Jennifer Joanne Epstein

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day imposed for theft over $5,000, forgery, and possession of stolen property over $5,000 for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant had stolen the famous "Roaring Lion" portrait photograph of Winston Churchill by Yousuf Karsh from the Château Laurier Hotel in Ottawa, replaced it with a forgery, and sold the original through an auction house in London.

The majority upheld the sentence, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The dissenting judge found errors in principle in the sentencing judge's approach to establishing the sentencing range, particularly in relying on foreign precedents and narrowing focus to art crimes, and would have substituted a conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, possession of child pornography, making sexually explicit material available to a child, and assault.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider expert evidence regarding his cognitive disability when admitting his police statements and assessing his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's admission of the statements or credibility assessment.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding two errors in principle: the trial judge failed to recognize that the appellant's intellectual disability attenuated his moral blameworthiness despite his understanding of consequences, and the trial judge erred in refusing to grant COVID-19 credit.

The sentence was reduced from six years to four years and three months.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed B.N.'s application for bail pending appeal from convictions for sexual assault and related offences.

The court found that, although the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel clearly surpassed the "not frivolous" standard, public safety concerns—given B.N.'s extensive history of breaches and violence—outweighed reviewability and enforceability interests.

The decision applies the Oland/Farinacci framework for bail pending appeal and emphasizes the stand-alone importance of public safety in intimate partner violence cases.

The appellant, K.R., was convicted of obstructing justice in relation to her niece, J.D.R., after attempting to cover up sexual assaults committed by her co-accused, D.V. The trial judge allowed the Crown to amend the information to conform to the evidence, and convicted K.R. on the amended charge.

On appeal, K.R. argued that the amendment caused irreparable prejudice and that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainants’ credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the amendment or the credibility assessment.

The appellant, Dailean John, appealed his conviction for unlawful confinement and his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding him an active participant rather than a mere bystander.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude he played a culpable role given the evidence of the victim's confinement in his apartment and his awareness and control over her movements.

The appellant also sought to appeal his sentence, arguing it was unfit due to its impact on his Permanent Resident status and potential deportation.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the appeal, holding that reducing the sentence to avoid deportation would result in an unfit sentence given the seriousness and aggravating factors of the offence.

The appellant, previously declared a dangerous offender and subject to a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO), appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed for breaching LTSO conditions.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the sentencing judge's decision, finding no error in failing to consider the principle of proportionality.

The court reiterated that dangerous offender proceedings prioritize public protection and require a thorough inquiry into managing offender risk, with less coercive options considered before an indeterminate sentence.

The sentencing judge's detailed reasons, which highlighted the appellant's history of non-compliance with treatment and continued risk, were upheld.

The appellant was convicted of seven counts of sexual assault, one count of assault with a weapon, and one count of assault.

He appealed on three grounds: the trial judge's treatment of the complainant's motive to fabricate, alleged "oath helping" to bolster the complainant's credibility, and the admission of electronic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment that the mere existence of family law litigation did not establish a motive to lie, no impermissible oath helping in the complainant's explanation for delayed reporting, and that the electronic evidence met the low bar for admission under the Canada Evidence Act and was not central to the credibility analysis.

The appellant, Qiao Zeng, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's jury instructions were confusing and inadequate, particularly regarding the two distinct routes to liability (aiding a planned murder and common intention in a kidnapping resulting in death) and the evidence relevant to each.

The blending of these routes and the lack of clear delineation between them for the appellant and co-accused likely confused the jury and may have led to a compromise verdict.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial on the charge of second-degree murder.

The appellant, D.A., appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended material evidence and erroneously treated the complainant as a child witness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three material factual errors regarding the appellant's credibility, which formed a substantial basis for rejecting his evidence.

These misapprehensions were central to the verdict.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The court did not need to address the "child witness" ground of appeal.

This addendum addresses the appropriate forum for sentencing Shawn Cargioli after the Court of Appeal vacated his first-degree murder conviction and substituted it with second-degree murder.

The Court considered arguments from both Mr. Cargioli, who sought sentencing by the Court of Appeal, and the Crown, who requested remittal to the trial court.

Despite the passage of time since the original trial and sentencing, the Court found that the trial court was the more suitable forum, particularly given the Crown's anticipation of a contested sentencing proceeding involving substantial evidence, victim impact statements, and potential "Gardiner" hearings.

The Court ordered the matter remitted to the trial court for sentencing on the second-degree murder conviction.

Michael LeBlanc appealed his second-degree murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by not giving alternative jury directions on the partial defence of provocation and a rolled-up manslaughter charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality for either defence.

For provocation, the court determined the "sudden" element was not met as the appellant was prepared for the threat.

For manslaughter, the brutal nature of the attack indicated an intent to cause death or grievous bodily harm, leaving no realistic scope for a lesser verdict.

The appellants, Shawn Cargioli, Kendell Kamal, and Famien Morrisson, appealed their murder convictions stemming from the stabbing death of Shadi Taleb during a planned robbery.

Cargioli was convicted of first-degree murder, while Kamal and Morrisson were convicted of second-degree murder.

The appeals raised various grounds, including the admissibility of expert evidence, trial judge's rulings on witness testimony, admissibility of police statements, jury instructions on after-the-fact conduct, misapprehension of evidence, the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, and jury instructions on liability for manslaughter, murder, and first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals of Morrisson and Kamal, affirming their convictions and sentences.

For Cargioli, the court found a reversible error in the first-degree murder instruction regarding the contemporaneity of mens rea and actus reus for active participation.

Given the Crown's concession, the court substituted a conviction for second-degree murder for Cargioli and remitted the matter for sentencing.

This is an appeal from a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that overturned an acquittal in a sexual assault case and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant, finding reasonable doubt regarding consent and the alleged initial assault, partly due to an inconsistency in the complainant's evidence and the public nature of the alleged act.

The summary conviction appeal judge (SCAJ) allowed the Crown's appeal, concluding the trial judge engaged in "myth-based reasoning" and erred in finding consent.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appellant's appeal, restoring the acquittal.

The Court found the SCAJ erred by substituting its own factual conclusions, mischaracterizing the trial judge's reasoning as "myth-based," and failing to distinguish between a finding of lack of consent and a finding of reasonable doubt about consent.

The Court also noted the SCAJ's failure to apply the material error test required for Crown appeals from acquittal.

The appellant, a youth, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising three grounds: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, erroneous dismissal of a s. 278.3 Criminal Code application for production of the complainant's therapeutic records, and improper curtailment of cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish a miscarriage of justice due to counsel's performance, that the trial judge correctly dismissed the s. 278.3 application as the records were not shown to be "likely relevant" with case-specific information, and that cross-examination was not improperly curtailed.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding of non-consensual sexual contact and the inapplicability of the honest but mistaken belief in consent defence.

This is an application for bail pending appeal of a prison sentence for manslaughter.

The applicant, who pleaded guilty to manslaughter after initially being charged with murder, was sentenced to 51 months' imprisonment for killing his friend with a machine gun.

The Crown conceded leave to appeal and that the applicant was not a flight risk.

However, the court dismissed the application for bail, finding that the appeal lacked sufficient merit to cause unnecessary hardship, and that the applicant's detention was necessary in the public interest given the aggravating features of the offence and the slim chances of a substantial sentence reduction on appeal.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted.

The appellant, J.G., appealed verdicts of not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder, entered in 2005 when he was 16.

The appeal, consented to by the Crown, was based on fresh evidence indicating the appellant, who has significant intellectual disabilities, did not understand the consequences of an NCR verdict at the time.

The Court of Appeal found the process leading to the NCR findings unfair and a miscarriage of justice.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the NCR verdicts, substituted findings of guilt for the original offences, and imposed a concurrent sentence of one day, with execution stayed.

The appellant, B.G., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The main issue was whether Crown counsel invited the jury to rely on impermissible racial or cultural stereotyping during cross-examination of defence witnesses and in closing arguments.

The court found that the Crown's questioning and address created a risk of the jury applying negative stereotypes about Indian culture, particularly regarding women's agency and truthfulness, which was not supported by evidence.

The absence of a specific cautionary instruction from the trial judge resulted in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, R.H., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant testified that she consented to the sexual touching, which occurred due to the appellant's drug-induced paranoid hallucinations about her infidelity.

The trial judge, despite the complainant's testimony of consent and the Crown's argument focusing on the complainant's inconsistent police statement, convicted the appellant on the basis that her consent was vitiated by the history of violence in their relationship.

This theory of vitiated consent was not advanced by either counsel during the trial, nor was it raised by the judge with the parties before the decision.

The Court of Appeal found that convicting the appellant on an unargued and uncanvassed theory constituted a fundamental unfairness and denied the appellant his constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed, the sexual assault conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on that count.

The appellant was convicted of assault causing bodily harm after a jury trial.

The complainant, who was in a long-term relationship with the appellant, recanted her initial allegations at the preliminary hearing and trial.

The appeal raised three grounds: the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on prior consistent statements, the admission of prior disreputable conduct evidence, and the admission of the complainant's police statement for the truth of its contents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, particularly regarding the principled exception to hearsay and the use of prior bad acts to understand the relationship.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and breaches of weapons prohibition orders, his designation as a dangerous offender, and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury charge was within the trial judge's discretion.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no error in the application of the totality principle.

However, the dangerous offender designation was set aside due to a legal error: the trial judge failed to consider the appellant's future treatment prospects and intractability at the designation stage, as required by the Criminal Code and clarified by R. v. Boutilier.

The court substituted the dangerous offender designation with a long-term offender designation, while leaving the determinate sentence and long-term supervision order intact.