Jacky Cheung

In competing motions to strike pleadings in three related tax appeals concerning dividend rental arrangements, the Appellants moved to strike portions of the Respondent's replies, and the Respondent moved to strike portions of the notices of appeal.

The Tax Court of Canada allowed the Appellants' motion, striking the impugned reply provisions on the basis that they merely restated statutory language without pleading material facts, but granted the Respondent leave to amend.

The Respondent's motion to strike the notices of appeal was denied, as the alternative relief sought by the Appellants was subsumed within the primary issue.

The appellant bank sought to deduct interest paid to US tax authorities on overdue US income tax liabilities related to its US branch operations.

The Minister disallowed the deduction.

On a Rule 58 motion, the Tax Court of Canada held that the interest was not deductible under section 9 of the Income Tax Act and was precluded by paragraph 18(1)(a).

Applying the Roenisch principle, the Court found that the interest expense was incurred as a consequence of earning income, not for the purpose of earning income.

The appellant and respondent jointly brought a motion under Rule 58 of the Tax Court of Canada Rules (General Procedure) to determine a question of mixed fact and law before the hearing of the appeals.

The question asks whether interest payable by the appellant to foreign tax authorities in the United States in respect of overdue tax liabilities is deductible under section 9 of the Income Tax Act and not precluded by subsection 18(1).

The Court granted the motion, finding that the question is one of mixed fact and law, is raised in the pleadings, and its determination may dispose of all or part of the proceeding or result in a substantial saving of costs.

The appellant appealed the Minister's denial of a deduction for spousal support payments made in the 2018 taxation year.

The Minister argued the payments were not made pursuant to a written agreement because the 2011 separation agreement expired in 2014.

The Tax Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the parties' conduct demonstrated they continued to consider themselves bound by the 2011 written agreement, satisfying the statutory requirement.

Following a failed motion by the defendants to have their trial costs paid by various litigation loan providers, the loan providers sought their costs of the motion.

The court declined to award costs to the loan providers, finding that the defendants' motion raised a novel issue regarding the enforcement of a costs award against a litigation loan provider and the requirement for court approval of litigation loan agreements.

Given the novelty of the issue, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

The moving parties (defendants) sought an order to approve a loan and dispense with the consent of the responding parties (plaintiffs) for the loan and future financing.

The moving parties argued that the responding parties' refusal to consent was oppressive and intended to leverage a buyout.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving parties had not made a claim for oppression and that the court could not use its inherent jurisdiction to rewrite a commercial agreement negotiated at arm's length by sophisticated parties.

Despite the responding parties' success, the court declined to award costs due to their inequitable conduct.

The defendants, a charitable organization and a church, brought a motion to strike the self-represented plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff alleged various wrongs, including breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and reprisal, arising from his involvement with the defendants and his subsequent removal from his alleged position as a board member.

Applying recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on voluntary religious organizations, the court found it lacked jurisdiction over most of the claims, as they did not involve the vindication of legal rights.

The claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment were struck with leave to amend, as they were legally tenable but lacked sufficient particulars.

The remaining claims were struck without leave to amend as frivolous or disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment to claim a $100,000 deposit after the defendant purchasers failed to close a residential real estate transaction.

The defendants had submitted an unconditional offer but failed to close due to financing issues, and subsequently attempted to cloud the title to prevent resale.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, holding that the deposit was a true deposit subject to forfeiture.

The court rejected the defendants' claim for relief from forfeiture, finding the deposit amount proportionate and no unconscionability in the plaintiffs retaining it.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs.