Lisa Lynn Csele

The appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of controlled substances (cocaine and crystal methamphetamine) for the purpose of trafficking and one count of failing to comply with a release order.

He received a global sentence of two years imprisonment after credit for pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on grounds of alleged Charter violations relating to searches and access to counsel, and challenged the sentence on grounds of inadequate consideration of systemic discrimination and a procedurally unfair forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breaches.

The Court admitted fresh evidence on the sentence appeal but dismissed it on the merits, except for setting aside the forfeiture order for the funds seized.

The appellant, Preston Woods, appealed his 7-year sentence for drug offences on the basis that the sentencing judge erred by refusing to adjourn the sentencing hearing to allow him to obtain records of time spent in lockdown during pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by not allowing the adjournment, which prevented consideration of a possible sentence reduction (Duncan credit) for harsh pre-sentence conditions.

The Court allowed the appeal, admitted the lockdown records as fresh evidence, and substituted a sentence of 6 years and 9 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking cocaine, arguing that the trial judge erred by not cautioning the jury about relying solely on uncorroborated police evidence of an accused's utterance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that police witnesses are assessed for credibility and reliability in the same manner as any other witness.

A specific cautionary instruction is only appropriate if an evidentiary foundation is laid, and a categorical approach is unwarranted.

The court also found that the prosecution did not depend solely on the undercover officer's evidence, given the seizure of a significant quantity of cocaine.

The appellant, Justin Thombs, appealed his convictions for five counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking and two counts of possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown conceded one count of possession of proceeds (cash).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal for drug trafficking and the remaining property obtained by crime count (stolen license plate), finding no error in the trial judge's discretion to refuse a mid-trial Charter application, her assessment of plain view evidence, or her consideration of inferences.

The court entered an acquittal for the conceded cash count and refused leave to appeal sentence.

The appellant, Jennifer Pyne, appealed her convictions on several drug-related charges and sought leave to appeal her sentence, contending an error on the warrant of committal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding the location of discarded drugs.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, determining that while the sentencing judge made a minor calculation error in her oral reasons, the warrant of committal accurately reflected the imposed sentence, thus requiring no rectification.

The accused, Damodar Arapakota, was charged under s. 3(1)(a) of the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (CFPOA) for allegedly providing a material benefit (a US trip valued at approximately $20,000) to a Botswanan public official, Dr. Omponye Coach Kereteletswe, as consideration for official acts to obtain a business advantage for his company, Imex Systems Inc. The Crown argued the trip was consideration for letters confirming a contract and its value.

The defence contended the trip was for convenience and partially reimbursed, and the letters did not provide a material business advantage.

The court found that while a material benefit was conferred, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the benefit was "as consideration for" the letters (lacking a quid pro quo) or that the letters provided a material "advantage in business" as required by the CFPOA.

The accused was found not guilty.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached upon arrest.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's factual finding regarding the appellant's response to the police's offer of counsel ("I will at some point").

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's determination that this statement did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel, consistent with established jurisprudence.

As a result, no Charter breach occurred, and the issue of excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter was not considered.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Marcy McMahon, appealed her eight-month custodial sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine, which was imposed after a guilty plea and joint submission.

Fresh evidence was admitted, demonstrating that the appellant was unaware of the legal availability of a conditional sentence at the time of her sentencing due to a recent change in law (R. v. Sharma).

The Crown consented to the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, substituting the custodial sentence with a 23-month conditional sentence followed by one year of probation, finding the proposed sentence fit given the circumstances and the appellant's rehabilitation.

The appellant, Michael Trought, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised two grounds: unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the s. 11(b) appeal, finding the transitional exceptional circumstance applied and prejudice was not sufficiently established.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the ground of ineffective assistance, concluding that trial counsel failed to properly advise the appellant on the concept of constructive possession and agreed to a "blended procedure" (where voir dire evidence applied to the trial proper) without the appellant's informed consent.

This failure undermined the appellant's fundamental right to decide whether to testify and rendered the trial unfair.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Daniel Kebede, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and his 9-month jail sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the lawfulness of his arrest under s. 495 of the Criminal Code, alleging a s. 8 Charter violation, and argued trial unfairness due to judicial intervention and improper expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the arrest lawful and no unfairness.

However, the court granted leave to appeal sentence and allowed the sentence appeal, varying the sentence to a conditional sentence due to a change in sentencing law (R. v. Sharma) and the appellant's strong mitigating factors and rehabilitation.

The Appellants, Alex Goerk and Carling Propane, appealed the sentence imposed by a trial judge following their convictions under the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992.

The convictions related to deficiencies in hose testing and paperwork, resulting in a total fine of $17,500.

The Appellants argued that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, erred in considering general deterrence (claiming it was a "test case"), and failed to account for collateral consequences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient for appellate review and that general deterrence was a paramount consideration for public welfare offences.

The court found no error in the sentencing judge's approach.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown consented to the admission of fresh evidence and conceded that a new trial should be ordered.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed from two convictions and sentences.

The first conviction was for possession of methamphetamine and two counts of breach of recognizance, arising from a search warrant execution.

The second conviction was for possession of methamphetamine for the purposes of trafficking.

The appellant challenged the validity of the search warrant, claiming police fraud in altering the time on the warrant and improper reference to a confidential informant.

She also challenged the lawfulness of her arrest and search incident to arrest, and raised a Charter s. 11(b) right to trial within a reasonable time argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction appeals and the sentence appeals, except for vacating the victim fine surcharge in one matter.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on a guilty plea to fraud.

The respondent, a tax return preparation business operator, had added false business loss claims to 37 clients' tax returns for 2009-2012, resulting in a potential federal tax revenue loss of $488,178.37, from which he personally benefited by $96,946.

The sentencing judge imposed house arrest for eight months, followed by an eight-month curfew, three years of probation, and a fine of $96,946 (with $70,000 payable during the conditional sentence).

The Crown sought a two-year custodial sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by prioritizing the respondent's continued employment and ability to pay the fine over principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding the sentence was not manifestly unfit and that the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant principles.

Appeal from convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and failure to comply with a probation order.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's pre-trial ruling dismissing his application to exclude evidence arising from alleged breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The key issues were whether the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle, whether the vehicle was lawfully seized and searched, and whether the appellant was arbitrarily detained.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on all grounds, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purposes of trafficking following a search of his apartment conducted pursuant to a telewarrant.

The trial judge quashed the warrant on the narrow basis that the affiant failed to justify the use of the telewarrant procedure, but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's rulings on cross-examination of the affiant, the finding of reasonable and probable grounds, and the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and refused leave to appeal sentence.