Jeffrey William Strype

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their negligence action against a school board and school officials for failing to protect their child from bullying.

Although the trial judge found that the respondents breached the standard of care by failing to investigate a prior bullying incident and misplacing related documentation, he concluded that none of these breaches caused the subsequent incident in which the child was injured.

The appellants argued that proper investigation of the earlier incident would have prevented the later injury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's causation analysis and factual findings.

The defendants in a personal injury action brought a motion to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages for a jury trial, relying on the recently amended Rule 6.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that it would cause undue delay and increase costs.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while bifurcation can promote timely justice, the defendants' request was made too late in the litigation process, close to the scheduled trial date.

The court determined that granting the motion would cause significant prejudice to the plaintiffs by effectively adjourning the damages hearing for an estimated two years, outweighing any potential cost savings or efficiencies.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal by defendants seeking to hold litigation lenders liable for costs incurred by a class member (Mr. Zuber) who pursued an exaggerated damages claim and incurred substantial debt from litigation loans.

The trial judge had refused to order the lenders to pay costs, finding they did not instigate or control the litigation in a manner amounting to an abuse of process, despite the onerous interest rates and the loans impeding settlement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision, reiterating that non-party costs are limited to "person of straw" or abuse of process scenarios, neither of which applied to the lenders' conduct.

The court also refused leave to cross-appeal the trial judge's decision not to award costs of the motion to the lenders, finding no error in principle.

During a trial, the plaintiffs sought to admit a police report for the truth of its contents, citing the unavailability of the drafting officer and the report's reliability as an independent investigation.

Alternatively, they argued for its admission as a business record under the Evidence Act.

The defendants opposed, raising concerns about hearsay reliability and the report's content.

The court ruled the police report admissible as a business record, but with significant limitations: it was admissible for the officer's personal observations, communications, and understanding of events, and for party admissions against interest.

However, it was explicitly ruled inadmissible for the truth of non-party hearsay statements, opinions, impressions, or histories, particularly where sources were unidentified.

The plaintiffs' request for an unredacted report was also denied due to lack of proper motion and jurisdiction.

This decision addresses a motion by Slavica Pavlovic to stay an application brought by Strype Barristers LLP seeking approval of their fees.

Ms. Pavlovic had also commenced an action against Strype Barristers for professional negligence and breach of contract, and had previously brought her own application challenging the fees, which was stayed by consent.

The court determined that the Strype Barristers' application should not be stayed but rather asserted as a counterclaim in Ms. Pavlovic's action, effectively consolidating the proceedings to avoid multiplicity, inconsistent results, and to promote efficiency.

The court also addressed costs for Ms. Pavlovic's initial, stayed application, ordering her to pay $30,000 to Strype Barristers.

The court considered motions for approval of a tentative settlement in two tort actions and an order to continue without a litigation guardian, involving a plaintiff who suffered a serious brain injury.

The court found the motion records deficient, specifically regarding the plaintiff's current capacity and the clarity of proposed legal fees and disbursements.

Settlement approval was withheld, and counsel was directed to provide further documentation, including a certified capacity assessment and a detailed affidavit addressing the reasonableness of the contingency fee agreement.

Appellant suffered a traumatic brain injury and severe back injury during a company-sponsored event while employed by respondent.

Appellant was unaware of the permanent and disabling nature of the brain injury until after resignation.

Appellant subsequently applied for long-term disability benefits under the employer's policy approximately five years after the injury occurred.

The insurer denied the claim on the basis that coverage terminated upon cessation of active employment.

The trial court upheld the denial.

On appeal, the court reversed, holding that the policy language, when read as a whole, provides coverage for claims arising from incidents occurring during the currency of employment, regardless of when the claim is subsequently filed.

The court also granted relief from forfeiture for the late filing of proof of claim and addressed the applicability of contractual and statutory limitation periods.

The plaintiff brought a motion to exclude potential jurors or permit challenges for cause in a civil motor vehicle accident case, arguing that jurors who pay automobile insurance premiums have an inherent conflict of interest.

The court adjourned the motion, directing the plaintiff to serve the Attorney General and inviting The Advocates' Society to intervene as a friend of the court, recognizing the novel and broad implications of the issues raised regarding civil jury selection and impartiality.

The court reviewed a motion record concerning the proposed resolution of a minor’s Family Law Act claim arising from injuries to his mother in a motor vehicle accident.

The record revealed that the adult plaintiffs had settled their claims for $600,000, while the minor’s claim was effectively treated as having no value and no payment had been made by the tortfeasor.

Funds had instead been placed into investment vehicles by the litigation guardian from his own settlement without court approval, and part of the funds were paid to counsel.

The court held that the minor’s claim could not be treated as settled in the absence of full disclosure, expert evidence, and proper court approval.

The matter was referred to the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to investigate and advise regarding the proposed arrangement.

Following a successful appeal from a master's order, the court was required to determine costs both for the appeal and for the underlying motion before the master.

The parties had agreed that costs of the appeal would be fixed at $5,000 but disputed whether that agreement encompassed the costs of the earlier motion.

The court held that the agreement related only to the appeal and that the master's prior costs disposition had been set aside when the order was reversed on appeal.

Considering the partial indemnity costs outline, the complexity of the motion, and the reasonableness principle governing costs, the court fixed additional costs of $3,000 for the motion before the master.

Following the dismissal of a civil action by another judge of the Superior Court of Justice, the court issued an endorsement raising procedural concerns regarding how the matter had been reassigned.

The judge noted that an earlier endorsement he issued had not been addressed by counsel and questioned whether it had been brought to the attention of the judge who subsequently dismissed the action.

The court directed that the file be sent to the judge who dismissed the action to clarify whether the earlier endorsement had been provided and to determine whether the reassignment may have constituted judge shopping.

The defendant physicians brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice claim on the basis that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action alleged negligent delay in diagnosing breast cancer, which later recurred and became terminal.

The court considered the discoverability principle and the requirement that a claim be based on material facts including causation and actionable damage.

It held that although the cancer was diagnosed in 2007, the plaintiff’s condition went into remission and actionable injury only became apparent when the cancer recurred in 2009.

The court concluded that the defendants failed to establish that the limitation period necessarily began earlier, and that the issue required a trial.

Following a motor vehicle accident jury trial resulting in a modest judgment after statutory deductions and collateral benefit credits, the court addressed liability for costs.

The defendant insurer argued that its Rule 49 offer to settle should trigger cost consequences because the plaintiff recovered significantly less than the offer.

The court held that the offer was ambiguous due to unexplained references to provisions of the Insurance Act and therefore could not trigger Rule 49 cost consequences.

Applying Rule 57.05(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the recovery fell within the Small Claims Court monetary jurisdiction and determined that neither party should receive costs.