Loretta De Thomasis

The Plaintiff, Lisa Jagan, sought costs on a full indemnity basis after the Defendant, The Personal Insurance Company, abandoned its summary judgment motion.

The original summary judgment motion was deemed inappropriate by the court due to genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court awarded the Plaintiff partial costs for expert reports and legal fees, finding that while some work would be repurposed, a significant portion was "thrown away" due to the ill-conceived motion.

The court emphasized that costs "thrown away" are generally payable on a full or substantial indemnity basis but must be reasonable and genuinely wasted.

The defendants sought costs personally against the plaintiff's counsel following a mistrial.

The mistrial was declared due to the plaintiff's counsel's failure to disclose a conflict of interest involving her husband's medical assessment company, which retained the plaintiff's expert witnesses and significantly marked up their invoices.

The court found that the counsel's conduct frustrated and interfered with the administration of justice, noting her lack of candour and failure to adhere to representations previously made to the Law Society.

The court ordered the plaintiff's counsel to personally pay the costs of the mistrial.

In a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sought leave to adduce a late-served loss of income expert report.

The court denied leave under Rule 53.08, finding no reasonable explanation for the delay and prejudice to the defendants.

During the trial, a voir dire revealed that the plaintiff's law firm had retained medical experts through an assessment company owned by the spouse of the firm's principal lawyer.

The assessment company had also significantly marked up the expert's invoice.

Finding an egregious and undisclosed conflict of interest that breached the duty of loyalty, the court declared a mistrial.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing a motor vehicle personal injury action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that discoverability could not be fairly determined on the paper record because the issue was intertwined with the plaintiff's actual pain, dysfunction, medical advice, and when a reasonable person would have known a tort action was an appropriate means to seek a remedy.

Applying the summary judgment framework and discoverability principles in the motor vehicle threshold context, the court found a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The motion was therefore dismissed.