Lisa Lynn Csele

The appellant was convicted of seven drug charges and sentenced to three years' imprisonment after police found a substantial quantity of drugs hidden in a garage where he was present.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in assessing the circumstantial evidence of possession and that the sentence was excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the test for circumstantial evidence and reasonably inferred the appellant exercised primary control over the drugs for distribution.

The sentence was upheld as fit given the nature and quantity of the drugs.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud, arguing that the Crown failed to establish the actus reus because the alleged victim, Legal Aid Ontario, did not rely on the fraudulent conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the principle from R. v. Riesberry that proof of fraud does not always require showing reliance or inducement, provided there is a sufficient causal connection between the fraudulent act and the victim's risk of deprivation.

The appellant, a 43-year-old Aboriginal man, appealed his sentence of two years less a day followed by two years' probation for possession for the purpose of trafficking in heroin and oxycodone.

The appellant argued for a reduction based on pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the offences involved commercial trafficking in Schedule 1 drugs by an addict to support his habit.

The appeal was dismissed, with the court reiterating the trial judge's recommendation that the sentence be served at the Ontario Correctional Institute.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for marijuana production, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, finding police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest the passenger in the respondent's car.

On appeal, the Crown argued the police had grounds for an investigative detention, a position not advanced at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it would be unfair to allow the Crown to rely on a new factual scenario and legal theory not raised before the trial judge.

The Crown appealed the respondents' acquittals on drug and firearms charges.

The trial judge had excluded evidence found during a search of the respondents' home, ruling that the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked objectively reasonable grounds and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in weighing the first Grant factor.

Given the trial judge's finding of good faith by the police, the lack of objective grounds alone did not justify excluding the evidence.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime after the trial judge discharged two jurors during deliberations.

The jury had reported a stalemate, with ten voting to convict and two to acquit.

Following complaints from other jurors, the trial judge conducted extensive inquiries into the two dissenting jurors' conduct and ultimately discharged them.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's inquiries improperly probed the content of the deliberations, undermining jury secrecy.

The discharge of the two holdout jurors created an appearance of unfairness, resulting in an unfair trial.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants were convicted of multiple offences related to their involvement in a large-scale clandestine drug lab producing MDMA, ketamine, and methamphetamine.

They appealed their convictions, arguing insufficient evidence of production and identification, and their sentences of 14 and 16 years, arguing the trial judge erred by treating lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding ample circumstantial and identification evidence.

While the Court agreed the trial judge erred in considering lack of remorse as an aggravating factor, it upheld the sentences as proportionate given the massive scale of the operation and the danger of the drugs produced.

The appellant, a tax preparer, appealed his convictions for two counts of fraud and his sentence of three years' imprisonment and a $448,000 fine.

He argued that his rights under s. 11(b) of the Charter were violated due to a 65-month delay, and that his s. 8 Charter rights were violated during the execution of search warrants at his home and office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the delay was largely attributable to inherent time requirements and a mistrial caused by the trial judge's illness, and that the seized documents were properly obtained under s. 489(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The sentence was upheld as being within the accepted range for a serious fraud against the public purse.

The appellant appealed his conviction under ss. 153(3) and 160 of the Customs Act for defrauding Canada Customs by retaining rather than remitting duties and taxes.

He argued that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, applied the wrong burden of proof, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and clearly demonstrated the appellant's knowledge of the fraudulent activity as the directing mind of the company.

The court also found no error in the application of the burden of proof and concluded that the verdict was reasonable based on ample evidence.

The appellant appealed his nine-year sentence for importing 4.1 kg of cocaine.

The trial judge found that the appellant organized the importation and was in a superior position to the 19-year-old vulnerable courier.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's role and the multi-kilo quantity of cocaine.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant applied under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for state-funded legal assistance to appeal his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly consider circumstantial evidence of racial profiling and erred by not drawing an adverse inference from the Crown's failure to call a passenger as a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the proposed appeal lacked merit as it merely sought to revisit the trial judge's credibility findings, and noted that no Charter application to exclude evidence had been made at trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for drug trafficking and the dismissal of his entrapment claim, arguing the trial judge's findings were unreasonable and the reasons inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's rejection of the appellant's credibility and the evidence of an agreement to sell heroin to an undercover officer supported the conviction.

The court also held that the entrapment argument failed, as the police conduct was investigatory and followed by conduct amounting to trafficking.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug and weapons offences and his sentence of ten years and nine months.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to cross-examine the police officer who prepared the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant, alleging the officer deliberately omitted information to mislead the issuing justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was no air of reality to the allegation of mala fides.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge had properly considered the appellant's cooperation in expediting the proceeding.

The Crown appealed an order staying proceedings on a minor allegation.

The appeal judge had refused to order a new trial and stayed the proceedings, believing the allegations to be trivial.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the appeal judge erred by second-guessing the Crown's prosecutorial discretion.

However, the Court declined to order a new trial, noting the respondent had already appeared in court four times at personal expense, the allegation was minor, and the Crown had made its legal point.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing that the conduct of a police officer constituted entrapment.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the brief conversation between the police officer and the appellant did not ground a finding of entrapment.

The Court noted that the appellant was not induced to commit a crime but was already engaged in criminal activities when he allowed the officer to witness a drug transaction.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud and defrauding the Government of Canada of over $3 million.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that his silence at trial could not be used against him.

The trial judge had relied on Supreme Court of Canada obiter dicta suggesting s. 4(6) of the Canada Evidence Act prohibited such an instruction.

The Court of Appeal held that the SCC obiter was non-binding and conflicted with earlier binding SCC ratio, meaning the instruction could have been given.

However, the court found the jury instructions as a whole were adequate and the delay was reasonable given the complexity of the proceedings.

The appeal from conviction and the three-year sentence were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on drug trafficking charges.

The trial judge had found that an undercover police officer entrapped the accused by asking 'Can you hook me up?' without reasonable suspicion, and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the officer's question was merely an investigative step and did not provide an opportunity to commit an offence.

The Court set aside the finding of entrapment, entered guilty verdicts, and remitted the matter for sentencing.

The Court also noted that entrapment should only be considered after a finding of guilt, and that a stay of proceedings, rather than exclusion of evidence, is the proper remedy.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to defraud the Government of Canada and multiple counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to a scheme involving sham vehicle sales to exploit aboriginal tax exemptions and fraudulently claim GST refunds.

On appeal, the appellants argued that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for the convictions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made conclusory findings of guilt without identifying the specific evidence establishing the appellants' participation in the illegitimate transactions or addressing the individual fraud counts.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of tax evasion and making false statements in his tax returns.

The trial judge found that all essential elements of the offences were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but acquitted the respondent because she could not calculate the exact amount of unpaid tax due to an allegedly understated opening net worth statement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown is not required to negate every possibility regarding the amounts put forward, especially when the taxpayer failed to keep proper records and the matters are peculiarly within their knowledge.

The acquittals were set aside, convictions were entered, and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after Customs officials found 849 grams of cocaine hidden in his luggage.

At trial, the Crown relied on false statements the appellant made to Customs officials during routine questioning to prove he knew the drugs were in his luggage.

The appellant argued that admitting these statutorily compelled statements violated his s. 7 Charter right against self-incrimination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that routine questioning at the border does not engage the principle against self-incrimination, as travellers have no reasonable expectation of privacy or right to remain silent in that context.

The 40-month sentence was also upheld.