Mordy Mednick

The court considered two motions: the plaintiff’s motion to restore the action to the trial list and the defendant’s motion to dismiss for delay.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for significant periods of delay and failed to demonstrate that the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice if the action proceeded.

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s motion to restore and granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for delay, awarding costs to the defendant.

This appeal concerned a dispute over commercial rent arrears, specifically whether a binding rent relief agreement was in place during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding no genuine issues for trial due to alleged inconsistencies and an incomplete record.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the motion judge's factual findings, including that the rent relief offer had expired before acceptance and that no waiver or promissory estoppel applied.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an approval and vesting order that authorized a receiver to sell a property in receivership.

One of the appellants, a second mortgagee, sought to redeem the first mortgage or be recognized as a successful creditor bidder, arguing an absolute right to redeem under the Mortgages Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motions judge's decision that the right to redeem is qualified once a court-approved sales process has been undertaken in a receivership.

The court emphasized balancing the right to redeem against the integrity of the court-supervised sales process, finding no error in the motions judge's conclusion that the sales process was fair and the balance favoured its integrity.

The Landlord sought summary judgment against a former tenant for rent arrears totaling $367,668.44.

The tenant argued a binding rent relief agreement excused payment and raised defenses of waiver, promissory estoppel, and bad faith.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, determining that the tenant's response to the Landlord's offer was a counter-offer that was never accepted, and the Landlord consistently maintained no rent relief agreement was in place.

All the tenant's defenses were dismissed, and summary judgment was granted in favour of the Landlord for the full amount of arrears plus interest.

The defendants brought a motion to discharge a construction lien and dismiss the action, alleging the plaintiff, Kamlu Engineering Inc., repeatedly breached court orders regarding document production, discovery scheduling, appointment of counsel, attendance at hearings, and payment of costs.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that while Kamlu had demonstrated non-compliance and delay, its conduct did not warrant the severe sanctions of discharging the lien and dismissing the action.

The court noted that some breaches had been cured and that any non-compliance could be addressed through costs.

The appellant, Callidus Capital Corporation, appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for breach of contract and trust to the respondent, George Leslie Kemeny, regarding an unpaid consulting fee.

The fee was to be paid from the first advance of a loan to Esco Marine Inc. under an Irrevocable Direction.

The appellant argued the Irrevocable Direction was not a guarantee and that funds were unavailable after secured creditors were paid, and that the respondent was estopped by subsequent negotiations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's interpretation that the Irrevocable Direction created a direct contractual and trust obligation on the appellant to pay the fee from the first advance, irrespective of other disbursements, and found no basis for estoppel.

The plaintiff, George Leslie Kemeny, was successful in his action against Callidus Capital Corporation and sought costs.

The court considered the plaintiff's offer to settle for US$400,000 and the defendant's offer for US$25,000, noting the plaintiff's judgment of US$679,800 (CAD$873,203.10 plus prejudgment interest).

The plaintiff sought costs on a partial indemnity basis up to his offer and substantial indemnity thereafter, totaling approximately $107,000.

The defendant challenged this amount and sought a reduction for a successful motion.

The court awarded the plaintiff $85,000 in costs, plus disbursements and taxes, after considering setoff for a previous costs award against the plaintiff and a reduction for the defendant's successful motion.

The plaintiff, an independent financial advisor, brought an action against the defendant lender to enforce an Irrevocable Direction for the payment of consulting fees.

The plaintiff had facilitated a loan agreement between a borrower and the defendant.

The Irrevocable Direction, signed by the borrower and acknowledged by the defendant, directed the defendant to pay the plaintiff 2% of the authorized loan facility from the first drawdown.

The defendant refused to pay, arguing lack of authority and insufficient availability of funds.

The court found the Irrevocable Direction binding, rejected the availability argument as commercially absurd, and held that the defendant breached its contractual and trust obligations.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for US$679,800.

The defendants, a charitable organization and a church, brought a motion to strike the self-represented plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff alleged various wrongs, including breach of contract, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, and reprisal, arising from his involvement with the defendants and his subsequent removal from his alleged position as a board member.

Applying recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on voluntary religious organizations, the court found it lacked jurisdiction over most of the claims, as they did not involve the vindication of legal rights.

The claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment were struck with leave to amend, as they were legally tenable but lacked sufficient particulars.

The remaining claims were struck without leave to amend as frivolous or disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellant, Stoney Creek Centre Inc., appealed a judgment requiring it to pay the $3 million face amount of a mortgage, plus interest, to discharge it, rather than the approximately $2.7 million actually advanced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's interpretation of the mortgage financing agreement.

The court held that the parties had expressly agreed that the borrower would bear the lender's financing costs, making the full face value of the mortgage payable.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment seeking declarations of share ownership, directorship, invalidity of mortgages, and financial disclosure in a dispute over the sale of a hotel.

The defendants opposed, arguing a trial was necessary due to significant credibility issues and the inappropriateness of partial summary judgment, and also brought their own cross-motion for summary judgment.

The court dismissed both motions for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly concerning witness credibility and the inability to readily bifurcate liability from remedy without risking inefficient duplication or inconsistent findings.

The applicant tenant moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the new owner of the property from demolishing or renovating the premises, claiming the former landlord breached a right of first refusal (ROFR) in the lease.

The respondents moved to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) and for security for costs.

The court dismissed the injunction motion and discharged the CPL, finding no serious issue to be tried because the tenant had signed an Estoppel Certificate confirming no material default by the landlord and postponing its interest to the new mortgage.

The respondents' motion for security for costs was dismissed as they failed to show the tenant had insufficient assets.

TIF Mechanical Limited claimed a construction lien of $471,312.17 against the Owners for renovation work.

The Owners denied the claim, alleging overpayment, incomplete and unauthorized work, and counterclaimed for $500,000.

The court found that the parties had a series of individual contracts, initially fixed-price, then primarily verbal time-and-material agreements, rather than an overarching fixed-price general contract as alleged by the Owners.

The court largely accepted TIF's invoices as reflecting the agreed-upon price and found the Owners' credibility lacking regarding a budget limit.

While some deficiencies were found, the Owners' counterclaim for unauthorized work, zoning variance costs, completion costs, general damages, bad faith, and loss of opportunity was dismissed.

TIF was awarded $377,277.82 plus prejudgment interest.

Following a settlement between defendants and several third parties in a defective window litigation, the plaintiff sought disclosure of the settlement terms and scheduled a motion for that relief.

Before the motion proceeded, the plaintiff received sufficient information about the settlement through exchanged emails and draft releases and abandoned the motion but sought costs for bringing it.

The responding parties also sought their costs.

The court declined to determine the abstract merits of the abandoned motion solely for costs purposes and held that continuing the motion solely to support a costs claim was a waste of court and counsel resources.

No costs were awarded to any party.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss or stay the action on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction or, alternatively, that Manitoba was the more appropriate forum.

The plaintiff alleged breach of employment contract obligations, including confidentiality and non-solicitation provisions, and related economic torts following the departure of an investment advisor to a competing firm.

Applying the presumptive connecting factor framework from Van Breda, the court held that Ontario had jurisdiction because the employer carried on business in Ontario and the employment contract was formed in Ontario when acceptance was received there.

The defendants failed to rebut the presumption of a real and substantial connection or demonstrate that Manitoba was clearly the more appropriate forum.

The plaintiff’s cross-motion to have the action tried together with three other related Ontario actions was also dismissed due to material factual and contractual differences between the cases.