Tania L. M. Monteiro

The Crown appealed two conditional sentences imposed for possession of child pornography, arguing that each sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The appeal judge agreed that both sentencing judges overemphasized mitigating factors and failed to give sufficient weight to denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and the aggravating features identified in recent appellate guidance, including the size and nature of the collections and, in one case, the erroneous treatment of anime material as a mitigating factor.

The court held that custodial sentences should have been imposed in both cases.

However, because both respondents had already served substantial portions of their conditional sentences, the court concluded that incarcerating them was not in the interests of justice and dismissed the Crown's appeals.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in her handling of a s. 276 application regarding prior sexual conversations with the complainant.

The summary conviction appeal court found that while the trial judge correctly subjected the evidence to the s. 276 regime, she erred by dismissing the application at stage 1 and failing to advance it to an admissibility hearing.

The trial judge further erred by maintaining her ruling in the face of shifting evidence at trial, which prevented the appellant from advancing a defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on two offenders after the sentencing judge departed from joint submissions on sentence.

The sentencing judge reduced the agreed-upon sentences without notifying counsel or applying the public interest test from Anthony-Cook.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeals, finding that the sentencing judge committed material reversible error by failing to apply the correct legal test and denying procedural fairness.

The joint submissions were substituted for the sentences imposed below.

The appellant, Laurel Paige, appealed convictions for sexual interference, sexual assault, and committing an indecent act, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the complainant, a child witness.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge’s reasons, finding that while there was a palpable error in treating the complainant’s admission of prior false allegations as bolstering her credibility, the error was not overriding and did not affect the outcome.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges on credibility findings and clarifying the proper approach to issues of corroboration, inconsistencies, and motive to fabricate.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that comments made by the trial judge during sentencing created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

During sentencing, the trial judge made stereotypical remarks about aggressive driving cultures in war-torn countries, specifically referencing Israel, and linked this perception to the appellant, who immigrated from Afghanistan.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that these comments would lead a reasonable observer to believe the trial judge's credibility findings may have been unconsciously influenced by national and cultural stereotypes.

Consequently, the court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed the Crown's appeal from an absolute discharge imposed on Jennel Christie for assault causing bodily harm.

The Court found the sentence demonstrably unfit, given the seriousness of the offence, the lack of consideration for public interest, and errors in the sentencing judge’s reasoning regarding employment and immigration consequences.

The Court substituted a nine-month conditional sentence with strict conditions, followed by one year of probation.

The appellant, Andrew Haley, appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to order disclosure of a video depicting a prior altercation involving the complainant.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice found that the video was "obviously relevant" to the defence and should have been disclosed.

The failure to disclose violated the appellant’s right to make full answer and defence, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Michael Ara, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

He argued that the trial judge erred by not excluding evidence obtained in violation of his Charter rights (sections 8, 9, and 10(b)) and in the application of section 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge found breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) due to delayed breath demand and delayed access to counsel but declined to exclude the evidence, citing mitigating factors such as the officer's inexperience, inadvertent missteps, and the absence of attempts to elicit evidence during the delay.

The appellate court upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence in the section 24(2) analysis.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's failure to specifically address a section 9 breach, as the detention was not arbitrary given the RIDE stop and the "fail" on the approved screening device.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought an urgent application for certiorari and mandamus to quash a Justice of the Peace's decision to strike a bail hearing under s. 515(6) of the Criminal Code.

The Justice of the Peace struck the hearing after the proposed surety made a profane remark and then lied about it, deeming it unfair to the accused.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace lacked jurisdiction to strike the proceeding, as the witness's conduct, while unexpected, did not impair the accused's right to a fair hearing or engage principles of fundamental justice.

The court emphasized that a bail hearing is not subject to a "do-over" simply because a release plan falters.

The application was granted, quashing the decision and ordering the bail hearing to be completed.

The accused, Richard Isaac, was found guilty of the second-degree murder of Victoria Selby-Readman.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically the period of parole ineligibility.

The court considered the brutal nature of the killing, the accused's extensive criminal history of violence against women, and his callous conduct post-offence.

The victim was found to be highly vulnerable, and the crime occurred in her home.

The jury recommended a maximum of 25 years parole ineligibility, the Crown sought 18 years, and the defence sought 12 years.

The accused, Tiffany Clarke, was charged with one count of aggravated assault following an altercation outside a nightclub where the complainant sustained seven stab wounds.

The central issues were whether Clarke inflicted the wounds and, if so, whether she acted in self-defence.

The court found that the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Clarke inflicted the stab wounds, noting the circumstantial nature of the evidence and the possibility that the complainant was stabbed earlier in the altercation by another individual.

Furthermore, even if Clarke had inflicted the wounds, the court was not satisfied that the Crown disproved self-defence, given the complainant's aggressive actions.

Clarke was found not guilty.

The accused entered a guilty plea to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and possession of methylenedioxyethylvalerone (bath salts) for the purpose of trafficking.

The plea was entered shortly after the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the mandatory minimum sentence in R. v. Nur.

The accused subsequently sought to have the plea struck, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court struck the plea, but not on the basis of ineffective assistance.

Rather, the court found that the accused did not fully understand the ramifications of entering the plea, particularly that Charter violations could no longer be argued post-plea.

The court noted the accused's tendency to hear what he wanted to hear and the difficulty in assessing his true comprehension of the proceedings.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit on March 19, 2016.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The central issues were whether the Crown established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused operated the vehicle and whether he did so within the relevant time period.

The trial judge relied on circumstantial evidence, including the location of the vehicle on streetcar tracks in a tunnel, the accused's presence at the scene, his statements and conduct, and the timing of the incident relative to police dispatch.

The court found the accused guilty based on the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence establishing both identity and timing.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and drive over 80 after being stopped leaving a parking garage in downtown Toronto.

The accused raised multiple Charter motions challenging the grounds for arrest, delays in administering the approved screening device, delays in providing the breath demand, and violations of the right to counsel of choice.

The court found two Charter breaches: a section 8 breach regarding the failure to provide the breath demand as soon as practicable, and a section 10(b) breach regarding the right to counsel of choice at the station.

However, applying the section 24(2) test from R v Grant, the court admitted the breath evidence.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation based on extensive evidence of impairment observed by security and police, as well as video footage.

Two experienced hunters were charged with unlawfully discharging a firearm without due care and attention for people or property, and with hunting wildlife during prohibited hours.

During a hunting expedition on Meadow Creek, the defendants fired at geese, striking a seven-year-old child and his stepfather in a nearby boat.

The prosecution withdrew the charge regarding prohibited hunting hours.

The court found the defendants not guilty of careless hunting, holding that the prosecution failed to establish a breach of duty deserving of punishment.

The defendants were hunting during legal shooting hours with adequate visibility, from their boat as they stated, and could not have foreseen the victim's boat emerging from around a bend in the creek.

The victim's boat was essentially invisible and silent, making it unforeseeable to the defendants.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the validity of the approved screening device and Intoxilyzer demands on Charter grounds, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and that the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion based on the smell of alcohol, glazed eyes, and the accused's admission of coming from a bar.

The court rejected the argument that the officer was required to inquire about mouth alcohol before administering the test.

The court also found the samples were taken as soon as practicable despite a 17-minute delay at the police station.

The accused was convicted.