Beverly C. Jusko

The court considered a request by the defendants to dismiss the plaintiff’s action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found it may be appropriate to make such an order, as the claim appeared to attempt to re-litigate issues already decided and to seek liability against a law firm for its representation in a prior summary judgment motion.

The court directed the registrar to give notice to the parties and outlined the procedures for written submissions under Rules 2.1.01(8) and (9).

The proceeding is automatically stayed pending the court’s decision.

The plaintiff, Toronto-Dominion Bank, sought summary judgment against Michael D’Cruz and Rosalind D’Cruz to set aside a $94,000 payment made by Michael to Rosalind in February 2022, shortly before Michael’s bankruptcy.

The court found that the payment constituted a preference under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and was void under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, as it gave Rosalind preferential treatment over other creditors.

The court granted judgment in favour of the plaintiff for $94,000 and provided directions for costs.

This costs endorsement followed a decision to strike a third-party claim brought by the defendants against the plaintiff's lawyers.

The court found that the third-party claim, alleging breach of settlement privilege, did not plead a reasonable cause of action, as settlement privilege is a rule of evidence, not a basis for a lawsuit.

The court characterized the claim as an abuse of process and reprehensible litigation conduct.

Consequently, the third parties (plaintiff's lawyers) were awarded substantial indemnity costs, fixed at $23,500, as the court deemed the amount fair, reasonable, and proportional given the circumstances and the defendants' persistence in an improper claim.

The Legal Defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, alleged fraud by the defendants in prior actions and sought to declare previous court decisions null and void, along with damages and contempt findings.

The motion proceeded unopposed as the plaintiff did not attend.

The court found the claim to be a collateral attack on final decisions, protected by absolute privilege, lacking a duty of care owed by opposing counsel, an abuse of process, and improperly seeking contempt.

The Statement of Claim was struck without leave to amend, as its deficiencies were deemed incurable in law.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that held them liable under a guarantee to The Toronto-Dominion Bank.

The central issue was whether an email sent by one of the appellants constituted clear and unequivocal notice to terminate their liability under the guarantee.

The Court of Appeal found that the email, which sought confirmation of no obligation, did provide such notice.

The court distinguished the facts from a prior Supreme Court of Canada decision, noting that the bank had no doubt about the appellants' intent to terminate and did not take actions indicating a continuing relationship after the notice.

The appeal was allowed, reversing the summary judgment against the appellants.

This case concerns an abortive real estate swap transaction where the plaintiff, Goldie Malka, and defendants, Florica and Jozsef Racz, each agreed to purchase the other's property.

The agreements, scheduled to close on November 16, 2020, failed to complete, with each party blaming the other.

Malka moved for summary judgment for the return of her $170,000 deposit, while the Raczs cross-moved for summary judgment for damages of $504,240.80.

The court found that both parties fundamentally breached the agreement on the closing date and neither took steps to restore time of the essence, leading to the agreement being treated as abandoned.

Consequently, the court granted Malka's claim for the deposit and dismissed the Raczs' counterclaim, with all judgments issued without costs.

The plaintiffs sued two law firms and their lawyers for professional negligence related to a commercial asset sale and subsequent arbitration.

The defendants brought summary judgment motions to dismiss the claims.

The court dismissed both motions, finding genuine issues requiring a trial against the FLPC Defendants and deeming partial summary judgment inadvisable for the SWL Defendants due to the risk of inconsistent findings and the central role of credibility issues.

The Plaintiffs sought leave under Rule 39.02(2) to file a supplementary affidavit in response to the Defendants' reliance on the Limitations Act and tolling provisions, which the Plaintiffs claimed were raised unexpectedly after cross-examination.

The court granted leave, finding that the Plaintiffs were genuinely unaware of the disputed matters and that the strategic advocacy of the Defendants did not outweigh the principle of liberal construction of the Rules to achieve a just determination on the merits.