Colin P. Stevenson

The applicant wife brought an urgent without-notice motion for a restraining order under s. 46 of the Family Law Act against the respondent husband, who had been accused of running a Ponzi-type scheme and whose conduct since separation included a barrage of threatening emails and text messages demanding money.

The court found that while the applicant subjectively feared for her safety, the evidence did not objectively establish reasonable grounds to conclude her safety was at risk, and declined to grant the restraining order.

However, the court granted a non-contact order under s. 47.1 of the FLA, prohibiting the respondent from contacting the applicant except through counsel and from coming within 200 metres of the former matrimonial home, the applicant's workplace, and her mother's home, for a period of 14 days.

In a family proceeding with self-represented parties and prior findings of intimate partner violence, the court addressed a motion concerning the appointment structure for amicus curiae at a bifurcated financial-issues trial.

While the Attorney General proposed a single amicus limited to both cross-examinations, the court held that two appointments were necessary to preserve fairness, avoid intimidation risk, and prevent confidentiality and appearance-of-bias concerns inherent in a single-counsel model.

The court declined to impose a solicitor-client relationship between amicus and either party, but imposed confidentiality protections and otherwise adopted the draft order terms with targeted modifications.

The order appointed two amici for cross-examinations only, maintained role limits, and directed public funding and administration through the Ministry and Legal Aid Ontario.

No costs were awarded on the motion.

Following a motion on parenting time in which the respondent father was granted an increase on a graduated basis — less than he sought but more than the applicant mother preferred — the court addressed costs.

The father sought $2,000 all-inclusive, acknowledging the mother's modest annual income of approximately $45,000.

The mother sought $3,500, arguing she was the more successful party.

The court found the father prevailed on the motion, but reduced his costs award to $1,500 all-inclusive, payable within 30 days, to account for the mother's financial situation and the ongoing need for cooperative co-parenting in the child's best interests.

In this family costs decision following trial, the court held the applicant was successful in all significant respects and entitled to costs under Family Law Rule 24(3).

The court found the applicant beat settlement offers dated October 21, 2025 and December 5, 2025, and assessed comparability on an overall basis rather than term-by-term precision.

Relying on subrules 24(12) and 24(14), the court emphasized the respondent’s unreasonable litigation conduct, including delay, non-compliance, and positions that increased trial complexity and expense.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs up to the first offer and full recovery costs thereafter, including expert-related amounts, for a total all-inclusive award of $179,407 payable within 30 days.

The plaintiff, Jaymat Limited, brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, Vivo Pizza Pasta Franchising Inc. and Pino Trichilo, for repayment of advances made in respect of several restaurant locations.

The court found that the advances, initially ambiguous as to whether they were loans or equity, were ultimately confirmed as loans by a promissory note signed in October 2021.

The court held that both defendants received consideration for signing the note, and that the note was enforceable.

Judgment was granted to the plaintiff for $2,100,000 plus interest, with leave to amend the corporate defendant’s name.

The Plaintiff, Lisa Jagan, sought costs on a full indemnity basis after the Defendant, The Personal Insurance Company, abandoned its summary judgment motion.

The original summary judgment motion was deemed inappropriate by the court due to genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court awarded the Plaintiff partial costs for expert reports and legal fees, finding that while some work would be repurposed, a significant portion was "thrown away" due to the ill-conceived motion.

The court emphasized that costs "thrown away" are generally payable on a full or substantial indemnity basis but must be reasonable and genuinely wasted.

The Providius defendants brought a motion to stay the action against them for abuse of process, alleging that the plaintiffs (Evertz) failed to promptly disclose all non-financial terms of a Pierringer-type settlement agreement with the Lawo defendants.

The court found that while some initial terms were disclosed, critical "business terms" that fundamentally altered the litigation landscape, such as Lawo divesting shares in Providius, Evertz gaining an option to purchase those shares, and Evertz indemnifying Lawo against potential claims from Providius, were withheld for eight months.

The court ruled that these undisclosed terms significantly changed the adversarial relationship and potential claims, constituting an abuse of process.

Consequently, the motion to stay the action against the Providius defendants was granted.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation claim brought by the plaintiffs, a tattoo artist and her company.

The defamation arose from negative online reviews and social media posts by the defendants regarding alleged misadventures and disputes over tattoo services, pricing, and plagiarism.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the expressions, while attracting public attention, were fundamentally about private contractual and consumer disputes and did not relate to a matter of public interest as contemplated by the anti-SLAPP legislation.

The court also awarded costs against the defendants, noting the motions were inappropriate and tactical.

The defendant employer brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiff's claim for wrongful dismissal.

The plaintiff argued that the employment contract's termination provisions, which limited entitlements to Employment Standards Act (ESA) minimums, were void for ambiguity and failure to properly reference statutory exemptions.

The court found the contractual terms clear and unambiguous, complying with the ESA, and granted the defendant's motion, striking out the plaintiff's claim.

This is an appeal by the defendants from an Associate Justice's order that dismissed their request to strike certain paragraphs from the Statement of Claim.

The impugned paragraphs alleged bad faith contractual performance by the defendants, specifically referencing an alleged campaign to damage the plaintiff, including encouraging a false accusation of sexual assault, following the plaintiff's departure from their accounting firm.

The defendants also sought to strike paragraphs related to "departure negotiations" on the basis of settlement privilege.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the allegations of bad faith contractual performance were viable under Bhasin v. Hrynew and that the correspondence regarding departure negotiations was not presumptively privileged without evidence of intent to settle.

The plaintiff, Songfu Liu, sued his surgeon, Dr. Jonathan Chan, alleging fraudulent inducement to undergo unnecessary prostate surgery by manipulating test results.

Both parties brought motions for summary judgment.

The court found no evidence of fraud, confirming that Mr. Liu had prostate cancer and that the surgery was medically appropriate based on expert evidence.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted, leading to the dismissal of the entire action.