David Landesman

The appellant, Michael Ara, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

He argued that the trial judge erred by not excluding evidence obtained in violation of his Charter rights (sections 8, 9, and 10(b)) and in the application of section 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge found breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) due to delayed breath demand and delayed access to counsel but declined to exclude the evidence, citing mitigating factors such as the officer's inexperience, inadvertent missteps, and the absence of attempts to elicit evidence during the delay.

The appellate court upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in principle or misapprehension of evidence in the section 24(2) analysis.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's failure to specifically address a section 9 breach, as the detention was not arbitrary given the RIDE stop and the "fail" on the approved screening device.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Michael Ara, was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg in 100 mL of blood.

He brought a Charter application alleging violations of his section 10(b) right to counsel and section 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure regarding breath samples.

The court found that the police breached Mr. Ara's s. 8 Charter rights because the breath demands were not made as soon as practicable, and his s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached by delaying access to counsel despite his waiver of privacy.

However, applying the Grant test under s. 24(2), the court determined that admitting the breath sample evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the seriousness of the breaches, their impact on the accused, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court also rejected the argument that the certificate of analysis was fatally flawed due to a missing year, finding it a minor omission that did not mislead or prejudice the accused.

Ultimately, the accused was found guilty as charged.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that ordered a new trial for sexual touching due to insufficient reasons from the trial judge regarding whether the touching was over or under clothing.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario admitted a Digital Court Recording (DCR) as fresh evidence to clarify the complainant's testimony.

The Court found that the trial judge's conclusion that the touching was under clothing was apparent from the record, despite not being explicitly articulated in the reasons for conviction.

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal, restored the conviction, and remitted the matter to the summary conviction appeal court to address remaining grounds of appeal, including intent and sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The complainant testified that the appellant touched her vagina while they were in bed, but there was a discrepancy in the transcript regarding whether the touching was over or under her clothing.

The trial judge concluded the touching was intentional because it was under the clothing, but later stated during sentencing that it was over the clothing.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for resolving this critical discrepancy and concluding the touching was intentional.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, Anibal Silva, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging that the almost 25-month delay in his criminal proceedings for impaired operation, 80+, and failing to stop for police breached his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The Crown argued that after deducting defence and COVID-related delays, the net delay was below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found that the total delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling, attributing it to multiple failures including police non-disclosure, and a "culture of complacency" by all parties and the court in actively managing the case.

The court determined that COVID-19 did not cause any additional delay in this specific case as the outstanding disclosure could have been remedied during that period.

The application was granted, and the proceedings were stayed.

The appellant, Daniel Kebede, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and his 9-month jail sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the lawfulness of his arrest under s. 495 of the Criminal Code, alleging a s. 8 Charter violation, and argued trial unfairness due to judicial intervention and improper expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the arrest lawful and no unfairness.

However, the court granted leave to appeal sentence and allowed the sentence appeal, varying the sentence to a conditional sentence due to a change in sentencing law (R. v. Sharma) and the appellant's strong mitigating factors and rehabilitation.

The applicant, Sarkis Mirzoyan, sought certiorari to quash two decisions of a provincial court judge who had dismissed his request for an "administrative transfer of venue" from York Region to Toronto.

Mirzoyan argued that only the Chief Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice had jurisdiction for such a transfer under the Courts of Justice Act.

The Superior Court dismissed the application for certiorari, finding that there is no legislative or procedural mechanism for an accused to seek an "administrative transfer of venue" from the Chief Justice.

The court clarified that such requests are not true administrative transfers but rather akin to s. 599 Criminal Code change of venue applications, which were premature in this case as no election for mode of trial had been made.

The accused brought an application to contest venue, seeking to transfer the proceedings from Newmarket (York Region) to Toronto (Toronto Region) for an alleged hand-to-hand drug transaction and related firearms offence.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the application, whether a case management judge should hear it, and what test applies to contested venue applications.

The court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the application and that a case management judge was appropriately placed to do so.

Applying the test under s.599 of the Criminal Code, the court found that the Crown bore the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that it was expedient to the ends of justice to keep the case in Newmarket.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the presumption of locality favoured York Region, where the offence occurred, and that all relevant witnesses and police were based in York Region.

W.G. was found guilty of sexual assault (stayed) and sexual interference.

The court considered sentencing submissions, including a constitutional challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence for sexual interference under s. 151 of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted the Crown's concession that the mandatory minimum was unconstitutional, relying on prior Superior Court declarations.

Considering W.G.'s low blameworthiness (negligence in ascertaining age), lack of criminal record, and community support, the court imposed a conditional sentence of one year, to be served in the community, along with ancillary orders.

The accused, W.G., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of L.S., who was 15 years old at the time.

The central issue was whether W.G. had an honest but mistaken belief that L.S. was at least 16 years of age, and if so, whether he took "all reasonable steps" to ascertain L.S.'s age as required by s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while W.G. genuinely believed L.S. was 18, he failed to take all reasonable steps to verify L.S.'s age, given the significant age disparity and L.S.'s efforts to conceal his true age.

Consequently, the defence under s. 150.1(4) was unavailable, and W.G. was found guilty of both offences.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The charge involved operation of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a single-vehicle collision.

The total delay from charge to trial exceeded the eighteen-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan by approximately two weeks.

The Crown argued that a four-week delay attributable to defence requests for additional disclosure should be excluded from the calculation.

The court found that the defence request for radio communications was reasonable and necessary, and that the delay was primarily attributable to police failure to provide timely disclosure.

The court granted the stay of proceedings, finding the delay unreasonable both under the new Jordan framework and under the former Morin framework.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death and dangerous driving causing death following a motor vehicle collision on Highway 427 in Toronto on August 16, 2010, which resulted in the death of the front passenger, Allison Stachyra.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown presented evidence of the accused's manner of driving, including testimony from civilian witnesses describing dangerous driving behavior, and expert evidence from a collision reconstruction specialist.

The defence argued that intervening factors, including the passenger's failure to wear a seatbelt and the possibility that the passenger grabbed the steering wheel, broke the chain of causation.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial on the charge of dangerous driving causing death, applying the minimal threshold test for committal.