Anne Marie Morphew

The appellant appealed conviction and sentence on charges of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm in a vehicle, possession of MDMA, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in Charter rulings regarding arbitrary detention under s. 9 and unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on a driving prohibition, the search of a satchel near the appellant's leg was a valid search incident to arrest, and the trial judge's findings on knowledge and control for possession were supported by the record.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to address anti-Black racism principles from Morris.

The court found the failure did not impact the sentence, which was at the low end of the range for a second firearm offence.

The accused was charged with one count of assault and two counts of sexual assault.

The assault charge related to an incident on February 28, 2023, where the complainant alleged the accused made a threatening gesture toward her during an argument.

The two sexual assault charges related to alleged incidents in December 2006 and May-June 2013.

The trial proceeded by indictment before the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found significant credibility and reliability issues with the complainant's testimony, particularly regarding her reliance on "recovered memories" obtained through therapy sessions.

The court acquitted the accused on all three counts, finding that the Crown had not proven the essential elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

This endorsement clarifies a witness caution issued to the Crown's main witness, LSB, during an ongoing criminal trial for assault and sexual assault.

The caution restricted LSB from discussing her evidence with anyone except her criminal lawyer and therapist.

A motion for direction was brought by the accused's counsel, prompted by a Superior Court Justice's endorsement, seeking clarification regarding LSB's ability to discuss underlying events with her family law counsel for a separate, upcoming family law trial involving similar allegations.

The court declined to further modify the caution to specifically address family law proceedings, reiterating that LSB should seek independent legal advice for family law matters, and clarified the caution to explicitly prohibit LSB from discussing her criminal trial evidence with her family law counsel.

The appellant sought to overturn convictions for possession of a stolen vehicle, drugs for trafficking, careless use of a firearm, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and challenged the total 10-year sentence.

The conviction appeal argued misapprehension of evidence regarding the firearm's location.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, noting the judge's reasoned assessment of witness credibility despite inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal contended errors in applying the totality principle and the correct sentencing range for recidivist firearms offenders.

The Court affirmed that sentencing ranges are flexible and that the imposed sentence was proportionate, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation given the gravity of the offences involving guns and drugs, and the offender's extensive criminal record, while acknowledging mitigating factors.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Michael John William Ball, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's jury charge on two grounds: the standard of proof regarding the cause of death and the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness.

He also argued that the trial judge erred in handling the jury's request to review expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The court concluded that the jury charge, when considered holistically, adequately equipped the jury, and the Vetrovec warning fulfilled its purpose.

Furthermore, the trial judge's decision to cease playback of expert testimony upon the jury's indication that their questions were resolved was deemed a reasonable exercise of discretion, as the reviewed evidence was uncontroversial and did not require further contextualization.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay a sexual abuse prosecution due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay slightly exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown argued that the defence's inability to accept short-notice earlier trial dates should be attributed as defence delay.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the defence's unavailability on short notice did not constitute defence delay.

In the alternative, the court found that even if the delay fell just under the ceiling, it was markedly excessive due to significant disclosure delays and chronic institutional delays in the jurisdiction.

The accused was discharged at a preliminary inquiry on two counts of trafficking in a scheduled substance under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown subsequently preferred an indictment that included two counts of trafficking in a substance held out to be a scheduled substance, based on the same underlying facts.

The accused brought a motion to quash these counts, arguing they were the same offences for which he had been discharged.

The court agreed, finding that trafficking is a single offence that can be committed in different ways, and therefore the Crown could not prefer an indictment for these charges under section 574 of the Criminal Code.

The application was granted and the counts were quashed.

An application was brought by eight young persons to vary a previous court order to explicitly prevent media from disseminating their identifying information, including through private social media messages, in relation to charges of second-degree murder.

The court found that a reporter's actions of contacting individuals on social media and disclosing a young person's name and charges contravened the spirit of the Youth Criminal Justice Act's publication ban under section 110, even if not an intentional breach of the specific prior order.

The court clarified that "publication" under the YCJA includes indiscriminate communication on social media that risks making information known to the general public.

Charles Okito pleaded guilty to kidnapping and robbery.

The court considered aggravating factors (impact on victim, imitation firearm) and mitigating factors (youth, first offence, guilty plea, difficult background, mental health challenges, collateral consequence of deportation).

Applying sentencing principles, including deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation, the court imposed a sentence of 42 months' imprisonment before credit for presentence custody, resulting in a further 20 months and 15 days to serve.

The judge also made a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a non-communication order, and waived the victim fine surcharge.

The judge recommended against deportation due to the offender's rehabilitation prospects and lack of support in his home country.

The appellant, convicted of importing cocaine, sought leave to appeal her sentence of six years and three months.

She argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider collateral consequences related to her children's care by the Catholic Children's Aid Society and the impact of systemic discrimination and racism.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately considered family circumstances as a mitigating factor and that systemic factors, while relevant to responsibility, do not diminish the gravity of the offence.

The sentence was at the low end of the established range for such offences.

The appellant, Steven Vanroy Browne, appealed his conviction for manslaughter, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that evidence of phone numbers provided to his probation officer was inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict reasonable, supported by DNA evidence, mobile phone records, and association evidence, despite inconsistencies in eyewitness identification.

The court also upheld the admission of phone number evidence, ruling it was not compelled and did not violate Charter rights, as the appellant failed to establish a subjective or objective belief of compulsion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for dangerous driving.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge relied on inadmissible hearsay to find that the appellant was the driver of the tractor trailer involved in the collision.

As there was no other admissible evidence tying the appellant to the accident, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal.

The appellant, Davide Duncan, appealed his conviction for aiding or abetting the importation of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The appeal raised two main issues: the admissibility of wiretap evidence, challenged on the basis of alleged misleading or fraudulent affidavits used to obtain the authorization, and the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge did not err in allowing amplification or excision of the affidavit errors, as they were not deliberate and the affiant acted in good faith.

The court also upheld the finding that the wiretap authorization fell within the criminal organization exception under s. 186(1.1) of the Criminal Code, negating the need to prove investigative necessity.

Finally, the court found no error in the trial judge's jury instructions on the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting certain text messages from the complainant as *res gestae* statements and improperly using them in the reasons for judgment.

The court found no error in admitting the texts as relevant to the complainant's state of mind immediately after the alleged assault, and as *res gestae* statements for their truth, given that the timing and situation negated the possibility of concoction.

The court also determined that the trial judge did not improperly use the texts to bolster the complainant's credibility, but rather considered them appropriately in the context of chronology and emotional state.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, received after convictions for impaired driving, dangerous driving, failing to stop while pursued by police, and driving while disqualified.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to fully apply Gladue principles when considering his criminal record, suggesting previous sentences established an artificially high baseline.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting the trial judge carefully reviewed the Gladue report, considered systemic factors, and that the "step up" principle was not applied.

The paramount consideration was the protection of other road users.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of setting aside the victim surcharge; in all other respects, it was dismissed.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in s. 99(2) and s. 99(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court declined to hold a full hearing on s. 99(2)(a), ruling that prior declarations of constitutional invalidity by judges of coordinate jurisdiction rendered the provision of no force and effect, and it would be inappropriate to reconsider whether those decisions were plainly wrong.

The challenge to s. 99(3) was dismissed as moot because the applicant was not being sentenced for an offence under that section.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's calculation of defence delay, noting that defence counsel was unavailable for 17 blocks of trial dates offered by the court.

The net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the appellant failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to admit the preliminary inquiry evidence of two unavailable witnesses under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code.

One witness was too ill to testify, which the defence conceded.

The other witness had left Canada and was evading his subpoena.

The court found that the witness was absent from Canada and that it was not feasible to take his evidence via video link.

Balancing the probative value of the evidence against potential trial unfairness, the court admitted the preliminary inquiry evidence, noting the defence could lead evidence regarding the witness's credibility.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, applied for a change of venue for his re-trial.

In his first trial, the jury convicted him of causing an indignity to a body but could not reach a verdict on the murder charge, resulting in a mistrial.

The applicant argued that extensive pre-trial publicity regarding the 'split verdict' created a likelihood of prejudice in the local area.

Relying on expert evidence regarding the effects of pre-trial publicity, the court found that knowledge of the first trial's outcome would likely taint a new jury's ability to be impartial, as it implied the first jury rejected the accused's evidence.

The application was granted and the venue was ordered changed.