Nate Jackson

The offender pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm after stabbing a man during an altercation on a TTC streetcar.

The offender, who was subject to a peace bond prohibiting weapons, acted in self-defence but used excessive force.

The court considered the offender's 11 months of pre-sentence custody, his lack of a prior criminal record, and his career plans.

Finding that a discharge would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, the court granted a conditional discharge with 36 months of probation.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Leave to appeal sentence granted; sentence appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for theft over $5,000, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that it was not informed.

The appellant claimed he was unaware that a conviction would result in automatic deportation with no right of appeal.

The trial judge had imposed a suspended sentence and 12 months probation.

The appellate court found that the appellant was sufficiently informed of the immigration consequences through his trial counsel's advice that he could be deported and should seek independent immigration legal advice.

The court rejected the appellant's claim that he needed to know with certainty that he would be deported, finding that knowledge of the possibility of deportation was sufficient.

The court also found that the appellant had not established prejudice, as his primary concern was avoiding jail time, which the guilty plea achieved.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching against a 14-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to disclose the second part of a jury note asking for a rest day, failing to give a cross-count reasoning instruction, and failing to give a prior consistent statement instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the jury note, which did not indicate rushed deliberations or prejudice.

The court also found that the additional jury instructions were not necessary, as there was no risk of cross-count reasoning and the Crown did not rely on prior consistent statements to bolster credibility.

The appellant, S.D.C., appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference against his daughter.

He argued that the trial judge unevenly scrutinized the evidence and failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.).

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s approach, holding that her reasons were careful, comprehensive, and entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

This appeal decision addresses whether the trial judge erred in dismissing Charter challenges and in sentencing, following Raquel Rodrigues’s conviction for “over 80” under s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that her s. 9 Charter rights were violated by being handcuffed in a police car for 30 minutes, that breath samples should have been excluded under s. 24(2), and that credit should have been given for a pre-trial driving prohibition.

The court found the trial judge’s findings reasonable, deferred to the trial judge’s discretion, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference following a jury trial.

At trial, the Crown argued in closing that the self-represented appellant's lack of romantic relationships provided a motive for the offences, characterizing him as a 'sexual opportunist'.

The trial judge included this theory of motive in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal held that this evidence was irrelevant, prejudicial, and unfair, as it invited impermissible reasoning and the appellant was never cross-examined on it.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision reversing a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal judge had deducted 15 months of pandemic-related administrative adjournments and nearly 3 months of delay caused by an administrative mailing error as exceptional circumstances, bringing the net delay below the 18-month ceiling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the pandemic delay issue was already settled law and the administrative error did not raise a question of law alone or a failure of natural justice.

The appellant, Andrew Haley, appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to order disclosure of a video depicting a prior altercation involving the complainant.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that the video was "obviously relevant" to the defence and should have been disclosed.

The failure to disclose violated the appellant’s right to make full answer and defence, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to call rebuttal evidence, failing to apply the W.(D.) framework to defence evidence, and admitting unauthenticated Snapchat screenshots.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to admit the rebuttal evidence as it responded to a new issue raised by the defence.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof or the admission of the electronic evidence, which met the low threshold for authentication.

The Ontario Court of Justice considered a s. 11(b) Charter application for a stay of proceedings due to alleged unreasonable delay in the trial of Oluwatofunmi Ola, charged with firearms offences.

The court analyzed the timeline from arrest to anticipated trial conclusion, attributing delays to Crown and defence actions.

Despite the net delay being just over the 18-month Jordan ceiling, the court found that much of the delay was attributable to Crown-caused adjournments and reasonable defence unavailability.

The court ultimately granted a stay, finding the delay unreasonable and unjustified by exceptional circumstances.

The appellant, Justin Lozon, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing death.

The central issue at trial was whether the deceased's motorcycle headlight was on, which the trial judge found to be true.

The appeal argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge failed to apply the principles from *R. v. W.(D.)* regarding credibility analysis.

A fresh evidence application was also brought, claiming the motorcycle had mechanical difficulties, including the light.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, the *W.(D.)* principles correctly applied, and the fresh evidence lacked cogency due to inconsistencies and the witness's credibility issues.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possessing proceeds of crime and his 26-month sentence.

He argued the verdict was inconsistent with his acquittal for possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and that the trial judge erred in her circumstantial evidence analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence of knowledge and control over the cash was compelling, unlike the evidence regarding the cocaine.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the trial judge properly considered the collateral immigration consequences but correctly concluded that a sentence under six months would not adequately address the gravity of the offence.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation (excess blood alcohol) after being stopped by police on private property as part of a RIDE program.

The officer believed the stop was authorized by the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found that while a common law power existed for sobriety checks on private property, the officer's reliance on a mistaken understanding of the Highway Traffic Act rendered the detention unlawful, violating the defendant's Charter rights (sections 9 and 8).

Applying the Grant test, the court determined the breaches were technical and not serious, the impact on the defendant's rights was modest, and the reliable breath evidence was crucial to the Crown's case and society's interest in deterring drunk driving.

Consequently, the evidence was admitted, and the defendant was convicted.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence (two firearms) found during a vehicle stop and search.

They alleged racial profiling, lack of grounds for the Cannabis Control Act (CCA) search, and violations of their s. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found no racial profiling and determined that the strong smell of fresh marijuana provided valid grounds for the CCA search.

While s. 10(a) rights were not breached, the court found a serious violation of the accused's s. 10(b) rights due to "lackadaisical" police conduct at the station, resulting in significant delays in facilitating access to counsel of choice.

However, applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the long-term repute of the justice system would be better served by admitting the evidence, given its reliability, the minimal impact of the breach on the accused (who eventually spoke to counsel), and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious charges on their merits.

The application for exclusion of evidence was dismissed.

The defendant, Tal Amdurski, brought a second s. 11(b) application to stay proceedings based on post-verdict delay, arguing that the seven months and ten days between verdict and anticipated sentencing violated the five-month ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, clarifying that the Jordan ceilings do not apply post-verdict and that time attributable to post-verdict motions unrelated to sentencing, such as the lost evidence application in this case, is to be considered separately.

After deducting the time for the lost evidence application, the remaining post-verdict delay was found not to be unreasonable.

The applicant, previously found guilty of eight offences including human trafficking and sexual assault involving a 13-year-old complainant, sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter.

The application alleged a breach of section 7 Charter rights due to the police's loss of relevant cellphone evidence from the complainant.

The court found that the police's failure to properly label, bag, tag, or securely store a USB drive containing the downloaded cellphone contents constituted unacceptable negligence, leading to a breach of the applicant's section 7 rights.

However, the court determined that the loss was due to human error and inadvertence, not intentional wrongdoing or abuse of process.

Furthermore, the court found that the lost evidence did not cause actual prejudice to the applicant's right to make full answer and defence, as other evidence was available to him.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed, as it did not meet the high threshold of being one of the "clearest of cases."

The defendant was charged with impaired (by drug) care and control of an automobile.

The court assessed whether the defendant was in care and control of the vehicle and whether their ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by drugs.

The court found that the defendant was in care and control based on the presumption in Section 320.35 of the Criminal Code and the realistic risk of danger.

The court also found the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by narcotic analgesics, relying on observations from a bank employee, police officers, and the detailed 12-step evaluation by a Drug Recognition Evaluator (DRE), whose expert opinion was accepted.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant, Michael St. Clair, appealed his conviction for possession and careless storage of a prohibited firearm and ammunition.

The appeal stemmed from an unsuccessful Charter application to exclude seized evidence, where the police had inexplicably lost surveillance video referenced in the information to obtain (ITO) the search warrant.

The application judge found a breach of the appellant's s. 7 Charter rights (right to make full answer and defence) due to the lost video but, as a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter, only excised references to the appellant "exhibiting the characteristics of an armed person" from the ITO, not all references to the video.

The application judge concluded that sufficient grounds remained in the ITO to uphold the search warrant and found no s. 8 Charter breach, thus dismissing the exclusion application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the automatic excision rule (typically for s. 24(2) breaches) does not apply to s. 7 breaches arising from lost evidence, where remedies under s. 24(1) are flexible and contextual.

The Court found the application judge's chosen remedy appropriate, as the ITO still contained ample corroborated information to support the warrant's issuance.

The accused, Tal Amdurski, was charged with multiple sexual services, sexual assault, and human trafficking offenses involving a 13-year-old complainant.

The central issue for several charges was the accused's mistaken belief in the complainant's age and whether he took all reasonable steps to ascertain it.

For human trafficking, the court also considered the elements of conduct and purpose, specifically whether the accused exploited the complainant.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault, sexual interference, material benefit from sexual services of a person under 18, obtaining sexual services for consideration of a person under 18, and procuring.

He was found not guilty of the primary human trafficking charge and material benefit from human trafficking, but guilty of the included offenses of trafficking in persons and material benefit from trafficking in persons, as the Crown failed to prove knowledge or willful blindness regarding the complainant's age for the higher charges.