Tim DiMuzio

The accused was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder for shooting the victim.

The court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years.

The court noted that this was the accused's second first-degree murder conviction, but due to the Supreme Court's decision in Bissonnette, consecutive periods of parole ineligibility could not be imposed.

The court also ordered a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and a lifetime non-communication order with the victim's family and a key witness.

The respondent brought a motion seeking to dismiss the applicant's spousal support claim on the basis that she did not meet the definition of "spouse" under the Family Law Act.

The applicant brought a cross-motion for interim disbursements.

The court dismissed the applicant's adjournment request, finding she had ample time to secure counsel.

Applying the Hryniak v. Hryniak summary judgment framework, the court determined that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on the threshold question of whether the applicant was a spouse.

Based on extensive objective evidence, including the parties' statutory declaration for immigration purposes, tax returns, driver's licenses, and third-party affidavits, the court found that the parties did not cohabit continuously for three years and did not otherwise meet the definition of "spouse" as interpreted by the Molodowich v. Penttinen factors.

The court noted significant credibility issues with the applicant's evidence.

Consequently, the respondent's motion was granted, and the applicant's claims were dismissed.

This ruling addresses a defence application for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing a lack of evidence for planning and deliberation.

The Crown contended there was ample evidence.

The court reviewed the legal standard for directed verdict motions, emphasizing that the judge's role is to determine if a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could convict, without assessing credibility or weighing evidence.

Applying this standard, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, including the accused's identity, the execution-style nature of the killing, the use of a getaway vehicle, efforts to conceal identity, and post-offence conduct suggesting prior knowledge of legal rules, from which a jury could reasonably infer planning and deliberation.

Consequently, the application was dismissed, and the trial proceeded on the first-degree murder charge.

The accused, Saaid Mohiadin, charged with first-degree murder, brought a mid-trial application to exclude bank records due to late disclosure, arguing a violation of his s. 7 Charter right to make full answer and defence.

The Crown sought to admit the records to corroborate a key witness's testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while disclosure was not ideal, it did not render the trial unfair, and any potential prejudice could be remedied by recalling the witness for further cross-examination.

The court emphasized that exclusion of evidence for late disclosure is reserved for exceptional cases where no other remedy suffices.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to be permitted to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The court dismissed the application, reaffirming the traditional functional approach to courtroom seating.

The judge balanced fair trial interests, including the presumption of innocence, with courtroom security concerns and the need for the jury to clearly observe the accused, especially given that identification was a main issue in the case.

The court emphasized that clear jury instructions can mitigate any perceived prejudice from the accused's placement and noted the accused's significant criminal record and institutional misconduct as legitimate security concerns.

The defendant, Ronald Baider, was charged with sexual assault against L.L., a security guard he supervised.

The incident involved a search for a lost work phone, during which L.L. alleged Baider touched her breasts and inner thighs.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The court found that the touching, as described by an independent witness, was brief and not sexual in nature, thus not constituting sexual assault.

While the court found L.L. did not subjectively consent to the search, it also found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Baider knew L.L. was not consenting, given the possibility she acquiesced by saying "ok".

Consequently, the charge was dismissed.

The accused brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutionality of a search warrant executed at her residence, which yielded a loaded handgun and crack cocaine.

The warrant relied heavily on information from a confidential source.

After denying the defence's request to cross-examine the affiant and allowing the Crown to rely on step 6 of the Garofoli procedure, the court assessed the facial validity of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court found that the police failed to sufficiently corroborate the confidential source's information, rendering the search a violation of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's privacy outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits, resulting in the exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2).

The applicant, Shaheed Bacchus Ali, sought a bail review after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds for 22 charges, including firearms and drug trafficking.

The application was based on two material changes: a stronger release plan with 24/7 surety supervision and GPS monitoring, and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the improved supervision plan adequately addressed secondary ground concerns regarding reoffending.

On the tertiary ground, while the Crown's case was strong and the charges serious, the court balanced these factors against the heightened risks of COVID-19 in correctional facilities and the viability of the proposed release plan.

The court granted judicial interim release with strict conditions, including house arrest, GPS monitoring, and self-isolation.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm without a licence, possession of a firearm contrary to a prohibition order, and possession for the purpose of trafficking crack cocaine.

The offences occurred during a civic holiday weekend in downtown Toronto when the accused robbed an American tourist at gunpoint near Union Station.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 7 years, while the defence sought 5 years and 2 months with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and lockdown conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 5 years and 5 months, less pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a remaining sentence of 4 years and 5 months.

The court also imposed a lifetime firearms prohibition and a DNA order.

Ayub Ali was found guilty of manslaughter as a party to the first-degree murder of Kadir Abdulkhadir.

The co-accused, Mohamud Dirie, was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The court was tasked with sentencing Mr. Ali, who was 19 at the time of the offence and a youthful first offender.

The jury's verdict implied Mr. Ali knew Mr. Dirie was armed and intended to recklessly discharge a firearm, and Mr. Ali aided in tracking the victim and positioning Mr. Dirie for the ambush.

The Crown sought 12-13 years imprisonment, while the defence sought 6 years.

The court considered the aggravated nature of the manslaughter, the use of a firearm (triggering a 4-year minimum), and the principles of denunciation, general deterrence, and rehabilitation for a youthful first offender.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 years imprisonment, reduced to an effective term of 3 years and 11 months after enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to admit the preliminary inquiry evidence of two unavailable witnesses under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

One witness was too ill to testify, which the defence conceded.

The other witness had left Canada and was evading his subpoena.

The court found that the witness was absent from Canada and that it was not feasible to take his evidence via video link.

Balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential trial unfairness, the court admitted the preliminary inquiry evidence, noting the defence could lead evidence regarding the witness's credibility.

During a first-degree murder trial, the accused brought an application under s. 24(1) of the Charter to exclude the evidence of a Crown witness, arguing that the police's failure to properly record and preserve evidence from group meetings with witnesses breached his rights under ss. 7 and 11(d).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the police did not deliberately fail to make a record to avoid production, and that the imperfect note-taking and group interviews did not render the trial unfair given the extensive disclosure available to the defence for cross-examination.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown brought an application to admit several ante-mortem hearsay statements made by the deceased to his mother and cousin.

The statements detailed a history of animosity and fear of the accused.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, assessing the threshold reliability of each statement.

The court admitted several statements that possessed sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, such as those made shortly after traumatic events or expressing present fear.

However, the court excluded other statements that were made under circumstances of suspicion or were inextricably intertwined with double hearsay.

The court also declined the defence's request to cross-examine the deceased's mother on the voir dire, finding that her preliminary inquiry transcripts were sufficient to assess threshold reliability and that her credibility was not so deficient as to rob the statements of all probative value.

The applicant, a professional photographer charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving four aspiring models, applied to sever the counts so they could be tried separately.

The Crown intended to bring a similar fact application.

The court found that three of the complainants alleged severe conduct (intercourse and vaginal touching) and were allegedly connected through the applicant's former partner, making a joint trial appropriate.

However, the fourth complainant alleged less severe conduct (touching breasts), had no connection to the others, and the applicant did not intend to testify in her case.

The court severed the fourth complainant's case from the other three to prevent undue prejudice and protect the applicant's right to silence.

The accused, charged with attempted murder following a shooting at a Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) apartment, brought an O'Connor application for third-party records held by TCHC relating to the complainant's tenancy.

The accused sought the records to test the complainant's credibility, identify other potential targets or suspects, and challenge her claims of fearing the accused.

Following a review of the records and with the assistance of counsel for the complainant and TCHC, the court ordered the production of specific relevant documents and redacted records, while sealing the unredacted copies.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit (over 80) following a traffic stop in downtown Toronto.

The defendant conceded all factual elements of the Crown's case but challenged whether police complied with the Charter right to counsel of choice under section 10(b).

The defendant indicated a desire to speak with a friend he believed to be a lawyer, but police did not adequately facilitate this request before offering duty counsel.

The court found a breach of the defendant's section 10(b) rights and excluded the breath test evidence as the appropriate remedy under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal on the over 80 charge.

The defendant brought a Charter s. 11(b) motion challenging unreasonable delay in his prosecution for operating a motor vehicle with excessive blood alcohol concentration and speeding.

The defendant was arrested on May 18, 2012, released on a Promise to Appear, and the Information was sworn on June 7, 2012.

The trial was not scheduled until September 3, 2013—nearly 15 months later.

The court found that approximately 10 months of delay was attributable to institutional factors and a further 2 months to Crown conduct.

The defendant suffered actual prejudice to his security interests, including anxiety, depression, and medical intervention.

The court concluded that the delay exceeded permissible guidelines for simple cases and granted a stay of proceedings.