Susan J. Woodley

A costs decision in a family law matter concerning decision-making responsibility for a child.

The parties initially reached a mediated agreement in December 2021, which was rejected by the court due to concerns regarding family violence.

Following an Office of the Children's Lawyer investigation and trial commencement, the parties reached a consent agreement on the third day of trial providing for joint decision-making responsibility with consultation requirements and dispute resolution mechanisms.

The respondent sought costs as the successful party, while the applicant opposed costs on grounds of financial hardship and the extraordinary circumstances.

The court declined to award costs, finding that the unusual circumstances, including the court's rejection of the initial consent agreement and the OCL's strong support for the applicant's position, compelled the applicant to proceed with litigation, and that awarding costs would be contrary to the child's best interests.

This is a costs decision following the dismissal of the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim against the defendant.

The plaintiff sought compensation for alleged improvements made to property owned by the defendant during his common law relationship with the defendant's daughter.

The action was dismissed in its entirety after trial.

The defendant, having made a Rule 49 offer to settle on a without costs basis that was not accepted, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis from the date of the offer and partial indemnity basis prior to that date.

The court awarded costs in the amount of $74,029.04, finding the plaintiff's claim was improperly conceived and pursued, and noting that the claim had been repeatedly amended during trial, creating a moving target for the defence.

This decision addresses costs and the removal/retention of a writ of seizure and sale following the setting aside of a default judgment.

The plaintiff had obtained a default judgment against the defendant for sexual assault and battery totalling approximately $500,000.

The defendant successfully moved to set aside the default judgment, and the court subsequently addressed the costs of that motion, costs thrown away, and whether the writ should remain filed.

The court fixed costs for both parties at $11,439, offsetting each other, and ordered the writ to be withdrawn and vacated within 30 days.

This costs endorsement addresses the fixing of costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action for delay.

The court reviews the parties’ submissions on quantum, the applicable legal principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, and the reasonableness of the fees claimed.

The court ultimately fixes costs in favour of the defendant Town of Bracebridge, finding the amounts sought to be fair and proportionate given the complexity and history of the litigation.

The plaintiff, Texford St. Bernard, sought compensation from the defendant, June Andrews, for alleged unpaid contributions to the construction and improvement of a property at 179 Bullis Road, Brighton, Ontario.

The court found that the claim was largely statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that the evidence did not support the plaintiff’s assertion that he was owed money for the work or expenses claimed.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiff, Vista Mortgage Capital Corporation, sought partial summary judgment for possession of mortgaged property against the defendants, Rachelle Adelle MacSweeney and her spouse Garrett Patrick MacSweeney.

The defendants argued the matter was not appropriate for summary judgment, that not all necessary parties were named, that the mortgage was invalid, and that the Farm Debt Mediation Act (FDMA) applied and had not been complied with.

The court found that summary judgment was appropriate, the correct parties were before the court, and the mortgage was valid.

However, the court held that the plaintiff failed to comply with the FDMA notice requirements before commencing proceedings, rendering the action a nullity.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and the claim struck, with no costs awarded.

The plaintiff, David Richard Reid, brought a motion to set aside the Registrar’s order dismissing his 2015 action for delay.

The court reviewed the history of related litigation between Reid and the Town of Bracebridge, including prior settlements, subsequent actions, and procedural steps.

Applying the contextual approach to the four-factor test for setting aside a dismissal for delay, the court found that Reid failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay, did not show inadvertence, and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendants.

The motion was dismissed and the Registrar’s dismissal order confirmed.

The plaintiffs, Christopher Morgis and Jo-Anne Morgis, brought a motion under Rule 48.14(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure for an extension of time to set their action down for trial and for a timetable for the completion of remaining steps.

The action arose from a dispute over the removal of personal property and chattels from a property sold under power of sale.

The court reviewed the lengthy procedural history, including duplicative actions, delays, and failures to comply with procedural requirements.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay and that the defendants would suffer non-compensable prejudice if the action were allowed to continue.

The motion was dismissed and the action was dismissed for delay.

The court considered a Rule 21 motion by Shell Canada Products and Tosh Skalosky to strike the claim against Skalosky personally.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to plead material facts supporting personal liability against Skalosky, as required by law.

The claim against Skalosky was struck, but the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their claim if they could plead sufficient facts.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

The decision concerns a motion by the Defendants to amend their Statement of Defence in an estate dispute regarding whether a $160,000 transfer from the deceased to his cousin was a loan or a gift.

The court finds that the proposed amendments do not constitute a withdrawal of admissions, and grants leave to amend under Rule 26.01, as no non-compensable prejudice to the Plaintiff is established.

The ruling clarifies the distinction between factual and legal admissions in pleadings and the applicable test for amendments.

This decision concerns the costs arising from protracted estate litigation over the administration and distribution of the estate of Maria Giuseppa Cosentino.

The court reviews the history of three related proceedings, the conduct of the parties and their counsel, and the reasonableness of legal fees claimed.

The court finds that much of the litigation was driven by sibling conflict and overreaching claims, particularly by Sam Cosentino, who acted as both lawyer and party.

The court fixes the costs payable from the estate, significantly reducing some claims, and authorizes the estate trustee during litigation to complete the administration and distribution of the estate.

The defendant Jose Ramos brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff Vittoria Fera, which had been granted after Ramos's statement of defence was struck for non-compliance with a timetable and failure to attend discovery.

Ramos argued he did not receive proper notice of key proceedings due to a change of address and an inactive email.

The court applied the three-part test for setting aside default judgments, considering promptness, plausible excuse, and arguable defence.

Despite Ramos's partial responsibility for not updating his address, the court found the plaintiff also bore responsibility for continuing service at an unresponsive address.

Given the serious allegations of sexual assault and battery, the court emphasized the importance of resolving the matter on its merits.

The motion was granted, setting aside the order striking the defence, the noting in default, and the default judgment, and reinstating the lawsuit.

This decision addresses Ali Baek's Charter application to exclude evidence (10 kg of cocaine) seized from his residence, alleging breaches of his section 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court conducted a Garofoli review of the warrants and orders, finding that the initial tracking warrant and production orders were issued without reasonable grounds due to erroneous, speculative, and misleading information provided by the police.

The police conduct was characterized as serious, involving reckless disregard for Charter rights and a failure of full and frank disclosure.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on Baek's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence, leading to its exclusion.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the denial of a Mareva injunction motion brought by the plaintiff.

The injunction, initially granted ex parte, was denied because the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case and did not make full and frank disclosure.

The defendants, as the successful party, sought costs on a complete indemnity basis.

The court, balancing the parties' conduct, awarded costs to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amount at $12,500.00 plus HST and disbursements.

Steve Williams was charged with sexual assault and procuring his stepdaughter's friend, KC, who was 16-17 years old at the time.

The sexual assault allegation involved a brief touch to KC's vagina.

The procuring charge stemmed from a series of text messages where Williams offered money for sexual services from KC and/or a "friend." Williams claimed the texts were an elaborate "prank." The court found Williams not credible regarding both charges.

While the court accepted KC's testimony about Williams' request to see her vagina, it found reasonable doubt regarding the intentional application of force for the sexual assault charge due to conflicting evidence on touching.

For the procuring charge, the court found Williams had the intent to procure KC but determined that the actus reus (the act itself) was not met because KC never actually offered or provided sexual services, interpreting the relevant section of the Criminal Code to require such an act.

Consequently, Williams was acquitted on both counts.

This criminal trial concerned three sexual assault charges against J.D., involving his daughter LG, allegedly committed when she was 6-7 years old.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant's and the accused's testimony, along with other witnesses.

Despite LG's credible demeanor, the court found significant inconsistencies and inaccuracies in her memory, particularly regarding corroborating details.

The accused's testimony, corroborated by a third-party witness, was found to be credible and reliable.

The Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The plaintiff and a defendant mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment and distribution of sale proceeds paid into court following the sale of two properties by power of sale.

The court found that the defendant owners had engaged in fraudulent conduct, including registering sham mortgages and fraudulently discharging a valid mortgage, to defeat creditors.

The court granted summary judgment, reinstated the fraudulently discharged mortgage, and ordered the distribution of the sale proceeds to the valid mortgagees, including their legal costs on a complete indemnity basis.

This estate litigation involved a dispute between the Estate of William Ronald Parker and his former common-law spouse, Carol Ann Savage, concerning the severance of a joint tenancy of their home.

The Estate sought partition and sale of the property and a priority claim for retail sales tax liability against Ms. Savage.

Ms. Savage counterclaimed, alleging lack of capacity, undue influence, and unjust enrichment.

The court found that Mr. Parker had the capacity to sever the joint tenancy and execute his will, and was not unduly influenced.

The court dismissed Ms. Savage's claim for unjust enrichment, finding she made little contribution to Mr. Parker's care or expenses.

The court ordered the partition and sale of the Broadgreen home, with specific terms for vacant possession, financial assistance to Ms. Savage, and the allocation of costs and liabilities, including Ms. Savage's sole responsibility for the retail sales tax lien.

During a trial concerning an oil spill, the plaintiff sought to admit an expert witness, Michael Flynn, retained by their insurer.

The defendant objected, arguing Flynn did not qualify as a participant expert and his report was non-compliant with Rule 53.03.

The court ruled that Flynn was not a participant expert as he was engaged by a party to the litigation and his opinions were not based on personal observation or participation in the events.

However, the court granted leave under Rule 53.08 to admit his report and allow him to testify as a Rule 53 expert, finding a reasonable explanation for the non-compliance and no prejudice to the defendant.

The court qualified Flynn to provide expert opinion on the origin and cause of the oil spill, Microbial Influenced Corrosion (MIC) generally, and compliance with codes and regulations for heating appliances and fuel suppliers.

He was not permitted to testify on the standard of care applicable to an Oil Burner Technician (OBT), adhering to the "specialist to specialist" rule for such opinions.

This motion concerned the duration of an assignment of future collateral income benefits under s. 267.8(12) of the Insurance Act, following a jury award for income loss.

The defendant insurer sought assignment until the plaintiff reached age 65, while the plaintiff argued for a limitation to 10 years, consistent with the jury's assessment of future income loss.

The court ruled in favour of the plaintiff, limiting the assignment to the 10-year period determined by the jury, emphasizing the legislative intent to prevent double recovery without under-compensating the injured party.