Weston Pollard

Following a failed motion by the defendants to have their trial costs paid by various litigation loan providers, the loan providers sought their costs of the motion.

The court declined to award costs to the loan providers, finding that the defendants' motion raised a novel issue regarding the enforcement of a costs award against a litigation loan provider and the requirement for court approval of litigation loan agreements.

Given the novelty of the issue, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

Following a lengthy trial where the plaintiff was awarded $50,000 but the defendants obtained a costs award of over $3.4 million, the defendants moved to recover those costs from four non-party litigation loan providers who had advanced funds to the plaintiff.

The court declined to order costs against the non-parties, finding that while the loans carried exorbitant interest rates, providing them did not amount to an abuse of process under the 'person of straw' test or the court's inherent jurisdiction.

The court also noted that while litigation loans should be approved by the court in class proceedings, the statutory requirement to do so did not exist at the time the loans were made.

During a personal injury class action trial arising from a VIA Rail derailment, a class member sought to qualify a chartered accountant as an expert witness to quantify past and future wage loss.

The defendants opposed the qualification, arguing the expert lacked objectivity and his evidence was unnecessary.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the Mohan framework and found the expert's evidence was not necessary, as he merely accepted the class member's uncorroborated figures without independent analysis.

The court also found the expert failed to establish a basic threshold of objectivity, rendering him improperly qualified.

The expert evidence was ruled inadmissible.

During a lengthy personal injury trial arising from a train derailment, the defendants brought a motion to determine whether the plaintiff required leave under section 12 of the Evidence Act to call more than three 'participant experts' (treating doctors) who intended to proffer opinion evidence.

The court held that while treating doctors testifying strictly to history, treatment, diagnosis, and prognosis do not require leave, those offering broader opinion evidence must comply with Rule 53.03 and are subject to the three-expert limit.

The court emphasized its gatekeeper function and the need for proportionality, ruling that the plaintiff must seek leave to call more than one expert per medical specialty.

During a personal injury trial arising from a train derailment, the defendants brought mid‑trial motions seeking orders requiring certain foreign witnesses to testify in person in Canada rather than by video conference and restricting the plaintiff to evidence previously disclosed under an earlier discovery order.

The court considered Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the broader access‑to‑justice principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The judge held that credibility concerns alone did not justify refusing video evidence and found the balance of convenience favoured permitting the witnesses, located abroad, to testify by video conference with interpretation.

The court also declined to limit the plaintiff’s evidence to earlier will‑say statements, finding that continuing disclosure obligations and fairness required allowing updated affidavit evidence while preserving the defendants’ opportunity to challenge it.