Edward Lloyd Burlew

This costs endorsement followed a decision to strike a third-party claim brought by the defendants against the plaintiff's lawyers.

The court found that the third-party claim, alleging breach of settlement privilege, did not plead a reasonable cause of action, as settlement privilege is a rule of evidence, not a basis for a lawsuit.

The court characterized the claim as an abuse of process and reprehensible litigation conduct.

Consequently, the third parties (plaintiff's lawyers) were awarded substantial indemnity costs, fixed at $23,500, as the court deemed the amount fair, reasonable, and proportional given the circumstances and the defendants' persistence in an improper claim.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 48.14 for an extension of time to set the action down for trial.

The action arose from a 2014-2015 sub-tenancy dispute.

The case had stalled since early 2017 because the plaintiff failed to answer undertakings from discoveries.

The court found the plaintiff's explanations for the delay—including the death of a principal, counsel's injury, and the COVID-19 pandemic—to be vague and unsatisfactory given the length of inactivity.

Presuming prejudice to the defendants due to the passage of time, the court dismissed the motion and dismissed the action for delay.

The plaintiffs sued the Crown and several public officials for misfeasance in public office, alleging they unlawfully reclassified the plaintiffs' firearms as prohibited and demanded compliance.

The defendants moved to strike the claim, and the plaintiffs moved to remove the Attorney General as counsel for the personal defendants due to a conflict of interest.

The Federal Court granted the motion to strike in part, striking claims for de facto expropriation, Charter violations, interference with economic relations, and negligence because they lacked material facts.

However, the court refused to strike the misfeasance claims, finding the pleadings sufficient for that cause of action.

The plaintiffs' conflict motion was dismissed as premature.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding a discretionary firearms prohibition order under s. 110 of the Criminal Code and a weapons prohibition in his probation order, following a conditional discharge for a minor assault.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and deleted the prohibition orders, noting the assault was minor, isolated, and did not involve a weapon.

The court also considered the appellant's lack of a criminal record, his safe use of firearms for competitive shooting, and his completion of an anger management course.

The defendant bailiff company brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision dismissing its motion for summary judgment.

The bailiff argued it had statutory immunity for seizing a crane, relying on a previous case.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding the previous case distinguishable because the bailiff here seized property from a location and person not named in the writ of seizure.

The court held the bailiff did not act in accordance with the court order, and there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision.

A licensed bailiff sought summary judgment relying on statutory immunity under s. 142 of the Courts of Justice Act after seizing a hydraulic truck crane pursuant to a writ of seizure.

The responding party alleged the bailiff seized the property from a person and location not identified in the writ and therefore did not act in good faith in accordance with the court process.

The court held that statutory immunity requires compliance with the court order and that seizing property from a person and place not named in the writ could not constitute good faith execution of the order.

The motion judge rejected the argument that immunity could only be defeated by evidence of bad faith and held that the evidentiary record did not establish good faith conduct.

Summary judgment was refused and the bailiff remained a party to the litigation.

In an estate dispute involving multiple estate trustees, the court addressed a costs issue following the dismissal of an application against a respondent who had been drawn into the litigation as the deceased’s common-law spouse and co-owner of the matrimonial home.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs after being unnecessarily involved in the dispute among the estate trustees.

The court found that the respondent had efficiently obtained relief through a prior motion for sale of the property and should not have been required to participate further in the application.

Although the applicants’ conduct contributed to unnecessary litigation steps, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $20,000 all-inclusive payable by the applicants.

The appellant brought a summary conviction appeal from a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice declining jurisdiction to hear a reference under s. 74 of the Firearms Act concerning an alleged revocation of a firearm registration certificate.

The lower court determined that a letter from the Registrar advising that a rifle’s bull‑pup stock was a prohibited device did not constitute a revocation.

The appellant argued that the court erred by deciding jurisdiction without permitting him to call evidence, contrary to s. 75(2) of the Act, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Superior Court held that once the hearing commenced the statute required the judge to hear all relevant evidence from both parties.

Because the lower court made factual findings based only on the Registrar’s evidence while refusing the appellant’s witnesses, the process violated natural justice and constituted an error of law.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing before a different judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction under ss. 153(3) and 160 of the Customs Act for defrauding Canada Customs by retaining rather than remitting duties and taxes.

He argued that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, applied the wrong burden of proof, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and clearly demonstrated the appellant's knowledge of the fraudulent activity as the directing mind of the company.

The court also found no error in the application of the burden of proof and concluded that the verdict was reasonable based on ample evidence.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against a former employee, which the motion judge had found to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The former employee had previously blown the whistle on alleged irregularities in the appellants' affairs, leading to a prior settled action and a release.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the current action was brought for an improper purpose, specifically to harass the respondent and suborn her testimony in an ongoing oppression proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's reasons which fully answered the issues raised.

The Court also declined to entertain Charter issues that were raised for the first time on appeal.

The appellant appealed the decision of Justice Henry Vogelsang of the Superior Court of Justice dated January 14, 2008.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons given by the lower court judge.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly stated the operative legal principles and carefully applied them to the evidence.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking a reduction of a five-year prohibition on the possession of firearms, ammunition, or gunpowder.

He argued that the prohibition should be reduced because he had already been subject to a similar prohibition for four and a half years prior to trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the total length of the prohibition was entirely appropriate given the circumstances of the offence.