and Eglinton Avenue East in Toronto.

3Basically, the accused, his girlfriend, and an unknown third party (a friend of the accused known only as “O”), arrived at the plaza in a black BMW sedan, driven by the unknown male. By that time, Mr. Oseke was already sitting in the front passenger seat of a black Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) that had earlier been parked by the plaza sidewalk. The accused approached the SUV from the sidewalk and chatted briefly with Mr. Oseke. This conversation may have been about a $100 debt that the accused claimed was owed to him by Mr. Oseke. In any event, during this brief conversation, the accused reached into the SUV and ripped off the gold chain from around the neck of Mr. Oseke. This led to Mr. Oseke getting out of the SUV, and onto the sidewalk, engaging in further conversation with the accused and picking up some of the broken pieces of his gold necklace from the ground. During this discussion, the unknown third male appeared, punched Mr. Oseke in the face, and then quickly retreated to his BMW and soon drove away. Mr. Oseke then drove the SUV after the BMW, almost striking the accused in the parking lot in the process. After pursuing this unknown man briefly in the black SUV, Mr. Oseke returned to the plaza, parking the SUV in, essentially, the same location as before. When Mr. Oseke got out of the SUV and walked behind the vehicle and over to the plaza sidewalk, the accused, who had remained there with his girlfriend, immediately slashed Mr. Oseke in the face with a knife that he had surreptitiously taken from his pants pocket and held at his side. This knife slash cut Mr. Oseke under his left eye across his left cheek and into his nose. This immediately resulted in a fairly lengthy physical confrontation between Mr. Oseke and the accused, with the accused continuing to stab at Mr. Oseke with his knife. At the conclusion of this lengthy confrontation, as the accused was trying to escape with his girlfriend, the accused stabbed Mr. Oseke in the chest with his knife, ultimately killing him. Immediately after Mr. Oseke was stabbed, the accused and his girlfriend quickly left the scene in the black BMW.

4The accused pled guilty to the charge of robbery (i.e. stealing the gold necklace from the neck of the deceased), but he contended that he acted in lawful self-defence thereafter. The jury, by its verdict: (1) accepted that the accused was guilty of robbery; (2) found that the accused had committed the offence of aggravated assault (i.e. by slashing Mr. Oseke across his face with a knife, and thereby wounding, disfiguring or endangering the life of Mr. Oseke – and did not do so in lawful self-defence); (3) but accepted, or at least had a reasonable doubt as to whether, the accused caused the death of Mr. Oseke in lawful self-defence.

5The accused must now be sentenced for his offences of robbery and aggravated assault. Importantly, in so doing, the accused must not be effectively “sentenced” for manslaughter as the jury found that the accused was acting in lawful self-defence in his killing of the deceased.

6The Crown suggested that the accused should now be sentenced to a global 4-year term of imprisonment (less the time credited to the accused for his pre-sentence imprisonment). Defence counsel argued, however, that the accused should be subject to a global term of imprisonment of some 2½ to 3-years (less the time appropriately credited to the accused for his pre-sentence imprisonment and his strict judicial interim release conditions).

B. The Facts of the Offences

7Beyond the basic outline of the relevant events just summarized, the video recordings from the surveillance cameras at the Knob Hill plaza, supplemented by the evidence of the various witnesses, showed, essentially, all of the following:

• Mr. Oseke was seated in the front passenger seat of a black Chevrolet Blazer Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV), that was parked by the sidewalk in the Knob Hill plaza. He arrived there at approximately 6:55 p.m. He was wearing a Toronto Raptors jersey.

• At approximately 6:56 p.m. a black BMW sedan arrived in the plaza and parked in the Knob Hill plaza parking lot. This vehicle contained the accused, his girlfriend, Jessica Younis, and an unidentified male known only as “O” (who had been driving the BMW). All three individuals exited the vehicle and walked toward the black SUV.

• The accused and his girlfriend walked to the plaza sidewalk and approached the passenger side of the black SUV. After the accused and Mr. Oseke engaged in a brief conversation, the accused reached into the black SUV, grabbed the gold chain necklace from around the neck of Mr. Oseke, and ripped it off him. This caused the necklace to break into a number of smaller pieces. This prompted Mr. Oseke to exit the SUV and stand on the plaza sidewalk.

• After Mr. Oseke collected some of the broken pieces of his gold necklace from the ground, and engaged the accused in further discussion, the unidentified male approached them from the rear of the black SUV and immediately punched Mr. Oseke in the face.

• The unidentified male, Ms. Younis and the accused then started to walk back toward the parked BMW sedan, with the unidentified male leading the way. As this was taking place, Mr. Oseke got into the driver” s seat of the black SUV and started to drive it. Mr. Oseke turned the SUV around in the parking lot and drove it towards the accused, who was still walking in the parking lot toward the parked BMW. The accused was able to successfully leap out of the path of the SUV, as it continued to drive out of the parking lot. The unidentified male had earlier entered the driver’s seat of the BMW and had immediately left the parking lot, followed shortly thereafter by Mr. Oseke driving the black SUV. The accused and his girlfriend then returned to the plaza sidewalk, where they remained.

• Shortly thereafter, within approximately five minutes, Mr. Oseke returned to the Knob Hill plaza, still driving the black SUV, and he parked the vehicle again in, essentially, the same spot it had been previously, next to the plaza sidewalk, near where the accused and his girlfriend were still standing.

• Mr. Oseke exited the driver’s seat of the black SUV, walked around the back of the vehicle and up to the plaza sidewalk, apparently to speak to the accused. However, seconds earlier, the accused had removed a knife from his pants pocket, opened the blade of the knife, and held it down by his right side, as Mr. Oseke approached him.

• As Mr. Oseke approached the accused, Mr. Cupid turned toward him, and slashed Mr. Oseke across the face with his knife. The forensic pathologist who subsequently performed the autopsy on the deceased, noted that this caused a superficial “incised wound” below Mr. Oseke’s left eye and into his nose, that was 8.5 centimetres in length.

• This knife slash started a physical confrontation between Mr. Oseke and the accused, in which the accused made multiple stabbing motions toward Mr. Oseke with his knife. This altercation moved from the plaza sidewalk into the parking lot toward Eglinton Avenue East. As the confrontation moved, it became a chase, with Mr. Oseke pursuing the accused on foot, and the accused running away. As this foot chase continued, the accused ran across the road, running to the opposite side of Eglinton Avenue East. When this happened, Mr. Oseke gave up the chase and returned to the plaza sidewalk. As he did so, Mr. Oseke removed his shirt, and he appeared to be bleeding.

• Shortly thereafter, the accused returned to the plaza sidewalk where his girlfriend was still located. The accused and his girlfriend then started to leave the area, by running further eastbound along the plaza sidewalk. As they did so, Mr. Oseke, now again, in the driver’s seat of the black SUV, tried to drive the vehicle into them on the sidewalk. However, the accused and Ms. Younis manage to leap out of the way at the last moment, and Mr. Oseke crashed the black SUV into the front door of the CIBC bank building in the plaza. The accused and his girlfriend continued to flee eastbound. Mr. Oseke then exited the black SUV and continued his pursuit of the accused and his girlfriend on foot.

• In the nearby eastern parking lot, the black BMW appeared and stopped to pick up the accused and his girlfriend. But, before they could both get into the vehicle, Mr. Oseke grabbed Ms. Younis by her arm, at which point the accused stabbed at him again, in the chest area. The BMW then drove away from the scene with the accused and his girlfriend inside.

• Mr. Oseke then staggered back to the area of the CIBC bank building, where he soon succumbed to his injuries. The forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy found that Mr. Oseke had suffered a three-centimetre-long stab wound to his left chest, just above his nipple, that entered his left lung and cut the pulmonary trunk, a major blood vessel coming out of the heart, which injury caused the death of Mr. Oseke.

8Of course, as I have indicated, given the verdicts reached by the jury, the offences committed by the accused are robbery and aggravated assault. Those are the two offences for which the accused must now be sentenced (not manslaughter).

C. The Personal Circumstances of the Accused

9The accused was born in Toronto, Ontario on October 27, 1997, and he is currently over 28 years of age. He lived in the “Lawrence Heights” area of Toronto for the first half of his life.

10The accused is a black man, and defence counsel was able to eventually obtain a Morris Report in advance of the sentencing hearing in this matter, which sought to address and assess the “Impact of Race and Culture” in relation to the accused. This Report was prepared by assessors with the Viola Desmond Justice Institute. Much of the following personal information about the accused came from this lengthy Report.

11The accused has a fraternal twin brother, and two other siblings. His home life as a child was not a happy one, as his father physically abused his mother, while she struggled with drug addiction. Their community-housing residence in “Lawrence Heights” was an area that was “marred by violence.” According to Mr. Cupid, as a child he witnessed people in his neighbourhood being “shot and killed.”

12His father was eventually deported to Trinidad, for “drug use” and other “trouble with the law” when the accused was only eight years of age. Eventually, communication between the accused and his father ceased thereafter. The accused had a brief, poor relationship with his subsequent “stepfather,” who had a brief relationship with his mother. Accordingly, the accused grew up without a significant, positive, adult male role model.

13Their family was supported, financially and emotionally, by the accused’s mother, who did the best she could in difficult circumstances. This was an overwhelming task for the accused’s mother, and the demands of her jobs led to the oldest brother becoming the effective male head of the family and “caregiver” to his siblings, including the accused.

14The accused was “exposed to criminality from adolescence to adulthood.” His young friends were all involved in criminal activity from an early age. In seeking “validation” outside the home in this way, the accused himself committed a number of offences. The accused abused marijuana at a young age. Later, he consumed Xanax as a “coping method.”

15The accused was academically gifted and excelled in public and middle school, especially in mathematics. During this time, the accused was also positively involved in a number of different sports, including basketball, soccer and football, where he showed promising abilities.

16When he was just 15 years old, however, and while attending grade 10, the accused was a victim in a random “drive-by” shooting, which he survived, but with “life altering injuries.” For example, thereafter his breathing was adversely affected, as one of the bullets punctured one of his lungs.

17It was following this incident that their family transferred out of the “Lawrence Heights” community, and into the community-housing project in “Swansea Mews.” This move adversely affected the financial security of his family, as it prevented his mother from continuing her job, and required social assistance for their family. Moreover, this transfer did not significantly reduce the violence that the accused was exposed to. Further, this shooting adversely impacted upon the academic trajectory of the accused, in that he was away from school for a significant time while he recovered from the shooting, and following his educational return to a different school, he was withdrawn, unmotivated and distracted. Indeed, following this shooting, the accused suffered from “extreme paranoia and anxiety.” Further, he began selling marijuana to other high-school students as a means of financial support.

18The accused remained at this “Swansea Mews” location with his family for approximately four years, before he moved out to Brampton on his own.

19The accused apparently suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The authors of the Report suggest that the “multiple traumatic events” over the extended life of the accused, including the “poverty, community violence, racialized policing and family disruption” he suffered (in addition to being the target of a drive-by shooting), may have “shaped his behaviour, emotional responses and life trajectories over time.” Indeed, according to the authors of the Report, his “reported experiences are consistent with trauma-related symptoms that may have influenced his perception of threat and safety,” such that the accused may have perceived a “level of threat” in the events in this case that “may not have been fully clear to others,” and which was driven, at least in part, by “a fear and a need for self-protection.”

20Further, the accused has the following criminal record:

• On July 14, 2017, the accused was convicted of failing to comply with a recognizance and sentenced to a fine of $1 after already serving 18 days of pre-sentence custody; and

• On August 7, 2019, the accused was convicted of assault with a weapon (i.e. a stabbing) and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance and given a suspended sentence and 12 months of probation, after he had served the equivalent of 6 months of pre-sentence custody. The accused was also made subject to a weapons prohibition order, under s. 110 of the Criminal Code, for a period of five years.

• On March 9 2026, while in custody in relation to this case, the accused was found with a knife located in his rectum, and he ultimately pled guilty to possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

21The accused told the authors of the Report that he has great “remorse” for his offences, that he accepts the “profound seriousness” of the offences he committed, and he knows that his actions have had an “irreversible harm” and “devastating and life altering effects” on the family of the deceased. The accused also told them that he wants to live the rest of his life in a manner that is “accountable, lawful and constructive.” The accused reiterated these feelings of remorse in his comments to me at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing.

22The authors of the Report have drawn a number of conclusions, including the following:

Mr. Cupid’s life experience reflects the complex intersection of individual experiences and broader structural conditions. His narrative illustrates how childhood exposure to poverty, community violence, family disruption, trauma and racialized surveillance can contribute to long term psychological and social impacts.

Environmental exposure to violence, [being a] victim of violence, systemic surveillance, economic hardship and limited protective resources collectively created conditions that increase vulnerability while constraining access to healthier development pathways.

23I understand that the current career goals of the accused are in the areas of music creation and production and real estate.

D. The General Sentencing Principles

24According to s. 718 of the Criminal Code, the “fundamental purpose” of sentencing is to contribute to “respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society” by imposing “just sanctions” that have one or more of the following objectives: (a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (b) to deter the offender and others from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society where necessary; (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or the community; and (f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

25According to s. 718.1 of the Code, the “fundamental principle” of sentencing is that a sentence “must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”

26Section 718.2 of the Code dictates that, in imposing sentence, the court must also take into account a number of principles, including the following:

• A sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender.

• A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances.

• When consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh.

• An offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and,

• All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.

E. Analysis

27As I have already mentioned, the accused cannot, of course, be sentenced for the killing of the deceased. He was found not guilty of the alleged offence of manslaughter by the jury, who must have at least had a reasonable doubt about whether his stabbing of the deceased in the chest with a knife was an act done in lawful self-defence.

28Nevertheless, it must be said that the accused personally started the series of events that eventually led to the death of the deceased. The accused approached the black SUV that was parked by the plaza sidewalk and intentionally engaged Mr. Oseke in conversation. When the conversation did not turn out to the satisfaction of the accused, he physically ripped the gold necklace off the neck of Mr. Oseke, breaking his necklace into pieces in the process. It was entirely predictable that Mr. Oseke would take offence at that conduct by the accused, and that it would cause Mr. Oseke to exit the vehicle. The accused had little choice but to plead guilty to this “robbery” of Mr. Oseke, as the entire incident was captured, with clarity, by the video surveillance cameras in the plaza.

29After Mr. Oseke returned to the plaza after his fruitless chase of the unknown male in the BMW sedan and had, once again, parked the black SUV next to the plaza sidewalk where it had been earlier, and exited the vehicle, the accused pulled his knife from his pants pocket, opened the bladed surface of the knife, and concealed it by his right side as Mr. Oseke approached him on the sidewalk. Then, without any provocation, the accused immediately slashed Mr. Oseke across the face with his knife. This knife attack inflicted an “incised wound” below Mr. Oseke’s left eye and into his nose, that was 8.5 centimetres in length. As the jury could only have reasonably concluded, this spontaneous slashing of Mr. Oseke’s face by the accused with his knife, was not done in lawful self-defence.

30Defence counsel urged me to conclude that, in all of the circumstances, the accused may have perceived an imminent attack by Mr. Oseke and simply acted prematurely and excessively in self-defence. I reject this submission. Having carefully reviewed the video recording of this event on multiple occasions, it is apparent to me that the accused was simply waiting for Mr. Oseke to get close enough to him so that he could slash him in the face with the knife he had in his hand and at the ready. Had he been so inclined, there were many things that Mr. Cupid could have done that would not have involved an immediate, weaponized knife attack on Mr. Oseke. For example: (1) the accused could have turned to face the advancing Mr. Oseke and showed him that he had a knife in his hand; or (2) the accused could have turned and faced Mr. Oseke and physically pushed him away if he continued to advance. But the accused was not waiting around to see what Mr. Oseke might say or do as he got closer to him – the accused readied his knife for use and, when Mr. Oseke got close enough, the accused slashed him across the face with his knife.

31This was a wildly dangerous criminal act of extreme violence against Mr. Oseke. The accused might easily have struck Mr. Oseke in the eye with his knife, and blinded him, or might have struck him in the neck, and potentially killed him, or he might have caused even greater, irreparable physical damage and disfigurement to his face. Of course, as the photographs of this facial injury aptly illustrate, the accused predictably caused very significant damage to Mr. Oseke’s face with his needless and irresponsible knife attack on Mr. Oseke. Given that, at the moment of his knife attack on Mr. Oseke, there was no need for any self-defence by the accused, I must reject the defence suggestion that the immediate, recklessly violent action by the accused amounted simply to an excessive act in self-defence.

32Predictably, this knife attack by the accused further provoked Mr. Oseke, and caused him to engage in a further violent exchange with the accused, who continued to use his knife against Mr. Oseke.

33In my view, this kind of unprovoked violence, causing serious personal injury to another person, and immediately leading to predictable violent mayhem, must be the subject of clear and unmistakable deterrence and denunciation. The sentence imposed upon the offender simply must be proportionate to the sheer gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the accused. I am not sure how the imposition of sentence on such an offender could otherwise encourage “respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society.” These were very serious crimes, especially the “aggravated assault” offence, in which the accused viciously slashed Mr. Oseke in the face with his knife. Moreover, the accused was entirely responsible for the commission of both the robbery and the aggravated assault offences.

34It is not inconsequential that the accused committed this aggravated assault offence against Mr. Oseke, while he was still subject to a court order, made on August 7, 2017 (following an earlier stabbing incident by the accused), prohibiting him from the possession of any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, for a period of five years, under s. 110 of the Criminal Code. The knife that the accused used to slash Mr. Oseke in the face clearly fell within the definition of a “prohibited weapon” within the meaning of s. 84(1) of the Criminal Code. Accordingly, while this order was designed to prohibit the accused from even the possession of his knife, he elected instead to use the knife he illegally possessed to slash Mr. Oseke in the face. Of course, such prohibition orders will cease to have any practical effect if they can simply be ignored, when considered inconvenient, by an offender most in need of such a prohibition order.

35In my opinion, the accused must be given an effective penitentiary sentence of at least four years imprisonment for his two offences – six months imprisonment for the “robbery” offence, and a concurrent four-year term of imprisonment for the “aggravated assault” offence which he committed very shortly thereafter. See, for example: R. v. Fisher, 2023 ONSC 1705; [2023] O.J. No. 1166, at paras. 2-3, 6-7, 19, 29-30, 34. Indeed, in my view, this is the most lenient sentence that can, in good conscience, be imposed upon this accused. In fact, a longer penitentiary term could easily be justified.

36The fact that the accused has experienced a difficult life and has suffered various traumas in the past cannot (and does not) excuse his violent criminal conduct on this (or any other) occasion. Indeed, the fact that his unfortunate background may cause him to overreact to situations as a result of his paranoia and perceive danger to his safety where others simply would not, does not serve as an excuse for his spontaneous violence. Rather, his circumstances simply illustrate how inherently dangerous the accused continues to be to others, until he takes all of the necessary rehabilitative steps to overcome these problems.

37Accordingly, a global sentence of four years imprisonment is the effective sentence that I intend to now impose upon the accused while, of course, giving him fair and appropriate credit for all of the pre-sentence restrictions on his liberty.

F. The Pre-Sentence Credits Due to the Accused

1. Pre-Sentence Custody Credits

38I understand, from the submissions of counsel, that the accused has now been in custody in relation to these charges for a total of some 494 actual days. This time includes the time between the sentencing hearing (April 23, 2026) and today (June 16, 2026).

39The parties agree that, as required by s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, the accused should be given credit for having already served 1½ days of imprisonment for each day of this pre-sentence custody.

40By my calculation, that means that the accused must be credited with having already served a sentence of approximately 741 days (or approximately two years and 11 days). See: R. v. Summers, 2014 SCC 26, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 575, at paras. 7, 34, 68-80, affirming, 2013 ONCA 147, 114 O.R. (3d) 641.

2. Additional Credit – Harsh “Lockdown” Conditions

41Defence counsel argues that the accused should receive an additional credit to account for the harsh “lockdown” conditions he has experienced while detained in pre-sentence custody.

42According to the materials filed on the sentencing hearing, as I understand them, between May 29, 2023 and May 22, 2025, the accused was under “lockdown” conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre (TSDC) for a total of 174 days. Further, between January 1, 2026 and April 22, 2026, the accused was under “lockdown” conditions at the TSDC for a total of a further 48 days. Accordingly, the accused was under “lockdown” conditions while in pre-sentence custody for a total of some 222 days (or approaching 7½ months).

43During such “lockdown” conditions, inmates had reduced access to phone calls, showers and “yard” privileges. While there were no affidavit or other evidentiary materials filed that suggested that these conditions had an adverse effect on the accused, I am prepared to assume that these pre-sentence conditions had an adverse effect on the accused and rendered his time in pre-sentence custody somewhat more difficult than it would have been in the absence of such “lockdown” conditions.

44In R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754, [2016] O.J. No. 5255, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recognized, at para. 6, that credit in relation to pre-sentence incarceration is not “capped” at the statutory limit of 1½ days for each day of pre-sentence custody in s. 719(3.1) of the Code, but rather may, in appropriate circumstances, include additional credit for “particularly harsh presentence incarceration conditions.” Further, the court in Duncan noted that, in considering whether any enhanced credit should be given for such conditions, the sentencing court should “consider both the conditions of the pre-sentence incarceration and the impact of those conditions on the accused.” Further, the court suggested that where an accused has served a significant part of his or her pre-sentence incarceration in “lockdown” conditions, which had an “adverse effect” on the accused, such additional credit will be appropriate. See also: R. v. Henry, 2016 ONCA 873, [2016] O.J. No. 5897, at para. 9; R. v. Johnson, 2017 ONSC 3512, at paras. 66-81; R. v. Powell, 2017 ONSC 7437, at paras. 37-39; R. v. Borsi, 2019 ONCA 989; R. v. Rajmoolie, 2020 ONCA 791, 155 O.R. (3d) 64; R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344, at paras. 40-53; R. v. Peti, 2025 ONCA 536.

45There is no helpful mathematical formula that can be applied in these circumstances to conveniently calculate the appropriate credit for these types of harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody, which have had a negative impact upon an accused. Rather, the specific nature of the appropriate credit is left to the discretion of the sentencing court.

46In my view, in all of the circumstances of this case, given the duration and extent of the lockdown conditions, and their presumed adverse impact on the accused, he should be extended a further custodial credit that is equivalent to approximately 2½ months imprisonment.

3. Conclusion on Custodial Credits

47Adding these various custodial credits together results in a total credit of approximately 2 years and 3 months imprisonment. Accordingly, the penitentiary sentence that would otherwise have been imposed upon the accused will be fairly reduced by that total credit.

G. Probation Order

48Once the accused is fairly given the credit he deserves for the pre-sentence restrictions on his liberty, it is apparent that he will now be sentenced to a reformatory term of 21 months imprisonment. In the result, the accused is legally eligible for the imposition of a probation order to help guide his rehabilitation. I have no hesitation imposing this order on the accused in all of the circumstances of this case.

49More particularly, when the accused is released from custody, he will be subject to the terms of a probation order for a period of three years. As I have suggested, such an order is in the best rehabilitative interests of the accused, as it will provide him with continued guidance and supervision following the conclusion of his sentence of imprisonment.

50As part of this probation order, the accused shall be subject to all of the following statutory conditions prescribed by s. 732.1(2) of the Code, namely, that the accused shall: (a) keep the peace and be of good behaviour; (b) appear before the court when required to do so by the court; and (c) notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or the probation officer of any change of employment or occupation.

51As part of this probation order, the accused shall also be subject to all of the following additional conditions pursuant to s. 732.1(3) of the Code, namely, that the accused shall:

• Report to a probation officer within two working days of his release from custody, and thereafter as directed by his probation officer;

• Remain within the province of Ontario unless advance written permission to go outside that jurisdiction is obtained from the court or the probation officer;

• Abstain from the possession and consumption of drugs, except in accordance with a medical prescription, and abstain from the consumption of alcoholic beverages or any other intoxicating substances;

• Seek and maintain gainful full-time employment or continue his full-time education;

• Abstain absolutely from owning, possessing or carrying any weapons;

• Once he is released from custody, the accused shall perform 120 hours of community service over a period not exceeding 12 months, at a rate of not less than 10 hours per month;

H. Ancillary Sentencing Orders

52In all of the circumstances of this case, I am compelled to also make the following two ancillary sentencing orders. I understand from the submissions of the parties that the imposition of these orders is not controversial.

53First, pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code, I make an order, in form 5.03, requiring that samples of bodily substances be taken from the accused for purposes of forensic DNA analysis. The crimes of “aggravated assault” and “robbery,” committed by the accused, are both “primary designated offences” as defined in s. 487.04(a) of the Criminal Code and, accordingly, such an order is statutorily mandated in the circumstances.

54Second, pursuant to ss. 109(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, there shall be an order prohibiting the accused from the possession of any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, or any other type of firearm, crossbow, prohibited or restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, or explosive substance for life. To be clear, the accused must comply with this order.

I. Conclusion

55In conclusion, in an effort to now impose the functional equivalent of a 4-year global term of imprisonment on the accused, he is now sentenced to a reformatory term of 6 months imprisonment for the offence of robbery, and to 21 months imprisonment (concurrent) for the offence of aggravated assault. Having already served the functional equivalent of 2 years and 3 months of imprisonment, that results in the functional global equivalent of a 4-year penitentiary term of imprisonment.

56The accused is also subject to a 3-year term of probation thereafter, in accordance with the terms that I have imposed as part of that probation order. The accused is also subject to the two ancillary sentencing orders that I have made today.

Kenneth L. Campbell J.