S.S.L. v. M.A.B., 2022 ONSC 6326

COURT FILE NO.: FC-19-FS44

DATE: 20221128

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

S.S.L.

Applicant

– and –

M.A.B.

Respondent

Barry T. Paquette, for the Applicant

Respondent appearing in person

HEARD: September 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14 & 15, 2022

The honourable mr. justice d.j. gordon

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] The applicant, “father” or “S.S.L.”, and the respondent, “mother” or “M.A.B.”, were in a relationship for several years. A child, “M.L.”, was born in 2016. In this trial, the primary issues requiring determination include decision-making and parenting time, and related matters. There is a secondary issue regarding child support.

A. Factual Background

[2] The parties were in a romantic relationship from September 2015 to December 2018, with a hiatus between May 2017 and October 2017. They did not cohabit but resided in the same neighbourhood, each spending time regularly at the other’s residence.

[3] S.S.L. is 47 years of age. He obtained a diploma in computer programming at Conestoga college in 1998. S.S.L. has worked in his field since graduation in both the private and public sector. When his contract position with a local municipality expired in 2021, S.S.L. established a consulting business.

[4] S.S.L. was previously married to T.R., separating in 2012 and subsequently divorced. They are the parents of three children, 29, 21, and 18 years of age. The children primarily resided with him after separation, seeing their mother regularly. The two older children now live independently. The youngest child resides with each of his parents, said to be on an equal basis.

[5] S.S.L. has owned his residence in the Region of Waterloo for fifteen years, where he lives with his fiancé, J.G., M.L., and his youngest son. There is a self-contained apartment in the basement. It is rented to a university student.

[6] M.A.B. is 42 years of age. She was born in Poland, emigrating to Canada with her parents and brother. Her mother, A.B., has returned to Poland. Her father, M.B., and brother reside in Toronto. M.A.B. has a background in teaching. She has provided tutoring services for many years.

[7] M.A.B. is married to S.M., separating in 2014. They have three children, 21, 17 and 8 years of age. The children primarily resided with M.A.B. after the separation. The oldest child, M.M., resides in the Region of Waterloo, occupying a condominium owned by M.A.B. while enrolled in an undergraduate university program.

[8] M.A.B. resided in the Region of Waterloo for many years. Since 2018, she and the children have lived in several different rental units. In August 2022, M.A.B. and the children moved to Etobicoke, residing in an apartment with S.M. S.M. is employed by the Region of Waterloo.

[9] There were difficult periods in the relationship. The level of conflict increased when that relationship ended. The parties agree on few matters. They have different views on parenting roles.

[10] The relationship terminated on December 1, 2018. Thereafter, M.L. was in the care of M.A.B. S.S.L. was unable to arrange parenting time in a manner satisfactory to him. This litigation followed.

B. Litigation History

[11] The following chart sets out the critical events in the litigation process:

i) January 22, 2019 – Application issued, father seeking joint custody, fixing a parenting schedule, police enforcement, non-removal of child’s residence from the Region of Waterloo, and other relief;

ii) April 5, 2019 – Answer delivered, mother claiming sole custody, supervised access to father of two hours weekly to age three and expanding thereafter, child support, police enforcement, restraining order, and other relief;

iii) May 15, 2019 – Father’s urgent motion for parenting time was heard, Madsen J. subsequently granting a temporary order that provided parenting time to him every Saturday and Tuesday, both for two hours and to occur at the municipal library, and addressing other matters;

iv) May 15, 2019 – A further temporary order was granted by Madsen, J., partially on consent, awarding costs of $1,500.00 to father for mother’s delay in responding to his application and to be credited towards child support, father to pay monthly guideline child support of $519.00, section 7 expenses to be shared, and other matters;

v) June 24, 2019 – First Case Conference held, Walters J. granting a temporary order, on consent, directing the parties to communicate by Our Family Wizard, disclosure, expanding father’s parenting time to three hours per event in July, and permitting mother to travel to Poland with the child for four weeks in the summer;

vi) September 18, 2019 – Second Case Conference held, MacLeod J. granting a comprehensive temporary order, on consent, addressing parenting:

a) M.L. to reside primarily in the care of mother;

b) Father’s parenting time to be increased in stages to every Tuesday evening and alternate weekends;

c) Schedule for sharing holidays, special days and summer vacation, including one week for father and accommodating travel by mother and child to Poland;

d) Permitting mother to travel with M.L. to Poland for two weeks;

e) Child’s residence not to be removed from the Region of Waterloo; and

f) Other matters.

g) A further term of the order, not on consent, awarded father additional parenting time on alternate Thursday evenings.

vii) October 19, 2020 – Braid J. granted an order for disclosure of police records;

viii) April 13, 2021 – Father’s motion for contempt heard, mother not appearing, Broad J. granting a temporary order:

a) Inviting the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to conduct a section 112, Courts of Justice Act, investigation and directing the parties to deliver intake forms within 10 days;

b) Police enforcement regarding the order granted September 18, 2019;

c) Prohibiting S.M. attending on exchanges of the child, permitting only mother or her father to be present for that purpose;

d) Providing additional parenting time for father from April 14 to 18 and 23 to 25, 2021;

e) Mother to pay costs to father of $6,500.00, on a full indemnity basis;

f) Adjourning the balance of the motion to a long motions list to be set by the trial co-ordinator;

ix) March 18, 2022 – Settlement Conference held, MacLeod J. directing the trial to occur at the sittings commencing September 6, 2022;

x) March 23, 2022 – Reply delivered on behalf of father;

xi) April 29, 2022 – Trial Management Conference held before MacLeod, J. the trial scheduling endorsement form disclosing names of witnesses and estimating an eight day trial;

xii) August 29, 2022 – Speak to Court for the September sittings, Madsen J. directing trial to be called, now estimated at five days; and

xiii) September 7, 2022 – Trial commenced in person, completed seven days later on September 15, 2022.

[12] Father did not pursue scheduling of the contempt motion that was adjourned on April 13, 2021, Mr. Paquette saying his client was content with the Children’s Lawyer appointment.

[13] M.A.B. also served a motion, dated April 22, 2022, seeking to set aside the order of April 13, 2021. It came before Piccoli J. on July 20, 2022 and was adjourned, on consent, to be heard by the trial judge.

[14] Following the presentation of evidence on the trial, submissions were heard on this motion. The decision was reserved. In my reasons for decision, released concurrent with these reasons, as 2022 ONSC 6310, that motion was dismissed.

C. Children’s Lawyer

[15] As indicated above, in his order granted April 13, 2021, Broad J. invited the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to provide services for the child, specifically a section 112 investigation and report. M.A.B. received a copy of that order, by email, on the same day. S.S.L. delivered his intake form to the Children’s Lawyer. M.A.B. did not, despite having received independent information on the process. Nevertheless, the Children's Lawyer accepted the invitation on August 16, 2021. Todd Perreault was assigned as the clinical investigator.

[16] Mr. Perreault interviewed S.S.L. on August 20, 2021. He spoke to M.A.B. on August 17 and 27, 2021. M.A.B. declined to participate in the process. In result, Mr. Perreault delivered a Collapsed Report of the Children's Lawyer on September 29, 2021, saying in part:

[M.A.B.] was very clear that she did not wish to participate in the section 112 investigation, nor did she wish to have [M.L.] to be part of this investigation.

[17] During cross-examination, M.A.B. challenged the accuracy of Mr. Perreault’s comments, advising that she did not refuse. M.A.B. also claimed the investigation had to be conducted virtually, due to the COVID-19, but Mr. Perreault insisted it be in person. Accordingly, M.A.B. determined the investigation would not be “healthy” for M.L.

D. Parenting During Relationship

[18] While there was some dispute as to the extent of parenting by each party during the relationship, it was clear both provided care for M.L., his or her own children, and the children of the other parent. The employment of S.S.L. was in the daytime while the tutoring services provided by M.A.B. usually occurred in the evening. This pattern of work required each party to support the other in parenting responsibility.

[19] As they lived in the same neighbourhood, their older children developed friendships.

[20] S.S.L. attended the medical appointments of M.A.B. during pregnancy and was present for the birth of M.L. Both parties acquired furniture, clothing and supplies for the child after discharge from the hospital.

[21] M.A.B. was then coping with some form of mental health issues, perhaps depression. There were conflicting comments as to the cause but M.A.B. acknowledged it had to do with the conduct of her former spouse, S.M. She would spend considerable time in bed. At some point, M.A.B. consulted her family physician. Subsequently, she attended at the emergency department at a local hospital. M.A.B. advised being directed to see a psychiatrist. Such never occurred. No medical records were tendered in evidence. Whatever the issue was, S.S.L. was spending additional time providing childcare.

[22] The relationship came to an end on December 1, 2018. M.A.B. attended at the residence of S.S.L. while he was at work. She removed the bed used by M.L. along with the child’s clothing, toys, and supplies. M.A.B. acknowledged taking these items, saying it was accomplished several hours before the separation. S.S.L. contacted the police. Officers spoke to both parties, but no further action was taken.

E. Parenting After Separation

[23] S.S.L. did not see M.L. from December 1, 2018, until May 18, 2019. He made requests for parenting time but there was no response from M.A.B. Mr. Paquette was retained.

[24] A number of emails were exchanged between Mr. Paquette and M.A.B., as follows:

i) January 4, 2019 – Mr. Paquette requests a parenting arrangement and invites M.A.B. to retain a lawyer;

ii) January 4, 2019 – M.A.B. responds several hours later, saying once she has legal representation the lawyer will respond;

iii) January 8, 2019 – M.A.B. reports speaking to a law firm and seeks details of what S.S.L. is proposing;

iv) January 9, 2019 – In response, Mr. Paquette proposed two evenings weekly, alternate weekends and further time for holidays and special occasions; and,

v) January 11, 2019 – M.A.B. replies, proposing a three-hour visit monthly in a public place, special occasions to be determined.

[25] Given the position as stated by M.A.B., the application of S.S.L. was issued on January 19, 2019. It was served on M.A.B. thereafter.

[26] On March 6, 2019, M.A.B. delivered an email to Mr. Paquette, reporting that she was not able to retain a lawyer and proposing S.S.L. have weekly visits with M.L. in a public setting, commencing immediately. This was not satisfactory to S.S.L.

[27] Subsequently, M.A.B. retained a lawyer and Mr. Paquette was so informed. This lawyer did not respond to Mr. Paquette’s inquiries as to parenting time for S.S.L. This led to an urgent motion and the other granted on May 15, 2019, as noted previously. At the hearing on the motion, M.A.B. was opposed to regular parenting time for S.S.L., her lawyer submitting his time be limited to two hours weekly and be supervised at Child and Parent Place. Madsen J. rejected that proposal.

[28] Subsequent court orders expanded on the parenting time of S.S.L., most on consent. On each court appearance, to and including October 19, 2020, M.A.B. was represented by a lawyer. At some later point in time, she became a self-represented party but, on occasion, M.A.B. would contact the Family Law Information Centre and speak to a lawyer.

[29] As hereafter discussed, compliance with the parenting schedule became problematic. Such continued until the trial.

[30] Each party reported M.L. as enjoying time in his or her care. The child has been involved in family and other activities. Photographs were presented in evidence to demonstrate a happy child participating in these events with each parent and others. The evidence suggests M.L. is content and willingly spending time in the care of each of her parents. Neither party presented any compelling complaint, only advancing general comment, as to the parenting or parenting skill of the other.

F. Compliance With Court Orders

[31] The temporary orders granted in this case, in my view, are clear and unambiguous. Yet, there are many complaints regarding compliance to the terms, including lateness on exchanges, cancellation of parenting time and other matters.

[32] Both parties have been late for an exchange, on occasion, in part due to other family responsibility or unexpected events. S.S.L. was late several times, notice being provided in advance. Of greater concern, M.A.B. has been consistently late in delivering M.L. to S.S.L. for his periods of parenting time.

[33] S.S.L. maintained a diary, recording events. Such were made at the time events occurred. The diary was presented in evidence, S.S.L. expanding on particular matters in his evidence. While M.A.B. challenged some of the comments as recorded by S.S.L., she did not disagree with the evidence in principle.

[34] S.S.L. indicated M.A.B. was late delivering M.L. to him on most exchanges, delivering notice in advance on only a few occasions. Often the lateness was an hour or more, problematic for a three-hour parenting time period. Several times S.S.L. kept the child beyond the scheduled time period to make up for the late start.

[35] M.A.B. also cancelled the parenting time of S.S.L. a number of times on her own initiative. She would complain, for example, about the lack of disclosure from S.S.L. regarding his fiancé or tenant as the basis for cancellation. M.A.B. said she understood such was required as part of the evidentiary process on the motions and not then being aware she had to present a motion to change herself. M.A.B. also cancelled the mid-week parenting time of S.S.L. in summer months, incorrectly interpreting the order regarding vacation time.

[36] M.A.B. refused to participate in the Children's Lawyer investigation. She also relocated with the child. Both matters were contrary to court orders.

G. Exchanges

[37] Problems began to occur on exchanges, initially occurring at the municipal library, later changed to the police station. Part of the dilemma was lateness.

[38] Since 2019, other persons were attending on the exchanges on behalf of M.A.B. Her father, M.B., would travel from Toronto for this purpose. His involvement was not of concern. Thereafter, it was S.M., husband of M.A.B., bringing or picking up the child. S.S.L. and S.M. had been friends in the past. However, conflict developed between them on these exchanges. While each blamed the other, neither denied verbal arguments were occurring, resulting in police intervention. M.L. would have been exposed to this conflict.

[39] The order granted on April 13, 2021, included a term prohibiting S.M. attending on the exchanges of the child. Yet he would continue to do so, despite being aware of the order. S.M. said he would deliver the child to the area close to the exchange site but was not present on the exchange. This would necessitate M.L. having to walk across the parking lot. S.M. acknowledged being advised by police officers on several occasions to comply with the court order. M.A.B. commented on the order being vague as it did not specify a distance.

H. February 2021

[40] On February 12, 2021, M.A.B. and S.M. attended at the residence of S.S.L. M.L. was with them in the vehicle. S.S.L. was not home. The purpose of this visit was said to be to have a conversation regarding M.L. S.M. described his role to be a facilitator in achieving a parenting agreement.

[41] Shortly thereafter, S.S.L. and M.A.B. engaged in a six-hour telephone conversation. S.M. was present with M.A.B. but did not participate in the discussion. Each party presented their position to the other, S.S.L. seeking equal parenting time, M.A.B. wanting him to give up on the court ordered parenting time and have occasional visits. M.A.B. claimed the child was suffering from anxiety and stress due to the schedule. No agreement was achieved.

[42] S.S.L. summarized the conversation in his diary and in an email to M.A.B. delivered that same day. He recorded her to say:

…if I did not “Give up my Access” and only see her for “Daddy Visits” occasionally, then you would ultimately stop being a mother to [M.L.] and give Full Custody to me.

[43] M.A.B. did not respond to this email. She acknowledged a lengthy conversation but denied making any comment of giving up custody. However, S.M. reported M.A.B. to have made the comment, saying it was a statement of desire to keep M.L. “whole” rather than “cutting her in half” by a shared parenting regime.

[44] Immediately after this conversation, M.A.B. cancelled the parenting time of S.S.L. He did not see M.L. until the order granted on April 13, 2021.

I. Decision-Making

[45] The temporary orders did not address decision-making for M.L. Section 20(4), Children’s Law Reform Act, did not apply as the child did not live with M.A.B. with the “…consent, implied consent or acquiescence…” of S.S.L. Accordingly, decisions could only be made by the parties together or by a further court order.

[46] During this litigation, M.A.B. has made unilateral decisions, including:

i) Home-schooling during COVID-19;

ii) Enrolling in a Polish School in Etobicoke;

iii) Baptism; and

iv) Relocation of the child.

[47] S.S.L. was not consulted as to either homeschooling or attending a Polish School, being informed only after the decision was made.

[48] He expressed concern with the lack of information from M.A.B. He did not see the benefit for either form of schooling and felt such impeded the child’s social development. S.S.L. wanted M.L. to learn to speak English before taking instruction on another language.

[49] M.A.B. spoke of her concerns regarding COVID-19. She also thought M.L. would benefit from homeschooling as she was falling behind. Attendance at the Polish School in Etobicoke commenced in September 2021 on a part-time basis, M.A.B. advising such did not occur during the parenting time of S.S.L. Learning the Polish language and culture is important to M.A.B. and S.M. They intend on pursuing such programs for M.L. as with their children.

[50] In an email from M.A.B. to S.S.L. on March 3, 2019, she asked:

Are you in agreement with [M.L.] being baptized?

[51] In response, S.S.L. said:

Yes I am ok with that. I would like more details around it though. Like is it a full body baptism? Is it done in front of the whole church? Will it be in English so I can feel a part of it? Will [M.L.] be ok with it? Not traumatized by it do you think? What would my role be in this? Do I have to avow for anything? Be honest with me on how you feel with all of this.

[52] M.A.B. replied, saying:

I will have you sign for the Baptism when I have the paperwork. You can read on the details of a Catholic Baptism.

[53] In a separate email on the same day, M.A.B. communicated with S.S.L. as follows:

Prior to this first weekend, I am sending a preliminary list of decisions that should be made jointly and I am expressing my positions on these decisions here to clarify.

I intend to Baptize [M.L.] soon and hope you will be in agreement with this. [M.L.] loves attending Mass and the get togethers we have right after in the Parish Hall. She has made many little friends there. She also insists on praying at night. My parish is a tolerant and very pleasant and nurturing place for young children and I think [M.L.] will benefit greatly from being a part of it. You will see the positive results.

[54] Despite these exchanges of emails, no further information was provided to S.S.L. He was not presented with documentation to sign. M.A.B. said it was not her role to provide information and that S.S.L. could have done his own research or spoken to the priest directly. M.A.B. also advised that only the mother signs for a baptism.

[55] M.L. was baptized at a local Roman Catholic Church in November 2021. S.S.L. did not attend. He was not invited and was unaware the event had been scheduled.

J. Other Involved Persons

[56] Other persons were identified at trial as being involved with M.L., some being called as witnesses.

[57] J.G. is 38 years of age. She has been in a relationship with S.S.L. for two years. They are engaged to marry at some future date and are presently cohabiting in the residence owned by S.S.L. J.G. is employed. S.S.L. indicated J.G. participates in activities with M.L., including gardening, crafts and family trips. J.G. was present during the trial but was not called as a witness by either party. No complaint about J.G. was advanced by M.A.B. in her evidence.

[58] M.M. is the oldest daughter of M.A.B. and S.M. She is 21 years of age, recently married and enrolled in the fourth year of a university undergraduate program and intending on pursuing a post-graduate degree in veterinary medicine. M.M. and her husband reside in the condominium in the Region of Waterloo owned by M.A.B.

[59] M.M. testified at trial. She spoke of her mother’s parenting skills, which is not in dispute. M.M. also commented on the importance of sibling relationships and a close connection with M.L.

[60] M.B. and A.B. are the parents of M.A.B. They are divorced. M.B. resides in Toronto. A.B. returned to Poland.

[61] M.B. testified at trial. He was involved in some of the exchanges of M.L. with S.S.L. While supportive of his daughter, he did not make any negative comments about S.S.L. Indeed, he made references to the exchanges occurring without incident and that M.L. was always happy to see her father. There does not appear to be any conflict between M.B. and S.S.L.

[62] M.B. spoke about the condominium acquired by M.A.B., saying he is also an owner, having provided the deposit. Such method of acquiring property was described as a common practice in their culture.

[63] A.B. was not called as a witness. S.S.L. made a brief reference to her, saying they did not have a good relationship. An email from A.B. to S.S.L., dated May 21, 2021, was presented in evidence. In this communication, A.B. makes several critical and, indeed, defamatory remarks about S.S.L. It would appear S.S.L. is correct in his comments.

K. Mother Relocates

[64] The order granted on September 18, 2019, includes a term “The child’s residence shall not be removed from the Region of Waterloo”.

[65] On September 2, 2022, several days before the commencement of this trial, M.A.B. delivered an email to Mr. Paquette saying she “had to vacate” the residence in the Region of Waterloo and that she and M.L. “will be staying temporarily at their Vacation Residence” in Etobicoke. This communication made reference to the difficulty in obtaining a local residence due to current rent prices and that she was working with her agent to find a residence in the Region of Waterloo.

[66] The evidence at trial presented a more complete report on the relocation, differing with this email in many respects.

[67] The residence in Etobicoke is the rental apartment of S.M. He has lived there since November 2021 although his employment is in the Region of Waterloo. S.M. reported M.A.B., M.L. and their other children staying at his apartment periodically since he acquired same for the purpose of attending the Polish School in Etobicoke. This became a regular event, he said, by the summer of 2022.

[68] M.A.B. gave notice to her landlord in late June 2022 that she would be vacating the residence in the Region of Waterloo on August 31, 2022. She did make reference to financial difficulties, saying monthly rent and utilities expense of $6,000.00 was beyond her ability to pay. Yet, in her financial statement, sworn August 24, 2022, before the move, M.A.B. shows a rental expense of $2,770.00 monthly, rising to $3,158.00 with utilities, insurance, cable and internet. It was unclear what M.A.B. contributes to the rental expense in Etobicoke.

[69] M.A.B. registered M.L. at the Polish School in Etobicoke. The child is enrolled in Grade 1.

L. Incomes and Child Support

[70] Pursuant to the consent order granted by Madsen J. on May 15, 2019, S.S.L. has been paying child support to M.A.B. in the monthly amount of $519.00. Such commenced on May 1, 2019. The specified amount is guideline support on income of $56,188.00.

[71] S.S.L. provided documentation, including income tax returns and rental income calculations, to show the following income:

2018 $62,547.00

2019 $56,240.00

2020 $58,268.00

2021 $56,358.00

2022 $33,699.00 (estimated)

[72] S.S.L. was employed by a local municipality on a contract position. When it expired in 2021, he established a consulting business. In result, S.S.L. reports a decline in current income, expected to be temporary.

[73] S.S.L. was not challenged on his evidence regarding income.

[74] Mr. Paquette prepared a table to calculate the child support obligation from December 1, 2018 to September 30, 2022 based on actual income. S.S.L. confirmed the accuracy of the amounts specified. This chart calculates further child support owing by S.S.L. of $875.00, the request being to set off against the cost awards unpaid by M.A.B.

[75] M.A.B. reported the following income by reference to notices of assessment, no income tax returns being provided:

2018 $22,596.00

2019 $21,689.00

2020 $34,268.00

2021 $30,592.00

2022 $37,092.00 (estimated)

[76] M.A.B. confirmed the accuracy of her reported income in cross-examination but was not otherwise challenged. It was unclear what impact, if any, there has been on her income as a result of the recent move.

M. Discussion and Analysis

[77] There are a number of topics that warrant review and consideration. As to the issues requiring determination, the terms of the order granted are set out in detail in the summary that follows, addressed in a more general manner in this section.

(a) Credibility

[78] There is a significant issue in this case regarding the credibility of the parties, and some of the other witnesses, and in the evidence presented.

[79] S.S.L. was well prepared for trial. For the most part, his evidence was clear and consistent. In my view, there was some exaggeration; however, to his credit, S.S.L. did acknowledge, for example, the conflict between him and S.M. on the exchanges of M.L. “could have been handled better by both of us”. S.S.L. was focused on the issues in dispute. While critical of M.A.B. and S.M., he made no complaint about M.B. or M.M. Nor did he attack the parenting skill of M.A.B., save as to how her conduct impacted on his parenting time and with decisions unilaterally made by her. I am satisfied S.S.L. was a credible witness.

[80] There are concerns regarding the conduct of M.A.B. since the end of the relationship and during this litigation. The oral evidence from M.A.B., along with the documentary record, reveals her views on parenting. As the child’s mother, M.A.B. is of the belief parenting is her responsibility. She has been controlling, making unilateral decisions. M.A.B. has treated S.S.L. more as a family friend, not as a parent of their child. M.A.B. only permitted S.S.L. to have parenting time as a result of this litigation. She also opined that her initial proposal of three hours of monthly parenting time for S.S.L. was “plenty”.

[81] M.A.B. refuses to recognize the parenting role of S.S.L. Of greater concern, she has demonstrated a complete disregard for the right of M.L. to have a relationship with her father. Refusing to allow the Children's Lawyer to conduct an investigation and her relocation on the eve of trial clearly show a lack of insight on parenting and children’s rights. Rather, these and other decisions made by M.A.B. appear to have been made to intimidate S.S.L.

[82] M.A.B. has not complied with court orders, attempting in some situations to interpret terms to her advantage. Again, this indicates her controlling nature.

[83] I conclude M.A.B. was not a credible witness, her evidence being seriously challenged by her conduct.

[84] Both M.B. and S.M. presented their evidence in a straightforward manner and, in general terms, appeared to be credible. However, their evidence must be examined with caution. They are supportive of M.A.B. Both witnesses were well aware of the terms of the court orders. Despite this, they participated in her relocation. S.M. continued to attend on exchanges.

(b) Legislation

[85] The relevant provisions in the Children's Law Reform Act are as follows:

Definitions and interpretation, Part III

18 (1) In this Part…

“decision-making responsibility” means responsibility for making significant decisions about a child’s well-being, including with respect to,

(a) health,

(b) education,

(c) culture, language, religion and spirituality, and

(d) significant extra-curricular activities;

“family violence” means any conduct by a family member towards another family member that is violent or threatening, that constitutes a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, or that causes the other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person, and, in the case of a child, includes direct or indirect exposure to such conduct;

“parenting order” means an order made under section 28 respecting decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to a child;

“parenting time” means the time a child spends in the care of a parent of the child, whether or not the child is physically with the parent during that time;

“relocation” means a change in residence of a child, or of a person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to the child or is an applicant for a parenting order in respect of the child, that is likely to have a significant impact on the child’s relationship with,

(a) another person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to the child or is an applicant for a parenting order in respect of the child, or

(b) a person who has contact with respect to the child under a contact order;

Best interests of the child

24 (1) In making a parenting order or contact order with respect to a child, the court shall only take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with this section.

Primary consideration

(2) In determining the best interests of a child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, and, in doing so, shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.

Factors

(3) Factors related to the circumstances of a child include,

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child’s care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting the child; and

(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child.

Factors relating to family violence

(4) In considering the impact of any family violence under clause (3) (j), the court shall take into account,

(a) the nature, seriousness and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve the person’s ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

Past conduct

(5) In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person, unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of the person’s decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact with respect to the child.

Allocation of parenting time

(6) In allocating parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much time with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child.

Application to related orders

(7) This section applies with respect to interim parenting orders and contact orders, and to variations of parenting orders and contact orders or interim parenting orders and contact orders.

Parenting orders and contact orders

28 (1) The court to which an application is made under section 21,

(a) may by order grant,

(i) decision-making responsibility with respect to a child to one or more persons, in the case of an application under clause 21 (1) (a) or subsection 21 (2),

(ii) parenting time with respect to a child to one or more parents of the child, in the case of an application under clause 21 (1) (b), or

(iii) contact with respect to a child to one or more persons other than a parent of the child, in the case of an application under subsection 21 (3);

(b) may by order determine any aspect of the incidents of the right to decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, as the case may be, with respect to a child; and

(c) may make any additional order the court considers necessary and proper in the circumstances, including an order,

(i) limiting the duration, frequency, manner or location of contact or communication between any of the parties, or between a party and the child,

(ii) prohibiting a party or other person from engaging in specified conduct in the presence of the child or at any time when the person is responsible for the care of the child,

(iii) prohibiting a party from changing the child’s residence, school or day care facility without the consent of another party or an order of the court,

(iv) prohibiting a party from removing the child from Ontario without the consent of another party or an order of the court,

(v) requiring the delivery, to the court or to a person or body specified by the court, of the child’s passport, the child’s health card within the meaning of the Health Insurance Act or any other document relating to the child that the court may specify,

(vi) requiring a party to give information or to consent to the release of information respecting the child’s well-being, including in relation to the child’s health and education, to another party or other person specified by the court, or

(vii) requiring a party to facilitate communication by the child with another party or other person specified by the court in a manner that is appropriate for the child.

Exception

(2) If an application is made under section 21 with respect to a child who is the subject of an order made under section 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, the court shall treat the application as if it were an application to vary an order made under this section.

Same

(3) If an order for access to a child was made under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 at the same time as an order for custody of the child was made under section 102 of that Act, the court shall treat an application under section 21 of this Act relating to parenting time or contact with respect to the child as if it were an application to vary an order made under this section.

Allocation of decision-making responsibility

(4) The court may allocate decision-making responsibility with respect to a child, or any aspect of it, to one or more persons.

Allocation of parenting time

(5) The court may allocate parenting time with respect to a child by way of a schedule.

Parenting time, day-to-day decisions

(6) Unless the court orders otherwise, a person to whom the court allocates parenting time with respect to a child has exclusive authority during that time to make day-to-day decisions affecting the child.

Parenting plan

(7) The court shall include in a parenting order or contact order any written parenting plan submitted by the parties that contains the elements relating to decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact to which the parties agree, subject to any changes the court may specify if it considers it to be in the best interests of the child to do so.

Right to ask for and receive information

(8) Unless a court orders otherwise, a person to whom decision-making responsibility or parenting time has been granted with respect to a child under a parenting order is entitled to ask for and, subject to any applicable laws, receive information about the child’s well-being, including in relation to the child’s health and education, from,

(a) any other person to whom decision-making responsibility or parenting time has been granted with respect to the child under a parenting order; and

(b) any other person who is likely to have such information.

Decision-Making Responsibility, Parenting Time and Contact – Residence and Relocation

Change in residence, person with decision-making responsibility or parenting time

39.1 (1) A person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to a child and who intends to make a change in residence, or in the child’s residence, shall notify any other person who has decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact under a contact order with respect to the child of the intention.

Notice requirements

(2) The notice shall be in writing and shall set out,

(a) the date on which the change is expected to occur; and

(b) the address of the new residence and contact information of the person or child, as the case may be.

Exception

(3) On application, the court may in any circumstance provide that subsections (1) and (2) do not apply, or apply with any changes the court specifies, if the court is of the opinion that it is appropriate to do so, including if there is a risk of family violence.

Same

(4) An application under subsection (3) may be made without notice to any other party.

Non-application

(5) This section does not apply with respect to relocations.

Relocation

39.3 (1) A person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time with respect to a child and who intends a relocation shall, at least 60 days before the expected date of the proposed relocation, notify any other person who has decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact under a contact order with respect to the child of the intention.

Notice requirements

(2) The notice shall be in the form prescribed by the regulations or, if no form is prescribed, shall be in writing and shall set out,

(a) the expected date of the proposed relocation;

(b) the address of the new residence and contact information of the person or child, as the case may be;

(c) a proposal as to how decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, as the case may be, could be exercised; and

(d) any other information that may be prescribed by the regulations.

Exception

(3) On application, the court may in any circumstance provide that subsections (1) and (2) or anything prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of subsection (2) do not apply, or apply with any changes the court specifies, if the court is of the opinion that it is appropriate to do so, including if there is a risk of family violence.

Same

(4) An application under subsection (3) may be made without notice to any other party.

Objection

(5) A person with decision-making responsibility or parenting time who receives notice of the proposed relocation under subsection (1) may, no later than 30 days after receiving the notice, object to the relocation by,

(a) notifying the person who gave the notice of proposed relocation of the objection to the relocation; or

(b) making an application under section 21.

Notice requirements

(6) A notice under clause (5) (a) shall be in writing and shall set out,

(a) a statement that the person objects to the relocation;

(b) the reasons for the objection;

(c) the person’s views on the proposal referred to in clause (2) (c); and

(d) any other information that may be prescribed by the regulations.

Regulations

(7) The Attorney General may make regulations,

(a) prescribing anything in this section that may be prescribed by the regulations;

(b) requiring that a notice under this section be given in a manner specified by the regulations. 2020, c. 25, Sched. 1, s. 15.

Section Amendments with date in force (d/m/y)

Authorization of relocation

39.4 (1) In this section,

“family arbitration award” has the same meaning as in the Arbitration Act, 1991.

Same

(2) A person who has given notice of a proposed relocation in accordance with section 39.3 and who intends to relocate a child may do so as of the date referred to in the notice if,

(a) the relocation is authorized by a court; or

(b) no objection to the relocation is made in accordance with subsection 39.3 (5) and there is no order prohibiting the relocation.

Best interests of the child

(3) In determining whether to authorize the relocation of a child, the court shall take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with section 24, as well as,

(a) the reasons for the relocation;

(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;

(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child, and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;

(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3 and any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award and agreement;

(e) the existence of an order, family arbitration award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;

(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses; and

(g) whether each person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child has complied with their obligations under any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.

Factor not to be considered

(4) In determining whether to authorize a relocation of the child, the court shall not consider whether, if the child’s relocation were to be prohibited, the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child or not relocate. 2020, c. 25, Sched. 1, s. 15.

Burden of proof

(5) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, family arbitration award or agreement that provides that a child spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party who intends to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the best interests of the child.

Same

(6) If the parties to the proceeding substantially comply with an order, family arbitration award or agreement that provides that a child spend the vast majority of time in the care of the party who intends to relocate the child, the party opposing the relocation has the burden of proving that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the child.

Same

(7) In any other case, the parties to the proceeding have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child.

Burden of proof, exception

(8) If an order referred to in subsection (5) or (6) is an interim order, the court may determine that the subsection does not apply.

Costs of relocation

(9) If a court authorizes the relocation of a child, it may provide for the apportionment of costs relating to the exercise of parenting time by a person who is not relocating between that person and the person who is relocating the child.

(c) Legal Principles

[86] The starting point in determining parenting issues is to recognize that the focus is on the child, not the parent. The best interests of the child it the only test to consider. See: Young v. Young, 1993 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.); and Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.). Section 24 provides a non-exhaustive list of human goods required for the well-being of any child. See: Ojeikere v. Ojeikere, 2018 ONCA 372.

[87] Past conduct and family violence, specifically addressed in section 24 as pertaining to the best interests of the child primarily focus on the child. Parental conduct, however meritorious or reprehensible, does not enter into the analysis unless it relates to the ability of the parent to meet the needs of the child. See: Gordon v. Goertz, supra, at p.47. Misconduct, however, that results in the parents having a negative view or attitude towards each other may necessitate consideration when it affects the emotional well-being of the child. See: Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60, at para. 23. Family violence may be a relevant consideration, particularly when considering a shared parenting regime, as the victim might be unable to co-parent due to the trauma and ongoing fear of the perpetrator. See, for example, Bell v. Reinhardt, 2021 ONSC 3352, at para. 15.

[88] Maximum conduct, is a principle long part of the Divorce Act and now codified in section 24 (6). Spending time with each parent is the right of the child, not the parent. See: MacGyver v. Richards, (1995) 1995 CanLII 8886 (ON CA), 11 R.F.L. (4th) 432 (Ont. C.A.). The goal of maximum contact will only be overtaken to the extent that contact with a parent conflicts with the child’s best interests. See: Young, supra; and Rigallo v. Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 548. An order granting parenting time on alternate weekends, one week night per week, three in the summer and shared holidays represented “minimal” time that fails to respect the “maximum contact principle” in the absence of any compelling reason to limit parenting time. See: Vamos v. Vamos, 2012 ONCA 262.

[89] For joint decision-making, there must be some historical evidence that, despite their differences, the parents are able to communicate effectively with each other. The fact one parent professes an inability to communicate with the other parent does not mean joint decision-making cannot be considered. The hope communication will improve is not sufficient. The standard of communication is not one of perfection. Rather, there must be a reasonable measure of communication and co-operation. See: Kaplanis v. Kaplanis, 2005 CanLII 1625 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 275 (Ont. C.A.); Lawson v. Lawson, 2006 CanLII 26573 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 3179 (Ont. C.A.); May-Iannizzi v. Iannizzi, 2010 ONCA 519; and Lambert v. Peachman, 2016 ONSC 7443.

[90] Joint decision-making incorporating a parallel parenting regime is a relatively recent development, used to reduce or avoid parental conflict. This regime envisages that the parents have equal status and exercise the rights and responsibilities associated with decision-making independently of the other. See: Kaplanis, supra.

[91] In Jackson v. Jackson, 2017 ONSC 1566, at para. 72, Chappel J. provided a helpful list of factors to be considered, as developed in the caselaw. Briefly stated, those factors include:

(a) Have both parents consistently played a significant role in the child’s life on all levels?

(b) Are the parenting abilities of each parent and the quality of their decision-making relatively the same?

(c) Should there be an equality of influence between the parties?

(d) Is there a power imbalance between the parents resulting from domestic violence?

(e) Is one parent seeking this arrangement solely as a means of controlling the other parent?

(f) Can each parent place the needs of the child above their own needs and interests?

(g) Will it de-escalate the conflict between the parties or inflame it?

(h) Will the conflict between the parents result in an inability to navigate basic issues, such as scheduling or interpretation of the court order where the dividing lines of responsibility are not clear?

(i) Is one parent the major cause of the discord?

(j) Will the parents ever be able to disengage from combat?

(k) Will the parties be able to respect the crafted terms of the order, having regard to compliance with prior orders?

(l) Is one parent interfering with the contact between the child and the other parent or alienating the child from the other parent?

(m) Does the geographic distance between the residences of the parents’ problematic in implementing decisions?

[92] During cross-examination of S.S.L., M.A.B. made reference to section 6(2), Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and sought to file the documents as an exhibit. I advised her it was a matter for final submissions, not evidence. No reference was made to the Charter in her submissions. Nevertheless, I feel obligated to address the issue.

[93] Section 6(2) provides:

Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of Canada has the right

(a) To move to and take up residence in any province; and

(b) To pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province.

[94] Given the nature of her cross-examination, I understood M.A.B. to be saying the Charter has established mobility rights, such allowing her to move with M.L. for the purpose of employment and to financially benefit her and the child.

[95] The mobility right is qualified in section 6(3), as follows:

The rights specified in subsection (2) are subject to a) any laws of general application in force in a province…

[96] Such, in my view, includes the Children's Law Reform Act, which specifically addresses relocation in section 39.

[97] Further, the application of the Charter to the best interests test in section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act was specifically addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Young v. Young, supra. While the issue in that case involved section 2 of the Charter, namely freedom of religion and association, the principles are also applicable to section 6. The court determined the best interests test did not violate those section 2 rights, also saying parent’s rights play no role in decision-making and parenting time issues. Rather, as previously stated, the focus is on the child and her best interests.

[98] The views and preferences of the child deserve significant consideration. See: Kaplanis, supra; and Maltina v. Maltina, 2018 ONCA 641. The child has the right to be heard, as provided in Article 12, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and section 64, Children's Law Reform Act. The views and preferences factor is consistent with the Convention. See: Cote v. Parsons, 2021 ONSC 3719.

(d) Children’s Lawyer

[99] M.L. is now six years of age. On the limited evidence presented regarding the child, it appears she is intelligent, well-adjusted, sociable and healthy. M.L. enjoys spending time with each of her parents, siblings, other family members and friends. In the child’s Final Report Card, dated August 24, 2022, M.A.B., as the homeschool teacher, assigned her grades in Senior kindergarten as primarily A+ and indicating M.L. had met all objectives in the prescribed curriculum.

[100] On this evidence, I conclude M.L. was well able to participate in a section 112 investigation by the Children's Lawyer and present some indication as to her views and preferences. The child’s right to be heard and to participate in this case were denied by M.A.B.’s decision not to participate.

[101] It is of some interest that the Children's Lawyer accepted the court’s invitation to provide services for M.L. despite the absence of an intake form from M.A.B. In my view, a section 112 investigation and report would have been most helpful given the conflict between the parties and their different positions.

[102] M.A.B. challenged the comments made by Mr. Perreault regarding her participation. Such is improper. The Collapsed Report is a report within the meaning of section 112(2). It is evidence at trial pursuant to section 112(6). M.A.B. did not serve a dispute to this report, as required by Rule 21(e), Family Law Rules. Mr. Perreault, therefore, was denied the opportunity to respond to her testimony. In the absence of a served dispute, M.A.B. is prohibited from challenging the findings and comments of Mr. Perreault. See: Mason v. Bell, 2010 ONSC 4325.

[103] I accept the evidence of Mr. Perreault and conclude M.A.B. refused to comply with the court order requesting an investigation by the Children's Lawyer. Accordingly, in these circumstances, it is appropriate to draw an adverse inference, namely that an investigation by the Children's Lawyer would not have been of assistance to the position of M.A.B.

(e) Domestic Violence and Abuse

[104] Family violence is identified as a factor to be considered in section 24(3)(i) and (4). It warrants separate consideration.

[105] M.A.B. presented serious allegations regarding the conduct of S.S.L. in her answer. This pleading made reference to verbal and financial abuse and other matters. Other than a general complaint, M.A.B. did not present evidence in support of those allegations. S.S.L. did make reference to being slapped by M.A.B. on several occasions during an argument.

[106] The conflict between the parties during and after the relationship, in all likelihood, lead to inappropriate comments by each party. However, the evidence does not meet the requisite test, none impacting on parenting ability or the wellbeing of the child. I conclude the conflict between the parties does not reach the level of family violence as defined by the legislation.

(f) Parenting

[107] There is conflict between the parties, the reason for such being unclear. While part of this conflict is the result of litigation, most is due to their different views on parenting roles, making decisions and the nature of their communication.

[108] Despite acknowledging that joint decisions were required, M.A.B. consistently acted unilaterally, only communicating to S.S.L. the result. Her approach to decision-making is consistent with her view on parenting roles, believing this is only the responsibility of a mother.

[109] The parties can communicate as demonstrated by their six-hour telephone conversation on February 12, 2021. While no agreement was reached on that occasion, the parties were able to discuss matters pertaining to M.L. and exchange their positions. Yet on other occasions, there is an absence of communication, particularly by M.A.B., as seen by her refusal to provide information regarding the baptism.

[110] Communication between parents is for the benefit of the child. M.L. needs to know that both of her parents are involved in her life. Our Family Wizard provides a protocol for parental communication. Compliance with those terms is essential, ensuring that every detail regarding the child is provided to the other parent. Failure to communicate is contrary to the best interests of the child.

[111] Police officers have been involved far too often for no legitimate reason. It is not the role of the police to referee disputes between parents. Rather, it is to keep the peace. Regularly exposing M.L. to police officers on parenting matters is harmful to the child.

[112] Despite the conflict between the parties, M.L. appears to be doing well. She enjoys spending time with each of her parents. No concerns were identified pertaining to M.L. or with respect to parenting ability of either party.

[113] Having regard to the section 24 factors, the evidence supports the following findings:

i) Every child requires stability. While parenting since separation has had some consistency, there have been far too many gaps due to cancelled time. No particular needs were identified. However, the transient lifestyle cannot continue.

ii) M.L. has a positive relationship with each of her parents as well as other family members and people involved in her life. There are no negative matters identified.

iii) Each party supports the child having a relationship with the other parent. However, M.A.B. does not recognize the role of S.S.L. as a parent, making decisions unilaterally and declining to provide information pertaining to M.L. on a regular basis.

iv) M.L. has received care from each of her parents, there being no real complaint as to parenting ability.

v) The views and preferences of M.L. are unknown. Such could have been presented but for the decision of M.A.B. not to participate in the investigation by the Children's Lawyer. As the child enjoys time with each parent, it must be presumed M.L. wants to continue having both involved in her life in some manner.

vi) The Polish language and culture are important to M.A.B. and should be encouraged for M.L. as it is part of her heritage. Similarly, the child’s participation in the Roman Catholic faith is of great significant to M.A.B. S.S.L. did not express any views on religion but appears supportive, given his commitment to a Catholic education.

vii) M.A.B.’s plan is for sole decision-making and limited parenting time for S.S.L. She would continue to reside in Etobicoke with M.L. and the child would attend the local Polish School. S.S.L.’s plan is for parallel parenting, he having sole decision-making in all areas, save religion, and equal parenting time if M.A.B. returns to the Region of Waterloo. These matters will be addressed in greater detail in the following sections.

viii) Each party is able to care for the child and could do so independently in the absence of the other.

ix) The parties, at times, can communicate. M.A.B. has consistently refused to provide S.S.L. with information regarding M.L., such as school and baptism. M.A.B. has acted unilaterally in making decisions and has not demonstrated a willingness to co-operate with S.S.L. in matters pertaining to M.L. S.S.L. has made attempts to work with M.A.B. on parenting matters but M.A.B. has not been responsive.

(g) Decision-Making

[114] Each party is intelligent, both completing a post-secondary education program and being employed in their respective fields. Both have successfully raised older children. M.L. has a close bond with each of her parents. During the relationship, child care for M.L. was shared despite involving separate residences. In these circumstances, a shared parenting arrangement with joint decision-making would have been expected. But the conflict between the parties has been an obstacle.

[115] After the relationship came to an end, M.A.B. took complete control of the child. S.S.L. did not see M.L. for several months. He was excluded from decision-making, despite the absence of any term in the temporary order in this regard.

[116] M.A.B. has consistently ignored or misinterpreted court orders. She has cancelled parenting time of S.S.L. without justification. Exchanges have been problematic, both as to lateness and conflict. M.L. has been exposed to these adult issues.

[117] M.A.B. decided on homeschooling, attending a Polish School and baptism without meaningful consultation with S.S.L. She believes it is her role as the child’s mother. M.A.B. has ignored the parental right of S.S.L. to be involved and, more importantly perhaps, ignored the child’s right to maintain a relationship with her father.

[118] M.A.B. also relocated to Etobicoke on the eve of trial despite a court order prohibiting removal of M.L. from the Region of Waterloo. The notice provided by M.A.B. did not comply with the legislative requirements. There was no logical basis for the move. Rather, I conclude it was a strategic decision made to frustrate the role of S.S.L. and to influence the court.

[119] Refusing to participate in the section 112 investigation was yet another demonstration by M.A.B. to ignore a court order. Her decision did not take into consideration the best interests of M.L. M.A.B. only took into account her interests, perhaps thinking it would be to her advantage. Denying a child’s right to be heard is unacceptable.

[120] The evidence does not support the position of M.A.B. on decision-making. There is no logical basis to exclude S.S.L. He is well qualified to participate and M.L. will benefit from her father’s experience and involvement.

[121] Joint decision-making, despite the conflict, could have been workable, perhaps by using a parenting co-ordinator. I have rejected such a term as, in my view, it would simply create another forum for dispute. M.L. is entitled to stability.

[122] Having regard to the significant matters for decision-making, it is to be recognized that there is actual agreement on some matters, including education and religion. Both would enrol M.L. in a Roman Catholic elementary school, M.A.B. committing to same on return to the Region of Waterloo. S.S.L. is supportive of M.A.B. continuing to involve M.L. in the Roman Catholic Church. No significant health issues of the child were mentioned, and it appears each would continue regular medical care as in the past. The only item of contention might be with extra-curricular activities, none being arranged to occur during the parenting time of both. Yet, I did not hear S.S.L. to oppose some form of involvement in Polish activities, his complaint being focused on full-time education in a Polish School. Hopefully, the parties will listen to M.L. as to her expression of interest in other matters, such as sports.

[123] As noted above, there is agreement on religion, the only restriction requested by S.S.L. being that it not impact his parenting time. That can be accommodated by specific detail in the order.

[124] I pause at this point to consider culture and language. These are matters of importance to M.A.B. She spoke of her Polish background and her desire to expose M.L., as with her older children, to the language and culture. I did not hear S.S.L. to oppose such in general. His concern was ensuring M.L. learnt the English language before taking on another.

[125] M.A.B. and S.M. made reference to travel to Poland for the purpose of the child learning the language and culture. This was also said to be the motivation for attendance at the Polish School in Etobicoke.

[126] Language and culture are important as it is part of the child’s heritage. However, extended travel and enrollment in a school in a different community cannot be used to limit the child’s relationship with her father. Such would be contrary to M.L.’s best interests.

[127] There are many residents in the Region of Waterloo with a Polish background. As a result, Sir Casimir Gzowski Polish School was established in 1894. It operates in conjunction with the Waterloo District Catholic School Board and under the supervision of the St. Louis Adult Learning and Continuing Education Centre in Kitchener. This school functions under the umbrella of the Ontario Ministry of Education’s International Languages Program.

[128] Sir Casmir Gzowski Polish School provides instruction regarding the Polish language as well as Polish traditions, history, and geography. Classes are held on Saturday mornings.

[129] This school can provide the services sought by M.A.B., as it does for many families in the community. M.L. would benefit from participation in the program with her peers.

[130] In the circumstances of this family, a new decision-making regime is warranted. To allow M.A.B. continuing to make unilateral decisions, while ignoring court orders, would erode on the role of S.S.L. and impede the relationship between M.L. and her father.

[131] I conclude it is in the best interest of M.L. to award sole decision-making to S.S.L. on all matters, save religion, which is awarded to M.A.B., provided such does not affect the parenting time of S.S.L. unless he provides consent. M.L. will be enrolled in a Roman Catholic elementary school in the catchment area of S.S.L.’s residence or as designated by the Waterloo District Catholic School Board. The parties must consult with each other before decisions are made. M.A.B. may also enrol M.L. at Sir Casmir Gzowski Polish School during her parenting time and only in the parenting time of S.S.L. with his consent.

[132] The issue of an alternative Polish School, to that of the present school in Etobicoke, was not addressed at trial. In result, leave is granted to address this matter by way of motion if there is disagreement with the term imposed.

(h) Parenting Time

[133] I am satisfied M.L. has a close bond with each of her parents. Family members are important to her and those relationships must continue.

[134] The parenting time of S.S.L. was restricted at the outset of this due to the allegations and conduct of M.A.B. Although his time increased somewhat, there was no evidentiary basis at trial to justify the limits placed on father. In my view, the regime was never in the best interests of M.L. The maximum contact principle supports a new equal shared parenting regime. It is long overdue. The recent relocation by M.A.B. cannot be allowed to frustrate S.S.L.’s parenting or to penalize M.L.

[135] In this regard, M.A.B. is in breach of the consent order granted September 18, 2019. She must return to the Region of Waterloo and, preferably, the catchment area for the child’s school. Regardless, M.L. is to be returned to S.S.L. immediately upon the release of these reasons, subject to the terms of the order granted.

[136] Given the age of M.L., equal parenting time would normally involve shorter time periods, such as a 2:2:5 schedule, so that she is not away from either parent too long. The existing conflict between the parties and others, including problems on exchanges, invites a different approach. The priority is M.L. and avoiding her being exposed to adult issues. In result, I conclude the schedule must be week about so that the majority of exchanges can occur at school. I am satisfied M.L. will adjust to this new regime. Other exchanges will continue at the police station although I encourage the parties to consider a supervised exchange centre instead.

[137] Until M.A.B. returns to reside in the Region of Waterloo, given the distance to Etobicoke and to avoid disruption to M.L.’s education, her parenting time will be limited to alternate weekends and one mid week evening visit, the latter to occur in the Region of Waterloo.

[138] Holidays, special days and vacation periods will be shared. Neither party is to schedule activities for the child on the other party’s parenting time unless consent is provided in advance. The parties are encouraged to arrange extra-curricular activities that do occur regularly during the parenting time of both, such as sports, so that the child can enjoy full participation with her peers.

[139] Both parties seek a police enforcement term. Such is appropriate to avoid future problems.

[140] There was no compelling evidence to support the decision of M.A.B. not to attend on exchanges. However, the evidence was clear as to the conflict involving some of the individuals attending on her behalf. From the perspective of M.L., this conflict must be eliminated. In result, S.M. and A.B. are prohibited from attending the exchanges or being involved in any manner whatsoever. There are other family members who can assist M.A.B. if needed, including her father and oldest daughter.

(i) Relocation

[141] M.A.B. did not seek permission to relocate with the child in her answer. The pleading was not amended. Her draft order includes a term the child’s residence would not be changed from the Region of Waterloo.

[142] M.A.B. did relocate with the child, contrary to a term in a prior order. In her final submissions, M.A.B. indicated her plan was to remain in Etobicoke with M.L. until September 2023. They would return to the Region of Waterloo for the school year commencing that month.

[143] There was no evidentiary basis for the move occurring days before the commencement of the trial. As mentioned above, I conclude it occurred for strategic reasons.

[144] Similarly, there is no evidentiary basis to support remaining in Etobicoke, even for the time period proposed. Such may assist M.A.B., but is contrary to the best interests of M.L.

[145] The child is to be returned to S.S.L. in the Region of Waterloo immediately. Relocation from this region in future in prohibited, other than on consent or by court order in the manner prescribed in the legislation.

(j) Name Change

[146] In her draft order, M.A.B. seeks a term changing the surname of M.L. to her own. This relief was not sought in her answer, nor was any notice given for the request. Further, the issue was not addressed in evidence and, hence, there is no foundation for the claim. Such is dismissed.

(k) Restraining Order

[147] A restraining order is requested in the answer of M.A.B. It was not included in her draft order.

[148] Section 46, Family Law Act, allows the court to grant a restraining order if the party seeking the relief has “reasonable grounds to fear for his or her safety or for the safety of any child in his or her lawful custody”. The court also has common law jurisdiction to impose such a term or as an ancillary matter to parenting.

[149] This relief is discretionary. While there are subjective and objective elements in the test, more is required than an expression of concern. There must be evidence as to specific events and a connection to the present situation. See: Noriega v. Litke, 2020 ONSC 2970.

[150] No such evidence was presented. Conflict does not always meet the test. At most, inappropriate comments may have been made. There is no evidentiary basis to support the claim. It is, in my view, simply part of the unfounded allegations by M.A.B. and can only represent an expression of her concern.

[151] The claim is dismissed.

(l) Child Support

[152] S.S.L. has paid child support to M.A.B. as required by the consent order granted on May 15, 2019. There are no arrears.

[153] M.A.B. was entitled to child support from December 1, 2018, when the relationship came to an end. The chart prepared by Mr. Paquette takes that into account and I agree there is a further amount owing from S.S.L. in the amount of $875.00 to September 2022.

[154] M.A.B. says S.S.L. is in arrears of $17,000.00 for guideline support and $2,138.00 for section 7 expenses. It is unclear how these amounts are calculated. In her final submissions, M.A.B. reported her claim being from the birth of the child or, in the alternative, from the end of the relationship. The claim for child support in the answer of M.A.B. does not specify from birth.

[155] Regardless, M.A.B. did not tender any evidence in support of her claim for child support. Nor did she cross-examine S.S.L. on this issue.

[156] The only evidence at trial regarding child support was presented by S.S.L. He reported contributing funds and purchasing items for the child from birth until the end of the relationship. He also said there was never any discussion about child support. This evidence was not challenged.

[157] The order granted on May 15, 2019, was correct in terms of the reported income of S.S.L. Mr. Paquette has calculated the appropriate amount from the outset and on all income of S.S.L. Extending the child support period to November 2022, to coincide with the release of these reasons, reduces the child support payment owed to $415.00 if S.S.L. has continued to pay in accordance with the prior order.

[158] Neither party presented evidence as to the extraordinary expenses of M.L. The basis of the claim of M.A.B. is unclear.

[159] The only expense identified by M.A.B. was for Polish School although it is unknown what amount has been paid for tuition. Regardless, I do not accept this expense as an appropriate section 7 matter. Enrolment was a unilateral decision by M.A.B. S.S.L. was never consulted.

[160] I conclude there are no outstanding section 7 expenses owing by either party at the present time. Future expenses are to be shared on an equal basis. The parties must agree to the expense in advance.

[161] There are two outstanding cost awards owing by M.A.B. The order of May 15, 2019 directed her to pay $1,500.00 and allowed such to be a credit on any retroactive or arrears of support owing by S.S.L. The order of April 13, 2021 required M.A.B. to pay $6,500.00. The total amount owing is $8,000.00.

[162] It is appropriate to set off the child support owing by S.S.L. Although child support is the right of the child, the amount outstanding is small, and it would not be reasonable to require him to pay while she has ignored her obligation. I am satisfied there would be no economic consequence to M.L. if a set off is allowed. See: Rego v. Santos, 2015 ONCA 540.

[163] In result, for clarification and proper enforcement:

1. the obligation of S.S.L. to pay child support to M.A.B. pursuant to the order of May 15, 2019 is terminated as of November 2022;

2. S.S.L. shall pay a further amount for child support to M.A.B. in the amount of $415.00;

3. this amount shall be set off against the cost awards owed by M.A.B.; and

4. the total amount owing by M.A.B. to S.S.L. for the cost awards of May 15, 2019 and April 13, 2021 is now set at $7,585.00.

[164] The evidence regarding future child support is less than clear, having regard to the current incomes of the parties. S.S.L. has disclosed income of $33,699.00 for 2022, much of this being an estimate for his recently established business. M.A.B. reported income of $37,092.00 in her financial statement, confirming the amount to be correct in cross-examination. She has never disclosed her income tax returns, only the notices of assessment, as required by section 21, Child Support Guidelines. The financial statement of M.A.B. pre-dates her relocation and she did not address her tutoring work at present.

[165] M.A.B. reported 2021 income of $30,592.00. Mr. Paquette refers to this amount in his draft order. I am content with doing the same. In result, commencing December 1, 2022, M.A.B. shall pay child support to S.S.L. in the monthly amount of $261.00 given the parenting regime provided herein. Should M.A.B. return to the Region of Waterloo and equal parenting time is established, this requirement to pay child support is automatically terminated.

[166] On the evidence presented, I am satisfied the incomes of the parties are sufficiently comparable as to direct that no guideline child support shall be payable by either party in an equal parenting time schedule at this time. Future annual disclosure, commencing June 2023, will address any adjustments to child support based on actual incomes.

(m) Summary

[167] For these reasons, a final order is granted on the following terms:

Parenting Time

1. The applicant, S.S.L. shall have final decision-making with respect to major issues relating to the child, M.L., born October 11, 2016, as to health, education and extra curricular activities.

2. S.S.L. shall enrol M.L. in the Roman Catholic elementary school in his catchment area or such other school as designated by the Waterloo District Catholic School Board.

3. The respondent, M.A.B., shall have final decision-making with respect to major issues relating to M.L. as to religion, provided such does not affect the parenting time of S.S.L. unless he provides written consent in advance.

4. M.A.B. may enrol M.L. at Sir Casmir Gzowski Polish School during her parenting time and only in the parenting time of S.S.L. with his written consent provided in advance. Leave is granted to address any issue regarding the child’s enrolment in a Polish School by way of a motion in the event of disagreement.

5. Prior to making a major decision with respect to M.L. as above, each party shall meaningfully consult the other party in the following manner:

a) the party seeking to make a decision shall notify the other party of the particular issue, including disclosure of any relevant documents, and the proposed decision he/she intends to consider;

b) the other party shall respond within 3 business days as to his/her views and the decision he/she supports;

c) if the parties are unable to reach an agreement within 5 business days after the time permitted for a response, the party granted final decision-making authority may make the final decision;

d) both parties may consult with any third-party service providers, pertaining to the decision required, during the course of the consultation process; and,

e) the party making the final decision shall notify the other party of the decision made.

6. In the event of a medical emergency involving the child, the party who has care of her at the time may make any decision but shall first notify the other party of the circumstances, time permitted, and certainly after as to the decision made.

7. The applicant shall keep the respondent informed as to the names and contact information of all third-party service providers and shall further advise her of all regularly scheduled appointments and the results of same. The respondent may attend on any such appointments.

8. The respondent may consult with any third-party service provider and is entitled to receive information and documentation concerning the child’s well-being directly from that service provider.

9. If the child has been prescribed medication, such shall travel with her, and each party shall ensure the child takes the medication as directed by the physician.

10. The respondent may arrange with school officials to receive copies of the child’s report cards and other school communication.

11. The applicant shall be listed as the primary emergency contact with the child’s school, or other organizations, other than the Church or the Polish School, for which he shall be listed as the secondary contact. The respondent shall be listed as the primary emergency contact with the Church or Polish School and as the secondary contact for the child’s school.

12. Provided both parties agree, they may attend any scheduled parent teacher meetings together. If they cannot agree, each party may schedule and attend parent teacher meetings independently.

13. The applicant shall be the custodian of the child’s documents, including birth certificate, health card and passport. He shall provide a notarial copy of the birth certificate and health card to the respondent. The applicant shall be responsible for renewing all of the child’s documents. He shall deliver renewal applications, if required, to the respondent at least 30 days prior to expiry. She will return the signed renewal application to the applicant within 10 days.

14. The respondent shall deliver to the applicant forthwith the child’s documents, including birth certificate, health card and passport. She shall also deliver forthwith the child’s vaccination records.

15. The applicant shall deliver the child’s passport to the respondent at least 10 days prior to any scheduled international trip. She shall return it to him on the next parenting time exchange following return from the trip.

16. The parties shall co-operate and execute any further authorization, direction or consent necessary to implement any of the above provisions.

17. The child’s residence shall not be moved from the Region of Waterloo.

18. The parties shall continue to communicate with each other using Our Family Wizard website. They shall communicate on all matters pertaining to the child as they occur and shall respond, as required, promptly. Such communications shall be focused and brief. The parties are prohibited from making critical or editorial comment in these communications and shall not solicit personal information about the other party.

19. The parties shall continue to renew their subscription for Our Family Wizard so long as it is required and at their own expense.

20. The parties may also communicate with each other in matters, or in the case of an emergency, by telephone, text or email.

21. The parties shall provide the other with their current residential address, email address and telephone numbers, including an emergency contact number, and shall further advise when there are changes to same.

22. The parties shall refrain from making disparaging or negative remarks about the other in the presence, or within listening distance, of the child and shall ensure that all other persons comply with this direction.

23. The parties shall prefer the interests of the child to their own and shall not ask the child to divulge information about the other party. The parties shall encourage the child to have a good relationship with each of her parents.

24. Neither party shall disclose personal information about the other party or the child as a result of this litigation, or the circumstances giving rise to this case, including the termination of their relationship or any conflict between the parties, to any person whatsoever, save as to a lawyer consulted as to the issues in this case or to a health care provider.

25. The parties are prohibited from discussing with M.L., or with other persons in the presence of the child, past or present legal proceedings or the issues between the parties. The parties shall also ensure that any information or documentation pertaining to these matters is not accessible to M.L.

26. During the COVID-19 pandemic, or any future pandemic, the parties shall abide by all public health regulations and recommendations from Health Canada, Public Health Ontario and the local Public Health Unit. They shall ensure that all other persons having involvement or contact with M.L. comply with this direction.

Parenting Time

27. The respondent shall deliver M.L. to the applicant on November 30, 2022, at 5:30 p.m. at the Waterloo Regional Police Services Station, 45 Columbia St. E., Waterloo.

28. M.L. will primarily reside with the applicant.

29. The respondent shall have parenting time with M.L. as follows:

a) Alternate weekends, from Friday after school, or 3:30 p.m. if there is no school that day, to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., extended to Monday at 7:00 p.m. of a long weekend, commencing on the Friday following release of these reasons for decision; and

b) Every Wednesday, or such other weekday as agreed to by the parties, from after school, or 3:30 p.m. if there is no school that day, to 7:00 p.m., such parenting time to be exercised in the Region of Waterloo.

30. Upon the respondent relocating to the Region of Waterloo and providing satisfactory evidence to S.S.L., as to her permanent residence, or by motion to the court in this proceeding, para. 29 shall be revoked and the parties shall share equal parenting time with M.L. on a week about basis, from Friday after school, or 3:30 p.m. if there is no school that day, to Friday at school, or 3:30 p.m. if there is no school that day.

31. In the event an exchange of M.L. cannot occur at school, exchanges shall be at the Waterloo Regional Police Station, 45 Columbia St. E., Waterloo, or such other location as the parties may agree in writing.

32. Neither S.M. or A.B. are permitted to attend on any exchanges of M.L. and they shall not be within 100 metres of the exchange site.

33. The parties shall ensure that family celebrations or special events are scheduled only during their respective parenting times.

34. Neither party shall arrange activities for the child during the parenting time of the other unless consent is obtained in advance in writing.

35. Both parties may attend scheduled school events and the child’s extracurricular activities regardless of the parenting time schedule.

36. M.L. may bring any personal items, including toys, games and clothing between the homes of the parties.

37. Each party shall be responsible for transporting the child to and from school and activities or scheduled appointments during the party’s parenting time. Should the child need to be picked up early from school due to injury, illness or other reason, the party scheduled to pick her up after school that day shall be responsible for the early pickup.

38. The parties may communicate with the child by video call, telephone, text or email once each day while she is in the care of the other party.

39. The child may communicate with the party she is not residing with by video call, telephone, text or email once each day and without restriction in the event of an emergency.

40. The party with whom the child is residing shall be solely and financially responsible for making childcare arrangements during his/her parenting time, including making alternate arrangements, such as daycare, family members or the other party, when unable to care for the child as a result of employment, illness or other reason.

41. The regular parenting time schedule in para’s 29 and 30 shall be suspended for the following holidays, vacations and other special days, during which parenting time schedule shall be as follows:

a) Christmas

i) In even numbered years, commencing in 2022, M.L. shall be in the care of the applicant from Christmas Eve at 2:00 p.m. until Christmas Day at 2:00 p.m. and in the care of the respondent from Christmas Day at 2:00 p.m. until Boxing Day at 2:00 p.m.

ii) In odd numbered years, commencing in 2023, M.L. shall be in the care of the respondent from Christmas Eve at 2:00 p.m. until Christmas Day at 2:00 p.m., and in the care of the applicant from Christmas Day at 2:00 p.m. until Boxing Day at 2:00 p.m.

iii) Parenting time during the balance of the Christmas School Break shall be in accordance with the regular parenting time schedule.

b) Easter

The party who does not have M.L. in his or her care pursuant to the regular parenting time shall have M.L. in his or her care from Easter Sunday at 2:00 p.m. until Monday at 7:00 p.m.

c) Thanksgiving

The party who does not have M.L. in his or her care pursuant to the regular parenting time schedule shall have M.L. in his or her care from Sunday of Thanksgiving weekend at 2:00 p.m. until Monday at 7:00 p.m.

d) M.L.’s Birthday

The party who does not have M.L. in his or her care pursuant to the regular parenting time schedule shall have M.L. in his or her care from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

e) Applicant’s Birthday

If the applicant does not have M.L. in his care pursuant to the regular parenting time schedule, he shall have M.L. in his care from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

f) Respondent’s Birthday

If the respondent does not have M.L. in her care pursuant to the regular parenting time schedule, she shall have M.L. in her care from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

g) Mother’s Day

In the event Mother’s Day falls during the parenting time of the applicant, M.L. shall be in the care of the respondent from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

h) Father’s Day

In the event Father’s Day falls during the parenting time of the respondent, M.L. shall be in the care of the applicant from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

i) Halloween

i) In odd numbered years, commencing in 2023, M.L. shall be in the care of the applicant from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

ii) In even numbered years, commencing in 2024, M.L. shall be in the care of the respondent from 5:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.

j) Summer Vacation

i) Each party may have one extra week for summer vacation with M.L., resulting in a two-week period if para. 30 applies.

ii) The respondent’s extra week shall be in July.

iii) The Applicant’s extra week shall be in August.

iv) The parties shall notify each other in writing on or before May 1 each year of the extra week selected.

v) M.L. shall not go more than two weeks without parenting time with either party, unless parties agree in writing.

vi) If a longer vacation period is requested, both parties shall agree in writing, consent to such request shall not be reasonably withheld.

42. Each party may travel with M.L., either in Canada or internationally, during his or her regular or special or vacation parenting time, without the consent of the other party. In addition, either party may travel with M.L. to Poland, or any other country, for longer periods of time than permitted in the regular or special or vacation parenting time schedule, with the consent of the other party, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld, provided such does not unduly interrupt the child’s school attendance. Travel with M.L. to any country experiencing hostility is prohibited.

43. If a party is travelling with M.L., he or she shall provide the other party with a detailed itinerary, at least 30 days prior, including the name(s) of any flight carrier and flight times, accommodation, including addresses and telephone numbers or other means of contact.

44. If travel is outside Canada, the non-travelling party shall provide a notarized travel consent for M.L. at the travelling party’s expense.

45. If a party is travelling with M.L. for a period in excess of 5 days, the travelling party shall arrange for telephone or FaceTime contact between M.L. and the non-travelling party at a minimum of every 3 days, or more frequently if requested by M.L.

46. The police force having jurisdiction where M.L. may be found shall locate, apprehend and deliver the child to the parent entitled to parenting time with her, pursuant to section 36 of the Children’s Law Reform Act. This provision shall continue in full force and effect without a termination date, unless terminated by further order of this court.

Child Support

47. The obligation of the applicant to pay child support to the respondent, pursuant to the temporary order granted by Madsen J. on May 15, 2019, is terminated as of November 30, 2022.

48. There are no arrears of child support owing by either party to the other.

49. The applicant shall pay to the respondent a further amount for child support of $415.00, to be set off against the cost awards owing by the respondent to the applicant.

50. The total amount owing by the respondent to the applicant for cost awards granted May 15, 2019 and April 13, 2021 is fixed at $7,585.00 and is payable forthwith.

51. The respondent shall pay guideline child support to the applicant in the monthly amount of $261.00, commencing December 1, 2022, based on her 2021 income of $30,592.00 and the Child Support Guidelines.

52. Upon the parties entering into a shared, equal parenting time arrangement, or an order granted for same, in accordance with paragraph 30 herein, the obligation of the respondent to pay child support to the applicant, pursuant to paragraph 51 herein, is automatically terminated and neither party shall pay guideline child to the other based on their comparable incomes.

53. The parties shall equally share special and extraordinary expenses pursuant to section 7, Child Support Guidelines. Such expenses shall be agreed upon in advance, agreement not to be unreasonably withheld.

54. The parties shall regularly provide each other with their section 7 invoices and receipts and shall reimburse each other within 10 days.

55. For so long as the parenting time schedule is in accordance with para. 29 herein, the applicant shall be solely entitled to any income tax deductions, Canada Child Benefits or any other income tax benefit pertaining to the child, as permitted by the Income Tax Act, or any other statute, and allowed by the Canada Revenue Agency. Should the parenting time schedule be in accordance with para. 30 herein, the parties shall be equally entitled to share such benefits based upon an equal parenting time schedule.

56. Each party shall designate the child as a beneficiary on any health or dental insurance plan as may be available through employment.

57. Each party may contribute to a joint or separate Registered Education Savings Plan for the child and shall co-operate with each other to maximize the benefits available. Any contributions made by a party, and used by the child to fund her education, shall be a credit to that party’s obligation under section 7(1)(e), Child Support Guidelines.

58. The parties shall exchange their income tax returns and notices of assessment and re-assessment, and all other financial disclosure as required by the Child Support Guidelines each year on or before June 1, commencing in 2023, and shall adjust the amount, if any, of child support payable by either party or the sharing of section 7 expenses, by July 1.

59. Unless the support order herein is withdrawn from the Office of the Director, Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director, and amounts owing under the order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed.

60. A Support Deduction Order shall issue.

Other Claims

61. All other claims in the application or answer are dismissed.

[168] Notwithstanding Rule 25, Family Law Rules, the order granted herein takes effect immediately on the date these reasons for decision are released and is enforceable as an order of the court without the need of an order to be prepared and approved by the parties and then issued by the court.

[169] If the parties are unable to resolve the issue of costs, written submissions are to be exchanged and delivered to my chambers by email to my attention, care of kitchener.scjja@ontario.ca as follows:

i) By the party seeking a cost award, within 30 days of the release of these reasons for decision;

ii) By the party responding, within 15 days of being served with submissions seeking a cost award; and

iii) The party seeking a cost award may reply within 7 days hereafter.

[170] If no written submissions are received within the prescribed time period, the issue of costs will be considered settled, and the file will be closed.

Gordon, J.

Released: November 28, 2022

COURT FILE NO.: FC-19-FS44

DATE: 20221128

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

S.S.L.

Applicant

– and –

M.A.B.

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

Gordon D.J., J.

Released: November 28, 2022