Luque v. Garcia, 2025 ONSC 2779

COURT FILE NO.: FC-23-2025 MOTION HEARD: 20250505 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO RE: Paulo Chira Luque, Applicant AND: Rebeca Ketze Garcia, Respondent BEFORE: Associate Justice Kamal COUNSEL: Jeremy Dolgin, for the Applicant Respondent, Self-Represented ENDORSEMENT 1 . This motion is not about the mother losing anything. It is about the child gaining one extra day each month with the father and the father having appropriate decision making and information sharing with professionals involved with the child. It is the child that benefits from the request of the father. 2 . This is the Applicant father’s motion seeking an expansion of parenting time and expanded involvement decision making responsibilities with respect to the child, Jeremy Joshua Chira Garcia born on August 29th, 2020. 3 . Rule 42 of the Family Law Rules applies to the jurisdiction of Associate Judges in Family Law. Rule 42(8)6. Specifically permits Associate Judges to make a temporary parenting order or contact order under the Children’s Law Reform Act or the Divorce Act (Canada) . 4 . I note that the Notice of Motion originally sought a Divorce and an order severing the divorce from all other issues. However, counsel for the Applicant father had advised the Court in advance of the motion that this request was not being sought on this motion. 5 . Before addressing the substantive issues in the motion, two procedural issues were addressed. First, the Respondent mother sought an adjournment of this motion to July, which was denied. Secondly, I addressed some procedures to assist the Respondent mother, who is self-represented. The Respondent Mother’s Request for an Adjournment 6 . This motion was originally returnable on October 8, 2024. At this motion date, the parties agreed to a settlement conference rather than proceeding with the motion and came to what the Applicant father believed was an agreement. Justice Jensen’s endorsement read (in part) as follows: “We ran out of time before a final agreement could be reached on the primary issues. There were also other issues raised outside of the main issues that could not be resolved today. The parties will have to decide whether to attempt to resolve the subsidiary issues or to put them aside for later resolution. The lawyers for the parties will have a discussion about the proposed agreement and draft order prepared by counsel for the Respondent.” 7 . However, the parties did not reach a resolution. 8 . In November, the Respondent mother terminated her counsel. In anticipation of the October motion date and prior to terminating her counsel, the mother filed a 15-page affidavit (84 pages including the Exhibits). This Court is relying on this affidavit in this motion. 9 . The motion was then scheduled for March 11, 2025. On that date, Justice Engleking endorsed that the motion be heard by end of May 2025. That adjournment was granted to allow the Respondent mother to retain counsel. She has not done so. 10 . The Respondent mother has had ample time (since November of 2024) to find new counsel and has not done so. 11 . In my view, it is appropriate for this motion to proceed today with some accommodations for the Respondent mother as a self-represented litigant. The Respondent as a Self-Represented Litigant 12 . The Respondent mother was self-represented at this motion and was present with an interpreter. 13 . The Ontario Court of Appeal provided some guidance in dealing with self-represented litigating in Grand River Conservation Authority v. Vidhya Ramdas 2021 ONCA 815 , at paras. 18 – 21 , outlining the following considerations: a. Self-represented litigants are expected to familiarize themselves with the relevant practices and procedures pertaining to their case and respect the court process; b. The Court has the duty to ensure that self-represented litigants receive a fair hearing; c. The court’s obligations to self-represented litigants are outlined in the Canadian Judicial Council’s 2006 Statement of Principles on Self-represented Litigants and Accused Persons , which was endorsed by the Supreme Court in Pintea v. Johns , 2017 SCC 23 , [2017] 1 S.C.R. 470 , at para. 4 . d. The Court must permit the represented party and the self-represented party to explain how they understand where things stand in the litigation; and, e. It is open to a judge to engage in active adjudication. However, a judge must not cross the line between assisting self-represented litigants in the presentation of their evidence and becoming their advocate. 14 . Recognizing the importance of providing appropriate assistance in cases where a party is self-represented, I took the following steps in this hearing this motion: a. After the I made the decision to proceed with the motion today, counsel for the Applicant father emailed all documents to the Respondent mother to follow along during the hearing. The Respondent mother had been served with the materials previously, but this email assisted the Respondent mother in having the documents easily accessible in one place. b. We took an extended break after the Applicant father counsel’s submissions to allow Respondent mother to organize herself to make submissions. c. During the break, the Respondent mother also printed the documents. d. During the Respondent mother ’s submissions, I went through each line of the Applicant’s Notice of Motion and sought her position and submissions on each relief requested by the Applicant father. e. I reminded and regularly asked counsel to take pauses in their submissions to allow the Respondent mother to receive interpretation. I also paused regularly when I was speaking. Parenting time 15 . The Applicant father sought the following interim parenting time: a. Every Monday after school to Tuesday morning when the child goes to school; b. For three consecutive weeks each month, commencing this Friday, from Friday after school to Tuesday when the child goes to school; c. In the months of July and August, alternating weeks from Friday at 5:30 to Friday at 5:30 in the months of July and August; and d. One week during the two-week Christmas holiday period. 16 . Jeremy has special needs and that is an important consideration for this Court in determining the issues. 17 . The Applicant father worked from home for the first few years of Jeremy's life and was available to help in his care during the day as well as at night when he was not working. When the Applicant father went back to work at the office, the Applicant father registered Jeremy in daycare. 18 . From the child's birth to November of 2023, when the parties’ relationship ended, the parties worked together to raise Jeremy. The evidence is clear that the Applicant father was involved in all aspects of Jeremy's care and decision making for Jeremy. 19 . From November 2023 to December of 2024, the Respondent mother took unreasonable positions with respect to the Applicant father’s parenting time. In around December of 2024, the Respondent mother’s attitude towards the Applicant father and his parenting seemed to shift. First, she agreed to the Applicant father taking Jeremy on a trip to Edmonton Alberta for five days over Christmas. Second, she agreed to contact Jeremy’s school and allow the Applicant father to have unfettered access to information about Jeremy. Third, the mother agreed to the Applicant father having more time with Jeremy which she unilaterally decided. 20 . While this appears to be progress, it is based on the Respondent mother ’s unilateral actions. 21 . The Respondent lives alone in a recently acquired apartment. 22 . The Applicant father lives in a home with his new partner who is trained nurse who works with people with disabilities and has extensive knowledge about helping people with autism. She has an 11 year old daughter who also lives with the family. The Applicant father also has a very close relationship with both of his parents (Jeremy's paternal grandparents) who saw Jeremy almost most days of his life until Jeremy was taken from all of them in November of 2023. 23 . Parenting orders in this case are made pursuant to section 16.1 of the Divorce Act . 24 . The test for determining parenting time is what order is in the best interests of the children. Section 16 (1) of the Divorce Act states that the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting order or a contact order. 25. The ‘best interests’ test is a flexible and fact-driven exercise, tailored to the needs and circumstances of the child whose well-being is under consideration, see: Lang v. Qureshi , 2025 ONSC 585 (SCJ) . 26. Case by case consideration of the unique circumstances of each child is the hallmark of the process. Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60 (SCC) ; O’Connor v. Duguay , 2023 ONSC 2374 (SCJ) . 27. The analysis must remain centered on the rights of the child, from a child-centred perspective. The ‘rights’ of a parent are not a criterion. Young v. Young, 1993 34 (SCC) . 28. The focus is on the child, not the parent. S.S.L. v. M.A.B ., 2022 ONSC 6326 (SCJ) . 29. Section 16 (3) of the Divorce Act outlines the following factors when considering the best interests of the child: (a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability; (b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life; (c) each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse; (d) the history of care of the child; (e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained; (f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage; (g) any plans for the child’s care; (h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child; (i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child; (j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things, (i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and (ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child; and (k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security and well-being of the child. 30. The list of best interests considerations in the Act is not exhaustive. The list does not prioritize any one criterion over another, with the exception of the primary consideration. No single criterion is determinative, and the weighting for each criterion will depend on the circumstances of the particular child. See: White v. Kozun , 2021 ONSC 41 . It is also not a checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning. Rather, it calls for the court to take a holistic look at the child, his or her needs and the persons around the child. See: Phillips v. Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480 . An assessment of the best interests of the child must take into account all of the relevant circumstances with respect to the needs of the child and the ability of each parent to meet those needs. See: Mokhov v. Ratayeva , 2021 ONSC 5454 (SCJ) . 31. The court must ascertain a child’s best interests from the perspective of the child rather than that of the parents. See: Gordon v. Goertz , 1996 191 (SCC) . Adult preferences or “rights” do not form part of the analysis except insofar as they are relevant to the determination of the best interests of the child. See: Young v. Young 1993 34 (SCC) ; E.M.B. v. M.F.B . 2021 ONSC 4264 ; Dayboll v. Binag , 2022 ONSC 6510 . 32. In S.S. v R.S ., 2021 ONSC 2137 , the Court states “[a] human rights-based approach to the amended Divorce Act calls on the Courts to recognize, respect and reflect each child as an individual distinct from their parents, and to empower children to be actors in their own destiny. In practice it requires judges to probe into each child’s lived experience, to meaningfully consider their views and preferences, and to craft an order that promotes that child’s best interests and overall wellbeing.” 33. Parenting orders are fact specific. Each case turns on its own unique circumstances. Gordon v. Goertz , 1996 191 (SCC) ; N.S. v. A.N.S. 2021 ONSC 5283 (SCJ) . The court’s function is not to pronounce on what is in the best interests for all children in a general sense, but rather what is in the best interests of the child before the court. See: A.P. v. P.P., 2021 ONSC 6540 (SCJ) . 34. Pursuant to section 16(6) of the Divorce Act , in making an order for parenting time, the court shall give effect to the principle that a child should have as much contact with each parent as is consistent with the best interests of the child. 35. This provision does not override the best interests analysis. Rather, it is part of the best interests analysis. Lang v. Qureshi , 2025 ONSC 585 (SCJ) . 36. There is no presumption of equal time-sharing of children after parents separate. Bembenek v. Bembenek 2019 ONSC 4050 (SCJ) ; K.M. v. J.R. , 2022 ONSC 111 (SCJ) ; B. v. W. 2022 ONSC 934 (SCJ) ; B ressi v. Skinulis et al, 2021 ONSC 4874 (SCJ) . There is no presumption that having as much contact as possible with both parents will necessarily be in the best interests of the child. Barendregt v. Grebliunas , 2022 SCC 22 (SCC) . 37. A child-focussed approach is required, with an important goal of achieving as much parenting time as possible with each parent, so long as it is consistent with the child’s best interests . It may end up being equal time. It may end up being some other division of time. Each family is different, and the principle is a general guide set out to benefit children. Knapp v. Knapp , 2021 ONCA 305 (ON CA) ; R.F. v. J.W. 2021 ONCA 528 (ON CA) ; Agboola v. Unoh , 2024 ONSC 6191 (Div Ct) . 38. Frequent and meaningful parenting time is necessary for the formation and continued development of healthy attachments between young children and their parents. P.C.P. v. L.C.P., 2013 ONSC 2564 (SCJ) ; Bazinet v. Bazinet, 2020 ONSC 3187 (SCJ) ; Burley v. Bradley, 2019 ONCJ 624 (OCJ) ; Rajani v. Rajani, 2021 ONSC 4784 (SCJ) ; De Souza v. De Souza , 2023 ONSC 2457 (SCJ) . 39. The allocation of time must address both quantitative and qualitative considerations. Parenting time entails more than simply one-on-one parent and child interaction. It includes parental responsibility and involvement with respect to all aspects of the child’s life – throughout the child’s schedule -- including school-related matters, extra-curricular activities, and other events. S.K. v. D.P ., 2022 ONSC 2359 (SCJ) ; B.M. v. D.M. 2023 ONSC 2068 (SCJ) . 40. The most appropriate allocation of time in any given situation will depend on many factors including the child's age; temperament; stage of development; the relevant schedules and commitments of the child and each parent; and any other considerations relevant to the determination of the child's best interests. The parenting schedule must accord with the child's best interests. 41. The courts have emphasized that the goal of maximum contact with each parent is not absolute, but maximum contact can only be restricted to the extent that it conflicts with the best interests of the child. The child’s best interests must be paramount to any other consideration when parenting time is ordered. The convenience of the parents is not ignored, but is secondary to the welfare of the child, see Wilson v. Wilson , 2015 ONSC 479 , para 34 and 65 42. The Respondent mother’s affidavit raises allegations of family violence. Specifically, the Respondent mother alleges that the Applicant father restricted her communication with family, controlled the finances and was psychologically and sexually violent. 43. The Applicant father denies all of the allegations. The father says that he did not restrict the Respondent mother’s finances. He was the only one who earned money and paid all bills for the house, for food and for Jeremy. The Applicant father paid for a phone for the Respondent mother which she used to call her mother, aunt and cousin in Saskatchewan multiple times a week if not daily. The whole family visited Peru about a year before separation and spent most of the time there with her extended family. The Applicant father encouraged the Respondent mother to learn English and paid for English classes. 44. The Supreme Court of Canada in Barendregt v. Grebliunis , 2022 SCC 22 made the following observations about family violence:

1. The recent amendments to the Divorce Act recognize that findings of family violence are a critical consideration in the best interests analysis (par. 146).
2. The suggestion that domestic abuse or family violence has no impact on the children and has nothing to do with the perpetrator’s parenting ability is untenable. Research indicates that children who are exposed to family violence are at risk of emotional and behavioral problems throughout their lives: Department of Justice, Risk Factors for Children in Situations of Family Violence in the Context of Separation and Divorce (February 2014), at p. 12. Harm can result from direct or indirect exposure to domestic conflicts, for example, by observing the incident, experiencing its aftermath, or hearing about it: S. Artz et al., “A Comprehensive Review of the Literature on the Impact of Exposure to Intimate Partner Violence for Children and Youth” (2014), 5 I.J.C.Y.F.S. 493, at p. 497. (par. 145).
3. Domestic violence allegations are notoriously difficult to prove. Family violence often takes place behind closed doors and may lack corroborating evidence. Thus, proof of even one incident may raise safety concerns for the victim or may overlap with and enhance the significance of other factors, such as the need for limited contact or support (par. 145).
4. I have considered the following principles established in the case law with respect to family violence as it related to considering the best interests of the child: a. Family violence is not limited to physical assault: it embraces a range of behavior which includes mental and emotional abuse, with implications that spill-over to children. See CCAS v. I.B. et al ., 2020 ONSC 5498 . b. In cases of family violence, particularly spousal violence, it is crucial that the court consider whether a co-operative parenting arrangement is appropriate. A victim of family violence might be unable to co-parent due to the trauma they have experienced or ongoing fear of the perpetrator. In addition, co-operative arrangements may lead to opportunities for further family violence. See: Bell v. Reinhardt , 2021 ONSC 3353 . c. Family violence can be insidious. It can take many forms, and frequently involves coercive and controlling behaviors which are usually very difficult to prove because they often take place in private. Abusers, especially those of the coercive and controlling kind, are often skilled manipulators; they can be charming, they can be convincing liars, and they can be very persuasive. Victims of family violence are often the only witnesses who can attest to their abuser’s behavior and unfortunately, they are sometimes not believed because of their inability to support their allegations with objective third party evidence. See: Volgemut v. Decristoforo , 2021 ONSC 7382 . d. Violence need not be physical. Emotional and psychological abuse can have a devastating impact on a child. See: Dayboll v. Binag , 2022 ONSC 6510 ; El Khatib v. Noun , 2023 ONSC 1667 . e. The court is also very aware that family violence is sometimes difficult for the victim to prove. It is often not reported. There may be many reasons for this. There will often be no medical, police or Children’s Aid Society reports to corroborate allegations of family violence. Victims sometimes minimize and rationalize the abuse. The family violence can take place in private so that there are no witnesses. Control and coercion can be subtle and only evident to the victim. See: Wiafe v. Aboakwa-Yeboah , 2021 ONCJ 201 .
5. It is particularly difficult to deal with allegations of family violence based only on conflicting affidavit evidence on a one-hour parenting motion. See Sadiq v Musa , 2023 ONSC 1811 .
6. In Ranjani v. Ranjani , 2021 ONSC 4784 at para 17 , Justice Glustein considered allegations of family violence against the father and commented that the court must be just as “cautious” not to deprive children of parenting from both parents unless satisfied that the presumption in favour of increased contact with the parent is rebutted on the evidence before the court. I adopt these comments.
7. In this motion I am not making any findings regarding the party’s credibility with respect to their allegations of family violence. To be clear, I am not deciding or making findings of fact regarding each party’s versions of the family violence that has occurred. Instead, I am considering the “impact” of any family violence on the “ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to cooperate on issues affecting the child.” See Pereira v. Ramos , 2021 ONSC 1737 .
8. The conflicting allegations in the affidavits have not been tested by cross-examination, and caution is required before making factual findings on disputed matters.
9. Based on the evidence before, I am not in a position to make findings of family violence.
10. However, I am satisfied, based on the evidence before me, there is not a risk to the child would experience physical, emotional, or psychological harm when he is being cared for by the father. I do not find that the family violence alleged would affect the ability and willingness of the father to care for and meet the child’s needs.
11. It is in the best interests of the child to have a meaningful relationship with both parents and not to be exposed to conflict or family violence.
12. In considering the list of factors to be considered, the following are most relevant based on Jeremy's age, needs, and circumstances: a) Jeremy’s need for stability, given his age and stage of development; b) The nature and strength of Jeremy’s relationship with each spouse; c) Each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse; d) The history of care of the child; e) The ability and willingness of each person to care for and meet the needs of Jeremy; and f) The ability and willingness of each person to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting Jeremy.
13. Jeremy always had a strong relationship with the Applicant father as well as the Applicant's parents who saw Jeremy multiple times a week if not every day for most of his life. As their relationship has been strained as a result of the Respondent mother seeking to unilaterally control the Applicant father’s parenting time, it is even more crucial that maximum contact should be ordered by the court at this early stage in order to curtail any further instability and ensure that Jeremy can rebuild her close bond with his father.
14. There is no evidence presented by either party to suggest that the Applicant father is unable or unwilling to meet the needs of Jeremy. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. When the Respondent mother permits it, the Applicant father meets the child’s needs and specifically, is attuned to the child’s special needs.
15. In my view, the parenting time requested by the Applicant father is in the best interest of Jeremy. Decision-making responsibility
16. The Applicant father is seeking the following orders with respect to decision-making responsibility: a. An order that both parties shall be entitled to access all of Jeremy's records, including, but not limited to those relating to health, education, and extra curricular activities. b. An order that both parents shall be free to discuss Jeremy's health and education with any professionals who are involved with Jeremy. c. An order that any decisions regarding Jeremy's health and/or education shall be made by both parties in consultation with each other. d. An order that the parties will cooperate to ensure that Jeremy is re-registered and participates in speech and occupational therapy.
17. Although the Applicant father did not use the term “joint decision making” in his Notice of Motion, the Applicant father is essentially seeking an interim joint decision-making order.
18. The Respondent mother’s position is that the information sharing requested by the Applicant father is already happening and so the Court does not need to make an order. However, the evidence before me is that it has only recently started happening and only because the Respondent mother finally started allowing it – the Respondent mother has been acting unilaterally. A court order is needed to ensure continuity for the child’s care.
19. Pursuant to section 16.3 of the Divorce Act , decision-making responsibility may be allocated to either spouse, to both spouses, to a person described in paragraph 16.1(1) (b) (being a person, other than a spouse, who is a parent of the child, stands in the place of a parent or intends to stand in the place of a parent), or to any combination of those persons.
20. A person entitled to decision making of a child has the rights and responsibilities of a parent and must exercise those rights and responsibilities based on the child’s best interests.
21. The Ontario Court of Appeal in Kaplanis v. Kaplanis 2005 1625 (ON CA) , [2005] O.J. No. 275 sets out the following principles in determining whether a joint decision-making responsibility order is appropriate:
22. There must be evidence of historical communication between the parents and appropriate communication between them.
23. It can’t be ordered in the hope that it will improve their communication.
24. Just because both parents are fit does not mean that joint custody should be ordered.
25. The fact that one parent professes an inability to communicate does not preclude an order for joint custody.
26. No matter how detailed the custody order there will always be gaps and unexpected situations, and when they arise they must be able to be addressed on an ongoing basis.
27. The younger the child, the more important communication is.
28. Courts do not expect communication between separated parties to be easy or comfortable, or free of conflict. A standard of perfection is not required and is obviously not achievable. To the contrary, a standard of perfection is not required; only a finding that there was a “realistic hope” that the parents would be able to work together for the benefit of their children. See: G.C. v. R.D.P. , 2021 ONSC 4206 , para 165-166 ; May-Iannizzi v. Iannizzi , 2010 ONCA 519 , para 2-4 . The issue is whether a reasonable measure of communication and cooperation is in place, and is achievable in the future, so that the best interests of the child can be ensured on an ongoing basis. See: Warcop v. Warcop , 2009 6423 .
29. Mutual trust and respect are basic elements for a joint decision-making responsibility order to work effectively. See: G.T.C. v. S.M.G., 2020 ONCJ 511 ; T.P. v. A.E ., 2021 ONSC 6022 ; Shokoufimogiman v. Bozorgi , 2022 ONSC 5057 ; Jacobs and Coulombe v. Blair and Amyotte , 2022 ONSC 3159 ; El Khatib v. Noun , 2023 ONSC 1667 .
30. Ultimately, the court must determine if a joint decision-making responsibility order, or an order allocating any decision-making responsibility between the parties, is in the child’s best interests. The court also has the option, if it is in the child’s best interests, to leave some or all aspects of decision-making responsibility silent. See: M. v. F ., 2015 ONCA 277 .
31. In this case, a joint decision-making order will not expose the child to parental conflict. The parents have demonstrated an ability to work together for the child. There is evidence of historical communication between the parents and appropriate communication between them.
32. The parties have demonstrated a mutual respect and the ability to communicate appropriately.
33. Prior to the parties separating, the Applicant father was primarily responsible for all of Jeremy’s medical visits. The Applicant father was also responsible to find Jeremy's daycare and to register him.
34. Jeremy has special needs. In this regard, the Applicant father worked with the social worker on Jeremy’s behavioural and language skills, preparing a plan for Jeremy to overcome his condition and to try to get him ready for school.
35. The Applicant father has worked with Jeremy’s occupational therapist also.
36. As a result of the Respondent mother’s limited English, the Applicant father has primarily communicated with the children’s daycare workers, therapists and other professionals involved with the child. This is not intended to penalize the Respondent mother as a result of her limited English skills, however, the reality of coordinating services for the child must be factored into the best interests analysis.
37. One example is that in January 2025, the Applicant father was finally able to start communicating with Jeremy’s school when the Respondent mother provided her permission to the school for them to communicate with the Applicant father. He learned that Jeremy has an educational assistant at the school. This educational assistant advised the Applicant father that she had been having trouble communicating with the Respondent mother given that the Respondent mother struggles with English and is not very sophisticated with technology. Since January, the Applicant father has communicated with the educational assistant on a weekly basis and has kept up to date with all information and updates on the school messenger app. As a result of this, the Applicant father has been able to help Jeremy much more with his schooling.
38. This type of progress and practical consideration is important to consider for the best interest of this child.
39. The Applicant father has also been communicating with the Respondent mother at least every week about Jeremy, his challenges, and his progress at school. This has given Jeremy the proper support and care that he needs.
40. The order requested promotes the child best interests as it allows the child to receive appropriate support and permits appropriate information sharing between the Applicant father and the professionals involved with the child. The Applicant father has demonstrated that he then appropriately shares this information with the Respondent mother.
41. The order requested does not remove anything from the Respondent mother – it allows the Applicant father to obtain information from professionals involved with the child in order to better support the child. This is clearly in the best interests of the child.
42. The Applicant father’s motion is granted, except the request for a Divorce and severing of the issues from the Divorce (which was withdrawn).
43. The Applicant father sought costs in this motion. While the Applicant father was successful, the Applicant father’s counsel advised he did not serve any offers to settle. Furthermore, the Respondent mother is of limited means. No costs are ordered for this motion. _______________________________ Associate Justice Kamal DATE: May 5, 2025