6 total
Charter Appeal dismissed
The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, possession of child pornography, making sexually explicit material available to a child, and assault.
He argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider expert evidence regarding his cognitive disability when admitting his police statements and assessing his credibility.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's admission of the statements or credibility assessment.
However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding two errors in principle: the trial judge failed to recognize that the appellant's intellectual disability attenuated his moral blameworthiness despite his understanding of consequences, and the trial judge erred in refusing to grant COVID-19 credit.
The sentence was reduced from six years to four years and three months.
A police officer with PTSD was excused from testifying due to serious health risks.
The defendant, Shamal Searchwell-Beals, subpoenaed D.C. Graham for a Charter application.
D.C. Graham sought to be excused from testifying under s. 700(2) of the Criminal Code due to medical grounds (PTSD).
The court applied a modified four-part test from R. v. N.S., considering whether the witness's health would be seriously jeopardized, if excusing them would risk trial fairness, if accommodation was possible, and if salutary effects of testifying outweighed deleterious effects.
The court found D.C. Graham's health would be seriously jeopardized, excusing him would risk trial fairness for the defendant, but no effective accommodation was possible.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the salutary effects of compelling testimony did not outweigh the deleterious effects on the witness's health, especially given the potential unreliability of his testimony and the existence of alternative evidence.
D.C. Graham was excused from testifying.
A youthful first offender was sentenced to 42 months' imprisonment for kidnapping and robbery.
Charles Okito pleaded guilty to kidnapping and robbery.
The court considered aggravating factors (impact on victim, imitation firearm) and mitigating factors (youth, first offence, guilty plea, difficult background, mental health challenges, collateral consequence of deportation).
Applying sentencing principles, including deterrence, denunciation, and rehabilitation, the court imposed a sentence of 42 months' imprisonment before credit for presentence custody, resulting in a further 20 months and 15 days to serve.
The judge also made a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a non-communication order, and waived the victim fine surcharge.
The judge recommended against deportation due to the offender's rehabilitation prospects and lack of support in his home country.
The offender was sentenced to six years imprisonment for impaired driving causing two pedestrian deaths, with his suicidal reckless driving deemed an aggravating factor.
The offender, Michael Johnson, pleaded guilty to two counts of impaired operation causing death, two counts of dangerous operation causing death, one count of impaired driving causing bodily harm, and one count of dangerous operation causing bodily harm.
These charges stemmed from a high-speed collision (161 km/h in a 50 km/h zone) while impaired (BAC 1.5-2x legal limit) that resulted in the deaths of two pedestrians and serious injury to a third.
The defence argued that the offender's suicidal ideation at the time of the collision should be a mitigating factor, while the Crown argued it was an aggravating factor due to the foreseeable risk to public safety.
The court found the offender's moral blameworthiness to be significant, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation.
The court concluded that driving recklessly with suicidal intent on a public street constitutes an aggravating factor.
A sentence of six years imprisonment was imposed, along with a 10-year driving prohibition and a DNA order.
The court sentenced an intellectually disabled offender to five years in prison for sexual offences against minors, finding his disability did not reduce his moral blameworthiness.
The defendant, Chad Storey, was convicted of possession of child pornography, making sexually explicit material available to a child, sexual interference, and assault, involving two young complainants.
The Crown sought a 6-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a 90-day concurrent sentence followed by probation, citing the defendant's intellectual challenges and stringent bail conditions.
The court, applying principles from R. v. Friesen, emphasized denunciation and deterrence for child sexual abuse offences.
It found that the defendant's intellectual disability did not reduce his moral blameworthiness to displace the need for a penitentiary sentence, as he demonstrated awareness of the wrongfulness of his actions.
The court also considered the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and lengthy house arrest bail conditions (50 months), granting 12 months credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail.
The defendant was sentenced to an aggregate of five years in the penitentiary, with ancillary orders including lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, DNA sample, 10-year firearm prohibition, and communication prohibition with victims.
The court struck down the two-year mandatory minimum for receiving material benefit from child sexual services and sentenced an offending victim to eight months incarceration.
The accused was charged with offences relating to forcing two minors to work in the sex trade.
She pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving a material benefit from the sexual services of minors pursuant to section 286.2(2) of the Criminal Code.
The Crown sought the mandatory minimum sentence of two years imprisonment.
The defence argued for a suspended or conditional sentence and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum provision.
The court found that while the mandatory minimum was grossly disproportionate to the offender's circumstances, it could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.
The court imposed a sentence of eight months incarceration, finding that the offender's own history of sexual exploitation and ongoing victimization at the time of the offences substantially reduced her moral culpability, despite the serious nature of the crimes and the harm caused to the young victims.