Court File and Parties
Court File No.: FS-26-00001390-0000 Date: 2026-03-26
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
BETWEEN:
Marcia Honey Lipson Applicant
– and –
John Mark Rosenthal Respondent
Meysa Maleki and Nadine Saba, for the Applicant
Without Notice
HEARD: March 25, 2026
Reasons for Decision
C. Stevenson J.
[1] This is a motion by the Applicant wife for a restraining Order, without notice, seeking amongst other relief, to restrain the Respondent husband from:
a. Contacting or communicating directly or indirectly with the Applicant, except through or in the presence of legal counsel.
b. Coming within 200 metres of the former matrimonial home located at 67 Teddington Park Avenue Toronto, the Applicant's place of work, or any place that the Applicant is known to be.
[2] The applicant relies primarily on s.46 of the Family Law Act R.S.O. 1990 c. F.3 ("FLA") which provides:
- (1) On application, the court may make an interim or final restraining order against a person described in subsection (2) if the applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of any child in his or her lawful custody.
Same
(2) A restraining order under subsection (1) may be made against,
(a) a spouse or former spouse of the applicant; or
(3) A restraining order made under subsection (1) shall be in the form prescribed by the rules of court and may contain one or more of the following provisions, as the court considers appropriate:
Restraining the respondent, in whole or in part, from directly or indirectly contacting or communicating with the applicant or any child in the applicant's lawful custody.
Restraining the respondent from coming within a specified distance of one or more locations.
Specifying one or more exceptions to the provisions described in paragraphs 1 and 2.
[3] This motion has been brought urgently. The context is that the Respondent, who has been the Applicant's husband for 26 years, has been accused of fraud, essentially, running a Ponzi-type scheme. The Respondent, who was a chartered professional accountant, is said to have defrauded many people of millions of dollars. The Applicant says she is one of the victims. The Applicant says the Respondent's actions were a total shock to her. The parties separated on September 25, 2025.
[4] The regulator which governs the Respondent's former profession, the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario, on October 1, 2025 revoked the Respondent's right to practice as a result of professional misconduct arising from the Ponzi scheme. Multiple creditors have filed lawsuits against him.
[5] Detailed allegations concerning the Ponzi scheme and the Respondent's involvement were published in the Toronto Star in February 2026. This two-part investigative article included a photograph of the Applicant and Respondent together, and identified the former matrimonial home, where the Applicant continues to reside. This led to third parties coming to the home and intrusions on the Applicant's privacy.
[6] The Applicant is concerned about such incidents increasing in the wake of the Toronto Star articles. The Applicant also notes, however, that upset creditors and process servers have attended at her home (the former matrimonial home) since May 2025.
[7] On February 3, 2026 one of the Applicant's lawyers wrote a letter to the Respondent demanding payment under certain promissory notes. To date, no payments have been made by the Respondent in response to that demand. No restraining order was sought at that time.
[8] Since separation the Respondent has sent the Applicant a barrage of emails and text messages demanding money and he has threatened to contact her business associates. He called the Applicant a "spineless coward" in a December 4, 2025 text, and she describes a history of verbal abuse and on two pre-separation occasions she says he lifted his hand threateningly.
[9] A December 1, 2025 email from the Respondent asked her "Do you want for me to Just perish or die?" (sic).
[10] The Applicant has recently issued a petition to assign the Respondent into Bankruptcy. It has not yet been served. The first return date is May 11, 2026. The Applicant is concerned about how he will react and worries this may "push him over the edge". She is 67 years old. She fears for her safety. The Respondent has been living in the U.S. since separation but he is expected to return to Canada in the near future.
[11] The legal principles which apply to issuing a restraining order are as follows:
a) Restraining orders are serious and should not be ordered unless a clear case has been made out, Ciffolillo v. Niewelglowski, 2007 ONCJ 469.
b) Courts should not order restraining orders in borderline cases just to be cautious. That would ignore the statutory test and the onus of proof, A.H. v. M.T., 2023 ONSC 2365.
c) A restraining order results in criminal consequences if there is a breach. This could adversely affect a person's ability to work or their immigration status, F.K. v. M.C., 2017 ONCJ 181.
d) It is not sufficient to argue that there would be no harm in granting the order, Edwards v. Tronick-Wehring 2004 ONCJ 195.
e) The court must be satisfied that there are "reasonable grounds for the person to fear for his or her own safety or for the safety of their child" McCall v. Res, 2013 ONCJ 254.
f) The test for a restraining order includes both an objective and subjective element. The legislation itself makes that clear, as an entirely subjective test would have no use for the words "reasonable grounds" as a qualifier to the fears expressed by the requesting party, A.H. v. M.T., supra; McGowan v. McGowan, 2018 ONSC 5950, at paragraph 38.
g) There must be evidence as to specific events and a connection to the present situation, Noriega v. Litke, 2020 ONSC 2970; S.S.L. v. M.A.B., 2022 ONSC 6326.
h) It is not necessary for a respondent to have actually committed an act, gesture or words of harassment to justify a restraining order. It is enough if an applicant has a legitimate fear of such acts being committed. An applicant does not have to have an overwhelming fear that could be understood by almost everyone; the standard for granting an order is not that elevated, Fuda v. Fuda, 2011 ONSC 154 at paras. 31-32.
i) A restraining order cannot, however, be issued to forestall every perceived fear of insult or possible harm without compelling facts. There can be fears of a personal or subjective nature, but they must be related to a respondent's actions or words. A court must be able to connect or associate a respondent's actions or words with an applicant's fears, Fuda v. Fuda, supra.
j) Courts should have regard for the passage of time. Events that once triggered a temporary restraining order may not be so compelling on the issue of a permanent order, D.C. v. M.T.C., 2015 ONCJ 242; Jumale v. Mahamed, 2022 ONSC 566.
k) In borderline cases, the court must consider what other protections may be available if a restraining order is not granted, D.C. v. M.T.C., supra; M.H.S. v. M.R., 2021 ONCJ 665.
l) It is appropriate, in borderline cases, to consider the balancing prejudice to the respondent if the restraining order is granted, D.C. v. M.T.C., supra; M.H.S. v. M.R., supra.
[12] The Applicant says that the Respondent has hurled disparaging insults at her and expressed suicidal ideations since they separated. The Applicant is also concerned that the Respondent may attempt to damage her valuables out of anger.
[13] The Applicant says that while the Respondent did not physically harm her, his conduct was emotionally and psychologically abusive and threatening. She says that historically he also made sexual comments about her in front of others, such as her brother-in-law. She understandably testified that this made her feel very uncomfortable and it was very distressing. It also meets the definition of family violence in the 2021 amendments to that definition in the Divorce Act.
[14] The Applicant's evidence shows that she subjectively fears for her own safety, but I am not satisfied that objectively there are compelling facts which constitute reasonable grounds to conclude that her safety is at risk.
[15] A restraining Order is not to be granted lightly even if there is some evidence (not yet tested in court and with no responding evidence at all) of a history of psychological or financial abuse. The evidence here is not compelling enough to warrant issuing a restraining Order. The history of this matter does not allow me to reasonably conclude that the Applicant's safety is at risk.
[16] Although a restraining Order pursuant to s. 46 is inappropriate, I will, however, apply s. 47.1 of the FLA which provides:
47.1 In making any order under this Part, other than an order under section 46 the court may also make an interim order prohibiting, in whole or in part, a party from directly or indirectly contacting or communicating with another party, if the court determines that the order is necessary to ensure that an application under this Part is dealt with justly.
[17] I am satisfied that a "non-contact" order should issue pursuant to s. 47.1 of the FLA based on the evidence of the Respondent's threats, such as that he would allow some of his creditors to attend at the former matrimonial home to seize and sell household contents.
[18] I order that the Respondent shall not contact or communicate directly or indirectly with the Applicant except through or in the presence of legal counsel.
[19] This Order is also appropriate based on the Applicant' evidence that since separation the Respondent has sent her a barrage of emails and text messages demanding money and threatened to contact her business associates.
[20] The non-contact order will extend to the Applicant's place of work and her business associates. The Applicant testified how during the marriage the Respondent called her multiple times a day during work hours, demanding to know her whereabouts and what she was doing.
[21] I order that the Respondent shall not come within 200 meters of the former matrimonial home located at 67 Teddington Park Avenue Toronto, the Applicant's place of work, or any place that the Applicant is known to be, including the Applicant's mother's home.
[22] The last phrase in the Order will ensure the Respondent does not attend at the Applicant's elderly mother's home, where the Applicant spends a lot of time.
[23] The Order shall continue in force for 14 days after which it shall expire, unless extended on consent or by further order of the court. Any such motion can be brought on a regular motion day provided it will, as I currently expect, take less than one hour. No case conference is required before such a motion is brought.
[24] The Applicant is given leave to bring this motion, as well as any motion to extend, on an urgent basis without having first had a case conference; rule 14(4.2), Hodgson v. Hodgson, 2026 ONSC 476. Leave is also granted to bring this motion (but not the extension motion) on a without notice basis pursuant to rule 14(12)(d) (probable serious consequences).
[25] The draft Order may be sent to me through my judicial assistant to be signed.
[26] No Order as to costs.
C. Stevenson J.
Released: March 26, 2026