Amanda Taerk

In a family law trial, the applicant sought equalization of net family property and damages for the tort of intimate partner violence.

The court resolved property valuation disputes, including valuing the respondent's extensive gun collection and excluding a property held in resulting trust.

Applying the newly recognized tort of intimate partner violence, the court found the respondent engaged in a decades-long pattern of coercive control, physical abuse, and psychological manipulation.

The court awarded the applicant $400,000 in compensatory damages, $25,000 in punitive damages, and issued a permanent restraining order.

The moving party sought an extension of time to perfect his appeal from a family law order, intending to adduce fresh expert evidence.

The moving party had previously had his pleadings struck for breaching disclosure and support orders, and remained in breach of ongoing support obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the moving party lacked clean hands and that the delay was inexcusable and prejudicial to the responding party and children.

The proposed appeal was also found to be without apparent merit.

The applicant foster parent sought a review of the respondent Children's Aid Society's decision to remove a 32-month-old child from her care following a domestic dispute between the applicant and her former partner.

The Child and Family Services Review Board found that the respondent failed to provide the statutorily required notice of removal and improperly removed the child without a local director's opinion of risk.

The Board rejected the respondent's argument that it lacked jurisdiction to order the child returned to a closed Outside Paid Resource foster home.

Applying the best interests of the child test, the Board concluded that the child's physical, mental, and emotional needs, as well as the importance of continuity of care and the child's strong attachment to the applicant, favoured returning the child to the applicant's care.

The removal decision was rescinded.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated October 24, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered costs payable to the responding party in the amount of $5,000 all-inclusive.

Following a motion on parenting time in which the respondent father was granted an increase on a graduated basis — less than he sought but more than the applicant mother preferred — the court addressed costs.

The father sought $2,000 all-inclusive, acknowledging the mother's modest annual income of approximately $45,000.

The mother sought $3,500, arguing she was the more successful party.

The court found the father prevailed on the motion, but reduced his costs award to $1,500 all-inclusive, payable within 30 days, to account for the mother's financial situation and the ongoing need for cooperative co-parenting in the child's best interests.

This is a costs decision following an urgent motion concerning parenting time.

The father sought to modify parenting arrangements and brought an ex parte motion with serious allegations against the mother.

The mother was successful in the underlying motion and sought costs of $20,000.

The father argued the amount was disproportionate and proposed $5,000, citing financial hardship from supervised access costs and child support obligations.

The court found the father's conduct was aggressive, litigious, and hovered close to bad faith.

The father failed to attempt settlement before commencing litigation and made unverified serious allegations.

The court ordered the father to pay costs of $18,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable at $3,000 per month beginning September 1, 2025.

This decision addresses an urgent motion concerning parenting time for a 10-month-old child amidst serious allegations of family violence and mental health concerns.

The court carefully analyzed the evidence, including affidavits, text messages, audio recordings, and medical reports, applying the best interests test under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The court emphasized the importance of an expansive approach to evidence in family law, especially in cases involving family violence, and ruled on the admissibility of contested evidence.

Ultimately, the court ordered supervised parenting time for the Father, citing concerns about his conduct, mental health, and the safety of the child and Mother, and declined to grant a without prejudice order.

The moving party brought a motion for a stay and for leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay and leave to appeal paragraph 3 of the order.

However, the court granted leave to appeal paragraphs 1 and 2 regarding whether the motions judge erred in deciding an evidentiary issue on a final basis.

Costs of $7,200 were awarded to the responding party.

The parties resolved parenting issues and proceeded to trial on child and spousal support.

Both parties sought to impute income to the other.

The applicant father operated a framing business at a significant loss, while the respondent mother was unemployed with childcare responsibilities.

The court found both parties intentionally under-employed.

Income was imputed to the father at $85,000 and to the mother at $25,000.

The court ordered set-off child support of $593 per month payable by the father.

The mother was awarded spousal support of $780 per month for five years, with the father receiving credit for $40,000 already paid.

The applicant father sought an order for a Voice of the Child Report (VCR) for his two children (aged 8 and 6) to ascertain their views and preferences regarding a proposed expansion of his parenting time.

This motion was brought in the context of a review provision in a prior consent parenting order, which did not require a material change in circumstances.

The respondent mother objected to the VCR, primarily due to concerns about potential parental influence on the children's statements.

The court granted the father's motion, ordering the VCR to be conducted by a privately retained mental health professional following the Office of the Children's Lawyer methodology, and clarified that potential parental influence goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.

The court also declined to order the VCR professional to contact the children's therapist, upholding privacy principles and standard VCR methodology.

The applicant father and respondent mother sought an order for decision-making responsibility for their 6-year-old child.

The parties had resolved parenting time but remained in high conflict over health and education decisions, largely driven by the father's disproportionate anxiety regarding the child's health.

The court ordered that the mother have sole decision-making responsibility for health and education to reduce conflict and ensure stability.

The parties were granted shared decision-making responsibility for culture, language, religion, and significant extracurricular activities, as they demonstrated an ability to cooperate in these areas.

The appellant appealed a final order varying spousal support, arguing the trial judge erred by excluding the respondent's post-separation income increases, setting the retroactivity date to 2018 instead of 2016, determining the separation income at $117,000, and using the low end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and discretionary decisions.

The court upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent's income increases were unrelated to the marriage and that the appellant's evidentiary gaps justified a low-range SSAG award.

The applicant father brought a motion to expand his parenting time with his four-year-old daughter to include overnights and to lift the requirement for supervision.

The respondent mother opposed, citing historical concerns about the father's mental health and alcohol use.

The court found that the mother failed to satisfy the onus of showing that supervised access remained necessary, noting the father provided medical evidence indicating he had no current mental health issues or substance abuse problems.

The motion was granted, allowing for a gradual increase to unsupervised, overnight parenting time.

The parties separated after a long marriage during which the applicant was primarily a homemaker and the respondent built a successful legal career.

At trial, the court determined the equalization of net family property, including the valuation of the respondent's home, his interest in a Florida LLC, and corporate debts.

The court also determined the respondent's income for support purposes, attributing some corporate pre-tax income to him, and ordered retroactive and ongoing spousal support based on both compensatory and needs-based grounds.

The Applicant sought divorce, sole custody, supervised access for the Respondent, child support, unequal division of net family property, and a vesting order for the matrimonial home.

The court granted the parenting orders, including sole decision-making for the Applicant and supervised parenting time for the Respondent, based on the children's best interests and the Respondent's history of mental illness and family violence.

Claims for child support, unequal division of property, and a vesting order were adjourned due to insufficient evidence, specifically the lack of a Net Family Property Statement and a proper valuation of the matrimonial home.

The Respondents moved for an order to initialize the names of the parties and children in the proceeding to protect their identities.

The Applicant consented to initializing the children's names but opposed initializing the parties' names.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test and considering s. 70 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court found that initializing both the parties' and children's names was necessary to prevent serious emotional harm to the children due to the sensitive and unique facts of the case, which involved a long-term deception regarding parentage.

The court determined that the salutary effects of the order outweighed the deleterious effects on the open court principle, especially given the limited nature of the order (initials only, no sealing or publication ban).

The motion was granted, and costs were awarded to the Respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

This family law trial addressed the applicant's requests for continuation of restraining orders, child support, imputation of income, and sharing of extraordinary expenses, and the respondent's counter-requests for unsupervised access, setting aside a separation agreement, recovery of funds, and equalization of net family properties.

The court found the respondent's behavior to be abusive and bullying, upholding the restraining order for the younger children, declaring the separation agreement valid, imputing income to the respondent for child support, and dismissing all of the respondent's claims.

Costs were awarded to the applicant on a full recovery basis due to the respondent's bad faith conduct throughout the litigation.

A temporary care and custody motion under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act concerning child N.H., whose twin sibling died from inflicted injuries.

The Children's Aid Society sought placement of the child with the paternal great-aunt subject to supervision.

The parents sought return of the child to their care or alternatively placement with the paternal uncle with parental residence in that home.

The court found credible and trustworthy evidence of inflicted trauma to both children and determined that the child could not be returned to parental care even with supervision.

The court ordered the child remain in the temporary care and custody of the paternal great-aunt with supervised access to the parents at the society's discretion.

The applicant mother sought an order for substituted service of her application and affidavit on the respondents (the child's paternal aunt, uncle, and the child's other parent) who had been granted final custody of the child in a prior child protection proceeding.

The respondents could not be located at known addresses.

The Children's Aid Society opposed the motion, arguing it lacked mandate and resources to participate in private proceedings and could not disclose address information.

The court granted the motion, ordering substituted service through multiple methods: private Facebook messages to two respondents and text message to the third, as well as service through the Children's Aid Society by ordinary mail to last known addresses on file.

The applicant sought security for child support and s.7 expenses due to the respondent's history of payment default and negative animus.

The parties had previously agreed on the form of security and some specific expense reimbursements.

The court determined the quantum of security, ordering $250,000 to cover reasonably foreseeable future support obligations, to be held in the respondent's counsel's trust account.

The decision also addressed the process for future costs submissions.