Anne Marie Morphew

The appellant appealed conviction and sentence on charges of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm in a vehicle, possession of MDMA, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in Charter rulings regarding arbitrary detention under s. 9 and unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8, and that the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on a driving prohibition, the search of a satchel near the appellant's leg was a valid search incident to arrest, and the trial judge's findings on knowledge and control for possession were supported by the record.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to address anti-Black racism principles from Morris.

The court found the failure did not impact the sentence, which was at the low end of the range for a second firearm offence.

The applicant was charged with trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and firearm-related offences.

The applicant brought a section 8 Charter motion challenging the validity of search warrants for his residence and two vehicles, and alleging that a search of a storage locker was warrantless and unauthorized.

The Crown conceded that the storage locker search was warrantless.

The court found that the search warrants for the residence and vehicles were validly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds, but that the warrantless search of the storage locker violated section 8 of the Charter.

The court excluded the evidence obtained from the storage locker under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the breach and its impact on privacy rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings for breach of his Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The applicant was charged with fraud on March 6, 2024.

The Crown indicated an intention to prosecute the applicant jointly with a co-accused, but never formalized this by laying a joint information or obtaining a court order.

Trial dates were scheduled to conclude on November 21, 2025, approximately 20.5 months after charges were laid, exceeding the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the Crown had reasonable alternatives available on February 11, 2025, to schedule the trial within the Jordan ceiling but failed to pursue them, instead accommodating the schedule of the co-accused's counsel who was not retained for trial.

The court granted the stay.

The accused was charged with one count of assault and two counts of sexual assault.

The assault charge related to an incident on February 28, 2023, where the complainant alleged the accused made a threatening gesture toward her during an argument.

The two sexual assault charges related to alleged incidents in December 2006 and May-June 2013.

The trial proceeded by indictment before the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found significant credibility and reliability issues with the complainant's testimony, particularly regarding her reliance on "recovered memories" obtained through therapy sessions.

The court acquitted the accused on all three counts, finding that the Crown had not proven the essential elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

During a criminal trial for assault and sexual assault, the defence challenged the admissibility of an out-of-court statement made by the accused during a joint therapy session in 2007.

The complainant testified that during the session, the accused admitted to "taking" her and apologized for hurting her, which she understood as an admission of rape.

The defence argued the statement lacked sufficient context and was too incomplete to be reliable.

The court ruled the statement admissible, finding that the context of the therapy session provided enough meaning to make the statement logically relevant, with any issues of completeness going to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.

Sentencing for a multi-year human trafficking and prostitution enterprise involving seven victims, intimate partner violence, distribution of intimate imagery, and laundering of proceeds of crime.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, applied the Lopez sentencing factors, and treated the offender's plea, rehabilitative efforts, racialized background, and harsh pre-sentence custody as mitigating factors, though it found no sufficient nexus between anti-Black racism and the offending conduct to materially diminish culpability further.

A global 15.5-year custodial sentence was imposed after totality, with Summers credit reducing the remaining sentence to just over 10 years.

The court also ordered restitution and a matching fine in lieu of forfeiture of $92,855, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, non-communication, and lifetime SOIRA orders.

During a trial for sexual assault, the complainant testified in cross-examination that she 'recovered' memories of the alleged assault during therapy sessions.

The accused brought a motion for directions to cross-examine the complainant on these recovered memories without making an application under s. 278 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the accused could ask the complainant what she meant by the terms 'recovered memory' and 'walked back', as this did not elicit the content of the therapeutic records.

However, the court ruled that questions regarding whether the memories were consistent or changed over time would elicit the content of the records and therefore required a s. 278 application.

This endorsement clarifies a witness caution issued to the Crown's main witness, LSB, during an ongoing criminal trial for assault and sexual assault.

The caution restricted LSB from discussing her evidence with anyone except her criminal lawyer and therapist.

A motion for direction was brought by the accused's counsel, prompted by a Superior Court Justice's endorsement, seeking clarification regarding LSB's ability to discuss underlying events with her family law counsel for a separate, upcoming family law trial involving similar allegations.

The court declined to further modify the caution to specifically address family law proceedings, reiterating that LSB should seek independent legal advice for family law matters, and clarified the caution to explicitly prohibit LSB from discussing her criminal trial evidence with her family law counsel.

The appellant sought to overturn convictions for possession of a stolen vehicle, drugs for trafficking, careless use of a firearm, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and challenged the total 10-year sentence.

The conviction appeal argued misapprehension of evidence regarding the firearm's location.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings, noting the judge's reasoned assessment of witness credibility despite inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal contended errors in applying the totality principle and the correct sentencing range for recidivist firearms offenders.

The Court affirmed that sentencing ranges are flexible and that the imposed sentence was proportionate, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation given the gravity of the offences involving guns and drugs, and the offender's extensive criminal record, while acknowledging mitigating factors.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Michael John William Ball, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's jury charge on two grounds: the standard of proof regarding the cause of death and the adequacy of the Vetrovec warning for an unsavoury witness.

He also argued that the trial judge erred in handling the jury's request to review expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The court concluded that the jury charge, when considered holistically, adequately equipped the jury, and the Vetrovec warning fulfilled its purpose.

Furthermore, the trial judge's decision to cease playback of expert testimony upon the jury's indication that their questions were resolved was deemed a reasonable exercise of discretion, as the reviewed evidence was uncontroversial and did not require further contextualization.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay a sexual abuse prosecution due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay slightly exceeded the 18-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown argued that the defence's inability to accept short-notice earlier trial dates should be attributed as defence delay.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the defence's unavailability on short notice did not constitute defence delay.

In the alternative, the court found that even if the delay fell just under the ceiling, it was markedly excessive due to significant disclosure delays and chronic institutional delays in the jurisdiction.

The accused was discharged at a preliminary inquiry on two counts of trafficking in a scheduled substance under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown subsequently preferred an indictment that included two counts of trafficking in a substance held out to be a scheduled substance, based on the same underlying facts.

The accused brought a motion to quash these counts, arguing they were the same offences for which he had been discharged.

The court agreed, finding that trafficking is a single offence that can be committed in different ways, and therefore the Crown could not prefer an indictment for these charges under section 574 of the Criminal Code.

The application was granted and the counts were quashed.

An application was brought by eight young persons to vary a previous court order to explicitly prevent media from disseminating their identifying information, including through private social media messages, in relation to charges of second-degree murder.

The court found that a reporter's actions of contacting individuals on social media and disclosing a young person's name and charges contravened the spirit of the Youth Criminal Justice Act's publication ban under section 110, even if not an intentional breach of the specific prior order.

The court clarified that "publication" under the YCJA includes indiscriminate communication on social media that risks making information known to the general public.

Charles Okito pleaded guilty to kidnapping and robbery.

The court considered aggravating factors (impact on victim, imitation firearm) and mitigating factors (youth, first offence, guilty plea, difficult background, mental health challenges, collateral consequence of deportation).

Applying sentencing principles, including deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation, the court imposed a sentence of 42 months' imprisonment before credit for presentence custody, resulting in a further 20 months and 15 days to serve.

The judge also made a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a non-communication order, and waived the victim fine surcharge.

The judge recommended against deportation due to the offender's rehabilitation prospects and lack of support in his home country.

A group of media organizations applied under section 119 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act for access to the unredacted youth criminal court records of eight young persons charged with second degree murder.

The Crown and the young persons opposed the application, citing the young persons' heightened privacy interests and fair trial rights.

The court found that while the media had a valid interest in the records, granting access to the entire unredacted file at this early stage was not desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice due to the risk of irreversible harm from inadvertent dissemination of private information.

The court granted partial access to redacted records, including the charging informations and bail release orders, with identifying information removed.

The appellant, convicted of importing cocaine, sought leave to appeal her sentence of six years and three months.

She argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider collateral consequences related to her children's care by the Catholic Children's Aid Society and the impact of systemic discrimination and racism.

The Court of Appeal granted leave but dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge adequately considered family circumstances as a mitigating factor and that systemic factors, while relevant to responsibility, do not diminish the gravity of the offence.

The sentence was at the low end of the established range for such offences.

The appellant, Steven Vanroy Browne, appealed his conviction for manslaughter, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that evidence of phone numbers provided to his probation officer was inadmissible.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict reasonable, supported by DNA evidence, mobile phone records, and association evidence, despite inconsistencies in eyewitness identification.

The court also upheld the admission of phone number evidence, ruling it was not compelled and did not violate Charter rights, as the appellant failed to establish a subjective or objective belief of compulsion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for dangerous driving.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge relied on inadmissible hearsay to find that the appellant was the driver of the tractor trailer involved in the collision.

As there was no other admissible evidence tying the appellant to the accident, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered an acquittal.

The appellant, Davide Duncan, appealed his conviction for aiding or abetting the importation of cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine.

The appeal raised two main issues: the admissibility of wiretap evidence, challenged on the basis of alleged misleading or fraudulent affidavits used to obtain the authorization, and the trial judge's instructions to the jury regarding the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge did not err in allowing amplification or excision of the affidavit errors, as they were not deliberate and the affiant acted in good faith.

The court also upheld the finding that the wiretap authorization fell within the criminal organization exception under s. 186(1.1) of the Criminal Code, negating the need to prove investigative necessity.

Finally, the court found no error in the trial judge's jury instructions on the burden of proof.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting certain text messages from the complainant as *res gestae* statements and improperly using them in the reasons for judgment.

The court found no error in admitting the texts as relevant to the complainant's state of mind immediately after the alleged assault, and as *res gestae* statements for their truth, given that the timing and situation negated the possibility of concoction.

The court also determined that the trial judge did not improperly use the texts to bolster the complainant's credibility, but rather considered them appropriately in the context of chronology and emotional state.

The appeal was dismissed.